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There was also something known as Expressionism. Nobody could say 
just what it was, but the word suggests some kind of squeezing-out; 
constructive visions, perhaps, but inasmuch as the contrast with 
traditional art revealed them as being destructive, too, we might simply 
call them structive, which commits one to nothing either way, and a 
structive outlook sounds pretty good. 
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In the early 1900s, the German sociologist Max Weber looked at his world and found it 
disenchanted. It was a world that, to Europeans such as Weber, was breathtakingly “modern”—
everything seemed to be new, changing rapidly, and careening into the future. New 
technologies, from steam power to electricity, were transforming the ways people lived, 
traveled, and worked. New ways of thinking and scientific discoveries were undoing old ways of 
seeing the world. And while all this newness could be liberating, it also produced a profound 
sense of anxiety and alienation. Many Europeans felt as though they had lost their sense of 
community—they felt disconnected from each other, their beliefs, and even from themselves. 
It seemed to many that they were living through a time of historical crisis.  
Yet not everyone seemed to be experiencing this transformation. Europeans were 
becoming increasingly aware of people on the periphery of the “civilized” world, people who 
had not yet endured the drastic changes of modernization. Weber was writing in the wake of an 
unprecedented burst of imperialism in the late nineteenth century, an imperialism that had 
unfolded over the last few hundred years, as European nations relentlessly colonized much of 
the globe. Europeans brought back gold, rubber, and other goods, fueling and financing 
Europe’s industrial revolution and imperial expansion. They also brought back other treasures—
artwork and masks, utensils and ceremonial objects. To Europeans, these objects and their 
makers seemed curiously “primitive.” Europeans imagined the people from such places as  
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Africa, Oceania, and the Americas as natural, timeless, instinctual, and somehow more 
authentic—everything that modern Europe was not.  
 This encounter with otherness revolutionized European art, laid the foundations for  
anthropology and the social sciences, and transformed philosophy; it also shaped what it 
meant, for Europeans, to be human. In most accounts, this encounter has been understood 
from the perspective of people like Weber, or the contemporary avant-garde artists who, like 
him, were intrigued by the people from these exotic lands and their “primitive” ways of life. For 
these Europeans, it seemed obvious that their own modern world—whether they embraced it 
as the achievement of rational progress, or cursed it as the onslaught of an alienated 
modernity—was the source of their fascination. The following study contends that, on the 
contrary, Europeans developed their understandings of modernity through this exchange itself, 
and the set of ideas and interpretations that developed to make sense of it—that is, through 
the discourse of primitivism. This study is an exploration of this set of primitivist ideas and 
concepts, the relationships that exist between what are usually posed as disparate cultural or 
disciplinary fields, and the role of primitivism in producing an imagined modernity. 
 
Primitivist ideas circulated, and continue to circulate, through all facets of modern 
culture, yet existing studies of primitivism have treated it in isolated domains—as a provocative 
feature of modern art, or an embarrassing former trait of anthropological writing. This 
compartmentalized vision has occluded the ways in which these discourses work together to 
create a pervasive set of identities and interpretive strategies. Moreover, this tendency has 
bolstered a consensual view in which primitivism is theorized as a projection. In studies on the 
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early texts of anthropology, for example, the often derogatory descriptions of naïve and 
benighted savages are seen as a result of the anthropologist’s sense of living in a civilized 
modern society built on science and progress; in the history of art, primitivism is depicted as a 
romantic longing for primitive authenticity, the inevitable result of modern autonomy, power, 
and knowledge, along with its Faustian price, alienation. This study highlights connections 
between primitivism in anthropology, avant-garde art, and theoretical writing to argue that the 
discourse of primitivism itself has historically produced this experience of civilized “modernity.” 
Modernity has multiple meanings—I maintain specifically that primitivism has been productive 
of what political theorist Jane Bennett has described as the “disenchantment narrative” of 
modernity, in reference to Weber.1 Weber is simply one prominent voice of a widespread 
“critique of modernity”—the belief that such forces as capitalism, rationalization, 
secularization, urbanization and bureaucratization have led to the “disenchantment of the 
world.”2  
Critics such as Bennett, Bruno Latour and others, belonging loosely to the school of 
thought known as new materialism, have persuasively argued that this notion of a 
disenchanted world is simply one of the myths of the moderns; yet the narrative has been a 
                                                     
1 Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2001). Frederick Cooper has recently drawn attention to the numerous problems with 
the popular use of the concept of modernity in postcolonial studies. As I discuss in Chapter One, my own argument 
is not concerned with whether different types of modernization in the colonial context should be described as 
modernities (modernity as an analytic category), but rather with the historical construction of a particular (and 
culturally prominent) understanding of modernity. It is, moreover, an attempt to draw attention to the 
ethnocentric framing of the concept. See Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
2 Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in Max Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations, ed. 
John Dreijmanis, trans. Gordon C. Wells (New York: Algora, 2008), 35. 
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difficult one to dislodge.3 I contend that this is in part due to treating it as a theoretical rather 
than historical problem. What has been left out of this work is the history of the 
disenchantment narrative, and specifically its fundamental relationship to primitivism.4 In the 
prevailing view, the critics of modern society, from the eighteenth-century Romantics through 
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century social and economic theorists (such as Weber or Georg 
Simmel), seized upon the idea of an authentic “primitive” society as a means of negotiating the 
new “realities” of alienation and autonomy produced under modernity. I maintain that while 
there is no denying a history in which technological and social change are evident, the 
evaluation of these changes as moments of historical crisis for the “modern” subject was 
contingent. Technological and social change could have been experienced differently—the fact 
that they were not is a complex product of imperialism and primitivism. 
Combining theoretical analysis, archival research, and aesthetic interpretation, this 
study critiques the colonial discourse model to frame primitivism as an international and 
transcultural discourse of alterity in modernity, then focuses on specific instances of primitivism 
in German ethnology, avant-garde art, and critical theory. In doing so the work demonstrates 
the historical ways in which individuals in the colonial era worked together to create a 
“modern” subject identity in opposition to an imagined “primitive” other, how this contingent 
                                                     
3 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1993); Latour, Inquiry into Modes of Existence, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2013); Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
See also Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010). 
4 Victor Li has persuasively argued that primitivism continues to permeate contemporary critical theory, yet his 
critique similarly treats the “primitive” as an ahistorical concept rather than a contingent historical discourse.  See 
Li, The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity (Toronto: University of Toronto 




process produced an imagined, disenchanted “modernity.” The second principal argument of 
this study is that some examples of primitivism in fact call the discourse of primitivism into 
question, and in doing so, undermine the disenchantment narrative of modernity. These 
examples of self-critical primitivism are drawn from German ethnology and German 
Expressionism, and constitute the second part of the dissertation. Before explicating the 
individual chapter arguments, it will be useful to begin with an example from primitivist 
modern art.  
 
In 1905, a group of young artists in Dresden joined together, calling themselves the 
Brücke (the “Bridge”). The Brücke was the first group of German artists to take a pronounced 
aesthetic interest in “primitive” art—a loose term for the colorful masks, statues, weapons, 
carvings, architectural designs, and so on, which originated primarily in particular regions of 
Africa, Oceania, and the Americas, and which the Brücke artists and other Europeans 
encountered in anthropology museums, curio shops, the pages of popular newspapers, local 
bars and artists’ ateliers. Europeans had long had an interest in foreign, exotic, or “primitive” 
others, but the Brücke members were among a handful of artists in Europe, primarily in France 
and Germany, who, in the early years of the twentieth century, acquired a particular fascination 
with the aesthetic creations of these imagined “primitive” people. They gradually began to 
incorporate these images, ideas, and forms into their own artistic work, as well as their 
everyday lives, in the form of carvings and studio decorations.5 
                                                     
5 In this study I have generally used quotations when primitive is used as an adjective (“primitive” art) or noun 
referring to people (the “primitives”), to prevent the implication that there is such a thing as “primitive” art or 
“primitives.” However, for ease of reading, quotation marks will not be used to designate the primitive when used 
6 
 
The consensus in the scholarship on the Brücke is that, in such artworks as Bathers 
Throwing Reeds (1909), by Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, and Standing Child (1911), by Erich Heckel, 
the Brücke artists expressed a simple primitivism, in which the figure of the “primitive” 
represented a freedom from bourgeois civilization and its societal constraints (see figs. I and II). 
Their interest in the  “primitive” is said to belong to a more general interest in nudity, sexuality, 
and playfulness, in contrast to rigid norms and mundane superficiality. On the other hand, the 
occasional association of the “primitive” with children in their work is said to present an ideal of 
unspoiled innocence. Finally, the rough quality of the Brücke aesthetics—their starkly carved 
figures, rough-cut etchings, and rapidly executed sketchwork—are interpreted as an attempt to 
achieve a kind of “primitive” immediacy in terms of artistic creation. Subsuming these various 
facets, the “primitive” is thus said to represent a kind of authentic mode of being and creating, 
in contrast to a modern world ravaged by anxiety and alienation. As Reinhold Heller, one of the 
leading Brücke scholars, writes, “the Brücke members had a naïve, idealistic perception of a 
utopian, ‘primitive’ life in which modernity’s central conflict—humanity, industry, and 
civilization versus nature—did not exist.”6 
 This prevalent interpretation has been too quick, however, to take the primitivism of the 
Brücke at face value. Rather than offering a simple romanticization of the primitive, the Brücke 
developed a mode of primitivism which in fact calls into question the common distinctions 
between primitive and civilized (distinctions, for example, between culture and nature, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
abstractly (without appending it as a trait to particular people or societies). For example: the Brücke were 
interested in the primitive; they were inspired by the “primitive” art of Africa and Oceania. This of course is not 
unproblematic. I’ve employed this as a guide, not a mandate, and sometimes style and sense have rendered 
uniform quotations awkward and unnecessary. 
6 Reinhold Heller, “Brücke in Dresden and Berlin, 1905-1913,” in Brücke: The Birth of Expressionism in Dresden and 
Berlin, 1905-1913, ed. Reinhold Heller, on behalf of the Neue Galerie New York (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2009), 27. 
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foreword progress and ahistorical time, alienation and authenticity). As Heller’s comment 
makes clear, it is widely assumed that these distinctions are a defining feature of modernity. 
This view is founded upon a belief that modernity represents a moment of historical crisis, the 
apex of a process of civilization, in which rationalism and technology have produced 
unprecedented autonomy, but at the price of alienation and the loss of authenticity. I argue 
that, rather than reading the Brücke’s primitivism as an expression of this view, we might read 
their aesthetics as a paradoxical critique of primitivism; and moreover, that if the Brücke were 
subtly undermining the discourse of primitivism, they were accordingly also undermining this 
particular view of modernity. 
If we look more closely at Kirchner’s Nude with Mirror and Man (1912), we find a more 
complicated primitivism at work (see illustration, next page). A large painting, about five feet 
tall and two and a half feet wide, with bold colors and strong outlines, the canvas features a 
posterior view of a nude female, whose length occupies nearly the entire height of the canvas. 
We see her body, but her face is turned away from us, the viewer. She stands before a full-
length mirror, while a fully dressed male seems to observe or perhaps be communicating with 
her. Although earlier works by Kirchner feature naked women and men together, cavorting in 
the studio or frolicking outdoors, the pair here seem detached, almost inhabiting separate 
worlds. The woman is likely a prostitute, the man a client, although the identities remain 
ambiguous. Kirchner, who had moved from Dresden to Berlin in 1911, became increasingly 
interested in the figure of the prostitute; the figure emerged as the focal point of Kirchner’s 
most famous series of paintings, known as the Berlin Street Scenes (1913–15). Much has been 











E.L. Kirchner, Rückenakt mit Spiegel und Mann (Nude with Mirror and Man), 1912. 
Oil on canvas, 160 x 80 cm. Brücke-Museum, Berlin. Reproduced in Jill Lloyd and 
Magdalena M. Moeller, eds., Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years 




urban modernity, but the consensus is that the prostitute functioned as a symbol of modern 
alienation. Deborah Wye, for example, writes that “Kirchner’s scenes bring the viewer face-to- 
face with figures who symbolize the dehumanizing urban environment and its effect on the 
individual psyche.” 7 Wye suggests that Kirchner’s view of prostitution and modernity paralleled 
that of the German sociologist, Georg Simmel, whose popular lectures “discussed not only the 
pervasive effects of the money economy as it dominated city life, but also the mentality of 
detachment that was needed to cope with crowded conditions and an over-abundance of 
stimulation. . . . Such disengagement is personified in Kirchner’s symbol of the streetwalker, in 
whom objectification reaches its acme.”8  
This entrenched interpretation is based upon a prevalent misreading of Kirchner’s 
attitudes about modernity. Wye’s comment does not address Kirchner’s primitivism; yet this 
interpretation provides the framework in which the primitive is routinely understood. In 
contrast to the “negativity and depersonalization”9 of the modern urban environment, the 
primitive is seen as a panacea—the natural and authentic. Yet if we attend to the significance of 
the primitive in Kirchner’s Nude, it becomes clear that Kirchner’s work undermines this 
interpretation of the primitive, and in doing so, repels Wye’s attempts to read a certain 
understanding of modernity into the picture. 
                                                     
7 Deborah Wye, Kirchner and the Berlin Street (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2008), 25. For a similar 
perspective, see Rosalyn Deutsche, “Alienation in Berlin: Kirchner’s Street Scenes,” Art in America 71, no.1 (January 
1983): 64-72. For an exceptional revisionist reading that dovetails in important ways with my own, see Charles W. 
Haxthausen, “‘A New Beauty’: Ernst Ludwig Kirchner’s Images of Berlin,” in Berlin: Culture and Metropolis, eds. 
Charles W. Haxthausen and Heidrun Suhr (Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 58-94. 
Haxthausen notes that the image of Kirchner as “a deeply alienated artist who viewed the city with anxiety and 
foreboding” has been the consensus at least since Donald Gordon’s monograph, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). Haxthausen adds that “this new interpretation was based neither on new 
evidence nor on a more exacting reading of the source material, which to a large extent has evidently been ignored 
or dismissed as irrelevant.” (62) 
8 Wye, Kirchner and the Berlin Street, 26. 
9 Ibid., 41. 
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If the theme in this image is male sexual desire, the operations of that desire are 
ambiguous. The naked body of the woman fills the canvas, yet the viewer significantly cannot 
see her from the front, as can her male guest. Her sexuality is thus present to the viewer, yet 
hidden, not fully disclosed. If the viewer looks to the man, he appears to be looking obliquely in 
another direction. Moreover, as he stands there hovering in a nebulous blue field, he seems 
hardly a part of her reality, the reality of her room with its ornately carved dresser and swirling 
rug, out of which she seems to blossom organically, or to be sculpted, in an echo of the 
Corinthian columns framing the mirror.  
The mirror, to which the viewer might look next, offers however only the same view of 
her posterior. The single new detail that the mirror allows the viewer to see, which was not 
visible before, is the woman’s face. The woman does not look out at the viewer, however, but 
at herself, in the mirror. She sees what the viewer sees. Thus, in looking to the mirror, rather 
than achieving a voyeuristic view of the woman’s frontal nudity—the viewer sees the woman’s 
face, contemplating her own body, just as the viewer has been doing. The viewer’s perspective 
aligns with that of the woman. It begins to become clear that whatever kind of sexual desire is 
at work here, it is endlessly mediated, and endlessly postponed.  
Moreover, if the image creates desire, it does so only to unleash it upon things: as the 
gaze of the viewer faces the impossibility of immediate desire, it is drawn effortlessly to the 
dynamic swirls of the carpet, the curves of the dresser, the “thingness” of the woman’s shoes in 
contrast to her nakedness; the gaze seems to lose itself in the richness of the hues, the sharp 
contrast of the pinks and blues, the back and forth between the client’s reality, there, cool and 
detached, and the woman’s reality, here, warm and vital; and finally, the gaze seems to stop 
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and consider something which has been present all along, but somehow not quite present to 
the understanding, not quite available to interpretation: the carved “primitive” head.  
Mirrors are of course a favorite subject for artists, contemplating the complexities of 
representation, and Kirchner’s painting might well be making a comment on the mediation of 
desire. But the analysis so far fails to account for this mysterious head, which occupies so 
prominent a place on the center of the dresser. Indeed, the position of the carved head echoes 
the head of the woman, and the head of the man. It seems somehow to refer to both, 
positioned in her world, yet with its blue contours and pale flesh it is more akin to the man. The 
head somehow unites their worlds, yet it also doesn’t quite fit. It poses the fundamental 
ambiguity here, the presence of otherness. 
This head is where the encounter with the “primitive” enters into this image.10 A 
common interpretation would be that the presence of the primitive serves to suggest that 
beneath the superficiality of civilized life, there thrives a primitive sexuality, teeming if 
uncontrollable—as though the gaze of the head were taunting the depersonalized modern 
world around it. Critics might point to the woman’s shoes, for example, as a symbol of this 
superficial civilization. Kirchner indeed frequently painted his nudes with shoes or in hats, items 
that, although certainly useful, were also a shorthand for fashion, often serving more aesthetic, 
decorative purposes. The man in the corner, meanwhile, through his relationship to sex as a 
                                                     
10 In 1912 Kirchner was increasingly interested in sculpture from Cameroon, a possible source of inspiration for the 
image of the head. A similar style can be seen in Kirchner’s Nude Seated with Crossed Legs (1912) and the cover for 
the 1912 exhibition at the Galerie Fritz Gurlitt, Berlin (figs. III and IV). The head in this image may derive from 
Bangwa sculpture, which the Ethnological Museum in Berlin had in its possession at the time (fig. V), or possibly 
Mangbetu sculpture, which was characterized by elongation of the head. See Wolfgang Henze, “The Sculpture of 
Ernst Ludwig Kirchner,” in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years, eds. Jill Lloyd and Magalena M. 
Moeller (London: Royal Academy of the Arts, 2003), 33-37; Lorenz Homberger, ed., Cameroon: Art and Kings, with 
contributions by Christaud M. Geary and Hans-Joachim Koloss (Zurich: Museum Rietberg, 2008). 
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commodity that can be purchased, is alienated from sexuality, from the woman, from life. He is 
thus seen as a symbol for modern man, reduced to a phantom, longing for the authentic, 
primitive sexuality, from which he is severed.  
However, if we follow up on the operations of desire I sketched above, another 
interpretation comes into view. It is significant that the head’s gaze does not confront the 
viewer, but looks off in other direction altogether. The figure’s gaze is not focused on us, as we 
are on it. It has its own reality, its own perspective, although not one to which we are privy. If 
before, sexual desire was in pursuit of the woman, whose sexuality remained elusive, now the 
unleashed desire is directed at this mysterious presence—desire transformed from the sexual 
into the interpretive.  However, just as before, as the sexual desire went unfulfilled and 
displaced, the desire here to understand the presence of the head and its signification is 
thwarted.  
In echoing the position of the woman’s head, the carved head seems caught up in a 
similar dynamic of self-interpretation. As she contemplates herself, the head gazes inward, 
contemplating itself. Just as the woman’s face, in turning towards the viewer, calls attention 
the fact that her body remained out of sight, the sculpture here exists without a body. The 
primitive, as before, is present, but also hidden, not fully disclosed. 
A primary interest of such “primitive” carvings for Kirchner and the other members of 
the Brücke was that they were not carved in the naturalist mode with which they were familiar, 
but rather appeared overtly stylized. While such objects signified, they did not aim to imitate an 
object according to the norms of nineteenth-century European aesthetics, in which artistic 
objects (whether carved or painted) aimed at similitude to the original. For the avant-garde 
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painters, the exciting thing about much of the non-European art they were discovering was that 
the beauty was in the style itself, the forms, the shapes, the contrasts. Art did not have to 
mimic something else; it could inhabit an awareness of itself as art. In other words, a carved 
head seemed to declare itself as a play of surfaces and significations. It did not attempt to 
reproduce its object, but rather abided in the state of both signifying an object and manifesting 
itself as object.  
If this head, then, is understood to be the pivot of the painting, the focal point of 
interpretive desire, it both thwarts that desire, and sets it free, by offering up the play of 
surfaces for the delight of the viewer. The carved head merges with the shoe in the mirror, 
suggesting an equivalence, not with “pure” sexuality, but with the “superficial” ornament. If the 
significance of the sculpture is in its features, not what they represent, the same now applies 
for the shoe as well. The “superficial” objects of civilization—shoes, the rug, the carved dresser, 
Corinthian capitals—these decorative surfaces become the essential. The surface, in other 
words, is not superficial, divorced from the authentic. 
The woman’s contemplation of herself in the mirror, accordingly, is not directed at her 
“pure” nakedness, but at nakedness wearing red heels, and the stylized curve of her leg, which 
it turns out is different from how it appears to the viewer. Her own view of herself is stylized; 
her sexuality is stylized. The man in the distance, opposite the viewer, could at first appear as 
the mirror image of the viewer, alienated and alone. Now it begins to appear that he is not in 
fact the viewer’s reality; he is, rather, the viewer’s projection. The lack of “things” around him 
underline his existence as a phantom. If the woman represents the viewer’s desire, the man 
represents his fear. The man may be alienated and alone, but the viewer, however, is not in his 
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world; the viewer stands here, in the liveliness of the woman’s boudoir, surrounded by the 
animated objects, the texture of things, contours, the volume of shapes, spherical buttocks and 
cylindrical thighs. This is a world of stylized things, but the viewer is not alone or separated 
from them, but rather caught up in the play of surfaces and significations.  Stylized sexuality is 
not alienated sexuality.  
It becomes clear that there is no “authentic” primitive here, in opposition to a 
“superficial” and “alienated” modernity. The primitivist imagery in Kirchner’s image evokes 
such oppositions, but at the same time calls the set of oppositions into question. In this sense, it 
is a type of primitivism that undermines the primitivist discourse. The act of interpretation, 
which begins with a mixture of desire and fear, leads to the mystery of the “primitive” carving 
and its significance, the symbol of otherness. From this encounter, the interpretation then turns 
back, like the reflection in the mirror, and leads to a reconsideration of the interpretation of 
civilization as it was presented by critics such Wye and others. Kirchner’s painting thus provides 
an example of how a work of primitivism can undermine its own discourse. Moreover, through 
an understanding of the workings of such self-reflexive or self-critical primitivism,11 it becomes 
possible to see how the primitive has played a fundamental role in the imagining of a 
disenchanted modernity. 
 
The aim of the following study, in short, is to follow this trail of significations, to expose 
connections between ideas across different fields, and to demonstrate the mutually 
constitutive relationship between primitivism and modernity. The study is divided into two 
                                                     
11 Neither term, self-reflexive or self-critical, is entirely accurate, and for this reason I have introduced the concept 
of the aporetic; see below. 
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sections, which represent the two principal arguments. In the first, I show how primitivism has 
been interpreted in recent theory as the longing for the simple, unsophisticated, natural, and 
authentic, in response to a modern society seen as alienating and artificial. I argue instead that 
the experience of society as alienating and artificial is predicated upon the discourse of 
primitivism. I demonstrate that this discourse of primitivism was not the obvious or inevitable 
projection of “civilized” Europeans onto the others they “discovered” in the age of imperialism. 
Through an examination of salient and revealing moments, not framed as central historical 
events, but as parts of a network,12 a conception of civilization as modernity was defined 
defensively, in response to power differentials in conjunction with tensions in the interactions 
of the discourses of race, gender, and class; in particular, in imperial encounters where 
experiences of ambiguity or liminality were produced by crossings of race, gender, or class, the 
primitive/civilized distinction offered one method of attempting to stabilize difference.  
The second section argues that this primitivist discourse was also challenged from 
within, in the form of primitivist works which both theoretically and aesthetically called the 
discourse and its categories into question. The two sections of the dissertation are thus 
                                                     
12 I have adapted here Latour’s concept of the network, stretching its synchronic application to cover a historical, 
diachronic connectedness as well. The concept of the network in this sense allows for a history of primitivism that 
locates connections across time and space, without positing a master narrative, a unilinear, teleological 
development over time, or a simplistically causal narrative. As Robert Young argues in White Mythologies, 
historicism itself bears the traces of imperialism; he therefore set out “to develop an epistemological critique of 
the West’s greatest myth—History.” He adds, “I was less interested in the question of imperial ideologies, the 
limits of which were obvious enough, than in examining the ways in which the West’s most radical dissident, 
critical perspectives shared the same assumptions. After that, my project was to look at the ways in which recent 
non-European theorists had explored how history might be retheorized as multiple, in the torsions and tensions of 
different, sometimes incompatible, perspectives, stories, times.” Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing 
History and the West, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 2-3. For Latour’s concept of the network, 
see Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). On the importance of avoiding master narratives and teleological accounts in the context of German 
history, see Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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devoted to separate analyses of two types of primitivism at work—one that reifies the 
discourse of primitivism, and hence the disenchantment narrative, and another type that 
undermines it. I have termed these alternative modes of primitivism the apotropaic and 
aporetic. The first chapter presents the theoretical framework linking the concepts of 
primitivism, disenchantment, and modernity. The second explores how recent theoretical 
writing on primitivism has reified the discourse of primitivism rather than illuminate it, and can 
therefore be described as apotropaic. The third chapter introduces the theme of imperialism at 
a conceptual level, in order to shift the analysis of the disenchantment narrative away from 
questions about rationalism and towards the encounter with cultural difference. 
The second section turns to examples of primitivism that undermine the primitivist 
discourse—what I have termed the aporetic. The art of the Brücke, as I examined in the reading 
of the Kirchner painting, offers an example of the latter, as does the nineteenth-century 
ethnology of Adolf Bastian. These case studies have not been chosen at random.  Both Bastian 
and the Brücke constitute leading figures in their respective fields of anthropology and art. 
Moreover, the choice of anthropology and art as fields of focus is itself not arbitrary. One could 
have explored primitivism in music, film, advertising, and popular culture. The fields I have 
chosen represent the most important terrains in which primitivism was articulated in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and they are deeply interconnected. Primitivism is a 
discourse that is part science, part aesthetics. It makes claims about the world and its people, 
but those claims are structured according to aesthetic principles. Anthropology and art 
represent two sides of the same primitivist coin. Anthropology established itself as the expert 
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authority on the primitive in the nineteenth century; the visual arts became the primary way in 
which primitivism became a subject of aesthetic contemplation in the twentieth.  
Finally, the examples of aporetic primitivism I have chosen are exceptional. The reason I 
have not examined the primitivism of the Blaue Reiter, or the anthropology of Felix von Luschan 
or Friedrich Ratzel, is that these figures, like the majority of primitivist theorists and artists, 
reaffirmed the disenchantment narrative. The Brücke and Bastian, on the other hand, 
constituted the most powerful and exciting challenges (in terms of cultural prominence) to the 
discourse of primitivism during the period in question. 
Chapter One presents the current state of the historiography on primitivism and its 
theorization, in order to prepare the foundations for my own theoretical revision. The chapter 
begins with an introduction to primitivism as a mode of twentieth-century aesthetics, as this is 
the form with which most readers will be familiar.  The study of aesthetic primitivism has been 
informed in recent decades by colonial discourse analysis, which provides the basis for my own 
critique as well.  The model of colonial discourse presents an interpretive pitfall, however, in 
that primitivism is routinely characterized as a projection. The problem with the projection 
model is that it tends to set up an ontology in which the “ailments” of modernity and the West 
are seen as the “reality,” in contrast to a primitivist discourse that merely reflects that reality; it 
thus perpetuates an ethnocentric narrative of modernity. 
To combat this assumption, I argue that primitivism should be retheorized, not as a 
projection of the West, but, to borrow from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, as a refrain.13 The 
notion of refrain is intended to underline that the entrenched habit of primitivism is not simply 
                                                     
13 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
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a matter of poor theory, which some amount of greater discipline or more rigorous self-
reflection will ameliorate. Primitivism understood as a refrain reveals its role as part of a 
cultural hermeneutic of experience, a discourse which produces a recognizable territory, the 
territory of an imagined modernity. This also helps account for the fact that primitivism keeps 
returning, taking on new shapes, sometimes serving the same ends, sometimes new ones. The 
refrain foregrounds the aesthetic aspects of discourse, aesthetic understood here as 
sensuous—it is language, combined with music, combined with bodies. The sonorous quality of 
the refrain stresses the imbrication of the aesthetic and the physical and the symbolic. 
Discourse is sometimes envisioned as the product of historical institutions and representations. 
The refrain, however, creates a shelter, a territory; its essence is shaped by desires and fears; it 
orders, organizes, and orients, but also provides the springboard for disorientation, and 
deterritorialization. 
If the concept of the refrain provides the basis for writing about seemingly disparate 
examples of primitivism as participating in the same discursive field, the first chapter also 
argues against the idea that primitivism is homogenous. The distinction between apotropaic 
and the aporetic is presented to call attention to those modes of primitivism that accept the 
distinction between primitive and civilized—those that bolster the discourse of primitivism—
and those that question it. Insofar as primitivism is sutured to the disenchantment narrative, 
these contrasting modes of primitivism either perpetuate the narrative’s vision of an alienated 
modernity, or undermine it.  
Chapter Two applies this new theoretical model of primitivism to recent scholarship on 
the topic, in anthropology, art, and theory. The chapter is thus on the one hand an in-depth 
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historiography, while on the other, an analysis that takes this recent work as its subject matter, 
to interpret and diagnose the persistence of primitivism in contemporary theory. The chapter 
opens with the historiographical development of the theory of primitivism as a projection. The 
critical insights of Edward Said (in postcolonial theory) and Johannes Fabian (in the history of 
anthropology), in conjunction with critical responses by James Clifford and others to the 
controversial 1984 Museum of Modern Art “Primitivism” exhibition, provided the crucial 
theoretical foundation for both the ensuing critique of primitivism in anthropology and in 
modern art. After drawing attention to the unique field of meanings evoked by the “primitive,” 
a field more specified and more fundamental than Orientalism or colonial discourse, I argue 
that cultural studies of primitivism have been shaped by the drive to link primitivism to 
modernism, and this has reinforced the notion of primitivism as a product of modernity. I then 
examine Victor Li’s argument in The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, 
and Modernity, that in spite of recent anti-primitivist scholarship, primitivism has not 
disappeared but continues to shape contemporary theoretical discourses.14 While I agree with 
Li, I argue that he himself has absorbed the confusion of the “projection” narrative, leading him 
to accept that alterity and culture can only be conceived in terms of a primitive-civilized 
distinction. Focusing on Li’s discussion of two leading figures from anthropology and cultural 
studies (Marshall Sahlins and Marianna Torgovnick), I argue that their use of such concepts as 
alterity and culture are not necessarily primitivist, but only contingently so. It is only when such 
concepts are posed as counters to modernity that they resuscitate the primitivist discourse. The 
reason for this lingering primitivism is that the discourse of primitivism is not simply a “mirror,” 
                                                     
14 Victor Li, The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2006). 
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reflecting the reality of modernity, but should be seen, rather, as productive of it. On the one 
hand, the discourse of primitivism has played a fundamental constitutive role in the 
disenchantment narrative of modernity. On the other, the problem extends beyond the domain 
of theory; at its root the problem is about an experience of modernity. The reason primitivism 
hasn’t been dislodged from contemporary critical theory is that it hasn’t been dislodged as a 
hermeneutic of aesthetic experience.  
Chapter Three develops the argument that modernity is an imagined community that 
has resulted from the historical encounter with otherness. Through an analysis of Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, I argue that the disenchantment 
narrative has been produced historically, the result of many conflicting forces, but principally 
through the discourse of primitivism. On the one hand, this central work of critical theory 
provides the theoretical tools for a critique of primitivism; on the other, I argue that it 
recapitulates the primitivist discourse, and therefore perpetuates the narrative of disenchanted 
modernity.  
In their argument that “Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to 
mythology,” Horkheimer and Adorno provide the grounds for a dialectical critique of reason.15 
As it is usually understood, this work poses a mythic “primitive” in opposition to a “rational” 
enlightenment, and reveals that that two in fact exist dialectically, or are co-constitutive of each 
other. This critique ensures that the primitive is not figured simply as a projection. Applied to 
primitivism, Horkheimer and Adorno’s work can serve to demonstrate the mutually constituting 
relationship of primitivism and modernity. 
                                                     
15 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002). 
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However, the text perpetuates the primitivist discourse and the disenchantment 
narrative, through its moral critique of a Western modernity identified with a particular form or 
reason, what they refer to in their critique as “enlightenment.” It will be noted that by 
enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno do not mean the particular historical set of 
philosophical discourses (the European Enlightenment), but rather a particular mode of 
rationality, which, they argue, informs classical Greek myth no less than it does Enlightenment 
thought. They write: “Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of 
thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. 
Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity.”16 In other words, the 
focus of their critique is instrumental reason, a type of reason aimed at both demythologization 
and power over nature. They discern the operations of instrumental reason in both classical 
Greek myth as well as twentieth-century positivism.  
This would seem to undermine the conventional notion of modernity as a moment of 
historical crisis. Yet the critique that Horkheimer and Adorno launch against contemporary 
society is nevertheless premised upon 1) the notion that instrumental reason indeed has 
eclipsed Western thought and society, and 2) a discourse that makes use of the 
primitive/civilized distinction. Horkheimer and Adorno, to be sure, would reject the idea that 
their work, in critiquing the objectification and identity-thinking of enlightenment, are 
suggesting that humanity is alienated from an “authentic” state as a result. Indeed, Adorno, in 
such works as The Jargon of Authenticity, explicitly critiqued the concept of authenticity.17 
                                                     
16 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xviii. 
17 Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
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However, their critique in Dialectic of Enlightenment primarily indicts contemporary society for 
a particular mode of thinking; while this mode is not framed as “inauthentic,” it is presented as 
“a new form of barbarism,” and posed in opposition to a utopian concept of reason that would 
be liberated from the dialectic. 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique is not intended to abandon the concept of reason 
altogether. “The critique of enlightenment,” they write, “is intended to prepare a positive 
concept of enlightenment which liberates it from its entanglement to blind domination.”18 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept of a dominant form of Western reason as instrumental 
rationality, which aspires to mastery over nature, but suffers from alienation in the process, is, I 
argue, a product of the discourse of primitivism. Instrumental reason is counterpoised to a 
utopian image, a longing for the humane as opposed to the barbaric, for liberated knowledge as 
opposed to fetishism. “What we had set out to do,” Horkheimer and Adorno write in the 1947 
preface, “was nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human 
state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.”19 The moral cogency of their critique requires 
this “human” utopia, from the perspective of which the present civilization appears mired in 
savagery. 
Moreover, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the problem with modern “Western” 
society is the dominance of instrumental rationality—a view that perpetuates an ethnocentric 
understanding of modernity as defined by a unique synthesis of knowledge and power. I argue 
that through their focus on reason, they fail to recognize the constructive role of empire. The 
concept of instrumental rationality, as something which aims at domination and mastery of 
                                                     
18 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xviii. 
19 Ibid., xiv. 
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nature, but which therefore alienates itself from nature, must be seen not as an ahistorical 
product of “rational” thinking, but as a contingent product of the discourse of primitivism as it 
developed under imperialism. In other words, the dialectic of enlightenment is a product of the 
dialectic of empire. 
To demonstrate in greater detail the lingering presence of primitivism in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, I analyze Horkheimer and Adorno’s interpretation of Homer’s Odyssey, which 
they present as “one of the earliest representative documents of bourgeois Western 
civilization.”20 I argue that, contrary to their reading Odysseus as a symbol of “self-preserving 
reason,” he should be read as a symbol of reason in thrall to empire. The primitivism of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s theoretical framework leads them to misread the Odyssey as merely 
expressive of the “dialectic of enlightenment,” when in fact it can be read as critical of it. I 
argue that Homer’s text condemns Odysseus—not on account of his rationalism, but for his 
failed relations with alterity (the strange humans and creatures he encounters on his journey). 
Homer’s text therefore offers a critique of Odysseus’s primitivism, and links that primitivism not 
to rationality, but to empire.   
The Dialectic of Enlightenment  presents the reader with the co-presence of the two 
forms of primitivism that I have termed the apotropaic and the aporetic. Part of the 
philosophical power of this text, I argue, is its ability to oscillate between these two conflicting 
tendencies. My analysis aims to show that while Horkheimer and Adorno theoretically 
articulate the oppositional dialectic between modernity and primitivism, they simultaneously 
reconstruct it on an affective level, and thus reinforce the discourse of modernity.  
                                                     
20 Ibid., xviii. 
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The second section of the dissertation turns to examine internal critiques of primitivism 
in ethnology and avant-garde art. The focus here is on works which paradoxically make use of 
the primitivist discourse, yet call that discourse into question. Whereas the first section treats 
primarily the apotropaic examples of primitivist discourse (moments where the discourse 
defensively reifies the distinction between modernity and the primitive), this section examines 
aporetic primitivism. Aporia is a term designating a type of interpretive impasse; it represents a 
moment through which a discourse cannot pass. In diagnosing cases of aporetic primitivism, I 
argue that these moments reveal the constructedness of an imagined modernity—an insight 
that can be empowering, yet also radically disorienting and therefore threatening. 
I begin this section with a study of Adolf Bastian, the nineteenth-century founder of 
German ethnology.21 The argument is framed as a response to Johannes Fabian’s important 
critique in Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, that anthropology has been 
consistently marred by a denial of coevalness (which Fabian defined as the denial that the 
anthropologist and the subject of anthropological writing exist in the same time and the same 
history—that they are “coeval”).22 As Fabian writes, “Anthropology emerged and established 
itself as an allochronic discourse: it is a science of other men in another Time. It is a discourse 
whose referent has been removed from the present of the speaking/writing subject. This 
                                                     
21 I use the term ethnology here to designate the German Ethnologie, a discipline that resembles what today is 
commonly referred to as cultural anthropology. In nineteenth-century Germany, Ethnologie was distinct from 
Anthropologie, or physical anthropology. In what follows I occasionaly use the English term “anthropology” as an 
umbrella term encompassing both fields of study. 
22 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, with a new foreword by Matt Bunzl 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1983; 2002). 
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‘petrified relation’ is a scandal. Anthropology’s Other is, ultimately, other people who are our 
contemporaries.”23  
Bastian employs a primitivist discourse, using the accepted nineteenth-century 
categories of German ethnology that distinguish between Kulturvölker (cultural people) and 
Naturvölker (natural people); this would seem a stark example of allochronic distancing, in 
which the ethnographic other is confined not only to another time but to the natural world. I 
argue, however, that Bastian’s theory and his textual practices have the startling effect of 
collapsing the distinction between these ethnographic categories. In Bastian’s model of 
ethnology as a kind of universal psychology, he presents both Kulturvölker and Naturvölker as 
equally natural and cultural. Both are shaped by historical and natural forces. At the same time, 
in his unusual writing style, Bastian employs paratactic textual practices in which the subject-
object dichotomy breaks down; the privileged allochronic standpoint of the ethnographic 
authorial subject is submerged in a flow of ideas and images in which sign and referent are 
dislocated. Temporal boundaries dissolve as it becomes increasingly difficult to locate what is 
self and what is other. Bastian’s theory and quasi-modernist writing, examined aesthetically, 
constitute an aporetic primitivism.24  Bastian’s work, I argue, challenges the allochronism of 
anthropological primitivism, and in doing so, undermines the subject position of modernity. 
 In Chapter Five, I examine the complex primitivism at work in the aesthetics of the 
German group of avant-garde artists known as the Brücke, especially Kirchner. As the first 
group of German visual artists to be categorized as Expressionists, the Brücke were also among 
                                                     
23 Ibid., 143. 
24 My approach here follows in some respects the model set forth in Dorothy Ross, ed., Modernist Impulses in the 
Human Sciences, 1870-1930 (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). 
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the first artists of the century to take a new interest in “primitive” art and aesthetics. 
Interpretations of the Brücke have routinely characterized their primitivism as a romanticization 
of the primitive, an inversion of nineteenth-century anthropological primitivism. The Brücke’s 
unique mode of primitivism was not in fact an expression of the romantic belief in an 
“authentic” or “unalienated” primitive, in opposition to a fragmented modernity. The existing 
literature has overwhelming interpreted the Brücke through the lens of various contemporary 
critiques of modernity, principally Georg Simmel’s critique of metropolitan life, art historian 
Wilhelm Worringer’s defense of aesthetic abstraction as a transcendental response to spiritual 
anxiety, and Julius Langbehn’s strident denunciations of rationalization, materialism, and mass 
culture. Contrary to these entrenched associations, the Brücke’s primitivism is best understood 
in the context of a Jugendstil-inspired vitalism and a vital materialism that comes close to the 
poetic orientation of the American poet Walt Whitman, who served as an inspiration of the 
Brücke artists. 
The argument of Chapter Five is rounded out by a more focused reading in Chapter Six 
of the aesthetic strategies deployed by the Brücke. Through a juxtaposition of the Brücke’s 
aesthetics with the poetry of the German poet Georg Heym and the philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche, the chapter demonstrates that the Brücke’s primitivism, rather than expressing a 
critique of modernity’s ailments, calls into question the opposition of primitive and modern. 
Although the Brücke’s aesthetics emerged from a ubiquitous discourse of romantic primitivism, 
in which the “primitive” commonly signified authenticity and unalienated existence, their own 
artistic creations, through such techniques as parataxis, montage, and a modernist self-
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reflexivity and attention to matters of mediation and representation, in fact dismantled such 
significations. 
The historical relevance of this argument is that, even before the “Dada Cyborg,” the 
artists of the Brücke were preparing the way for post-human and new materialist critiques.25 
Bruno Latour was awarded the prestigious 2013 Holberg Prize for having “undertaken an 
ambitious analysis and reinterpretation of modernity, challenging the most fundamental 
categories such as the distinction between modern and pre-modern, nature and society, human 
and non-human.”26 These instances of aporetic primitivism, in the art of the Brücke or the 
ethnology of Adolf Bastian, can be seen as linked to the contemporary theoretical efforts of 
new materialists and others to rethink and dismantle the distinctions between modern and 
primitive, nature and society, human and non-human. 
                                                     
25 Matthew Biro has recently argued that the Berlin Dadaists should be understood as developing an iconography 
of the cyborg that in some ways prefigured contemporary post-human critiques, such as that of Donna Haraway. I 
contend that certain features of the Brücke’s primitivist aesthetics can be said to anticipate the self-reflexive and 
aesthetically deconstructive aspects of Dadaist montage. See Matthew Biro, The Dada Cyborg: Visions of the New 
Human in Weimar Berlin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). See also Donna J. Haraway, Simians, 
Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991). 









Conceptual Paradigms: Primitivism, Disenchantment, and Modernity   
 
 
I.  A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his 
breath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients himself 
with his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of a calming 
and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos. Perhaps the child 
skips as he sings, hastens or slows his pace. But the song itself is already a skip: 
it jumps from chaos to the beginnings of order in chaos and is in danger of 
breaking apart at any moment. . . 
 
II.  Now we are at home. But home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a 
circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space. 
Many, very diverse, components have a part in this, landmarks and marks of all 
kinds. This was already true of the previous case. But now the components are 
used for organizing a space, not for the momentary determination of a center. 
The forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior space 
protects the germinal forces of a task to fulfill or a deed to do. . .   
 
III.  Finally, one opens the circle a crack, opens it all the way, lets someone in, 
calls someone, or else goes out oneself, launches forth. One opens the circle not 
on the side where the old forces of chaos press against it but in another region, 
one created by the circle itself. As though the circle tended on its own to open 
onto a future, as a function of the working forces it shelters. This time, it is in 
order to join with the forces of the future, cosmic forces. One launches forth, 
hazards an improvisation. But to improvise is to join with the World, or meld 
with it. One ventures from home on the thread of a tune. .  .  
 
. . . These are not three successive moments in an evolution. They are three 
aspects of a single thing, the Refrain (ritournelle). 
 
—Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, “1837: Of the Refrain” 1 
 
                                                     
1 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 













Part 1.  The “Discovery” of the Primitive: From Modernist Art to Colonial Discourse, from 
Colonial Discourse to the Critique of Modernity 
 
 
In his memoir Portraits avant décès, the French painter Maurice de Vlaminck recounts 
the day in which he first discovered “Negro” art: 
One afternoon in 1905 I found myself at Argenteuil. I had just finished painting 
the Seine, the boats, the quays. The sun was blazing hot. Having put away my paint and 
brushes, I packed up my canvas and went into a bistro. Sailors and coal-stevedores were 
gathered around the counter. While sipping my white wine and seltzer, I noticed, on the 
shelf behind the bar, between the bottles of Pernod, anisette, and curaçao, three Negro 
sculptures. Two were statuettes from Dahomey, daubed in red ochre, yellow ochre, and 
white, and the third, from the Ivory Coast, was completely black.  
Was it because I had just been working in the bright sun for two or three hours? 
Or was it the particular state of mind I was in that day? Or did it just confirm some 
thoughts that were preoccupying me at that time? These three sculptures really struck 
me. I intuitively sensed their power. They revealed Negro Art to me. 1 
 
For Vlaminck, “Negro art” was a prime example of what was more generally known as 
“primitive” art. Europeans had long had an interest in foreign, exotic, or “primitive” others, but 
Vlaminck was one of a handful of artists in Europe, primarily in France and Germany, who, in 
the early years of the twentieth century, acquired a particular fascination with the aesthetic 
                                                     
1 Maurice de Vlaminck, Portraits avant décès (1943), in Primitivism and Twentieth-Century Art: A Documentary 
History, ed. Jack Flam with Miriam Deutch (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003), 27.  
Vlaminck places the event in 1905, though it is now believed to have occurred the following year. 
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creations of these imagined “primitive” people. The artists gradually began to incorporate these 
images, ideas, and forms into their own work (see figs. 1.1 – 1.5).  
The avant-garde artists had two ambitious goals: to transform the tenets of classical 
aesthetics, and to critique modern society; the primitive seemed to offer the perfect weapon. 
For, to most of these artists, the primitive seemed to embody something that had been lost to 
modern civilization, caught up in the harsh, mechanical grip of capitalism, industrialism, and 
rationalism. This emerging aesthetics, which goes by the name of primitivism, remained at first 
confined to a few small but significant groups of artists, but rapidly caught on in artistic circles 
and grew in public appreciation in the decades after World War 1.  
Twentieth-century primitivism exerted a major influence on twentieth-century 
modernism, primarily through what is seen as a revolution in artistic form. 2 The most iconic 
work of primitivism in the visual arts is Pablo Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, painted in 
1907 (fig. 1.6) A large, aggressive work in a colorful, stark, fractured plane, featuring five nude 
prostitutes at a brothel, some of whose faces resemble African masks and Iberian sculpture, the 
painting is seen a forerunner of Cubist technique and widely heralded as a pivotal moment in 
modernist painting.3 Although Picasso’s work is often invoked as the earliest and most striking 
                                                     
2 Mark Antliff and Patricia Leighten, “Primitive,” in Critical Terms for Art History: Second Edition, ed. Robert S. 
Nelson and Richard Shiff (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 217-233. 
3 In addition to Picasso, critics identify Wassily Kandinsky (the Russian expressionist painter and founder of abstract 
art) as perhaps the second most important figure through which primitivism transformed modern art. The 
primitivism of Kandinsky’s works is less obvious, but abstraction in art developed in part out of the interest in 
abstract and stylized forms, which were associated with “primitive” art and folk art. The Blaue Reiter, the Munich-
based artists’ group to which Kandinsky belonged, was deeply shaped by this context of primitivism. On Picasso’s 
primitivism as a pivotal moment in modernism, see Frances S. Connelly, The Sleep of Reason: Primitivism in 
Modern European Art and Aesthetics 1725-1907 (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1995). Connelly writes: “In the Demoiselles d’Avignon, Picasso laid the framework for a stylistic language 
that inverted the ideals of the classical tradition more completely than ever before.” (Connelly, 109) It may be 
noted that even those who question the categorization of the painting as Cubist describe it as a crucial aesthetic 
turning point, e.g. William Rubin: ‘While marking the final stage of Picasso’s transition from a perceptual to a 
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example of modernist primitivism, it was Vlaminck who claimed to have been the first among 
his colleagues to “discover” African art, in a bistro near Paris, sometime in 1904 or 1905 
(although art historians now date his first acquisition of “primitive” art to 1906). Around this 
same time the primitive caught the eye of a few other French artists, namely André Derain and 
Henri Matisse (who were associated with a group of painters known as les Fauves, “the wild 
beasts”), as well as the members of the Brücke. 4  
One of my primary aims in the following study will be to argue that the primitivism of 
these various artists was not uniform—they each responded in unique and individual ways to 
“primitive” art. However, certain commonalities existed as well, and it is for this reason that I 
begin with Vlaminck at his moment of “discovery.” Europeans had of course been exposed to 
“primitive” art before; something happened to initiate the dramatic reorientation of these 
artists and their critics, who experienced this “discovery” as an aesthetic revolution, as 
something historically unprecedented—although they themselves were often unsure what lay 
behind it. Vlaminck, in his recollections, goes into detail about the evolution of a primitivist 
aesthetics, which offers some insight into how he and his colleagues interpreted their own 
situation: 
Derain and I had explored the Trocadéro Museum several times. We had 
become thoroughly familiar with the museum, having looked at everything with 
                                                                                                                                                                           
conceptual way of working, and suggesting something of the shallow relief space that would characterize Cubism, 
this great and radical work pointed mostly in directions opposite to Cubism’s character and structure—although it 
cleared the path for its development. The Demoiselles obliterated the vestiges of nineteenth-century painting still 
operative in Fauvism, the vanguard style of the immediately preceding years, it is thus more a ‘breakaway’ painting 
with respect to late nineteenth-century modernism—and post-Medieval Western painting in general—than a 
‘breakthrough’ painting with regard to Cubism in particular.’” (William Rubin, “Picasso,” in "Primitivism" in 20th 
Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern, Vol. 1, ed. William Rubin (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 
1984), 253. 
4 Flam and Deutch, Primitivism and Twentieth-Century Art, 3; Jean-Louis Paudrat, “From Africa,” in “Primitivism” in 
20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern, Vol. 1, ed. William Rubin (New York: Museum of Modern 
Art, 1984), 137-41. 
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great interest. But neither Derain nor I viewed the works on display there as 
anything other than barbarous fetishes. The notion that these were the 
expressions of an instinctive art had always eluded us. 
These three Negro statuettes in the Argenteuil bistro were showing me 
something of a very different order entirely! I was moved to the depths of my 
being.  
I asked the owner to sell them to me. He initially refused, but I insisted, 
and after many more refusals and excuses, he gave them to me on condition 
that I pay for a round of drinks. I finally left with the three statues. 
Shortly afterward, I showed my acquisition to a friend of my father’s. He 
offered to give me some of his African sculptures since his wife wanted to get rid 
of “these horrors.”  I went to his place, and I took a large white mask and two 
superb Ivory Coast statues. 
I hung the white mask over my bed. I was at once entranced and 
disturbed: Negro Art was revealed to me in all its primitivism and all its grandeur. 
When Derain visited and saw the white mask he was speechless. He stammered 
out an offer of twenty francs. I refused. Eight days later he offered me fifty. That 
day I was broke, so I accepted. He took the object to his atelier on the Rue 
Tourlaque and hung it up on a wall. When Picasso and Matisse saw it at Derain’s 
they were absolutely thunderstruck. From that day on, Negro Art became all the 
rage!5 
  
Vlaminck’s description is captivating for the countless subtle and not-so-subtle ways in 
which it reveals the significance these “primitive” objects held for their admirers.  At the most 
obvious level is their construction as “instinctive” arts. More subtle and interesting perhaps, the 
hot sun (of tropical climes), which deprives one of rational thought; the working men at the 
bar—a sailor (dreams of travel and adventure?) and the stevedore—both manly occupations 
(primitivism, gender, and class were often intertwined); the commingling of the statues with 
alcoholic spirits—a poetic fin-de- siècle evocation of the Dionysian, as access to the spiritual. 
The power of display, walls, the bedroom, a woman’s horror. The ironic transformation of 
“barbarous” fetishes—foreign objects which captivate, hold one captive, and irrationally so—
into “works of art” which indeed continue to do just that, works which are yet again fetishized. 
                                                     
5 Vlaminck, in Primitivism and Twentieth-Century Art: A Documentary History, ed. Flam with Deutch, 27-28. 
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The barbarous—the ancient Greek term for those uncivilized “others” who cannot speak—now 
seems to apply no less to the “stammering” Derain and his fellow artists, who become modern 
primitives, hence displaced, de-centered.  Finally, the narrative (and this is to be found in 
recollections produced by other artists as well) is noticeably interested in matters of 
acquisition, purchase, value. There is a beguiling contrast between words evoking the 
sublime—viewers are “speechless,” “thunderstruck,” “entranced” and “disturbed” by the 
objects’ “grandeur”—and the desire to, and difficulties of, bringing such powerful and elusive 
objects into a market, a place for rational exchange, ownership, and contemplation. 
Vlaminck’s memoir, Picasso’s Demoiselles — these inaugural examples evoke some of 
the multiple significations these artists associated with the primitive. The most current  body of 
research on primitivism in modern art has made three principal, increasingly specific arguments 
about this array of significations to explain the emergence of primitivist aesthetics. First, 
primitivism was not a “discovery” of the primitive, but conditioned by a long history of the 
primitive other in the European imaginary; second, primitivist aesthetics was shaped by the 
history of European imperialism, which itself was inseparable from the history of anthropology; 
and third, the figure of the “primitive” was a discursive construct, a projection, circulating in 
both the human sciences and popular culture, and this figure was both produced by, and 
helped sustain, the practices of imperialism.6  
                                                     
6 The major works here include Sally Price, Primitive Art in Civilized Places (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989); Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1990); Torgovnick, Primitive Passions: Men, Women, and the Quest for Ecstasy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); 
Patricia Leighten, “The White Peril and L’Art nègre: Picasso, Primitivism, and Anticolonialism,” The Art Bulletin 72, 
No. 4 (December 1990): 609-30; Jill Lloyd, German Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1991); Gill Perry, “Primitivism and the ‘Modern’,” in Primitivism, Cubism, 
Abstraction: The Early Twentieth Century, eds. Charles Harrison, Francis Frascina, and Gill Perry, 3-85 (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1993); Colin Rhodes, Primitivism and Modern Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 
34 
 
Before turning to my critique of this literature, I will summarize these three main 
arguments. To take the first point: primitivism was not simply an artistic movement, nor did it 
appear out of nowhere around 1906. Although the avant-garde interest in “primitive” art 
transformed artistic practices at the start of the twentieth century, this fascination with the 
primitive was not new. The coruscating web of significations we find in Vlaminck’s recollection 
had already been woven, by different actors in different ways, over the preceding years, 
decades, even centuries. Indeed, as Vlaminck observes, the art work and objects from 
“primitive” societies had not suddenly arrived in Europe, but had been accumulating for 
decades in ethnographic museums, and had been extensively analyzed in ethnographic studies. 
Moreover, these works and the “primitive” people who produced them had been a part of 
popular culture for some time: etchings and drawings of “primitive” life could be found in the 
pages of popular magazines, often accompanying the travel reports of famous explorers sent on 
expeditions to the “uncharted” regions of the globe, and the works and the people themselves 
could be found on display at the great colonial exhibitions and the crowd-drawing “human 
zoos” which were staged in various European cities (fig. 1.7).7 
This leads to the second point. Primitivism in art was shaped in particular by the history 
of European imperialism and anthropology. Memoirs such as Vlaminck’s reveal the racist, 
sexist, and imperialist context in which such ideas took shape. The primitive was a concept that 
Europeans used to refer to various non-Western peoples indiscriminately. These significations 
had nothing to do with the realities of blacks, Africans, or other presumed “primitives”; the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1994); Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush, eds., Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of 
Modernism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
7 Anne Dreesbach, Gezähmte Wilde: Die Zurschaustellung „exotischer“ Menschen in Deutschland 1870–1940 
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 2005); Cordula Grewe, ed., Die Schau des Fremden: Ausstellungskonzepte 
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particular “others” were obscured by the tapestry of images, a composite of the imagined 
“primitive” other. As Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush note in Prehistories of the Future: “As for 
‘primitives,’ they never existed. Only Western ‘primitivism’ did.”8 Beginning roughly in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the increased exposure to non-Europeans provoked new 
questions about the nature of the human, the content and direction of history, and humanity’s 
place in the cosmos. During this period, grisly depictions of barbarians and cannibals filled not 
only travelogues but informed philosophical treatises, as did representations of the “noble 
savage,” a phrase coined by John Dryden in the seventeenth century which would later come to 
be indelibly associated with the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.9 The figure of the 
uncivilized “primitive” populated the philosophical discipline of aesthetics, at least since the 
eighteenth century.10 Enlightenment thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant and Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach, disconcerted by the physical and cultural differences between the various peoples 
around the globe, pioneered new schemes of hierarchical racial classification to affirm claims to 
European moral and intellectual superiority and justify imperial power.11 The encounters in the 
                                                     
8 Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush, “Introduction,” in Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the 
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I am as free as nature first made man, 
Ere the base laws of servitude began, 
When wild in woods the noble savage ran. 
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New World didn’t simply pose new questions for philosophers to contemplate; these theories 
about human difference were inseparable from the systemic raw violence, theft, exploitation, 
madness, and destruction which infused the project of imperialism, not as aberrations but as 
part of its driving force.   
This leads to the third point, which is that the figure of the “primitive” can be 
understood as an discursive construct. As Marianna Torgovnick writes in Gone Primitive: Savage 
Intellects, Modern Lives: “The ensemble of these tropes—however miscellaneous and 
contradictory—forms the basic grammar and vocabulary of what I call primitivist discourse, a 
discourse fundamental to the Western sense of Self and Other.”12 More specifically, Torgovnick 
writes, primitivism works like a projection. She explains: 
Those who study or write about the primitive usually begin by defining it as different 
from (usually opposite to) the present. After that, reactions to the present take over. Is 
the present too materialist? Primitive life is not—it is a precapitalist utopia in which only 
use value, never exchange value, prevails. Is the present sexually repressed? Not 
primitive life—primitives live life whole, without fear of the body. . . . In each case, the 
needs of the present determine the value and nature of the primitive. The primitive 
does what we ask it to do. Voiceless, it lets us speak for it. . . . For Euro-Americans, then, 
to study the primitive brings us always back to ourselves, which we reveal in the act of 
defining the Other.13 
 
My approach in this study accepts the first two of these arguments; my concern is with 
the third point, raised here by Torgovnick. This is not to say I disagree entirely—I too work with 
the notion that the “primitive” should be understood as a discursive formation. Yet the framing 
of primitivism as a projection has been problematic. More specifically I argue that current usage 
of this concept in studies of primitivism has been under-theorized and incomplete. A new 
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theoretical approach to the concept of discourse analysis and its application to primitivism can 
offer greater insight into specific examples of primitivism, whether in modern art, ethnography, 
or contemporary theory. In addition, such an approach can draw to light the way in which 
primitivism has in fact shaped the way in which many people think about modernity. For on the 
one hand, Torgovnick accepts the mutually constituting categories of self and other; as she 
writes, “Euro-Americans begin as controlling subjects, using tropes to describe the primitive 
Other. But they sometimes end by adopting the tropes in their perception of self.”14 But at the 
same time, her analysis reifies these perceptions into a reality: these projections are 
“reactions” to the present, they “reveal” the self.  The problem is not simply a matter of poor 
word choice15; the existing literature on primitivism  frames primitivism as the projection of 
modernity, and has failed to articulate the historical constructedness of the “present” and the 
“self”—and the historical constructedness of a certain picture of “modernity.” 
To clarify this claim, and explain what I mean by a new theoretical approach, it will be 
helpful to summarize the context in which Torgovnick’s critique and others emerged. Recent 
work on primitivism in modern art is the product of the convergence of three main currents of 
academic critique. As Barkan and Bush’s epistemological framing of primitivism and 
Torgovnick’s concept of “primitivist discourse” suggest, the first important current is 
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postcolonial theory, in particular the legacy of Edward Said’s Orientalism (first published in 
1978) and the technical apparatus of colonial discourse analysis.16 The second is the current of 
critical anthropology, which initiated in the late 1960s as the discipline developed a heightened 
political sensitivity to its relationship to colonialism; these insights merged in the 1980s with the 
concerns of the “literary” turn, namely postmodernist questions about representation, 
textuality, and epistemology. These two currents of postcolonial theory and the critique of 
anthropology were brought together dramatically with a third current, an art historical critique 
of modernism spawned in the wake of the 1984 exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, 
“Primitivism” in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern. 
The organizers of the MoMA exhibition, William Rubin and Kirk Varnedoe, sought to 
reconfigure art history’s traditional approach to modernist primitivism, which had focused upon 
the analysis and historical reconstruction of the formal or thematic influences of “primitive” 
objects upon European artists. Rubin argued instead that modernist primitivism shared 
“affinities” with the “primitive” art of non-Europeans. Although Rubin was aware of the pre-
existing history of the ethnographic collection and study of such objects, this history was 
“irrelevant” for his study17—it didn’t matter so much that the artists didn’t “discover” these 
objects—what mattered from Rubin’s perspective was that they had in fact discovered an 
essential “primitive,” an instinctual, mystical, authentic mode of being—“a part of ourselves 
                                                     
16 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 
17 William Rubin, ed., "Primitivism" in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern, Vol. 1 (New York: 
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that Western culture had been unwilling to admit, not to say image, before the twentieth 
century.”18 
Before the MoMA exhibition, it had been possible to argue that modernist artworks and 
memoirs such as Vlaminck’s revealed a moment when the various European myths about 
“primitive” others had begun to transition from a primarily negative inflection, an 
anthropological view of the uncivilized savage, to an inflection of positive admiration.19 After 
MoMA, it became apparent that the modernist admiration for the primitive nevertheless 
perpetuated imperialist context in which such ideas took shape.20 Studies began to appear 
which reexamined primitivism in modern art, now in light of the new critical trends emerging in 
postcolonial theory and the critique of anthropology. This work, as represented most 
prominently by Sally Price (1989), Torgovnick (1990), Patricia Leighton (1990), and Jill Lloyd 
(1991), argued that primitivist aesthetics, although it may have reversed the prevailing negative 
hierarchy of imperial primitivism (the primitive in modern art was now represented as 
something positive, natural, or authentic), nevertheless preserved the imperial categories of 
“primitive” and “civilized.” 
As mentioned above, in making such an argument, these authors often drew on the 
postcolonial framework, in particular the notion of “discourse” from the colonial discourse 
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analysis pioneered by Said. It is worth tracing for a moment the trajectory by which Said’s 
insights were developed and eventually absorbed by the cultural studies of aesthetic 
primitivism. Said, influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, argued that the entire body of 
cultural productions dealing with “the Orient” should be conceptualized as a discourse, 
including therefore not only official academic writing (the historical discipline of Orientalism) 
but novels, letters, political theory, travel writing and all forms of imaginative production. By 
demarcating a field of discursive production and the social structures which facilitated 
discursive practices, Said was able to analyze Orientalism as “the corporate institution for 
dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, 
describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”21 
Said’s book intervened in an earlier line of research which had focused on exposing 
connections between the discipline of anthropology and the practice of colonialism—the 
critique of anthropology as the “handmaiden” of colonialism. Epitomized by Talal Asad and the 
other contributors to Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (1973), this work had stressed 
the ways in which anthropology had been tainted by its association with colonialism.22 Said, by 
introducing the concept of discourse, had expanded the field to show that colonialism was 
imbricated not only in the social science dealing with the colonial other, but that in fact 
colonialism infused cultural production as a totality. Said’s formulation also re-envisioned the 
more limited one-way causality of earlier critiques; not only did colonialism effect the 
production of knowledge, but the production of knowledge shaped colonialism. Said 
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emphasized not merely practical applications of ethnographic knowledge, or the influence of 
imperial rule upon knowledge gathering, but rather a deeper level of ideological collusion, in 
which ethnology as a mode of knowledge was embedded with modes of power. The great 
insight of Said’s work was that, as Fred Cooper writes, “Colonization was no longer out there, in 
exotic places, but in the heart of European culture.”23 
Said’s argument about the complicity of academic knowledge with institutions of power 
had a major impact on the discipline of anthropology, where it merged with other strains of 
political and epistemological forms of self-reflexive critique that had been developing since the 
late 1960s. Whereas Said’s book dealt with Orientalism, anthropologists focused primarily on 
the figure of the “primitive,” which since its articulation in the nineteenth-century emerged as 
the exemplary category of the Other of the Western self. Johannes Fabian, also deeply 
influenced by Foucault, made an argument about primitivism in anthropology that was similar 
in intent to Said’s claims about Orientalism, equally sweeping in its claims about 
epistemological hegemony, and yet more specified in its definition of primitivism as a specific 
type of colonial discourse. In Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (1983), 
Fabian argued that anthropology, since its nineteenth-century origins, was marked by 
primitivism; this was most evident in cultural evolutionism, but pervaded the history of the 
discipline.  The characteristic feature of primitivism (distinguishing it from Orientalism, for 
example) was what Fabian terms a “denial of coevalness,” which he defined as ”a persistent 
                                                     




and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the 
present of the producer of anthropological discourse.” 24 
Subsequent work on anthropology, although much of it only obliquely references Said, 
was nevertheless keenly aware of the essence and import of Said’s critique.25 Work on 
anthropological primitivism, represented most prominently by George W. Stocking, Jr. (1987), 
Adam Kuper (1988), Bernard McGrane (1989) and Henrika Kuklick (1991), revealed the ways in 
which anthropology and ideas about the primitive created an “other” against which a European 
civilized “self” took shape. 26 That “self” or subject position was marked by rationalism, history, 
progress, freedom. The primitive “other” was thus an discursive projection conditioned by 
imperial power relations. The implication of this work was that the “self”—the idea of the West 
as rational, historical, etc.—was equally a discursive construction.  
The major achievement of cultural studies of primitivism in modern art, such as the 
work by Torgovnick and others, is that through their absorption of the above critique of 
anthropology and colonial discourse analysis, they have been able to demonstrate that 
primitivism is an ideological discourse embedded in the history of imperialism and the history 
of anthropology, implicated in seeking, creating, and reproducing colonial forms of power, 
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instrumental in the cultural production of hierarchies of race and class, visions of sexuality and 
gender, and conceptions of morality, religion, science and politics. 
It is at this point in the historiography, however, that a tension can be discerned. The 
argument of this dissertation originates in the observation of a contradiction in the corpus of 
literature on primitivism in modern art. On the one hand, such studies, drawing upon the 
critique of anthropology and colonial discourse analysis, have emphasized the ways in which 
primitivism (and colonial discourse in general) worked to create sustaining fictions of empire. 
Primitivism is understood as a cultural discourse, an institutionalized set of cultural 
representations, that creates a “primitive” other in opposition to a “civilized” Western self. As 
implied in the quote from Torgovnick above, just at the “primitive” is revealed to be an 
ideological construct, so too is the “Western” self. The subject position produced in nineteenth-
century narratives of civilization, progress, and rationality is equally understood as an 
ideological construct. This latter insight, however, originating in postcolonial studies and the 
critique of anthropology, is undermined by an entrenched theoretical tendency in studies of 
primitivism in modern art, a tendency in which primitivism is consistently described as 
something produced by the experience of living in civilization: in the face of the alienating 
effects of industrialization, technologization, and rationalization, primitivism is presented as the 
nostalgia for a simpler, more authentic, more natural state—an idealized, pre-civilized state of 
being. In the existing literature on modernist primitivism, European artists are described as 
either arriving independently at, or appropriating, primitive aesthetic forms and styles as a way 
to critique not only the classical aesthetic tradition, but the many problems of European 
civilization: artificiality, anonymity, and alienation; the disintegration of community; the failures 
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of rational, secular, scientific society to provide some kind of meaningful fulfillment; the failure 
of industrialized or bureaucratic society to provide satisfactory modes of employment or an 
authentic experience of life. In other words, while one line of thought reveals the civilized 
Western self to be a discursive construct, a counter-current reifies this construct as a reality, 
namely, as the condition of alienated modernity. 
The primary aim of this dissertation is to address this contradiction, by tethering to one 
another the insights from postcolonial theory, the critique of anthropology, and the critique of 
modernist art. Through an interdisciplinary analysis, bringing together the disparate strands of 
argument regarding primitivism in anthropology with that in aesthetics as well as critical theory, 
new insights emerge. It becomes possible to consider the aesthetic elements of anthropological 
primitivism. By this I mean not simply that anthropologists were often in fact aware of 
aesthetics when considering the productions of those people they studied; but also that the 
discourse of primitivism which developed in anthropology had a particular aesthetics. Second, it 
becomes possible to embrace the postcolonial and anthropological critique of ethnographic 
primitivism, which had emphasized the ways in which anthropological primitivism functioned 
ideologically to produce a sense of a “civilized Western self.” By holding these strands together, 
I argue that modernity is an imagined community; more specifically, that a particular 
understanding of modernity (what Jane Bennett calls a “disenchantment tale”) can in fact be 
understood as a historical product of primitivism.  
This enables me, in other words, to tell a new history of the relationship of primitivism 
to the theory and history of modernity. In the existing scholarship on primitivism, the 
underlying assertion is that modernity’s problems were experienced as obvious, and that 
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primitivism offered one useful way of expressing discomfort with a rapidly changing industrial, 
urban, metropolitan civilization. It was the right tool at the right time. Had there been no 
encounter with the primitive, other artistic forms or styles would have sufficed. This view is a 
product of a teleological historical hindsight that should be re-examined;  I argue that the 
experience of modernity’s “problems” must not be seen as an obvious or inherent feature of 
social, political, and economic change, but as in fact a result of the primitive/modern 
dichotomy, as articulated historically in the discourse of primitivism.  
 
Part 2.  Defining Primitivism and Modernity 
 
In the existing literature on primitivism in modern art, primitivism is figured as the 
product of modernity. As Colin Rhodes writes in Primitivism and Modern Art: “The cultural 
discontent that characterizes Primitivism in modern art must be positioned specifically in 
relation to the dominant ideas operating in the West in the first half of the twentieth century, 
represented by materialism in politics and science, and positivism in philosophy.”27 Similarly, as 
Jill Lloyd writes: “In a positive sense, primitivism could be used to engage with the 
contradictions of modernity.” She admits that “the danger of false reconciliation, of a retreat 
from the real complexities of history into lazy universalism, remained,” but concludes that 
“Primitivism could be used as a critical tool to question the dominant values of Western 
bourgeois society—or as a panacea, a cure for all ills.”28 Primitivism, in other words, is 
described as tool with which to critique modernity. Although recent studies have rejected an 
                                                     
27 Rhodes, Primitivism and Modern Art, 20. 
28 Lloyd, German Expressionism, vii. 
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earlier historiography that naively celebrated the European “discovery” of primitive art, these 
works continue to position primitivism as a discovery of a new aesthetics, which enabled artists 
to express what was new, and troubling, about modernity. The primary aim of this dissertation 
is to reject this narrative. I argue, rather, that “modernity” (in the particular sense I will 
articulate below) is the product of the historical discourse of primitivism. To clarify what I mean 
in the assertion that primitivism has been productive of modernity, it is necessary to specify 
how I am using these terms.  
At the most basic level, by primitivism I seek to designate the discourse which 
represents the primitive. It shall be useful, then, to trace the history and meanings of the 
concept “primitive.” The word “primitive” seems to have first appeared in the English language 
in the fifteenth century, from the French primitif, meaning original, first, early, ancient (all 
fourteenth-century uses).29 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word has its roots in 
classical Latin (first century BCE to third century CE), where it also meant first-formed, early, 
archetypal. In the fourteenth-century European languages it is often used to describe church 
history (the primitive church), sometimes first-born offspring, sometimes ancestors. In this early 
usage, primitive generally means early, but also occasionally, by implication, it suggests purity. 
By the nineteenth century, the usage has expanded to mean not only that which “recalls an 
early or ancient period,” but also “simple, unsophisticated, or crude things or people as a class.” 
Also during in the nineteenth century, “primitive” begins to be used in discussions of art to 
describe pre-Raphaelite Italian (and also sometimes German gothic) painters (the “primitives”), 
both in reference to its earliness and its simplicity. Since at least the seventeenth century, 
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however, the term was also increasingly used to refer to the “uncivilized” inhabitants of non-
European lands, usually with darker skin, unfamiliar ways of life, and generally characterized by 
“isolation, low technology, and simple social and economic organization.”30 The term primitiv in 
German has had a somewhat different genealogy. It entered German from French during the 
eighteenth century, primarily carrying a negative connotation, in contrast to the German 
ursprünglich.31 Thus German usage partially demarcated an ambivalence which persisted in the 
English in French, such that primitiv was generally used to mean rude and undeveloped, while 
ursprünglich designated purity. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to surmise that this 
removed ambiguity from the German context, as both words were employed to refer to non-
Europeans as well as European ancestors; in addition, German shared with French and English a 
host of related words which were similarly used to designate “uncivilized” others,  such as 
Wilden or Naturvölker (“savages” or “natural people”). 
 This particular constellation of meanings, therefore, is the source of the potency of the 
discourse of primitivism. It also furnishes the appropriate criteria for the following discussion of 
primitivism. On the one hand, by primitivism I refer to the use of a set of terms or images by 
Europeans to describe non-European others (including not only the use of the term “primitive,” 
but its various correlates). It is in this sense not simply a discourse but an ethnographic 
discourse—a concept which, borrowing from  George Steinmetz, I will identify as “any 
representation, textual or visual, that claims to depict the character and culture of a given 
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sociocultural collective, regardless of whether that collective is described as a race, a culture, a 
society, an ethnic group, a community, or something else.”32  
On the other hand, by primitivism I refer to a discourse which posits a binary opposition 
between “primitive” and “civilized.” Combining these two parameters helpful circumscribes the 
field of study. I am not discussing all ethnographic or colonial discourse, but only that which is 
primitivist, a discourse which can be distinguished from Orientalism and other forms of colonial 
discourse.33 Primitivism is a more specified, and in that sense more fundamental, discourse. 
The Orient, for example, has traditionally been opposed in broad fashion to the West; the 
primitive is opposed to civilization. The Orient, in spite of its alleged inferiority in the Orientalist 
discourse, was conceived as an alternative (if abnormal) form of civilization, not as the absence 
of civilization. The primitive is imagined as subsumed in nature, pre-civilized, pre-writing, pre-
technology, and pre-history. This discourse is not neutral but embedded in a set of evaluative 
perceptions about “civilization”; primitivism therefore is a discourse of alterity which structures 
ways of thinking about such notions as nature, technology, and rationality as well as 
conceptions about time and the progress of history. 
This set of parameters also excludes primitivism that is not a part of ethnographic 
colonial discourse.  Primitivism, broadly speaking, can be found in numerous places around the 
world at various times. This broad definition of primitivism forms the subject matter for the 
pioneering study of primitivism, Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas’s Primitivism and Related 
Ideas in Antiquity (1935), which contains copious primary source examples of primitivism in the 
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writings of philosophers, poets, and historians of ancient Greece and Rome.34 Lovejoy and Boas 
define primitivism as “the discontent of the civilized with civilization, or with some conspicuous 
and characteristic feature of it. It is the belief of men living in a highly evolved and complex 
cultural condition that a life far simpler and less sophisticated in some or all respects is a more 
desirable life.”35 In the selections of Lovejoy and Boas, the concept of primitivism does not refer 
to non-Europeans, but is defined simply as a set of reflections upon “the progress of 
civilization”—“especially, of civilized man’s misgivings about his performances, about his 
prospects—and about himself.”36 Primitivist writings tended to imagine an idyllic former age—
primitivism in this sense could be said to denote any lapsarian perspective which posits an 
evaluative difference between the past and the present, whether positive or negative. 
Not all instances of primitivism, clearly, produced an experience of modernity, in the 
sense I shall argue here. There is, I argue, an important difference between the primitivism of, 
for example, Epicurus, rhapsodizing about the simple, self-sufficient life, and the primitivism of 
Vlaminck, fascinated by African masks. For the latter, ideas about a “more desirable” or “less 
sophisticated” age are embedded in an ethnographic discourse within a colonial context. This 
context produces a particular structure of power relations, knowledge production, and subject 
positions. The “other” is not simply an idealized former time, but a state of being identified 
with a particular category of humanity; humans have become the physical embodiment of an 
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abstract idea. Through the institutionalization of the primitivist discourse in the human 
sciences, political discourse, and popular culture, beginning roughly in the eighteenth century 
and accelerating in the nineteenth, the discourse has become authoritative, cohesive, and 
communal, in a way that would not apply to all of the examples of primitivism collected by 
Lovejoy and Boas. Colonial discourse analysis, then, provides the key for explaining how the 
phenomenon of primitivism (a set of evaluative ideas about civilization) can become during the 
imperial period a discourse specifically wedded to a concept of modernity. 
 I should like to preemptively address the possible objection that this formulation of the 
problem begs the question that in delineating the problem as I have, I have set myself up for 
the solution. The focus on ethnographic discourse limits us to the period of European 
imperialism, and hence may seem to facilitate my argument that the primitive/civilized 
dichotomy is the productive of what I am calling “modernity.” I am arguing, rather, that the 
primitive/civilized dichotomy, although it in fact pre-exists the ethnographic discourse of the 
imperial period, comes to be wedded to the discourse of modernity during this period, on 
account of power/knowledge structures fostered by imperialism, and it is for this reason I have 
demarcated the field as such. 
 The next point requiring clarification then is the term modernity. In the discourse which 
I have here designated for analysis, the primitive is characteristically opposed to civilization;  a 
further word must be said, therefore, about how a discourse about civilization becomes a 
discourse about modernity.  
“Modernity,” as Frederick Cooper has observed, is a problematic term, so prevalent and 
overdetermined that its analytic use is questionable. As Cooper writes, “The word modernity is 
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now used to make so many different points that continued deployment of it may contribute 
more to confusion than to clarity.”37  Part of the problem, Cooper notes, is that modernity 
functions as both a native category (a term used by historical actors to describe their 
experience) and as an analytic category. In addition to the confusion between these two 
registers, within the different analytic uses of modernity we find multivalent and often 
contradictory definitions. As Cooper explains, a confusion exists in the literature between 
invoking modernity as a condition (an identifiable set of economic, political, and social 
changes), and as a representation.38  
One primary source of this confusion, Cooper argues, stems from the way in which 
current discussions of modernity have largely absorbed the theoretical framework of 
modernization theory of the 1950s. Modernization theory was both analytic and normative, 
celebrating the achievements of industrialization, democracy, and the history of Western 
secularization and rationalization. The critique that emerged in the 1970s demonstrated the 
teleological and Eurocentric nature of the theory, but, as Cooper argues, “the telos remains in 
the form of a bourgeoning literature on modernity, colonial modernity, and alternative 
modernities, the former two with a negative valence instead of a positive one, the latter as the 
positive, non-Eurocentric reflection of the others.”39 The concept of alternative modernities, 
Cooper argues, doesn’t solve the problem: if we are speaking of genuine alternatives, it isn’t 
clear why they should be called “modernities”; if they do have some factor in common, it is a 
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narrative of progress, based on ideas about rationality, history, and capitalism.40 “The package 
is still on a pedestal,” Cooper explains, to the detriment of critical analysis. “Debate about a 
wide range of issues—from the equality of women in society to the desirability of free 
markets—will be conducted in relation to a presumed distinction between modern and 
backward rather than in more specific and less teleological terms.” Cooper concludes that it 
would be best at this point to abandon modernity as an analytic category:  
Scholars should not try for a slightly better definition so that they can talk about 
modernity more clearly. They should listen to what is being said in the world. If 
modernity is what they hear, they should ask how it is being used and why; otherwise, 
shoehorning a political discourse into modern, antimodern, or postmodern discourses, 
or into “their” modernity or “ours,” is more distorting than revealing.41 
 
Cooper’s criticism is a valid one. I am not interested therefore in using the concept analytically, 
to argue for example that primitivist aesthetics is modern (a concern which indeed has 
preoccupied the existing literature, in response to earlier arguments that it was antimodern). 
What interests me foremost is modernity as a representation. However, as Cooper points out, a 
great deal of the recent work, while treating modernity as representation, nevertheless 
recapitulates modernity as condition: “We seem to be living modernization twice, the first time 
as earnestness, the second time as irony.”42 The answer is to explore modernity as a native 
category, and that is what I do here. At the same time, however, the following argument about 
modernity is intended as a historical answer to what Cooper poses as a theoretical problem. 
One of my primary aims here is to chart the history of how a particular native category is 
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transformed into a widely adopted analytic category; I seek to explain how a set of 
representations has come to be seen as a condition.  
 In response to Cooper, then, I would suggest that this confusion is not incidental, and 
not something that can be resolved entirely through theory. One of my aims is to tell the 
history of this confusion, to help understand why, even where scholarship has embraced the 
idea of modernity as representation, it has been difficult to shake the idea of modernity as a 
condition. One of the leading reasons that “modernity” remains popular in theoretical 
discourse (a “package on a pedestal,” as Cooper terms it), in spite of attempts to critique it or 
replace it (with “multiple modernities” or “alternative modernities”), is its power as a marker of 
experience and its seduction as an identity. As Chantal Mouffe observes, “Collective 
identifications have to do with desires, with fantasies, with everything that is precisely not 
interests or the rational.”43 Modernity, I argue, can best be understood as a collective 
identification, as an imagined community. 
 Before moving on to clarify what I mean by experience and identity, however, let us 
resolve the definition of modernity. I am interested here in the ways in which modernity is used 
to identify a particular response to, and interpretation of, modernization. I am interested in 
how a set of representations have been attached to a condition. If modernization can be 
described as a set of social, political and economic changes, namely capitalism, industrialism, 
urbanization and bureaucratization, I am here focusing on a particular set of meanings given to 
these changes. These meanings are both interpretive and evaluative. On the one hand, these 
changes have often been interpreted as the inevitable accompaniment of a mentality or 
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worldview marked by rationalism, empiricism, secularism and materialism, a worldview often 
coded as European or Western. On the other, these changes have been the focus of evaluative 
judgments. They have been coded as historical progress, a gradual increasing of knowledge and 
power. In terms of knowledge, they have been credited for a greater self-awareness and a new 
degree of critical thought: the modern period is said to have broken free from a benighted, 
mythical, or naïve premodern past. These changes have also been said to produce increased 
individuality and autonomy, and by autonomy is meant greater power over oneself, others, and 
the world.  At the same time, this increase in knowledge and power is often depicted as 
bringing with it an inevitable set of problems, reflected in the widespread unease about 
technology, the rapid pace of modern life, disruptive social change. The common conflation of 
historical changes with cultural crisis can be seen, for example, in the definition proposed by 
theorist Charles Taylor: “By modernity I mean that historically unprecedented amalgam of new 
practices and institutional forms (science, technology, industrial production, urbanization), of 
new ways of living (individualism, secularizing, instrumental rationality), and of new forms of 
malaise (alienation, meaningless, a sense of impending social dissolution).”44 
 My use of modernity, then, is to designate specifically this historical critique—what 
political theorist Jane Bennett has described as the “disenchantment narrative,” alluding to the 
phrase of the German sociologist Max Weber.45 In a series of lectures and publications around 
the turn of the twentieth century, Weber argued that capitalism, secularization, rationalization, 
and bureaucratization had produced what he described as the defining feature of modernity, 
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the “disenchantment of the world” (Entzauberung).46 Weber is but one prominent voice in this 
historical discourse, which we might generally designate as the critique of modernity. The 
disenchantment narrative, Bennett contends, is “a powerful and rather pervasive narrative in 
contemporary politics and political theory.” She sums it up roughly as follows: 
There was once a time when Nature was purposive, God was active in the details of 
human affairs, human and other creatures were defined by a preexisting web of 
relations, social life was characterized by face-to-face relations, and political order took 
the form of organic community. Then, this premodern world gave way to forces of 
scientific and instrumental rationality, secularism, individualism, and the bureaucratic 
state—all of which, combined, disenchant the world.47 
 
To bring together these two definitions, then, I am arguing that primitivism, understood as an 
ethnographic discourse operating in the context of imperial relations of power and knowledge, 
has played a fundamental role in the historical construction of the “disenchantment narrative” 
of modernity. 
 
Part 3.  The Disenchantment Narrative and the Encounter with Cultural Difference 
 
Bennett, in The Enchantment of Modern Life, has sought to critique the disenchantment 
narrative of modernity, arguing that it has had dramatic political and ethical ramifications. As 
she explains, her “wager” is that, “to some small but irreducible extent, one must be enamored 
with existence and occasionally even enchanted in the face of it in order to be capable of 
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donating some of one’s scarce mortal resources to the service of others.”48 The problem, 
however, is that “in the cultural narrative of disenchantment, the prospects for loving life—or 
saying ‘yes’ to the world—are not good. What’s to love about an alienated existence on a dead 
planet?” She therefore reexamines in her work some of traditional “facts” about modernity 
that are routinely said to disenchant—materiality, calculabity, commodity fetishism—and 
makes the case for an alternative ontology and accompanying ethics, based on “the marvelous 
vitality of bodies human and nonhuman, natural and artifactual.” 
Bennett’s work belongs to a larger body of new materialist theory, which had critiqued 
long-held convictions, offering new ways of thinking about agency and autonomy, the human 
and nonhuman, nature and material.49  This is an important project, yet one whose success will 
depend upon a full understanding of the materialist and idealist theories it seeks to displace. 
The existing literature treats the disenchantment narrative as a product of abstract political and 
social theory; as Bennett sums up the intellectual history:  
Rousseau dreams of a modern form of community governed by a civil religion and a 
general will; Hegel then imagines a state that would allow citizens to recover their 
implication in a larger ethical order without sacrificing modern individuality; Marx 
rejects Hegel’s cure but affirms the diagnosis of alienation—later, alienated workers will 
become subjects of anomie and gesellschaft (i.e., a “rationally developed mechanistic 
type of social relationship characterized by impersonally contracted associations 
between persons”); finally, Weber collects these various claims under the banner of 
“the disenchantment of the world.”50 
 
My contention is that the disenchantment narrative is not merely a product of abstract 
political and social theory, but has been fundamentally shaped by the history of anthropology, 
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imperialism, and the cultural discourse of primitivism.  From Rousseau’s account of the state of 
nature, to Hegel’s discourse on Africa as the land without history, to Marx’s notion of 
commodity fetishism, to Weber’s ideas about the magic world of the “savage,” this political and 
philosophical critique of modernity has developed hand in hand with representations of the 
primitive other. If we examine Weber’s articulation of disenchantment, to take one example, 
the primitivist subtext is evident:  
Increasing intellectualization and rationalization does not mean increasing general 
knowledge of the conditions under which we live our lives. It means something else. It 
means the knowledge or belief that if we only wanted to we could learn at any time that 
there are, in principle, no mysterious unpredictable forces in play, but that all things—in 
principle—can be controlled through calculation. This, however, means the 
disenchantment of the world. No longer, like the savage, who believed that such forces 
existed, do we have to resort to magical means to gain control over or pray to the 
spirits. Technical means and calculation work for us instead. This, above all, is what 
intellectualization actually means.51 
 
Weber’s disenchantment is posed explicitly in opposition to a primitive world inhabited by 
magic and myth. A similar discursive primitivist subtext accompanies the other moments in the 
historical development of the disenchantment narrative, articulations of rationality and 
progress as well as fragmentation and alienation. Several excellent studies have focused on 
disparate moments in this discourse, analyzing the role that ethnography (if not specifically 
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primitivism) and imperialism have played in shaping theoretical work.52 Yet there has not yet 
been a synthesis of these insights, demonstrating that they share a common critique of 
modernity in opposition to the primitive; that, in other words, the disenchantment narrative is 
a historical product of ethnography and imperialism.  
In a sense, an inverted doppelgänger of this story has previously been assembled. 
Fuyuki Kurasawa, in The Ethnological Imagination: A Cross-Cultural Critique of Modernity, has 
argued that this critique developed as a product of the historical encounter with otherness.53 
Yet Kurasawa writes his history from the perspective that the critique refers to a condition, not 
representation; in other words, he takes the disenchantment narrative at face value. In his 
telling, focusing on Rousseau, Marx, and Weber as well as Emile Durkheim, Claude Lévi-Strauss 
and Foucault, he argues that these theorists’ “ethnological imagination” enabled them to 
develop a comparative perspective, identify cultural differences, and therefore gain a clearer 
picture of the dynamics of “Western modernity.” As Kurasawa writes: 
Their encounters with instances of cultural alterity [fueled] their diagnoses of what ails 
Western modernity or makes it flourish as a sociohistorical constellation. Its distinctive 
features—the emergence of the individual and the transformation of subjectivity, the 
control of nature by culture, the idea of history as teleological progress, the rise and 
conquest of rationalism, and new modes of socioeconomic domination and exclusion—
are virtually commonplace by now, yet few people appreciate that such a theoretical 
understanding would have been impossible without a cultural outside to the modern 
West.54 
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Kurasawa positions his account as a demonstration of “cross-cultural” awareness, an 
attempt at recasting social theory to meet the current “theoretical impasse” of the discipline, 
caught between postmodern accusations of ethnocentrism and defenses of false universalism; 
Kurasawa argues that in fact the history of social theory reveals an unexpected cast of 
“intercultural thought” and “intercultural sensibility.” He writes, “In constantly searching to 
engage with non-Western and nonmodern ways of thinking and acting, our six theorists have 
developed cross-cultural modes of interpretation and critique of the social order established in 
their own times and places.”55 The problematics of praising Marx for an understanding of 
African religious practices as fetishism and applying it to a theory of capitalist commodification 
needs no lengthy comment; Marx achieved an evocative application of primitivist discourse to 
social theory, but this hardly merits the label of inter-cultural understanding. Kurasawa’s work 
is useful for its rigorous demonstration of the inseparable connection between the 
ethnographic encounter and the history of social theory. What remains to be done, then, is turn 
Kurasawa’s narrative on its head.  
 
Part 4.  An Imagined Modernity 
 
If Kurasawa’s analysis provides a composite picture of the theoretical connections 
between primitivism and social theory, it does not account for the factors which made this 
particular critique of modernity so academically and culturally persuasive. Kurasawa assumes 
that the critical prominence, and popular acceptance, of such theories are simply a result of 
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their utility, their accuracy as descriptions of the condition of Western modernity. If we 
maintain that such theories are representations that may or may not correspond to their 
object, we must look elsewhere to account for their traction, to explain how a set of 
representations comes to be understood as a condition. To do so, we must first re-theorize 
modernity. 
Modernity, then, should not be mistaken for a theoretical construct, a product of social 
theory, but rather as a cultural construction, or an imagined community, not so different, in 
fact, from the concept of the nation as outlined by Benedict Anderson in his highly influential 
work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983).56 A 
political scientist influenced by Erich Auerbach, Walter Benjamin, and Victor Turner, Anderson 
provided a dramatically new way of thinking about nationalism in terms of meaning, 
subjectivity, and identity. Modernity, I argue, can be understood as imagined in the way that 
Anderson found nationalism to be imagined: as “an imagined political community—and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”57  
Anderson defines his terminology in some detail. The nation “is imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” The 
same can arguably be said of modernity. Moreover, modernity is imagined as limited because it 
proscribes insiders and outsiders. Modernity may appear to be ever-expanding, spreading out 
across the globe, threatening to eclipse all social life; this is the argument familiar from 
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globalization theory; yet modernity requires an outside, a periphery. Its identity depends upon 
the exclusion of others.58 Modernity is imagined as community, because it is conceived, like a 
nation, as “a deep, horizontal comradeship.” This is the common understanding that “moderns” 
share, uniting them against the aforementioned outsiders.59  
Finally, modernity is imagined as sovereign.  Anderson uses the term sovereign to 
suggest that the nation was imagined as free, liberated from the “divinely-ordained, 
hierarchical dynastic realm.” The nation, as a secular invention, is constrained by no higher 
purpose. He writes: 
Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents 
of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such 
religions, and the allomorphism between each faith’s ontological claims and territorial 
stretch, nations dream of being free. . . The gage [sic] and emblem of this freedom is the 
sovereign state.60  
 
Similarly, modernity, as has already been suggested, is imagined as the time of autonomy—free 
not only from dynastic or church authority, however, but from all modes of authority, including, 
even, nature itself. Modernity represents critical knowledge and technological power, the two 
primary sources of modern autonomy.  
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It may be noted that Anderson is using a limited sense of the term sovereign; sovereign 
in political theory denotes not only freedom but rule over a subject. Modernity, I would argue, 
is sovereign not simply in its “dream of being free” (in this case, free from the pre-modern or 
primitive past)—it is also imagined politically as a form of power. Modernity exerts sovereignty 
over individuals, and over nations, through its normative power. The discourse of modernity 
exhibits sovereignty over the field of nations, for example, when it is imagined as the 
“historical” period to which they must attain, through which they must pass.  
Modernity is also sovereign over the individual, yet not in the classical sense. It is 
sometimes forgotten that Anderson articulated this definition of nationalism as an answer to 
what he found to be “the central problem” posed by nationalism: “Ultimately it is this fraternity 
that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much 
to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”  What, he asks, could generate “such 
colossal sacrifices?” This raises the question: what sacrifices does modernity generate? If not 
literally, then metaphorically, what do individuals give up, to enter into this community of 
modernity?  
 Thus far I have been discussing the disenchantment narrative of modernity; this offers a 
useful way of characterizing this prominent cultural discourse. The problem, however, with this 
designation, and accordingly, with attempts by critics such as Bennett to “reenchant” 
modernity, is that this approach neglects the enchanting aspects already contained within the 
disenchantment narrative. The narrative compels precisely on account of what it has to offer, 
to return to Anderson, in terms of subjectivity, meaning, and identity. 
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 Charles Taylor, in A Secular Age, offers a helpful if lengthy description of the paradoxical 
combination of achievement and loss, enchantment and alienation, which characterizes this 
narrative of “modernity.”61 In the following quote, Taylor uses the concept of a “buffered” self, 
which he argues has replaced a more “porous” self in the modern, “secular” era. By buffered he 
means “bounded”—an image of the self that is protected, because it is imagined as divorced 
from external forces of nature and cosmos, unlike the “porous” self, which was “vulnerable, to 
spirits, demons, cosmic forces”—a result of the “anthropocentric” turn in which moral 
humanist philosophy placed humans at the center of the world. In other words, Taylor, like 
Kurasawa, accepts the disenchantment narrative, although he has in numerous works 
developed his own particular history with an emphasis on the moral, political, and religious 
changes which led to this “transformation of our world.” Taylor writes: 
What did (does) this buffered, anthropocentric identity have going for it? Its attractions 
are fairly obvious, at least to us. A sense of power, of capacity, in being able to order our 
world and ourselves. To the extent that this power was connected with reason and 
science, a sense of having made great gains in knowledge and understanding. 
 But beyond power and reason, there is something else very strong going for this 
anthropocentrism: a sense of invulnerability. Living in a disenchanted world, the 
buffered self is no longer open, vulnerable to a world of spirits and forces which cross 
the boundary of the mind, indeed, negate the very idea of there being a secure 
boundary. The fears, anxieties, even terrors that belong to the porous self are behind 
it....  
 Power, reason, invulnerability, a decisive distancing from age-old fears, of which 
we all still have some sense, not only from history, and not only from the as yet 
unenlightened masses, but also because they resonated somehow in our own 
childhood; all this belongs to the sense of self of those who have made the 
anthropocentric turn. And there are strong satisfactions which attend this. 
 Above all, there is a certain pride, and sense of one’s own worth; which is the 
stronger, the more acutely one is aware of what an achievement this is, of the 
unreasoning fears from which one has freed oneself. Part of the self-consciousness of 
modern anthropocentrism is this sense of achievement, of having won through to this 
invulnerability out of an earlier state of captivity in an enchanted world. In this sense, 
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modern self-consciousness has a historical dimension, even for those—who are, alas, 
many today—who know nothing about history. They know that certain things are 
“modern,” that other practices are “backward,” that this idea is positively “medieval,” 
and that other one is “progressive.”62 
 
Taylor’s account captures the enchantments of the disenchantment narrative. It thus 
helps answer the question, raised above, of the motivational factors responsible for the 
“sacrifices” made in order to belong to the imagined community of modernity. Taylor’s account 
is useful moreover as a prime example of major work of contemporary theory which presents 
the disenchantment narrative as the inevitable result of a set of philosophical changes in the 
history of “the West,” and which entirely neglects the role that primitivism has played.63 
Thus, I argue that rather than framing modernity as simply a product of social theory, it 
should be theorized as a cultural and discursive construction, an imagined community, much 
like the nation, or other collectives of participants, who share a shifting yet durable and 
cohesive set of attitudes, beliefs, and habits. Nations are imagined, but this doesn’t make them 
any less real. They are territories that both restrict and present new possibilities for movement, 
for action and interaction. Nations are held together not only by laws, but by languages, rituals, 
songs, dress, flags, monuments, martyrs, railroads, mountains, and rivers, an array of practices, 
materials, events, and discourses which make the nation seem obvious, natural, and inevitable. 
They are defined by ideas about what it means to belong, and who does not belong. Modernity 
is no different. 
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Part 5.  Defining Discourse 
 
The above discussion outlines this dissertation’s theoretical formulation of modernity as 
an imagined community. I argue that an insistence on modernity as imagined helps to break the 
compulsion to identify it with modernization, confusing the representation with the condition. 
It remains to be said how primitivism in particular has served as a fundamental discourse in the 
construction of the disenchantment narrative. To make this argument, I apply the theoretical 
framework of the colonial discourse model. However, as noted above, current usage of colonial 
discourse analysis has failed to demonstrate the connection between primitivism and the 
critique of modernity. The problem, I argue, is that current usage has overly relied on a 
projection model of colonial discourse, a model that originates in Said’s original formulation of 
discourse in Orientalism. 
Studies of primitivism routinely invoke the notion of discourse to explain primitivism. 
The utility of this concept for cultural studies of primitivism has been, primarily, its broad and 
encompassing scope, as a way of identifying multiple cultural areas of production as 
participants in the same phenomenon. As Gill Perry writes: “According to this approach, 
‘primitivism’ is seen as a complex network of sociological, ideological, aesthetic, scientific, 
anthropological, political and legal interests (that is, ‘discourses’), which feed into and 
determine a culture.”64 Second, the notion of discourse provides a way to demonstrate 
connections between cultural products, academic knowledge, and political power. In Perry’s 
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words, “those within Western society who analyze, teach, paint or reproduce a view of the 
‘primitive’ would, by this activity, be dominating, restructuring and having authority over that 
which they define as ‘primitive.’” Simply put, it provides recognition of the fact that primitivism 
operates in conjunction with imperial projects involving both political rule and knowledge 
production. 
The problem, however, is that Said’s theory of colonial discourse analysis, and its 
adoption by cultural studies to explain primitivism, has employed a truncated version of the 
concept of discourse as originally theorized by Michel Foucault, Said’s source of inspiration.  
Said’s application of discourse analysis to the problem of colonial knowledge and power posed 
a set of epistemological problems—namely, about the existence of subjects and objects. 
Foucault’s theory dispensed with subjects and objects, while preserving an account of 
subjectivity and objectivity.65 Said, however, in applying the model to the colonial situation, felt 
an understandable political compulsion to address the historical facts of colonizing subjects and 
colonized objects. Yet this compelled him to adopt a projection model, in which a colonizing 
subject is the producer of Orientalist represenatations. Thus, while colonial discourse brackets 
the question of how representations correspond to their objects (how does Orientalism relate 
to the Orient?), it preserves the ontology of the subject (the one doing the projecting). 
Discourse in Foucault’s understanding, on the other hand, not only creates 
representations of the object, the “primitive,” but representations of the subject; in this 
manner it creates forms of subjectivity. Foucault insisted that discourse be understood in a 
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biopolitical sense, not as a linguistic force repressing bodies, but as that which produces bodies 
and desires; this sense is missing from its application in cultural studies. 
 Foucault’s archaeological method was intended to displace the concept of the individual 
subject; Foucault argued that the subject was a product of discursive formations. He rejected 
the traditional concept of top-down power (of ruler and subjects); as he put it in The History of 
Sexuality, “In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king.”66 Yet 
his concept of discourse is commonly understood as merely a dispersion of top-down power 
across an array of discourses of domination. Rather, power must be understood as constructive 
as well. Foucault argued that one could read the history of sexuality, for example, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, not as a history of the repression of sexuality, but as the 
production of sexuality, which is imbricated with the creation of modes of subjectivity: 
Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in 
check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the 
name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to 
grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification 
of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the 
strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with 
a few major strategies of knowledge and power.67 
 
I argue that Foucault’s retheorization of power, and the hermeneutical suspicion which 
he  directs at sexuality, should also be applied to primitivism. Cultural studies of primitivism, 
however, have persisted in applying the notion of the Western subject, whose desires and fears 
are expressed and articulated in the discourse of primitivism. Such studies, in other words, 
embrace the notion of primitivism as a projection of Western fears and desires. Torgovnick, for 
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example, in Primitive Passions (the follow-up to Gone Primitive), describes the twentieth-
century “fascination with the primitive” as: 
an expression of fears about what the West has wrought in the world, even of white 
European self-loathing—often with an accompanying utopian impetus for change. 
Utopian desires are emerging strongly once again at the end of the twentieth century, in 
movements that envision the primitive as a locus of harmony and a shelter from the 
dangers and fragmentation of modern life.68 
 
 As this quote makes evident, Torgovnick has adopted the sense of discourse as 
theorized by Foucault, in which these desires and fears should themselves be understood as 
discursive products. It is precisely in this recognition, however, that it becomes possible to 
identify the relationship of the discourse of primitivism to the imagination of modernity. If the 
fears and desires which are said to be expressed through primitivism, are in fact, following 
Foucault, products of primitivism, it becomes clear that primitivism is not simply a reaction to 
“the dangers and fragmentation of modern life”—primitivism is the discourse productive of this 
representation of modern life. 
 This recognition allows for a crucial re-framing of existing studies of primitivism. In these 
studies, European artists are described as either arriving independently at, or appropriating, 
primitive aesthetic forms and styles as a way to critique not only the classical aesthetic 
tradition, but the many problems of European civilization. To cite one prominent example, 
Michael Bell, in his pioneering study of primitivism in literature, writes: “The general implication 
of this study has been that primitivism denotes, or arises from, a sense of crisis in civilization.”69 
Bell’s account is a causal one: primitivism, he explains, “is born of the interplay of the civilized 
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self and the desire to reject or transform it. . . . Primitivism, we might say, is the projection by 
the civilized sensibility of an inverted image of the self.” Moreover, Bell defines this a universal 
phenomenon:  
The nostalgia of civilized man for a return to a primitive or precivilized condition is as old 
it seems as his civilized capacity for self-reflection. And it is a familiar characteristic of 
human nature that almost every step towards what would generally be regarded as 
increased sophistication or progress is accompanied by misgivings frequently leading in 
turn to doubts about the whole enterprise of civilization.70 
 
My argument, put simply, is that this ubiquitous understanding of primitivism 
(exemplified here by Bell) already assumes too much about the ontological character and 
existence of “civilized man,” as the causal factor producing primitivism. I want to suggest that 
primitivism (in the sense of a “nostalgia for return”) should be seen not as the obvious product 
of “civilization,” the nostalgia produced by the stresses of the “enterprise,” but rather, as the 
discourse producing the subject position of “civilized,” defined by Bell as self-reflection, 
sophistication, progress, and misgivings.  In other words, it isn’t civilization that makes one 
nostalgic for a return, it’s the discourse of primitivism that produces the experience  called 
“civilization.”  
 I have cited Bell for two primary reasons. First, to observe that Bell’s definition reveals 
the basic postulates of the disenchantment narrative. Second, to demonstrate that recent 
studies of primitivism, in spite of their adoption of colonial discourse analysis, nevertheless 
perpetuate Bell’s conceptualization of primitivism: for Bell as well as the recent studies, 
primitivism is understood as a projection, which is produced by civilization.  
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On the one hand, in recent critiques of primitivism (written in wake of Said and the 1984 
MoMA exhibition), Bell’s universalism is roundly rejected in favor of a historicization. For Bell, 
primitivism refers to “a basic human feeling,” or “the nostalgia of civilized man for a return to a 
primitive or precivilized condition”; he envisions it as an ahistorical phenomenon. For recent 
authors, primitivism is necessarily imbricated with the history of imperialism. Yet recent studies 
of primitivism have in fact inherited from the earlier tradition of critique (represented here by 
Bell) the view in which primitivism emerges from the experience of civilization; the singular 
difference is that recent authors frame primitivism not as a response not to civilization in 
general, but civilization at its apex, modernity.  
For example, Patricia Leighten, who also makes use of the discourse framework, writes:  
“The modernists’ method was to critique civilization by embracing an imagined ‘primitiveness’ 
of Africans whose ‘authenticity’ they opposed to a ‘decadent’ West.”71 Similarly, Jill Lloyd opens 
her book on primitivism in German expressionist art by arguing that the key to understanding 
such art is to see it in the context of the “speed and drama of modernization in Germany at the 
end of the nineteenth century . . . [and] the dilemmas and contradictions that this involved.”72 
She cites the German sociologist Georg Simmel, whose writings on “the conflicting positive and 
negative effects of modernity” have become part of the canon on the topic: 
In Simmel’s monumental Philosophie des Geldes (1900; The Philosophy of Money), he 
explored the workings of the capitalist economy as a metaphor for the psychological 
experiences of the modern world: by “abstracting” or depersonalizing every aspect of 
our relations, money allowed simultaneously for greater freedom and greater 
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loneliness. It acted as a liberating agent and yet involved, at the same time, alienation, 
reification, and inhuman rationalization.73 
 
Lloyd and her colleagues collectively argue that primitivism is a response to the ailments of 
modernity. What for Bell was understood as a general nostalgia for an idealized past becomes 
in recent writing on primitivist modern art a more specified longing for the ethnographic 
“primitive” state, in opposition to the perceived alienation of modernity. What should be clear, 
however, is that this interpretation perpetuates uncritically the disenchantment narrative 
described above. Applying the notion of subjectivity implied in Foucault’s notion of discourse, I 
argue that primitivism is in fact productive of the disenchantment narrative, the “fears” and 
“desires” produced by modernity. 
By applying postcolonial theory, colonial discourse analysis, and the critique of 
anthropology to the discussion of primitivism in modern art, I show that the ideas about 
civilization and modernity to which these authors give voice were created in opposition, not 
simply to a former idealized time, but in opposition to the ethnographic primitive other. They 
offer, on the one hand, an example of how the primitivist discourse posits as cultural universals 
categories which are in fact historically produced; and on the other, how a set of discursive 
representations are transformed into a condition, an imagined modernity. 
 
Part 6.  The Primitive Refrain 
 
 The model of colonial discourse analysis, when applied to the study of primitivism, has 
failed to articulate the relationship between primitivism and modernity.  
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Although I am adopting the Foucauldian notion of discourse, the consistent failure of cultural 
studies to make good on the concept’s utility suggests that a theoretical corrective is needed. 
The literature frames primitivist discourse as a projection of Western fears and desires onto the 
“primitive” other, thus positing the primitive as culturally constructed while reifying the notion 
of the West. In order to re-emphasize the production of subjectivity, which was entailed in 
Foucault’s theory but has subsequently elided in contemporary studies,  I have borrowed the 
notion of the refrain, as outlined by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia.74 
 The concept of the refrain helps to address a set of problems which have been 
associated with colonial discourse analysis since its articulation by Said in Orientalism. Said’s 
critics were quick to identify two primary problems of his theorization of colonial discourse: the 
essentializing and the hegemonic aspects. By arguing that Orientalism essentialized the Orient, 
Said seemed to be essentializing Orientalism; in essentializing Orientalism, in a context in which 
discourse was identified as culture, Said seemed to be essentializing Eurocentric culture.  
On the other hand, Orientalism, for Said, was not limited to an academic discipline, but infused 
Western cultural production about the Orient; it therefore presented a hegemonic view of 
discourse. As Robert Young writes:  
The problem with Said’s book was that its historical and theoretical argument was so 
persuasive that it seemed to allow no alternatives. . . . After his brilliant demonstration 
that Orientalism as a discourse constructed an all-encompassing representation of, and 
form of knowledge about, the Orient, we have ever since been looking for chinks in its 
apparently hegemonic surface.75 
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The root of the problem is that Said sought to make an argument about Eurocentric power by 
beginning with the problem of representation as posed by Foucault. Said began by defining 
discourse as a system of “determining” representations of the “other”; this discourse he argued 
should be understood not as designating a real object, “the Orient,” but rather as “a set of 
constraints upon and limitations of thought.”76 In order to communicate, and be understood, in 
regards to the Orient, one had to be a participant in this discourse:  
The phenomenon of Orientalism deals principally not with a correspondence between 
Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas 
about the Orient (the East as career) despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack 
thereof, with a “real” Orient.77 
 
At the same time, Said defined this set of representations as Eurocentric knowledge and 
power. He thus wielded together of a theory of discourse as non-representational 
representation with a classical theory of political power. Said wrote, “Once we begin to think of 
Orientalism as a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient, we will 
encounter few surprises.” 78  However, the truth has been just the opposite, as Said’s version of 
Foucauldian discourse, filtered through the projection model, has led to a host of 
epistemological problems. On the one hand, the discursive theory of representation 
problematized the existence of subjects and objects; on the other hand, the problem of 
Eurocentric power and knowledge seemed to require subjects and objects, in order to address 
the history of imperial power and violence. Colonial discourse analysis, by applying the concept 
of discourse to the history of imperial power, has, in Foucault’s sense, not chopped off the head 
of the king.  
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In the first place, Said’s formulation of discourse as representation seems to create an 
unbridgeable gap between sign and referent. Second, by not only demonstrating the complicity 
of forms of knowledge with institutions of power, but asserting this complicity within the 
framework of imperial power, Said presented Orientalist discourse as an inescapable, 
hegemonic totality. As Said writes, “So authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I 
believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of 
the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism.”79 
The question then becomes, what are the parameters of the discourse? Are all forms of 
knowledge implicated in power? As Robert Young asks in White Mythologies, “How does any 
form of knowledge—including Orientalism—escape the terms of Orientalism’s critique?”80 Just 
as Said accuses Orientalist discourse of essentializing the Orient, he seems to have essentialized 
the discourse of Orientalism, in arguing that it’s fundamental unity was constituted by a form of 
political power over its object. In addition, by arguing for Orientalism’s totalizing nature, Said’s 
conception of Orientalism seems to preclude any possibility of critique  from “outside.” As 
Young points out, Said bases his critique of Orientalism on humanist principles, but humanism 
itself was structured historically through its involvement in imperialism. If theory itself it 
subsumed in Orientalist discourse, it becomes impossible to dialogue with, or in fact even 
theorize the existence of, the colonial other—a point made notably by Gayatri Spivak in her 
essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”81 
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Another way of putting it is to ask, who is doing the projecting? If colonial discourse is a 
projection of Europeans onto the colonial “other” (whether Oriental, primitive, or otherwise), 
this would deny any role played by the colonial subject. It leaves these “others” on the outside 
looking in. The notion of colonial discourse, although originally designed as a critique of 
Eurocentric knowledge and power, would seem to reinstate an inevitable Eurocentrism in any 
form of theoretical critique. As Young puts it: “Said’s revision of Foucault simply takes us back 
to the problem with which he had begun. . . . Said wants to hang on to the individual as agent 
and instigator while retaining a certain notion of system and of historical determination.”82 
In an important sense, however, although these are significant problems for Said’s 
framing of colonial discourse analysis, they are not terminal problems for applying the theory of 
discourse to understanding primitivism. The primary objection here is that this theory of 
discourse, strictly speaking, does not allow for the existence of subjects or objects. As a set of 
totalizing representations, there can be no position outside of the discourse, either for a subject 
to critique it, or to assess how the discourse corresponds to its object. I argue, however, that 
this is not in fact a problem with the theory of discourse, but the result of approaching the 
concept from the epistemological perspective it aims to critique, namely that of the 
correspondence theory of discourse. Discourse for Foucault does not preclude the existence of 
subjects and objects, merely the notion of a transcendental subject, or a material object.83 
Critics who argue that the notion of discourse leaves no room for a critical subject, are 
attempting to uphold a notion of agency or autonomy as transcendental (either in terms of the 
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Kantian subject, or more simply “the individual as agent” as Young puts it), as opposed to a 
heteronymous subject (that which Kant had rejected). In Foucault’s concept of discourse, 
however, subjects and objects do exist, but they are created historically and contingently. They 
are heteronymous, but not in opposition to a transcendental autonomy. Power relations can be 
established, but these are not fixed or inherent.  
The greater problem for Said’s theorization, however, resides in his political framework, 
the description of Eurocentric power in terms of classical sovereignty. Obviously, such an 
assertion is necessary, to account for historical colonial political power. Yet in positing colonial 
discourse as centered in European power, culture, and history, he must necessarily exclude the 
“objects” of that discourse from playing in role in its existence—and therefore he reinscribes 
Eurocentrism at the core of his theory. This creates impossibilities, both for the postcolonial 
critic of Orientalism, and for the colonized subject, in so far as the aim of both is presented as 
autonomy and resistance. The postcolonial critic has no place from which to stand “outside” 
the system of discourse. To “participate,” to enter into the discourse, the colonized subject 
experiences a double alienation: denied recognition by the colonizing subjects, and, from the 
perspective as a subject within the discourse, condemned to seeking out one’s objectivity but 
endlessly thwarted from attaining it—the problem as diagnosed powerfully by Frantz Fanon in 
Black Skin, White Masks (1952).84 
Said’s problem here results from treating discourse as ideology; yet Foucault’s rejection 
of the notion of the subject equally dispenses with the notion of ideology. Discourse 
understood as ideology in the classical sense recapitulates a top-down theory of power 
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relations; a psychoanalytic picture of the self as an entity upon which ideology acts; and a 
distinction between a true and a false discourse, which his notion of discourse is specifically 
poised to undermine.  
Therefore, if a return to a Foucauldian understanding of discourse helps alleviate some 
of the problems of using the colonial discourse model to understand primitivism, I have further 
introduced the notion of refrain in order to forestall some of these traditional objections. 
Discourse, especially in its application in current cultural studies, is figured as an ahistorical, 
abstract, disembodied set of representations, and therefore would be subject to the same 
criticisms outlined above. The concept of the refrain, I argue, offers the following theoretical 
advantages: it reemphasizes the production of subjectivity, the aesthetics of the discourse, and 
its multivocal nature.  
Discourse is often understood as a static, ahistorical product (a confusion stemming in 
part from Foucault’s original use of discourse as part of his “archaeological” method, although 
he subsequently sought to revise this with his “genealogical” approach). The refrain, however, 
implies existence in time—a repetition, or possibly an alteration of a precedent, a circling back. 
The notion of refrain helps account for the fact that primitivism keeps returning, taking on new 
shapes, sometimes serving the same ends, sometimes new ones. 
Second, refrain highlights the aesthetic qualities of discourse. Discourse is too often 
presented as a matter of linguistic representation; the refrain is not simply textual, but 
aesthetic—aesthetic understood here as sensuous. The refrain is language, combined with 
music, combined with bodies. The sonorous quality of the refrain entails the imbrication of the 
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aesthetic and the physical and the symbolic. By emphasizing the aesthetic, the refrain helps 
account for the compelling forces which call new territories into being, and which alter them. 
 The refrain therefore helps think through questions about the subject and object, by 
avoiding the strictly textual or representational field of discourse. Although discourse naturally 
implies speakers, Foucault’s focus on institutional forms of knowledge downgrades individual 
voices. The refrain allows for a concept of agency without insisting upon autonomy. Similarly, 
the refrain, for Deleuze and Guattari, has a spatial aspect. The refrain creates a territory; both 
the subject and the territory (or an object) are constituted through the refrain. The refrain 
therefore accounts for subjects, but not necessarily human subjects (the Kantian subject, the 
individual as agent):  
As Messiaen says, music is not the privilege of human beings: the universe, the cosmos, 
is made of refrains; the question in music is that of a power of deterritorialization 
permeating nature, animals, the elements, and deserts as much as human beings. The 
question is more what is not musical in human beings, and what already is musical in 
nature.85 
 
Finally, the refrain is better suited to conceptualizing the question of resistance. The 
refrain opens up onto metaphors such as harmony, counterpoint, fugue—a fugue state? The 
refrain can be altered by the incorporation of new voices. The refrain for Deleuze and Guattari 
is not a totality; they juxtapose (rather than oppose) it with music. The refrain is necessarily 
music, but it is also only a type of music: 
It is odd how music does not eliminate the bad or mediocre refrain, or the bad usage of 
the refrain, but on the contrary carries it along, or uses it as a springboard. . . .  What 
needs to be shown is that a musician requires a first type of refrain, a territorial or 
assemblage refrain, in order to transform it from within, deterritorialize it, producing a 
refrain of the second type as the final end of music.86 
                                                     
85 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 309. 




Together, these features of the refrain provide a theoretical framework in which 
colonial discourse analysis can be used to understand the operations of primitivism. Unlike 
Said’s model (or those who follow him by adopting a projection model), the refrain resists the 
dualities suggested by the notion of discourse, by emphasizing the heteronymous, 
heterogeneous, and contingent forces which shape subjects and objects. The refrain creates a 
territory, which is in a sense a shelter, a type of protection; it is shaped by desires and fears 
(and productive of them, as the haunting melody can instill fear); the refrain orders, organizes, 
and orients, both the subject and its object; but it also provides the springboard for 
disorientation, and deterritorialization.  
 I have introduced the notion of the refrain, however, not in the hope of replacing the 
notion of discourse in theoretical discussions, but because I find it useful to explain the manner 
in which I use the term discourse in this dissertation. Theoretical work should not deceive itself 
into believing that concepts are used abstractly and precisely; conceptual work also proceeds 
metaphorically, therefore it seems necessary to emphasize that although I continue to use the 
notion of discourse, it should be understood through the concept of the refrain.87 
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Part 7.  Modes of Primitivism: Apotropaic and Aporetic 
 
 In may be objected that whether primitivism is described as a discourse or a refrain, my 
discussion seems to posit primitivism as a monolithic system of representations. My use of the 
discursive  framework should not be seen as essentializing a discourse, however. I adopt a 
framework of analysis that posits heterogeneity of primitivist discourse. There has been a great 
deal of excellent work that has done much to pluralize empire and pluralize ethnographic 
discourse. George Steinmetz, for example, has persuasively argued that the discourse about 
“ethnographic others” in Germany during this period was in fact eminently diverse and 
multifaceted, as was colonial policy. As Steinmetz writes: 
Ethnographic discourse, colonial subjectivity, and the colonial state were less uniform 
and more internally complex and heterogeneous than has usually been argued. Except 
in the most extreme and unusual situations, European representations of non-
Europeans were much more layered and fragmentary than theories of “Orientalism” 
have led us to believe.88 
 
That being the case, it could appear retrograde and historically inaccurate to speak, as I do, of a 
singular primitivist discourse. In the first place, however, I am not here concerned with colonial 
policy; in the chapter where I do consider colonial policy, this is presented as a bounded test 
case, to explore discursive relations between a type of primitivism and colonial marriage bans. 
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Colonial marriage bans are not presented as emblematic of German colonial policy across the 
board. Second, although I do posit a primitivist discourse, I am not arguing that all ethnographic 
discourse is primitivist, nor that all examples of primitivist discourse operate identically. Just as 
the notion of a singular disenchantment narrative does not preclude variations within the 
narrative, and changes over time, neither should the concept of primitivist discourse. 
Of course, for a concept to have analytic purchase, a certain degree of conceptual 
cohesiveness is necessary. I have already introduced the general delimiting factor: primitivism 
that posits a binary difference between the primitive and the civilized. This is rather broad, but 
in the words of Ludwig Wittgenstein: “Many words in this sense then don’t have a strict 
meaning. But this is not a defect. To think this would be like saying that the light of my reading 
lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.”89 It is possible to delineate with 
some specificity the set of meanings surrounding the opposition between primitive and 
civilized. I am interested in discourses where the primitive is imagined as pre-civilized, pre-
writing, pre-history. I am interested in primitivism that posits, in the formulation of Fabian, a 
denial of coevalness. At the same time, the binary discourse of primitivism in inherently 
unstable. The primitive is both embedded in nature and human. The primitive is irrational, but 
also, insofar as it belongs to nature, is somehow beyond the rational/irrational binary.  The 
primitive is in the past, but also somehow outside of history altogether.  
Primitivism, to put it concisely, is a discourse of alterity that structures ways of thinking 
about nature, rationality, and temporality. Primitivism is a discourse that uses a self-other 
binary to make statements about such concepts as progress, history, autonomy, authenticity, 
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and alienation. Within this generally defined discourse, however, I will identify a set of salient 
differences. Before explaining the classifications of primitivist discourse that structure my own 
analysis, it is necessary to recount the existing classification scheme in studies of primitivism. 
The literature, to simply things a bit, identifies two basic categories of primitivism. The first, 
which we might call the anthropological or imperialist primitivism, is a discourse in which 
“civilization” is defined by progress, rationality, and autonomy, in opposition to a “primitive” 
other lacking these traits. If this discourse is generally marked by a celebration of civilization’s 
achievements, and an aversion to the primitive, the second mode of discourse, artistic or 
romantic primitivism, inverts this set of value judgments; in this mode of primitivism, the 
primitive is now esteemed for its naturalness, vitality, and authenticity.  
This is of course a crude distinction, although a helpful one. Anthropological or 
imperialist primitivism, in the sense proposed here, does not refer only to the use of primitivism 
in the academic discipline of anthropology, which was formally established in the nineteenth 
century, but also encompasses commonplace Eurocentric views of primitive society which have 
been expressed from the fifteenth century up to the present. These distinctions between the 
civilized and the primitive, however, acquired not only their clearest articulation but also the 
aura of scientific truth in the institutionalization of anthropology that took place in the 
nineteenth century, most profoundly in the theory of cultural evolutionism. Evolutionist 
thought envisioned a gradual historical progress of “man,” stretching from his origins in the 
pre-historical past, to the current heights of modern European civilization, defined by 
unprecedented technological and material progress.   
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Evolutionist thought, although the dominant theory of nineteenth-century British 
anthropology, represents a European-wide cultural development. In addition, the primitivist 
view of anthropologists was not confined to the texts of scholars or specialists, however, but 
pervaded popular culture as well. To take a prominent example, in 1846, in an essay on the 
inferiority of sculpture to painting, the French poet Charles Baudelaire remarked: “The origin of 
sculpture is lost in the darkness of time; it is therefore an art of Caribs. Indeed, we see that all 
peoples carve fetishes very skillfully long before they take up the art of painting, which is an art 
of profound reasoning and one whose enjoyment demands a particular initiation.” 90  The 
“Caribs”—the dark-skinned former inhabitants of the Caribbean islands, believed to have 
migrated there from South America, and in the popular imagination associated with 
cannibalism and fetishism—seemed to Baudelaire and his contemporaries an archetype of 
“primitive man.” 91 Baudelaire here gives voice to the intertwined constellation of concepts 
                                                     
90 Charles Baudelaire, “Pourquoi la sculpture est ennuyeuse,” Salon de 1846, Critique d’art, ed. Claude Pichois 
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comment to represent a popular negative view of the primitive, his own view was indeed more subtle, and no 
doubt shaped by his years-long erotic involvement with Jeanne Duval, a Haitian-born actress and dancer of mixed 
French and black African ancestry. Flam and Deutsch relate the following anecdote: “Baudelaire [once] visited a 
naval officer who had recently come back from the South Seas with a number of strange objects. While Baudelaire 
was examining a small carving, the naval officer, eager to draw his attention to something else, referred to the 
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the officer wanted to show him, the poet raised his hand said: ‘Take care, my friend, it is perhaps the true God.’” 
See Jack Flam with Miriam Deutch, eds., Primitivism and Twentieth-Century Art: A Documentary History (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003), 1; paraphrasing William J. Ivins, Jr. Prints and Visual 
Communication (Cambridge and  London; MIT Press, 1953), 147. On Baudelaire’s primitiism see Christopher L. 
Miller, Blank Darkness: Africanist Discourse in French (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). The Caribs were 
featured in the travel writings of Amerigo Vespucci and Christopher Columbus, who reported that they ate human 
flesh; the Carib word for person, karibna, may have been the source of the English term "cannibalism." See 
Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982),  81ff; Basil A. Reid, Myths and Realities of Caribbean History 
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which, in the course of the nineteenth century, solidified into the imaginary boundaries that 
separated the European from the primitive: Europeans produce art, primitives had the fetish; 
Europeans possessed reason, which empowered those who had it and excluded those who 
were not “initiated” into it, like a secret society; and finally, Europeans belonged to history, 
whereas the “primitive” existed so deeply recessed in the human past that it was somehow 
outside of time altogether.  
 As recent studies of primitivism have shown, it was in the context of this current of 
anthropologically informed primitivism that the modernist and avant-garde artists of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries “discovered” the art of  “primitive” societies. This 
artistic  primitivism sought to reverse the set of hierarchies inherited from the era of European 
imperialism in which Europeans cast primitives as inferior. The primitive now appeared natural, 
instinctual, spiritual, and communal—a set of traits which seemed to be missing from wan, 
rationalized, “civilized” European society. The primitivism of these artists, in this interpretation, 
be understood as a “romantic” valorization the primitive, a reversed evaluation of that which 
was formerly denigrated. To quote from Leighten again: 
The modernists’ method was to critique civilization by embracing an imagined 
“primitiveness” of Africans whose “authenticity” they opposed to a “decadent” West. . . 
They wanted to subvert Western artistic traditions—and the social order in which they 
were implicated—by celebrating a Nietzschean return to those imagined “primitive” 
states whose suppression they viewed as having cut off a necessary vitality.92 
 
The idea of romantic primitivism is used to refer to such early twentieth-century 
modernists as Picasso or Vlaminck.  It is also used more broadly to refer to the primitivism of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009);  Lene Østermark-Johansen, Walter Pater and the Language of 
Sculpture (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 158. 
92 Leighten, “The White Peril and L’Art nègre,” 610 (italics added). 
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their precursors, who did not invoke the primitive as part of critique of aesthetics, but who 
deployed a romanticized image of the primitive to critique society. A leading example here 
would be Paul Gauguin, whose Post-Impressionist paintings of idyllic Polynesian scenes, with 
their bold colors and dreamlike quality, were charming Parisian art circles in the 1890s (fig. 1.8). 
In literature a major figure would be Karl May, who was (and remains) a bestselling author in 
the German language, had been writing much-loved stories romanticizing Native Americans 
since the 1880s. (His most well-known series, Winnetou, about an Apache chief, was published 
in four volumes between 1893 and 1910.) 
A primary argument of recent studies of primitivism, however, has been that this 
romantic primitivism, in spite of its admiration for the primitive  (or in the case of the avant-
garde, in spite of the innovations in artistic form), nevertheless represents a continuation of 
anthropological primitivism, in its perpetuation of the categories of Eurocentric colonial 
discourse. This has been the argument unifying the diverse criticisms launched in the wake of 
the 1984  MoMA exhibition. As Leighten writes, although the modernists were critical of their 
own society and the norms of bourgeois life,  
[they] did not extend this social criticism to a radical critique of the reductive view of 
Africans that was promoted for colonial justification. Instead, they embraced a deeply 
romanticized view of African culture (conflating many cultures into one), and considered 
Africa the embodiment of humankind in a precivilized state, preferring to mystify rather 
than to examine its presumed idol-worship and violent rituals.93 
 
Scholars have noted, in other words, that both anthropological and romantic forms of 
primitivism involve an inherent imposition of a hierarchy between civilized self and primitive 
other. The categories remain unchanged: the “West” is imagined as rational, artificial, and 
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historical, while the “primitive” is mystical, natural, transcendent. The difference between 
anthropological and romantic primitivism is simply that the latter reverses the value judgment 
of the former; hierarchy and otherness are preserved, casting the other as an object of desire 
rather than fear.   
 This analysis has been an invaluable insight of post-MoMA critiques. However, as I hope 
to make clear, this scholarship continues to ascribe a difference between anthropological and 
romantic primitivism. Whereas the former is depicted as a naïve Eurocentric embrace of 
civilization, the latter is said to be distinguished by its use of primitivism as a critique of 
civilization. As Colin Rhodes writes, for example, in Primitivism and Modern Art, modernist 
primitivism is an expression of “discontent with contemporary society.”94  
 My principal argument is that this distinction obscures what is in fact a deeper 
continuity running through both. Whether nineteenth-century anthropologists (and Europeans 
in general) enjoyed a sense of their technological, rational, and moral superiority over 
“primitive” tribes, or avant-garde artists looked to the “primitives” as a means to escape or 
critique modernity (primitivism as a nostalgic longing or as a utopian contrast to the present), 
both are united in their description of modernity as identifiable by such markers as rationality, 
positivism, materialism, cultural or intellectual traits which are equated with the development 
of industrialization, technology, and capitalism.   
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 On the one hand, there is clearly a shift from anthropological primitivism to artistic 
primitivism; the former looked positively on the autonomy, self-awareness, power, and 
progress of modernity; twentieth-century modernists saw a world marked by fragmentation 
and alienation from self, society, and world.  What should be clear, however, is that both accept 
the categories of primitive and civilized.  The  only difference, for the recent studies of 
primitivism, is that the romantic primitivists are said to be critical of civilization. As before, we 
have only an inversion of attitude in regards to civilization. 
The problem, I argue, is that recent work fails to recognize the duality of the primitivist 
discourse; this discourse posits not only a set of representations about the primitive, but also a 
set of representations about civilization. Although recent work acknowledges a continuity 
between anthropological and romantic primitivism in terms of the imperial perception of the 
primitive other, it does not recognize that a similar continuity exists in the conception of the 
civilized. To put it cumbersomely, romantic primitivism occupied in the critique of civilization in 
fact perpetuates the narrative of civilization which was produced under the discourse of 
anthropological primitivism.  
 I therefore want to introduce a new approach to classifying primitivism: on the one 
hand, we can identify the primitivism that perpetuates this narrative of civilization, which is to 
say, the disenchantment narrative as I have outlined above; and on the other, that primitivism 
which calls that narrative into question. To put it another way, this dissertation seeks to make a 
distinction between modes of primitivism that accept the distinction between primitive and 
civilized—those which accept the discourse of primitivism—and those which question it. I have 
termed these alternatives apotropaic and aporetic forms of primitivist discourse. Apotropaic 
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discourse refers here to examples of primitivist discourse which reify the distinction between 
modernity and the primitive;  aporetic primitivism, on the other hand, refers to moments of 
discourse which paradoxically make use of the primitivist discourse, yet call that discourse into 
question. In diagnosing cases of aporetic primitivism, I argue that these moments therefore 
reveal the constructedness of an imagined modernity. 
 The term apotropaic I have borrowed from Hal Foster, who invoked it in his memorable 
critique of the 1984 MoMA exhibition. Foster opened his critique with a discussion of Picasso’s 
Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, “a primal scene of modern primitivism.”95 Foster argued that 
Picasso’s painting presents two encounters simultaneously: one is the depicted encounter in 
the brothel, the other is Picasso’s visit in 1907 to the “collection of tribal artifacts” in the Musée 
d’Ethnographie du Trocadéro. Foster points out that Picasso, in his later recollection of his visit 
to the museum, described this moment as the inspirational moment for Demoiselles. Moreover, 
Picasso says that he understood the meaning of the objects—they were “weapons”—and that 
this was in fact how his own artistic creation should be understood: 
They were against everything—against unknown threatening spirits.... I, too, I am 
against everything. I, too, believe that everything is unknown, that everything is an 
enemy! ... women, children ... the whole of it! I understand what the Negroes used their 
sculptures for.... All fetishes ... were weapons. To help people avoid coming under the 
influence of spirits again, to help them become independent. Spirits, the unconscious ... 
they are all the same thing.  I understood why I was a painter. All alone in that awful 
museum with the masks ... the dusty mannikins. Les Demoiselles d’Avignon must have 
been born that day, but not at all because of the forms; because it was my first exorcism 
painting—yes absolutely!96 
 
                                                     
95 Hal Foster, “The ‘Primitive’ Unconscious of Modern Art,” October 34 (Fall 1985): 45. 
96 Quoted in André Malraux, Picasso’s Mask, trans. June and Jacques Guicharnaud (New York: Hold, Rinehart, and 
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Thus, Foster argues, Picasso “intuited” the apotropaic function of these objects—their ability to 
ward off or turn away evil spirits.  Picasso’s oversimplification of these ethnographic art objects 
is beside the point; what matters, Foster argued, is that Picasso envisioned his own art in terms 
of a similar apotropaic function. As Foster explains, “In projecting the primitive onto woman as 
other, Demoiselles less resolves than is riven by the threat to male subjectivity, displaying its 
own decentering along with its defense.”97 Picasso’s primitivism grasps the decentering power 
of primitivism—the figure of the “primitive” presents a threat, not simply, I would note, to male 
subjectivity, but to colonial subjectivity. Picasso’s work displays this decentering power, and yet 
tries to defend against it, to ward off these threats as if they were evil spirits. Foster concludes: 
Picasso conveys the shock of this encounter as well as the euphoria of his solution, an 
extraordinary psycho-aesthetic move by which otherness was used to ward away others 
(woman, death, the primitive) and by which, finally, a crisis in phallocentric culture was 
turned into one of its great monuments.98 
 
In Foster’s reading, Picasso’s primitivism, for all its naïve understanding of African ethnographic 
art objects, is far from a romanticism. It represents, rather, a simultaneous recognition and 
disavowal: recognition that the concept of the “civilized” is threatened by paradoxes of the 
“primitive,” and disavowal of that recognition. It is in this sense that I have here employed the 
term apotropaic; to designate moments of primitivist discourse which reaffirm the categories of 
the imperialist primitivist discourse; and which reaffirm, therefore,  the discourse of modernity. 
The term apotropaic is perhaps obscure enough to ward off the likelihood of 
misinterpretation; the concept of aporia, however, surfaces upon occasion in discussions of 
primitivist art, and therefore a word should be said about how I am using this term. In most 
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instances it is used in an untheorized way, to suggest a paradox  or contradiction; it represents, 
as defined by Merriam-Webster, “a logical impasse or contradiction.”99 Foster, for example, 
writes that modernist primitivism, as epitomized by the MoMA exhibition, is marked by such a 
contradiction; it is marked by 
a repression of the fact that a breakthrough in our art, indeed a regeneration of our 
culture, is based in part on the breakup and decay of other societies, that the modernist 
discovery of the primitive is not only in part its oblivion but its death.  And the final 
contradiction or aporia is this: no anthropological remorse, aesthetic elevation, or 
redemptive exhibition can correct or compensate this loss because they are all 
implicated in it. Primitivism, then, not only absorbs the potential disruption of the tribal 
objects into Western forms, ideas, and commodities, it also symptomatically manages 
the ideological nightmare of a great art inspired by spoils.100 
 
Foster’s argument, therefore, diagnoses not only the apotropaic element in the primitivism of 
Picasso and the primitivism of MoMA, but primitivism in general. This basic observation has 
been developed into a more specified critique of particular types of primitivism by Victor Li, in 
The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity. 101 For Li, it is 
not primitivism in general that is aporetic, but a certain category of primitivism, what he calls 
“neo-primitivism.” Li’s argument is concerned not with the history of primitivism, but with an 
examination of the writings of contemporary theorists such as Torgovnick, Marshall Sahlins, 
Jean Baudrillard, and Jürgen Habermas. Li argues that although this corpus of work “questions 
the use of terms like ‘primitive’ and ‘primitivism,’ it continues to exhibit a deep primitivist logic 
that lurks in displaced but related concepts like ‘alterity,’ ‘culture,’ and surprisingly, 
‘modernity.’”102 In other words, although these writers reject the Eurocentric logic of 
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primitivism, and are thus “anti-primitivist,” they use these concepts in a way which Li shows is 
not neutral, but in fact unintentionally reproduces the primitivism they sought to overcome. 
For Li, then, the important contradiction is not in primitivism in general, but in critiques 
of primitivism. Li uses aporia to designate the dilemma in which such critics find themselves, 
committed to critiquing a Eurocentric discourse, but forced to rely upon that very discourse to 
make their argument. They are therefore trapped in the discourse which they try to critique. 
The theoretical writing of the neo-primitivists can thus be described as aporetic, as in the sense 
of being caught up in an irresolvable contradiction—as in, for example: “This sentence is not to 
be trusted.” 
Li’s response, on the one hand, is to urge for “a continuing vigilance against the return 
of the dismissed or deconstructed ‘primitive.’”103At the same time, however, Li concludes that 
he himself, in his own critique of neo-primitivism, is caught up in this aporetic discourse:  
I cannot escape from this aporia of at once criticizing neo-primitivism and of relying on 
certain of its theoretical assumptions. I can only acknowledge my dilemma. For who 
would want to be a neo-primitivist uncritically, when one can at least know critically the 
aporia in which one finds oneself.104 
 
Although I agree with Li’s exhortation to vigilance and the first part of his argument, that 
much contemporary theory does in fact reproduce the primitivist discourse it aims to critique, I 
disagree fundamentally with his second conclusion. Li  ultimately concludes that the “primitive” 
is necessary for critical thought—that, in the words of Michel de Certeau,  “theorizing always 
needs a savage.”105 Li writes: “In the course of our study of neo-primitivism, we have come to 
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understand that theorizing needs the savage especially when it critically examines or theorizes 
itself. To dismiss the primitive Other is thus to dismiss theory itself, a price we may be unwilling 
to pay.”106 
 Li’s error is in treating primitivism as a theoretical problem rather than a historical one. 
He concludes that the opposition between modernity and the primitive provides the 
unavoidable framing structure, not just of recent theory, but of theory tout court. Thus in spite 
of his call for continuing vigilance, he himself is led to inscribe primitivism indelibly onto critical 
thought.  
I argue rather that primitivism must be understood as a contingent historical discourse. 
It is indeed the case, as he argues, that theorists who critique primitivism often invoke such as 
concepts as culture or modernity in ways that reinscribe the dichotomy between primitive and 
modern; yet their predicament is not the product of theory, but of interpreting theory from 
within the perspective of the primitivist discourse.  
To demonstrate what I mean it will be useful to consider Li’s argument.  Li, for example, 
critiques Habermas’s theory of modernity as an example of aporetic neo-primitivism. On the 
one hand, in Habermas’s depiction of modernity as the “rationalization” of the “life-world” 
(Lebenswelt), he defines modernity against a premodern or primitive condition; on the other 
hand, his theory of modernity is marked by “a recovery of the prototype of normative 
consensus and communicative intersubjectivity present in the premodern condition that has 
been disavowed.” Li concludes: 
What Habermas has called “the unfinished project of modernity” can therefore be more 
accurately re-titled “the aporetic dilemma of modernity.” For, try as it may, modernity’s 
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rationalization of the world can never fully dismiss the pre-rationalized, premodern 
lifeworld’s attachment to archaic or primal images of “symbiotic wholeness and 
nurturing protection.”107 
 
The problem here, however, is that Li accepts Habermas’s identification of modernity as 
a condition, as the time of rationalization. Habermas defines it as such, but my point is that this 
is not a necessary conclusion. It is, rather, an acceptance of the discourse of primitivism, in 
which modernity has come to be defined as the time of rationality, progress, and autonomy, in 
opposition to the primitive. It is, in other words, an acquiescence to the disenchantment 
narrative, an embrace of an imagined modernity. 
Contrary to Li, then, I argue that criticism of primitivism is in fact possible—although I 
am using the term criticism loosely here, in the sense of negation, not a conscious act of 
criticism (a point to which I return below). In making this argument, I have used the term aporia 
to an end different from that of Li and Foster. My argument is not that all primitivist discourse 
is inherently paradoxical (Foster), or that specifically criticism of primitivism is paradoxical (Li). I 
argue rather that certain types of primitivism are paradoxical on account of the fact that they 
simultaneously make use of the discourse of primitivism, while undermining its assumptions.  
Significantly, therefore, I use “aporetic” to refer to examples of primitivism which 
successfully challenge primitivist discourse, rather than merely perpetuate it. Li uses aporia to 
define a situation in which the critic of primitivism is stuck or trapped. I use aporia here to 
emphasize its productive potential. Li’s usage of aporia to suggest simply paradox or 
contradiction, fails to draw upon a further meaning of the term, the sense it held in classical 
Greek philosophy and mythology. The word comes from the Greek aporia, for difficulty, which 
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was derived from aporos, “without passage” or “impossible path.” Plato’s early dialogues, for 
example, are described as ending in aporia. The poor target of Socrates’ interrogation is 
compelled through logical discussion to the realization that he does not know what he initially 
thought he knew; not because Socrates has argued an alternative, merely because Socrates has 
managed to demonstrate that the speaker’s own claims are self-contradictory. The aporia thus 
represents the end of the discussion, but also the beginning of knowledge, in that it means the 
abandonment of a false claim. I use aporia here in this sense, to designate a type of interpretive 
impasse; it represents a moment through which a discourse cannot pass. A moment of aporetic 
primitivism, therefore, is not faced with the inevitability of primitivism, as Li would have it; 
rather, it faces the impossibility of the primitivist discourse, and makes it known as such. 
An important distinction must be made here, between what I am describing as the 
operation of an aporetic discourse and the theory of deconstructionism, as a mode of literary 
and philosophical analysis which is also concerned with the aporetic. Deconstruction refers to a 
wide body of critical thought with roots in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, although it is 
above all associated with the work of Jacques Derrida. Derrida’s own manner of 
deconstructivist analysis was not uniform, but can be said to have shifted between his earlier 
and later writings, with the former more concerned with the notion of différance, the latter 
more the question of aporia.108  Derrida’s approach to textual analysis proved very influential 
not only for feminist critique but also for postcolonial analysis, and thus it is imperative to 
address the relationship of my own project to deconstructionist theory.  
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Crudely put, deconstructionist approaches to analysis seek to demonstrate a 
contradiction in a text that is inevitable. The aim of deconstruction is not to reveal a particular 
claim as false, but rather to demonstrate that contradiction is what makes the claim possible. 
The aporetic element of a deconstructivist reading of a text comes in the recognition of 
contradiction and the simultaneous recognition of its inevitability. Such approaches have been 
commonly adopted in literary theory, directed at a specific text or at a set of texts, as well as in 
philosophy, directed at the logocentrism of “Western philosophical ontology” or at the latter’s 
conception of radical alterity.109  
I must make clear that I am not here arguing that the authors or artists upon which I 
focus are engaged in a deconstruction of primitivism, in the above sense; nor am I myself 
engaging in a deconstructionist project. In the first place, although I will argue that authors such 
as Bastian “undermine” or “dismantle” the primitivist discourse, I am not arguing that he 
engages in a deconstruction of primitivism. Bastian himself would not have described his work 
as such; nor am I claiming that he unconsciously engaged in an act of deconstruction. I am 
arguing, rather, that Bastian’s primitivism contained a contradiction; it both inhabited the 
discourse of primitivism (made use of the categories of primitive and civilized) and undermined 
the meaning of those categories.  
This leads to the second point; it may appear that I  am offering a deconstructionist 
reading of particular works of primitivism. The point however is not simply that a work or text 
can be both primitivist and anti-primitivist, and is therefore aporetic from the critic’s 
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perspective. Nor is it the case that these authors, in undermining primitivism, are calling 
attention to a paradox. The particular way in which an author, text, or artwork can be said to 
undermine the meanings of the discourse will vary according to the work. Bastian’s theoretical 
work, for example, does not call attention to an inevitable contradiction in primitivism; it 
undermines the discourse of primitivism specifically by negating the denial of coevalness. 
Although he adopts the disciplinary theoretical framework of Naturvölker and Culturvölker, he 
develops a theory in which both categories are equally shaped by history and nature, the 
contingent and the inevitable; at the same time, although he participates in the genre of 
anthropological writing, with the implied authorial perspective of the anthropological expert 
providing knowledge of the object, he develops a literary technique that disrupts the privileged 
subject position of anthropological discourse. In these senses, then, he undermines the 
discourse of primitivism. As a form of primitivism that is also undermining primitivism, his 
discourse can be called aporetic. 
 
Part 8.  Interventions 
 
To summarize, then, I am interested here in assessing two types of primitivist discourse. 
By apotropaic primitivism I refer to modes of primitivism which reify the distinctions between 
the primitive and the modern; apotropaic primitivism thereby supports an imagined modernity, 
defined in terms of the disenchantment narrative (assuming we use that phrase as shorthand, 
aware of the enchantments of the narrative). By aporetic primitivism I refer to modes of 
primitivism which, although they participate in the primitivist discourse (whether as 
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anthropological or romantic primitivism, for example), they also critique that discourse. 
Moments of aporetic discourse critique primitivism not from an external vantage point, but by 
making manifest the paradoxes of the primitivist discourse. 
This interpretive framework makes it possible to analyze instances of primitivism in 
ethnography, art, and theory in such a way that existing debates about the significance of 
primitivism can be not so much solved as repositioned. Instances of apotropaic primitivism can 
be discerned in both anthropological primitivism and romantic primitivism; the same goes for 
aporetic primitivism.  
In studies of ethnology, for example, critical scholarship has focused on how primitivism 
has constructed the subject position of civilization. As Johannes Fabian has argued, 
anthropological discourse has historically been marked by a denial of coevalness. I shall argue 
that this neglects the fact that some forms of anthropological primitivism in fact can be 
described as aporetic—this argument forms the basis of chapter four on the German 
ethnologist Bastian.  
In the realm of aesthetics and avant-garde art, the scholarly debate has centered on the 
following questions: whether primitivism should be seen as a flight from modernity (a position 
running from Georg Lukács up to T.J. Clark’s Farewell to an Idea), or an engagement with 
modernity (from Ernst Bloch to recent scholarship by Jill Lloyd and Mary Gluck)110; and whether 
avant-garde artists were influenced by non-European artistic styles (thus suggesting a 
                                                     
110 Georg Lukács and Ernst Bloch, “Presentation 1,” in Aesthetics And Politics: Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukács, Bertolt 
Brecht, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, ed. Ronald Taylor (London and New York: Verso, 1977; 2007); T. J. Clark. 
Farewell to an Idea: Episodes From a History of Modernism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Lloyd, 
German Expressionism; Mary Gluck, "Interpreting Primitivism, Mass Culture and Modernism: The Making of 
Wilhelm Worringer's Abstraction and Empathy," New German Critique, no. 80, Special Issue on the Holocaust 
(Spring – Summer, 2000): 149-169. 
98 
 
multicultural or trans-cultural description), or found the artworks of non-Europeans interesting 
only because they had already arrived, independently, at an aesthetics that made it possible for 
them to appreciate that art.  
Regardless of which side of these debates one takes, primitivist movements in late-
nineteenth and twentieth-century art are widely understood as a critique of modern life. The 
classification I have proposed makes it possible to observe a distinction, however, between 
modes of primitivism that view the primitive as desirable—that is, which envy the primitive life 
for its supposed naturalness, freedom, community, for its incarnation of an unalienated, 
authentic existence—and modes of primitivism which emerge from the encounter with the 
primitive with questions—primitivism which asks, what is natural? what is freedom? What is 
authentic existence? Put simply, the distinction here proposed is between modes of primitivism 
which preserve these distinctions, and those which cultivate aporia. This argument forms the 
basis of chapters five and six, on the aporetic primitivism of the Brücke. 
 Third, this framework enables a critical perspective on recent theoretical statements on 
primitivism. Rather than arguing, as Li does, that all writing which critiques primitivism 
necessarily perpetuates the discourse, I posit that we can distinguish between the apotropaic 
and the aporetic in contemporary theory. To return to Foster: after diagnosing the apotropaic 
in Demoiselles, he argued that the MoMA exhibition itself served a similar apotropaic function. 
The exhibition, in positing the “primitive” as a timeless, transcendent mode of being, 
recapitulated the same recognition and disavowal that marked Picasso’s painting. Foster writes: 
The show pretends to revise the MoMA story of art, to disrupt its formal and narrative 
unity but only so as to reestablish it: the transgressive is acknowledged only to be again 
repressed. . . . This maneuver also allows it at once to contain the return of its repressed 
and to connect with a neoprimitivist moment in contemporary art: MOMAism is not 
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past after all! In all these ways, the critique posed by the primitive is contravened, 
absorbed within the body of modern art.111 
 
Post-MoMA critiques have sought to distance themselves from MoMA’s version of primitivism 
by critiquing the imperialist projection of the “primitive.” I argue, however, that these critiques, 
in spite of their self-reflexive awareness and their critique of the complicity of imperialism, 
anthropology, and art, nevertheless perpetuate the discourse of primitivism through their 
commitment to describing primitivist art as a critique of modernity. In other words, just as 
Foster argued that the MoMA exhibition was apotropaic, I argue that this body of 
contemporary scholarship on primitivism is apotropaic. This analysis forms the subject of 
chapter two. 
Finally, this classification system allows for an important distinction to be made 
between aporetic primitivism and two other modes of primitivism that seem to negate the 
distinction between civilized and primitive, but which in fact reinscribe the difference on a 
more subtle level. I am referring here to two types of arguments, frequently encountered in 
writing on primitivism in modern art: one, which we can call the “savage within” or “inner 
savage” argument, the second which we can call “savage civilization.”  
The first case refers to critics’ arguments that primitivist artists have used primitivism as 
a means of describing or drawing attention to a “universal” feature of human psychology; the 
implication is that beneath the civilized surface of “modern man,” is a primitive self, an “inner 
savage.” This argument comes in two variations; either the “inner savage” is imagined as the 
authentic, natural, mystical self, which modern life has repressed, and which should therefore 
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be recuperated; or the “inner savage” is pictures as the bestial, amoral, irrational inner self, 
which is present in all of us, but which civilization manages to keep in check.  
Critics have argued that such examples of primitivism effectively negate the distinction 
between primitive and civilized—that by universalizing the distinction (everyone has an “inner 
savage”), such works collapse the distinction between the two. On one hand this is a bit of a 
dodge, as the argument in most cases is clearly directed at identifying the “savage” within the 
“civilized” Westerner, and is rarely used to describe non-Westerners; nevertheless, even were 
the argument to be applied universally, however, the terms in which it is made perpetuate the 
civilized—primitive distinction. The “savage within” interpretation, although at first seeming to 
suggest an undermining of difference, does not dismiss the categories of primitive and civilized.  
In fact, not only does it re-impose their binary opposition, but posits a relationship which can 
only be hierarchical (the civilized mastery of the primitive self). Through the notion of the 
repressed “primitive,” the “civilized” subject is defined by rationalism and regularity, its 
struggle to control the forces “beneath the surface.” The universalizing aspect of the argument, 
therefore, far from collapsing the distinction, insidiously reifies the historical, imperialist 
discourse of primitivism into a normative psychology. 
 A related argument is the concept of “savage civilization.” If the above argument 
constitutes an application of primitivism to human psychology, this latter form constitutes an 
application to human society. I use the concept to refer to examples of primitivism which 
suggest that civilization itself is primitive. Most commonly, the argument is framed something 
like the following: that modern civilization, which had been thought, in the nineteenth century 
perhaps, to be rational, progressive, a movement toward freedom and enlightenment, is in fact 
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riven with violence, irrationality, mindlessness and servitude (to bourgeois norms and the 
insidious forces of capitalism). This argument, I suggest, characterizes some of the work 
produced by the members of the Frankfurt School, for example Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer’s critique of contemporary society in Dialectic of Enlightenment. As they write in 
the preface (1944/1947), “What we had set out to do [in this work] was nothing less than to 
explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of 
barbarism.”112 It is generally held that Horkheimer and Adorno reveal the dialectical 
construction of the primitive and the civilized; the work, after all, is devoted precisely to 
analyzing the dialectical opposition between myth and enlightenment. The categories of their 
analysis do not, however, simply overlap: myth is not identical with the primitive, 
enlightenment with civilization. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the distinction between myth and 
enlightenment is collapsed (myth, they write, “is already enlightenment, and enlightenment 
reverts to mythology”); but this collapsed state itself is identified as a specific historical crisis of 
civilization.  
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that civilization has succumbed to barbarism, but unlike 
their analytical negation of opposition between enlightenment and myth, this binary of 
civilization and barbarism (which is a form of the primitive/civilized discourse) remains intact. 
The force of their argument, as evidenced from the above quote, is premised precisely on the 
critique of contemporary society, a critique which is made from the standpoint of humanism. 
Enlightenment, in their telling, in asserting its own positive mastery of nature and self by 
excluding myth, deceived itself about the existence its own mythmaking propensity. Based on 
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the terms of their argument, we might argue that civilization similarly repeats this move vis-à-
vis the barbaric; but to collapse this distinction would vitiate the grounds of their own 
argument. They do not wish to demonstrate that all civilization reverts to barbarism, and that 
all barbarism is already civilized; they wish to argue that modern Western society in particular 
has succumbed to barbarism—to violence, exploitation, mindlessness, and the destructive 
forces of capitalism and rationalism.  
In conclusion, then, critics have commonly argued that types of  primitivism of the 
“inner savage” or “savage civilization” variety collapse the distinction between primitive and 
civilized. These critics have concluded that, unlike simple romantic primitivism, as presented 
above, these types of primitivism therefore represent a break with anthropological, imperialist 
primitivism. This is not the case, however, as these modes of primitivism in fact shore up the 
binary opposition between primitive and civilized; they therefore should be grasped as 
examples of apotropaic primitivism.  
 
Part 9.  The Significance for German History 
 
Thus far I have been speaking of primitivism as a phenomenon not confined within any 
particular national boundary, but as part of an international discourse. This is because, as I have 
argued, representations of the primitive in different national traditions often share certain 
features and are used to discuss common concerns, such as nature and alienation. I have 
resisted designated this a European or Western discourse, however, because these terms are 
problematic for several reasons. Of course, on the one hand, the designation “Western” makes 
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sense, in that primitivism, as a colonial discourse, was a feature of European imperialism. On 
the other hand, the discourse of primitivism often emerges in “non-Western” voices 
(individuals that the discourse meant to exclude).  Moreover, as I argue for a relationship 
between primitivism and the critique of modernity, it is no longer tenable to argue that the 
critique of modernity, or the social and political theories of the Enlightenment, should be seen 
as somehow only European, or Western, in origin.113  
I have therefore demarcated this as a study of primitivism in modernity. This definition 
is no doubt circular, since part of my aim is to demonstrate that just as primitivism is a 
discourse of modernity, modernity is produced in and through that discourse. However, I 
believe this particular circularity needs emphasizing. As typified in the quote from Torgovnick 
above, the current theoretical consensus understands primitivism as a projection of “Western” 
fears and desires onto the “primitive” other. Such a view denies the circularity which I am 
asserting, by positing modernity as a historical condition, the product of modernization in the 
West.  
Second, by defining primitivism as a discourse of modernity, rather than a discourse of 
the West, or Europe, I seek to avoid reinscribing the lingering ethnocentric conceptions   
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which identify the West in terms of rationality, freedom, power, etc., in opposition to the 
ethnographic other; this is, after all, a product of the primitivist discourse which I aim to 
critique.  
Accordingly, the following chapter maintains this broad scope, treating primitivism as an 
international discourse. I begin with an examination of how primitivism has been theorized in 
contemporary scholarly writing since roughly 1984 (the year of the Museum of Modern Art’s 
controversial exhibition on “Primitivism”). Here I argue that the insight provided by the 
theorization of primitivism as a projection has been undermined in studies of modernism by 
also framing primitivism as a project (the critique of modernity).  
After this initial argument, however, I narrow the field of analysis to the German case; 
having presented the necessary theoretical and historiographical context, I am able to offer 
new interpretations of several important texts, figures, and moments in German studies. I begin 
with a new reading of a canonical text of German studies, Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. I offer a new reading of Adolf Bastian, the leading figure of German ethnology in 
the nineteenth century, distinguishing him from the antihumanist strain in the German 
tradition, in order to show that contrary to Johannes Fabian, not all anthropology from the 
period was marked by a denial of coevalness. Finally, I take a revisionist look at the primitivism 
of the Brücke, arguing that the group’s artwork should not be understood as a critique of 
modernity, but as, in effect, a critique of primitivism and the disenchantment narrative to which 
it is enthralled. 
 This combination, then, of an international context with a set of national case studies is 
intended to demonstrate German participation in a broader, perhaps a global, history. 
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Therefore, although I have chosen to focus on Germans, one could also have chosen to explore 
the aporetic discourse of “non-European” figures, such as the writings of Chinua Achebe, or the 
performative practices of Bushmen intending to re-enact “primitive” conceptions for European 
tourists and documentary filmmakers.114 
This international or transnational framework is not intended to deny the presence of  
different national inflections of primitivism, however, just as there are differences between, 
say, German and British anthropological traditions, or the German and French variations of 
modernism. In a historiography that has traditionally been preoccupied with questions about 
peculiarity, discussions about national difference necessarily raise questions about German 
exceptionalism. The interdisciplinary framing of my project presents a set of overlapping 
questions in regards to German exceptionalism—broadly speaking, questions about the 
relationship of colonial discourse to culture, anthropology to culture, and colonialism to 
culture. 
As I am principally concerned with the discourse of primitivism, which is to say, 
representations of the colonial other, I engage with a complicated historiography concerning 
Germans’ conceptions of cultural and racial difference. Analysis of these issues is of course 
deeply colored by the calamity of the Holocaust and the National Socialist racial state. 
Bracketing for the moment the question of Germany’s colonial (or precolonial) past, it should 
be noted that an older body of literature had argued that German history revealed a deep 
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cultural disposition towards ethnocentrism and völkisch or racial thought.115 This tradition, 
while the target of substantial and sustained critique, has nevertheless found recent exponents. 
As Geoff Eley has observed, “This gesturing towards a deep cultural sociology of backwardness 
is perhaps the least adequately theorized or historicized part of the Sonderweg thesis, although 
it remains in many ways fundamental to the scaffolding of a continuing tradition of Anglo-
American historical interpretation.”116 Eley cites recent work by George Williamson, Dominic 
Boyer, Kevin Cramer, Isabel Hull, and Helmut Smith.117 
 This general tendency has, moreover, found some support in recent studies on the 
relationship of colonialism to German culture.118 The historiography here is not entirely new, 
but has roots in Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she argued that German 
colonialism can be understood as the breeding ground for National Socialism.119 Arendt’s 
suggestion remained largely undeveloped, primarily on account of the lingering sense that 
Germany’s short experience with colonialism limited any possible effects of colonialism on 
German society. More recently, Suzanne Zantop re-opened the discussion with her examination 
of Germans “colonial fantasies,” allowing her to consider a German colonial imagination even in 
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the absence of physical colonies.120 Although Zantop cautioned against “reading German 
history backward from the Holocaust,” she suggested a historical link between Germany’s 
“colonial fantasies” and twentieth-century genocide. Subsequent work, including the edited 
volumes The Imperialist Imagination and Germany’s Colonial Pasts, expressed reservations 
about the idea of a colonial Sonderweg; in both cases the editors expressed their desire to 
emphasize German heterogeneity and normalize Germany’s colonial history in international 
perspective (even if not all of the contributors shared the same approach).121  
 While such work has been vital for drawing much-needed attention to German 
colonialism, it has had the effect of reintroducing questions of deep continuities in Germans’ 
conception of otherness. In linking nineteenth-century colonialism to German culture, this work 
has often linked nineteenth-century German culture to twentieth-century disaster. As H. Glenn 
Penny and Matti Bunzl write: 
A number of scholars have attempted to show that there was a long, colonialist 
engagement between Germans and non-Europeans that might, in Zantop's words, 
explain “that racist, xenophobic and sexist models for action did not emerge in a 
vacuum but were firmly implanted in the imagination of “precolonial” Germans.”122 
 
This body of work on German colonialism has been an important foundation for my own; the 
notion of colonial fantasies supports my application of colonial discourse to a nation which only 
maintained colonies from the mid-1880s through World War 1 (and moreover, to a German-
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speaking community which pre-existed nationhood). It also supports my contention of a 
relationship between colonialism and culture.  
Nevertheless, my project is intended to reject arguments for German exceptionalism 
based upon a framework of cultural essentialism (of the “German mind” or “German nation” 
variety), as well as upon notions of continuity in general and teleology in particular. Two 
possible objections emerge here: first, it may appear that in bringing together anthropology, 
art, and theory under the concept of colonial discourse, I run the risk of reifying conceptions of 
a collective “German mind”; and second, that in linking examples of primitivist discourse from 
Georg Forster through to Adorno, I could be seen as positing continuity across time, adopting 
the longue dureé approach characteristic of genealogies of German racial, national, and völkisch 
thought. 
My theoretical framework, as well as the selection of studies, is meant to demonstrate 
that German history offers ample examples of both apotropaic and aporetic primitivism. There 
is not a singular “German” conception of the primitive persisting through time, nor is there a 
collective consciousness to be discovered. If “homologies” can be said to exist between 
instances, these should be understood as the product of historical contingency; intellectual 
traditions exist, but they only acquire utility in the moment they are put to use, by a particular 
author, for a particular reason. Traditions are only ever continually reinvented in the moment.  
I have tried therefore to draw attention to contingencies, whether personal (agency), 
societal (events), or institutional (structural). The personal level of explanation helps account 
for the uniqueness of Bastian, whose personal skills, ambitions, desires and experiences 
combined to position him as one of the prominent leaders in German ethnology, as opposed to 
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someone like Gustav Klemm, and which moreover led him to develop an idiosyncratic form of 
primitivism. At the level of societal events, transformative occurrences such as World War I 
effected anthropology as well as aesthetics.  Structural features, such as class, economic 
relationships, political systems, educational frameworks, all played a role in shaping instances 
of primitivist discourse. 
On a theoretical level, in order to posit connections and relationships while resisting 
teleology, I borrow from Bruno Latour the metaphor of network.123 Latour uses the concept to 
replace the “social” as a process of interactions between actors, both human and non-human; 
the concept of the social, understood as a zone of human interaction divorced from nature, for 
example, is itself a product a set of distinctions between nature and society, and therefore is 
unsuitable as the framework for analysis. The network itself represents the outcome of 
transformations of “unstable states” into a system, although the process is continual and the 
network ever changing. I should like to use the term network here not only synchronically, 
however, but also diachronically, across space and time. A network in this sense implies 
connection between locations (a tug on one node of the net can trigger movement in the 
others), but not totality (there are gaps in the net, it is not connected to everything) nor 
singularity. 
 More specifically, by arguing for the existence of an aporetic primitivism, and locating it 
in such prominent voices as Bastian and the Brücke, I demonstrate the inadequacy of a deep 
genealogy of German racism or völkisch ethnocentrism. However, it should be noted that my 
conceptual approach differs from a separate current of recent studies of Germans’ conceptions 
                                                     




of cultural and racial difference, as exemplified by Russell Berman’s Enlightenment or Empire: 
Colonial Discourse in German Culture (1998) and Todd Kontje’s German Orientalisms (2005).124 
As with the historiography on Germany’s “imperialist imagination” mentioned above, these 
works focus on German cultural production in relationship to colonialism—Berman more 
broadly, on and literature, travelogues, geography, missionary writings, and psychoanalysis, 
Kontje more specifically on literature. Berman argues that “the German intellectual tradition 
also contains moments of genuine openness to foreign cultures and significant cross-cultural 
exchange,” a conclusion shared by Kontje.125  
On the one hand, both monographs offer nuanced readings of important texts, 
demonstrating that “many of the figures deemed central to the German national literature 
were themselves products of border zones and contested identities, and that they write about 
these conflicts in their most famous works,” a claim with which I agree.126 Both are justly critical 
of the hegemonic aspects of Said’s argument, and hence press the case for plurality (Kontje’s 
Orientalisms replaces Said’s Orientalism). However, their refusal to engage with the important 
theoretical questions raised by Said’s critique leads to an un-theorized notion of discourse, a 
practice which ends up minimizing political context; positive representations of the colonial or 
Oriental other are misconstrued as moments of “cross-cultural exchange.” Berman’s framing of 
the problem as one of “Enlightenment or empire” suggests an easy delineation between the 
two which obscures a far more complex fusion, as if a text’s Enlightenment pedigree prevented 
its participation in imperialist modes of knowledge production. By adopting the frame of 
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colonial discourse, and the concepts of aporetic and apotropaic primitivism, I demonstrate that 
empire was already Enlightenment, and Enlightenment already empire. The concept of 
apotropaic primitivism entails that primitivism was a discourse simultaneously the product of 
both empire and Enlightenment. At the same time, resistance is possible from within the 
discourse, in the form of aporetic primitivism. 
 If the above demonstrates how my approach can productively reframe discussions 
about the relationship of colonialism to culture, my approach makes possible a related 
intervention in the historiography on the relationship of anthropology to culture. In light of Nazi 
racial science, there has been an understandable interest in assessing the relationship of the 
history of anthropology to National Socialism. Benoit Massin’s pioneering work offered insight 
into the growing tendencies toward racial determinism, in the history of physical anthropology 
in particular.127  However, as Penny and Bunzl caution, “Reading the discipline's trajectory 
through latter-day National Socialists is bound to produce a deep genealogy of Nazi thought 
qua anthropological race science.”128  The most important recent work on German 
anthropology has resisted implications of teleology; as Penny and Bunzl argue, “no clear 
trajectory can be drawn from the complex and multiple constellations that characterized 
imperial anthropology to the race science of the Nazis.”129 
 In making their case, however, Penny and Bunzl must place a heavy stress on the liberal 
humanism and cosmopolitanism of nineteenth-century anthropologists such as Bastian and 
Rudolf Virchow. German anthropology was, they argue, “a self-consciously liberal endeavor, 
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guided by a broadly humanistic agenda and centered on efforts to document the plurality and 
historical specificity of cultures.”130 However, as I argued above against Berman and Kontje, this 
paints too rosy a picture of German anthropology in the nineteenth-century, a century that, if 
we accept the work by Zantop and others, offered ample evidence of racism and 
ethnocentrism, not only in the culture at large but within the field of anthropology. Bastian’s 
ethnology, for all its humanism, was nevertheless marred by a set of common ethnocentric 
assumptions, such as the cultural “simplicity” of “primitive” primitives.  Anthropology, in spite 
of its humanism, nevertheless was not isolated from the imperial world, the “colonial fantasies” 
to which Zantop drew attention.131 The significant feature of Bastian’s thought is not simply his 
humanism, which Penny and Bunzl present in opposition to “biology, hierarchy, and 
invariance.” If we take seriously the claims of colonial discourse analysis, the inseparability of 
humanism from imperialism and ethnocentrism becomes an unavoidable conclusion; to suggest 
otherwise is to echo Berman’s simplified dichotomy of Enlightenment and empire.  Bastian’s 
thought was permeated as much by “biology, hierarchy, and invariance” as it was by “culture, 
plurality, and plasticity.”   
If this line of thinking is correct, it complicates the primary analytic narrative presented  
in Penny and Bunzl’s volume, which argues that the discipline was marked by a turn to race in 
the twentieth century, and a corresponding “shift from culture, plurality, and plasticity to 
                                                     
130 Ibid., 1. 
131 Andrew Zimmerman has made a related argument, stressing the antihumanism of German anthropology in the 
late nineteenth century.  Although I disagree with his classification of Bastian as antihumanist, his argument is 
otherwise a compelling one. Andrew Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
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biology, hierarchy, and invariance.”132 On the one hand, I would not dispute what they refer to 
as the “basic facts”: 
that most German anthropologists and ethnologists abandoned the liberal humanism of 
Virchow and Bastian after the turn of the century, and that they embraced an 
increasingly völkisch vision, dominated by the various “struggles” for Lebensraum, both 
outside and within Europe instead.133 
 
While there was a discernible shift in anthropological outlook from the late nineteenth to the 
early  twentieth century, it would be a mistake to characterize the history of German 
anthropology as a trajectory of “Herder to Hitler,” as Penny and Bunzl phrase it, even though 
they qualify the by noting that the trajectory “does not provide us with an obvious path from 
the first to the second.”134 On the one hand, anthropology in imperial Germany cannot simply 
be classed as humanist and pluralist. Andrew Zimmerman calls attention, for example, to the 
Schulstatistik, a survey conducted by the German Anthropological Society in the 1870s, headed 
by Virchow, which directed German states to record the hair, eye, and skin color of German 
schoolchildren. The anthropological knowledge produced by the study confirmed that 
“Germans were a blond, blue-eyed, and white-skinned ‘race,’ which was contrasted to brunet 
‘races,’ particularly Jews.”135 As Zimmerman writes, “Perhaps even more importantly, it taught 
the more than 6 million students whom it studied, as well as the teachers who collected the 
data, that Germanness could be perceived through ‘racial’ characteristics that were publicly 
perceivable by any layperson.” The study Zimmerman argues, therefore contributed to a 
discourse of nation and race in Wilhelmine Germany, and anthropology “represented an 
                                                     
132 Penny and Bunzl, eds., Worldly Provincialism, 21. 
133 Ibid., 17. 
134 Ibid., 11. 
135 Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 135. 
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attempt to displace—or at least supplement—the humanist political traditions of Imperial 
Germany with a culture of natural science in which concepts of race played an important 
role.”136 
If the notion of a turn-of-the-century “shift” to nation and race misrepresents 
nineteenth-century anthropology, Penny and Bunzl’s narrative also threatens to obscure a 
more complicated history, inseparable from an imperialist context, yet marked by more than 
one “shift”; it is a history better characterized as infused with oscillations.  By focusing on 
examples of primitivism from the Dialectic of Enlightenment to the writings of Adolf Bastian to 
the artwork of the Brücke, I aim to resist the simplified picture of a slippery slope, from “Herder 
to Hitler.” Although Penny and Bunzl suggest there is “no clear trajectory,” it would perhaps be 
best to resist the notion of trajectory here altogether. 
 If the thematization of a “shift” is problematic (perhaps “intensification” would be more 
appropriate), the fact of a disciplinary change is undeniable. The contributions to Penny and 
Bunzl’s volume offer an excellent  set of well-researched alternative explanations for the 
change, including: a changing social world (the public sphere, mass culture), the ideology of 
objective science, colonial politics, eugenics, and the exigencies World War I. My own argument 
offers an alternative account, which is that there are both internal discursive factors 
responsible for the change, as well as external factors. To return to the image of oscillation, 
Bastian’s aporetic ethnology was eventually replaced by diffusionism, a theory of cultural 
movement and struggle which proved more apotropaic. (In the field of aesthetics, the Brücke’s 
aporetic primitivism was quickly eclipsed by the apotropaic primitivism of the Blaue Reiter.) 
                                                     
136 Ibid., 146. 
115 
 
There is a sense in which these alternating perspectives can be seen as reactions operating 
within the field of discourse, in response to destabilization. This is not to suggest that history 
has followed a neat dialectical path, in which conditions manifest a thesis that is met by an 
antithesis, producing a synthesis, and so on. On the other hand, strong positions can, in the 
right circumstances, provoke reactions, and part of my argument has been that the aporetic 
primitivism of Bastian and the Brücke was a strong, indeed disorienting, position. 
 In terms of external causes, I argue that we should consider further the ways in which 
the colonial encounter produced ambiguities—liminal states, to borrow Victor Turner’s 
terminology, or unstable states, as described by Latour—which worked as both a threat and an 
incitement to discourse production.137 Liminality and instability can help us account for how 
discourse, through attempts to create systems of classification, produced liminal and unstable 
states, and how these instances of ambiguity compelled transformations in the discourse. By 
instances of ambiguity, I refer to human individuals, whether colonizers or colonial subjects, or 
to objects and artifacts, such as the ethnographic art objects collected by German ethnographic 
museums. This suggests that it wasn’t simply scientific “objectivity” or a “modernizing” society 
that led to an emphasis upon nation and race, but rather the particular ways in which 
encounters generated liminality in the colonial field. 
If the above arguments undermine the case for German exceptionalism in the history of 
German anthropology, it would be a mistake to deny that that the discipline followed a unique 
national trajectory in the nineteenth century. Although national traditions in the post World 
                                                     
137 Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols (Ithaca: Cornell Univrsity Press), 1967.  I am drawing primarily upon Carroll 
Smith-Rosenberg’s articulation of Turner’s liminal states. See Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, "Sex as symbol in Victorian 
purity," in Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates, eds. Jeff Alexander and Steven Seidman, 160-170 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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War II world have been marked by a “loss of distinctiveness,”138 during the period I examine 
national differences remain discernible. In spite of a common cosmopolitan orientation, and an 
awareness of developments across national boundaries, national traditions were noticeably the 
shaped by the personalities, institutional frameworks, and political contexts involved. If after 
1858, British anthropology, “which for decades had focused on the problem of human unity, 
was now refocused on the problem of the origin of human civilization,”139 the same cannot be 
said of the German tradition. Moreover, Bastian’s  approach to the question of human 
universals bore a unique cast; while British anthropology absorbed a positivist philosophy and 
attempted to reconstruct human history in “scientific” terms, Bastian approached the question 
of human universals through the lens of Kantian epistemology, applied to the study of the 
artifacts of human cultural production. Bastian’s humanist universalism, however, although 
based on a Eurocentric perspective in which the Naturvölker offered the best objects of study 
on account of their “simplicity,” framed anthropology not as the study of the other qua other, 
but rather as a form of self-knowledge.  
Colonial discourse (and the theoretical critique of colonial discourse) has framed as its 
central problem how to represent the “other”—as Young writes, postcolonial theory in the 
wake of Said has set itself “the theoretical problem of how the other can be articulated as such. 
How can we represent other cultures?”140 Bastian, however, did not set as his task the problem 
of representing the “other”; or, to put it another way, the “other” in his work was not imagined 
as the primitive, it was the fundamental structure of human psychology, of which both 
                                                     
138 Fredrik Barth, “Britain and the Commonwealth,” in One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, French, and 
American Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 56. 
139 George W. Stocking, Jr., Victorian Anthropology (New York: Free Press, 1987), 76. 
140 Young, White Mythologies, 42. 
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primitive and civilized were examples, and which, through an analysis of the relationship of 
particular to universal, might gradually be approached (even if knowledge of the other as such 
could never finally be achieved, as Bastian eventually came to suspect). In order to theorize, 
and represent, the truth of human universals, therefore, Bastian was not engaged in translating 
foreign meanings into recognizable categories, of representing the other; rather, his own 
textuality represented an obstacle, if also the only avenue, on the path toward knowledge. As a 
result he felt himself compelled toward a genre of writing that decentered the authorial 
perspective, and accordingly greatly puzzled his colleagues. 
Bastian’s primitivism was a radical revision of the self-other problem through the 
framework of anthropology; yet Bastian, for all his prominence in the field, was not largely 
understood by his colleagues, especially as his work grew more idiosyncratic. Thus it would not 
be correct to say that Bastian represented the “German” understanding of the “primitive”; yet 
at the same time his theoretical approach was a product of the German institutions, politics, 
and intellectual tradition out of which he grew. 
My study, therefore, is an argument for particularity, yet not peculiarity. I see this 
project contributing to the cause of decentering, pluralizing, and normalizing German history, 
both in a colonial and metropolitan sense. As Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer write in their 
coauthored volume Shattered Pasts: Reconstructing German Histories:  “There is no single 
master narrative to be told, no Weltgeist to be discovered, no national character to be indicted 
or, at long last, absolved.”141 
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 To circle back to where we began, it is clear that the twentieth-century artists who 
“discovered” the primitive drew upon a pre-existing, multivalent, and contradictory discourse 
of primitivism.  It was, in this sense, a primitive refrain. Moreover, the value they found in this 
art was not in the insights it offered into specific other cultures—while artists had their favorite 
primitives (Picasso was inspired by African sculpture; Gauguin admired the Polynesians), the 
term referred indiscriminately to a variety of different cultures and artistic styles, contemporary 
and historical, and occluded the differences between them. The value of the primitive, as it has 
been theorized in the corpus of existing scholarship, was that it offered a mirror, a fragmented 
mirror perhaps, but like Picasso’s canvas, reflecting back the fears and desires of Western 
artists. But, as I will argue, primitivism isn’t just a mirror. The discourse of primitivism did not 
merely reflect modern subjects’ fears and desires, but was productive of them: in encountering 
others, they imagined modernity. The “discovery” of the primitive was in this sense hardly a 
discovery; it was if anything a rediscovery, more akin to the unearthing of a time capsule that 



























Research on primitivism has flourished in recent decades. This research has pursued two 
distinct, though deeply intertwined, lines of argument. The first has explored the ways in which 
primitivism has functioned as a projection—an array of images and tropes reflecting the fears 
and desires of the Western subject, projected onto the “primitive” other. The second has 
theorized primitivism as a project. The primitivist “project” has a different connotation in 
critical anthropology and modernism studies, but ultimately these two theoretical strands work 
together to cast primitivism as a product of modernity.  
The first line of thought, which has its roots in Edward Said’s version of colonial 
discourse analysis, has argued that primitivism can be understood as a projection—an 
ideological construct produced by, and sustaining the processes of, imperialism.2  This line of 
                                                     
1 Christopher L. Miller, Blank Darkness: Africanist Discourse in French (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 
xi. 
2 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 
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thought can be broken down further into two sub-currents, critical anthropology and 
modernism studies. Historians of anthropology in particular have deployed Said’s theoretical 
framework to argue that anthropologists and imperialists in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century used primitivism as a discursive tool of political domination and knowledge 
production.3 This scholarship, which grew out of discussions about Orientalism, has not 
typically focused on primitivism per se, but on anthropology as a discipline which authorized 
and institutionalized the Western discourse on the colonial other, a practice in which 
primitivism played a fundamental role. Critical anthropology embraced the notion of the 
primitive as a projection of the West, and sought to show how the “primitive” other reinforced 
nineteenth-century notions of historical progress, rationality, and moral, racial and spiritual 
superiority.  
                                                     
3 I am referring here to such prominent works as: Fabian, Time and the Other; George W. Stocking, Jr., Victorian 
Anthropology (New York: Free Press, 1987); Stocking, The Ethnographer’s Magic and Other Essays in the History of 
Anthropology (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992); Adam Kuper, The Invention of Primitive Society: 
Transformations of an Illusion (New York: Routledge, 1988); Bernard McGrane, Beyond Anthropology: Society and 
the Other (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Henrika Kuklick, The Savage Within: The Social History of 
British Anthropology, 1885-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); James Clifford, The Predicament 
of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
I include Clifford here as he is generally seen as instrumental in the development of a critical anthropology, but 
due to the highly interdisciplinary nature of his work he is one of the few to legitimately straddle the distinction I 
am drawing here between the critique of anthropology and the critique of modernism. This body of literature on 
the history of anthropology relies upon a relatively straightforward notion of Saidian colonial discourse analysis. It 
should be noted however that a sizable amount of recent work on anthropology has not been concerned with 
colonial discourse analysis, and is therefore beyond the focus of this study. In addition, among postcolonial 
scholars of imperialism, some have dispensed with the model, while others have engaged to a greater extent with 
the subsequent critique of Said, most notably through the work of Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. 
George Steinmetz, for example draws upon the work of Bhabha in The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the 
German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); 
Andrew Zimmerman relies upon Spivak and Jacques Derrida in Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial 
Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). This body of work has compelling demonstrated that “all 
parties played active roles in anthropological and colonial encounters. . . . There was no inside or outside, no pure 
before or fallen after” (Zimmerman, 253n26). These studies therefore disengage from the projection model I 
discuss here. They have not however attended to the way in which primitivism as a discourse produced the subject 
position of modernity, nor how some examples of primitivism engaged in a form of aporetic self-critique. 
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At the same time, in the study of modernism, a separate but related body of work 
developed which was anchored in an analysis of primitivism in the arts, but which worked 
outward from there using the insights of colonial discourse analysis to think about primitivism 
as a broad cultural discourse of “othering.” This body of research adopted the same framing of 
primitivism as a projection which had been developed in colonial discourse analysis and in the 
critique of anthropology. This scholarship has above all been interested in linking primitivism to  
modernism, understood as a particular set of aesthetic principles and artist practices, 
originating sometime in the nineteenth century and stretching well into the twentieth. This 
“critique of modernism” has made primitivism its explicit focus (unlike the critique of 
anthropology, which targeted colonial discourse more generally). This work has richly 
contextualized primitivism in reference to the history of anthropology, as well as devoted 
attention to the many manifestations of primitivism in popular culture. 4 
 These two lines of thought, although I seek to distinguish between them conceptually, 
are in fact deeply intertwined in the cultural studies literature. With a common origin in 
colonial discourse analysis, running through both critical anthropology and the critique of 
                                                     
4 Sally Price, Primitive Art in Civilized Places (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Marianna Torgovnick, 
Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Torgovnick, Primitive 
Passions: Men, Women, and the Quest for Ecstasy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); Jill Lloyd, German 
Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1991); Gill Perry, 
“Primitivism and the ‘Modern’,” in Primitivism, Cubism, Abstraction: The Early Twentieth Century, eds. Charles 
Harrison, Francis Frascina, and Gill Perry, 3-85 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993); Elazar Barkan 
and Ronald Bush, eds., Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), Sieglinde Lemke, Primitivist Modernism: Black Culture and the Origins of 
Transatlantic Modernism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  It should be noted that the critique of 
modernism, having in some sense separated itself from the critique of anthropology, thereby provided a new basis 
from which to re-examine anthropology, leading to few excellent, if not widely noted, critiques of 
anthropology/colonial discourse in terms of modernist aesthetics (an approach I adopt in my later analysis of 
German anthropology). See Suzanne Marchand, "Leo Frobenius and the Revolt against the West," Journal of 
Contemporary History 32, no. 2 (1997):153-170; Simon Gikandi, "Africa and the Epiphany of Modernism," in 
Geomodernisms: Race, Modernism, Modernity, eds. Laura Doyle and Laura Winkiel, 31-50 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005); as well as James Clifford’s much earlier piece, "On Ethnographic Surrealism," Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 23, no. 4 (Oct., 1981): 539-564. 
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modernism, these two lines both share an emphasis on the notion of the primitive as a 
projection, an argument which has had major implications: it has fostered a greater awareness 
of the ideological constructs influencing scientific and art historical scholarship; it has bolstered 
efforts at more ethical forms of anthropological and art historical scholarship; and finally, it has 
initiated a better understanding of the constructedness of the “Western self.” Yet this last point 
has been curiously, and prematurely, truncated by a third line of thought, running counter to 
the first two, in which primitivism is understood as a “project.” The thematization of primitivism 
as a project is found in both the critique of anthropology and the critique of modernism, 
although, since both are motivated by a different set of disciplinary questions and concerns, the 
particular framing of primitivism as a project is different in each field; but the result, in both 
cases, is that primitivism is figured as a product of modernity.  
The critique of anthropology, for example, has focused on primitivism as a discursive 
tool of political domination and knowledge production. As Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush write 
in Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism (1995): 
A powerful fixture of contemporary Western thought, the primitivism produced by 
Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century supplied the necessary “Other” 
against whose specter embattled Victorian society reinforced itself. This construction 
was the defensive expression of a specific moment of crisis—the prehistory of a future 
whose unsettling shadow had just crossed the horizon.5 
 
The “shadow” here is the “impending cultural transition” to modernity. As nineteenth-
century social theorists such as Max Weber or Emile Durkheim “searched for the ills of modern 
society,” the discourse of anthropological primitivism provided them with a theoretical tool, the 
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“ideal types” of “the primitive and the civilized.”6 The description of primitivism as a “defensive 
expression” of an “embattled” society reveals that “the crisis” is not figured as imagined here, 
but as a condition, and a precarious one at that. Primitivism only “reinforced” the existing 
experience of reality “in crisis.” In other words, the anthropological primitivism of the 
nineteenth-century is seen as a product of modernity. The Other is seen as a “specter,” but the 
“ills of modern society” are not. 
In the critique of modernism, primitivism is also framed as a project, with the same 
results. The research focus here has been to understand the relationship of primitivism to 
modernism. Facing a long-standing critical dismissal of the aesthetic and political value of 
primitivism as an artistic movement, scholars of art history have made an effort to argue that 
avant-garde artists in fact used primitivism as a tool to critique modernity. In the words of Jill 
Lloyd, for example, primitivism could be deployed as “a disruptive strategy to challenge the 
norms and values of European culture.”7 But this rapprochement between primitivism and 
modernism is not without theoretical consequences, for modernism has universally been 
understood as a reaction to “the ills of modern society.” To cite the eminent art historian T.J. 
Clark:  
Modernism had two great wishes. It wanted its audience to be led toward a recognition 
of the social reality of the sign (away from the comforts of narrative and illusionism, was 
the claim) but equally it dreamed of turning the sign back to a bedrock of 
World/Nature/Sensation/Subjectivity which the to and fro of capitalism had all but 
destroyed.8 
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Aware that some of his readers might balk at his leftist leanings (as some did in response 
to his earlier, highly-regarded work, The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and 
His Followers9), Clark generously offers to bracket his foregrounding of capitalism in a revised 
definition: 
Leaving the word “capitalism” aside, is it not the case that the truly new, and 
disorienting, character of modernity is its seemingly being driven by merely material, 
statistical, tendential, “economic” considerations? We know we are living a new form of 
life, in which all previous notions of belief and sociability have been scrambled. . . . It is 
the blindness of modernity that seems to me fundamental, and to which modernism is a 
response.10 
 
Regardless of whether one inclines to the socialist critique of capitalism or not, 
modernism is construed as a product of modernity. In this context, primitivism, as simply a type 
of modernism, is therefore equally framed as such a product. 
These two lines of argument have complemented each other, yet I believe that the 
manner in which they have been intertwined has created a peculiar tension and obfuscation. 
Namely, that whereas the former tendency has encouraged scholars to embrace the cultural 
constructedness of the “primitive” other (as a projection), equally implying the constructedness 
of the “Western self,” the concurrent understanding of primitivism as a project has worked to 
anchor the relationship of primitivism to a particular monolithic and reified conception of 
modernity—namely, as the apex or apotheosis of civilization (defined by capitalism, 
industrialism, urbanization, rationalization—all of those forces which have scrambled “all 
previous notions of belief and sociability”). As a result, the utility of theorizing primitivism as a 
                                                     
9 T. J. Clark, The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and His Followers (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). See for example the review by Hilton Kramer, “T.J. Clark and the Marxist Critique of 
Modern Painting,” which appeared in The New Criterion in March 1985. (Reprinted in Hilton Kramer, “T.J. Clark and 
the Marxist Critique of Modern Painting,” in The New Criterion Reader: The First Five Years, ed. Hilton Kramer, 48-
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projection of self/other has been vitiated through the entrenched habit of theorizing this very 
projection as a result of the condition of modernity. 
 “Entrenched habit” is one way of describing this phenomenon. Another way might be, 
to borrow from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, as a refrain.11 As I use it here, the notion of 
refrain is intended to underline that the “habit” is not simply a matter of poor theory, which 
some amount of greater discipline or more rigorous self-reflection will ameliorate. Primitivism 
understood as a refrain, I will argue, helps emphasize its role as part of a cultural hermeneutic 
of experience, a discourse which produces a recognizable territory, the territory of modernity.  
This hermeneutic, I believe, is responsible for the theoretical tension. 
 I therefore begin this chapter by discussing primitivism as a theoretical problem, leading 
up to the work of Victor Li, the only theorist to take a critical stance in relationship to the body 
of work itself which I have just been describing (critical anthropology and critical modernism). 
Li’s work does not aim to participate in this scholarship but makes it the focus of his own critical 
analysis. In The Neo-primitivist Turn, Li argues that “our awareness of the . . . geopolitics of 
primitivism . . . has not led to the disappearance of primitivism but to its deeper imbrication in 
contemporary theoretical discourses that appear to be anti-primitivist and politically 
progressive.”12 
I believe that Li is correct about the lingering life of primitivism in contemporary theory, 
though not for the same reasons, and we come to a different conclusion. Li argues that 
although this corpus of work “questions the use of terms like ‘primitive’ and ‘primitivism,’ it 
                                                     
11 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
12 Victor Li, The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2006), viii. 
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continues to exhibit a deep primitivist logic that lurks in displaced but related concepts like 
‘alterity,’ ‘culture,’ and surprisingly, ‘modernity.’”13 In other words, although these writers 
dismiss primitivism, and are thus “anti-primitivist,” they use concepts such as alterity and 
culture in a way which Li shows is not neutral, but in fact reproduces the primitivism they 
sought to overcome.  
 Yet whereas Li sees this as a problem of theory, I argue it is a problem of history. 
For Li in fact, it is not only a problem of contemporary theory, but universal, endemic to theory 
itself. Li concludes that the “primitive” is indeed necessary for critical thought—that, in the 
words of Michel de Certeau,  “theorizing always needs a savage.”14 Li writes: “The primitive 
Other, even if it does not exist, has to be imagined in order for us to entertain not only the 
utopian hope for something different from our present, but also the possibility of critical 
reflexivity in general.”15 
 I argue that theorizing may need an Other, but that this need not be the “primitive” 
other. The problem is that Li has himself absorbed the confusion of the “projection” and 
“project” narratives, leading him to accept that alterity and culture can only be conceived in 
terms of a primitive-civilized distinction. Focusing on Li’s critique of two main figures from 
anthropology and cultural studies (Marshall Sahlins and Marianna Torgovnick), I argue that 
their use of such concepts as alterity and culture are not necessarily primitivist, but only 
contingently so. Li argues that alterity and culture can only be conceived in terms of a primitive-
civilized distinction, but the problem is not with these concepts, but the fact that they are used 
                                                     
13 Ibid., ix. 
14 Michel de Certeau, cited by Josette Féral, “The Power of Difference,” in The Future of Difference, ed. Hester 
Eisenstein and Alice Jardine (Boston: G.K Hall, 1980), 88, quoted in Li, Neo-primitivist Turn, 218. Li states that Féral 
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15 Li, Neo-primitivist Turn, 221. 
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by these authors as counter-concepts to modernity. The concept “modernity” is not simply a 
third term, another form of primitivism in this shell game—one which Li finds “surprising,” as if 
it wasn’t to be expected; it is rather the primitive-modernity binary which inflects these 
scholars’ particular uses of alterity and culture into a primitivist discourse. 
Li’s acceptance that the only possible Other is the “primitive” other simply reveals the 
extent to which primitivism has historically come to eclipse the field of alterity in modernity. Li’s 
intervention is burdened by this same “projection/project” tension, such that the primitive is 
seen as something which must be “imagined” in order to deal with the reality of a “the present” 
that is not imagined. The problem with the “projection/project” thesis is that the content of the 
projection is specified—it is the fears and desires of “the present,” of the “Western self,” that 
are projected onto the imagined “primitive” other. The projection is therefore more specifically 
a mirror—a reflection of the condition of modernity. The mirror is not a window onto the other, 
but a reflection of the reality of the self.  
Thus I will conclude with an argument that primitivism should be retheorized, not as a 
mirror, but as a lamp—a reference to M.H. Abrams’ 1953 work on Romanticism, The Mirror and 
the Lamp.16 If we can imagine the discourse of primitivism as a lamp, we can imagine 
primitivism, not as a product of modernity, but as that which illuminates the territory of 
modernity, or the territory of the modern self. 
In 1979, the year after Said first published Orientalism, Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature appeared. Rorty’s anti-representationist argument, rejecting the view of 
language as the mirror of nature, might be said to resonate through the halls of colonial 
                                                     




discourse analysis, in the form of the “projected” other. Yet the implications of an anti-
representationist theory of discourse would entail not only recognizing the projection of the 
other, but the projection of the self.  As Rorty once contemplated a “philosophy without 
mirrors,” I suggest that a “primitivism without mirrors” is possible. Whether this is desirable, as 
of yet, remains another question.17 
___ 
 
The above argument is presented below in three parts. The first part traces the 
historiographical development of the understanding of primitivism as a projection. I highlight 
the important theoretical framing work of Edward Said and Johannes Fabian, which, in 
conjunction with the 1984 MoMA “Primitivism” exhibition, provided the crucial foundation for 
the ensuing critique of anthropology and the critique of modernism. I also draw attention to 
the unique field of meanings evoked by the “primitive,” a field which is more specified and 
therefore more fundamental than Orientalism or colonial discourse more generally. 
The second part begins by clarifying the harmful effects of the discourse of primitivism, 
the desires of critics to overcome this tainted past, and the fleeting hopes that scholarship was 
finally about to move on. I then turn to assess Li’s argument that primitivism has not faded 
from critical discourse, but lives on in the form of what he terms “Neo-primitivism.” 
The third part examines in greater detail the way in which cultural studies of primitivism 
have been influenced by the drive to link primitivism to modernism.  I argue that in identifying 
primitivism as a type of modernism, this scholarship has reinforced the notion of primitivism as 
                                                     
17 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
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a product of modernity. To demonstrate the consequences of this, I then turn to the key 
concept of modernity itself, to argue that the discourse of primitivism is not simply like a mirror 
reflecting the reality of modernity, but should be seen, rather, as productive of it. I argue on the 
one hand that the discourse of primitivism has played a fundamental constitutive role in “the 
critique of modernity,” a view of society popularly characterized by Max Weber’s phrase as the 
“disenchantment of the world.”18 At the same time, I argue that the problem extends beyond 
the domain of theory; at its root the problem is about the experience of modernity. The reason 
primitivism hasn’t been dislodged from contemporary critical theory is that it hasn’t been 
dislodged as a hermeneutic of aesthetic experience.  
 
Part 1.  Anthropology, Empire, and Art 
 
To address this peculiar theoretical tension in the historiography of primitivism, 
between primitivism as projection and primitivism as project, it will be useful to follow for a 
moment the history of the scholarship on primitivism as it has taken shape over the last few 
decades. A swath of critical writing since the 1980s has demonstrated that the “primitive” is a 
cultural construction, a projection of the West; it is a discourse that works like a mirror, telling 
us little if anything about its object, the various “primitive” others, but revealing a great deal 
about the subject—the Western “self.” As Marianna Torgovnick writes in Gone Primitive: 
Savage Intellects, Modern Lives: 
                                                     
18 Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in Max Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations, ed. 
John Dreijmanis, trans. Gordon C. Wells (New York: Algora, 2008), 35. 
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To study the primitive is . . . to enter an exotic world which is also a familiar world. That 
world is structured by sets of images and ideas that have slipped from their original 
metaphoric status to control perceptions of primitives—images and ideas I shall call 
tropes. Primitives are like children, the tropes say. Primitives are our untamed selves, 
our id forces—libidinous, irrational, violent, dangerous. Primitives are mystics, in tune 
with nature, part of its harmonies. Primitives are free. Primitives exist at the “lowest 
cultural levels”; we occupy the “highest.”19 
 
In other words, in any attempt at defining the primitive,  
the needs of the present determine the value and nature of the primitive. The primitive 
does what we ask it to do. Voiceless, it lets us speak for it. . . . For Euro-Americans, then, 
to study the primitive brings us always back to ourselves, which we reveal in the act of 
defining the Other.20 
 
Torgovnick’s critique is representative of the current scholarly consensus—a consensus 
that has been driven largely by the developments of postcolonial theory as well as the cultural 
turn in the humanities. The postcolonial critique that had been developing in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, especially through the work of Edward Said (Orientalism, 1978) and Johannes 
Fabian (Time and the Other, 1983), revealed the Eurocentric framing of cultural discourse about 
the non-European other.21 Said’s focus was the Orient (which he demarcated, roughly speaking, 
as a loose concatenation of the Middle East and the Arab world), not primitivism per se, a 
distinction to which I will return momentarily. Said deployed Michel Foucault’s idea of 
discourse to understand the relationship of power and knowledge in the context of 
imperialism:  
Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism 
can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—
dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by 
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teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.22  
 
The discourse of Orientalism established norms and placed constraints upon any 
attempt to think the Orient; thus, "political imperialism governs an entire field of study, 
imagination, and scholarly institutions—in such a way as to make its avoidance an intellectual 
and historical impossibility."23 
Said argued that “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off 
against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.” 24 The Orient is thus 
figured as the archetypal discourse of alterity in Said’s conception. Yet it is worth observing that 
although he defines Orientalism as a cohesive set of “stereotypes” made about the Orient, the 
particular qualities attributed to the Orient are only loosely determined. From some of his more 
specific comments on the subject it is possible to identify what unites them. He writes for 
example: 
. . . . On the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are Arab-Orientals; 
the former are (in no particular order) rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of 
holding real values, without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things.25  
 
. . . . The essential relationship, on political, cultural, and even religious grounds, was 
seen—in the West, which is what concerns us here—to be one between a strong and a 
weak partner. Many terms were used to express their relation: Balfour and Cromer, 
typically, used several. The Oriental is rational, depraved (fallen), childlike, “different”; 
thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, “normal.”26 
 
                                                     
22 Said, Orientalism, 3. 
23 Said, 14. He continues: “My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly 
understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even 
produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the 
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24 Ibid., 3. 
25 Ibid., 49. 
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. . . . One of the important developments in nineteenth-century Orientalism was the 
distillation of essential ideas about the Orient—its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, 
its aberrant mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness—into a separate and 
unchallenged coherence.27 
 
Although Said claims a coherence and stresses “the internal consistency of Orientalism 
and its ideas about the Orient,”28 the only common denominator is the articulation of justified 
authority and power over the Orient, its perceived inferiority rendering it a legitimate subject of 
Western rule.  As Said writes, “the essence of Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction 
between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority.”29 Beyond this determinate power 
relation, the Orient is characterized simply by its abnormality; attributes are assigned according 
to the context. The Orient, in the Orientalist discourse, is whatever the West is not. Some 
attributes are persistent: the Orient is almost always irrational. Others are ambivalent: it is 
either too civilized (superficial or decadent) or uncivilized (savage); either excessively spiritual 
(mystical), or heathen (not Christian); either alluringly feminine (in deceptive submissiveness or 
weakness), or alarmingly masculine (in despotic strength or violence).  
The discourse of primitivism works in similar fashion, but is not identical with 
Orientalism. Primitivism is a more specified, and in that sense more fundamental, discourse. 
The Orient is opposed to the West; the primitive is opposed to civilization. The Orient, in spite 
of its inferiority in the Orientalist discourse, was understood as an alternative (if abnormal) 
form of civilization, not as the absence of civilization. The primitive is imagined as pre-civilized, 
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pre-writing, pre-history. Primitivism therefore is a discourse of alterity which structures ways of 
thinking about two particular concepts: nature and history.  
As nature is opposed to civilization, the primitive is embedded in nature. Civilization is a 
concept with many referents, yet in so far as it is opposed to nature, it represents mastery or 
separation from nature, a condition predicated upon, at the most basic level, technology. 
Technology in this sense refers both to tool-making but also society-making, the “artificial” or 
human-made constructs and inventions, whether spears or parliaments, which separate 
civilization from the state of nature. In this area, then,  primitivism has historically shaped 
attempts to think about autonomy, authenticity, and alienation. The primitive is also something 
that exists outside of history—and thus has informed attempts to think about temporality, 
progress, and historical consciousness. Primitivism is perhaps most crucially a lapsarian 
discourse in a way that Orientalism is not. For this reason it has been possible to speak about an 
“inner savage” but not an “inner Oriental,” and to conceive of the primitive (but not the Orient) 
as the origin of humanity—as its nadir, or apex, depending upon one’s view. 
Primitivism therefore asserts particular qualities about the other. Unlike the “Oriental,” 
the “primitive” is not simply irrational, but irrational on account of being subsumed in nature. 
At the same time, the binary discourse of primitivism in inherently instable. The primitive is 
both embedded in nature, and yet also human. The primitive is irrational, but also, insofar as it 
belongs to nature, is somehow beyond the rational/irrational binary.  The primitive is in the 
past, but also somehow outside of history altogether. The binaries in primitivism are less about 
clear oppositions of self/other than the confounding of these oppositions—more like an M.C. 
Escher print. Primitivism is therefore a more limited but also more fundamental discourse of 
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alterity; Orientalists, in other words, often deployed a primitivist discourse (among other 
discourses and stereotypes) in their descriptions of “the Orient.”  
 
Whereas Said focused on the Orient and cultural discourse more broadly, Johannes 
Fabian focused in particular on the temporality of primitivism and its construction and 
pervasiveness in the discipline of anthropology. Fabian’s key insight was that anthropological 
theory and ethnographic writing worked together to place the object of anthropological 
science, the primitive other, in a separate and subordinate temporal realm. Fabian found that 
this displacement of the primitive Other reached its definite articulation in the sense of 
evolutionary time which was developed and codified in nineteenth-century anthropology: 
It promoted a scheme in terms of which not only past cultures, but all living societies 
were irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of Time—some upstream, others 
downstream. Civilization, evolution, development, acculturation, modernization (and 
their cousins, industrialization, urbanization) are all terms whose conceptual content 
derives, in ways that can be specified, from evolutionary Time.30 
 
Fabian termed this anthropological practice a denial of coevalness—a refusal to 
acknowledge the intersubjectivity of the ethnographer and his object of study. Anthropological 
writing had thus been marked by a cognitive allochronism since the emergence of evolutionary 
thinking. As Matti Bunzl explains in his Foreword to Time and the Other: 
The discipline’s evolutionary doctrine—constituted at the intersection of scientism, 
Enlightenment belief in progress, and colonially veiled ethnocentrism—in turn codified 
anthropology’s allochronic orientation. In this manner, contemporary “scientific” 
categorizations like “savage”, “barbaric” and “civilized” signified stages of historical 
development. Conceiving global history in terms of universal progress, this allochronic 
logic identified and constituted late-nineteenth century “savages” as “survivals”—
inhabitants of more or less ancient states of cultural development. At the same time, 
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anthropology’s allochronism established a “civilized” West as the pinnacle of universal 
human progress, an argument that helped to legitimate various imperialist projects.31 
 
Although as we saw, primitivism has a long history, in the nineteenth century it acquired 
a particular articulation. Anthropology, as the study of non-Europeans, established itself as a 
scientific discipline with institutional authority over the discourse of primitivism. The image of 
the primitive solidified as a category of the other which was not simply strange and exotically 
different, but somehow behind, both in evolutionary time and in mental, moral, or spiritual 
capability. As Bernard McGrane puts it, in the nineteenth century, “evolutionary time . . . came 
between the European and the non-European Other,’ and gave rise to an anthropology that 
‘first . . . transformed difference into historical difference, and then . . . transformed history into 
evolution (progressive evolution).”32 At the same time, generally speaking, the heightened pace 
of European imperialism and colonialism paralleled a development in which earlier Romantic 
views of the primitive or natural life were replaced by a view of primitive societies as 
irredeemably inferior, undeveloped, and, most importantly, as in need of “civilizing.”33   
In this way, through the complicity of anthropology and empire, European individuals 
constructed a subject identity founded on a belief in civilization, progress, rationality, and 
autonomy, in opposition to a primitive “other” lacking these traits, and therefore an object of 
aversion or disgust. This anthropological primitivism increasingly informed popular 
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understandings of primitivism throughout the nineteenth century. The ironic result is that even 
whereas individual anthropologists themselves expressed serious interest in understanding 
their subject, which often meant trying to account for a people’s history or the recognition of 
“rational” self-governing behaviors, the institutionally and textually reinforced denial of 
coevalness harnessed such observations into supporting rather than undermining the 
primitivist discourse. This state of affairs is visible in the mocking comments made by a critic of 
the British anthropologist T. E. Bowdich’s 1819 study of the Ashanti of West Africa: “The 
‘history’ of the Ashantees, to which Mr. Bowdich has dedicated a whole chapter, is, like that of 
all other savages who can neither read nor write, the history of a day, and little worthy of 
notice.”34    
Modernist artists, as we saw above, inherited this set of tropes, but reversed the 
valence. That which had formerly been denigrated was now admired, praised, imitated.  It 
should be clear, however, that both these forms of primitivism involve an inherent imposition 
of an evaluative and normative difference, a hierarchy of self and other. The difference 
between anthropological and modernist primitivism is only that the latter reverses the value 
judgment of the former; hierarchy and otherness are inverted but preserved, casting the other 
as an object of desire rather than fear.  Thus the timelessness which Bowdich’s critic despised in 
the report on the Ashanti becomes in Gauguin’s paintings of Polynesian scenes an idealized, 
desirable, dreamlike state. 
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Although modernists saw themselves as overcoming the negative anthropological 
primitivism, the same forces propelling the critique of anthropology in the 1980s produced a 
rigorous critique of modernism.  Both were a part of the larger current of postmodernism, in 
which it became clear that modernism’s inversion or “validation” of the primitive was in fact 
primitivism in sheep’s clothing. A key catalyst in this history was the highly controversial 1984 
Museum of Modern Art exhibition, “‘Primitivism’ in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and 
Modern.” The MoMA exhibition served as a threshold of sorts—modernism’s last hurrah. 
Conceived in one intellectual climate, it offered a focal point around which the new 
developments could arrange themselves, a springboard into a new critical understanding of the 
significance of primitivism.35 
Previously, most studies of primitivism in the visual arts had focused on identifying the 
particular ways in which European artists had been inspired thematically or influenced by 
formal qualities of “primitive” art. Although some elements of the exhibition pursued this line 
of thought, the organizers, William Rubin and Kirk Varnedoe, also sought to dramatically revise 
this art historical paradigm. The format juxtaposed works by modern European artists, such as 
Picasso, with works of “primitive” art (from Africa, Oceania, and the Americas) to demonstrate 
their essential “affinities” and their shared “formal qualities.”36 (See figs. 2.1 and 2.2)  
The exhibition unleashed a virulent flood of criticism. The organizers, although aware 
they were wading into unsettled waters, imagined that by celebrating modernism and the 
artists who had been inspired by “primitive” art, and by including alongside these European 
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artworks the artistic productions of non-Europeans, that they were breaking with a long-
standing primitivist discourse which had denigrated non-Europeans and privileged the West. As 
Rubin sonorously intoned in the catalogue: “The vestiges of a discredited evolutionary myth still 
live in the recesses of our psyches. . . . I hope our effort will demonstrate that at least insofar as 
it pertains to works of the human spirit, the evolutionary prejudice is clearly absurd.”37 
The uncomfortable irony was that the exhibition reproduced the primitivist discourse it 
pretended to eschew. (It’s revealing enough that Rubin felt the need to qualify his remark – 
outside of art, he implies, the prejudice may have some traction?) The exhibition’s format, 
displaying objects identified as “primitive” and “tribal” alongside “modern” works by 
“Westerners,” effectively essentialized categories that were historical and contextual, and 
reaffirmed primitivist tropes. James Clifford, in a widely-noted article for Art in America 
(reprinted in The Predicament of Culture), unpacked the troubling implications of the 
exhibition’s allegory of affinity: “The word is a kinship term, suggesting a deeper or more 
natural relationship than mere resemblance or juxtaposition. It connotes a common quality or 
essence joining the tribal to the modern.”38 In search of affinity,  Clifford continued (quoting 
from Rubin), the exhibit picks out a hero: 
[Picasso’s] virtuoso work, an exhibition caption tells us, contains more affinities with the 
tribal than that of any other pioneer modernist. These affinities “measure the depth of 
Picasso's grasp of the informing principles of tribal sculpture, and reflect his profound 
identity of spirit with the tribal peoples.” Modernism is thus presented as a search for 
“informing principles” that transcend culture, politics, and history.39 
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In other words, Rubin and Varnedoe praised twentieth-century primitivist art as a 
moment in which artists were finally able to recuperate the primitive, the instinctual, the 
mystical other, a mode of being which Europe/the Western world had lost; and they praised 
“primitive” art of Africans and others where it was thought to best express this essential 
primitiveness. 
Rubin and Varnedoe made it clear that they had no interest in the particular history or 
function that the “primitive” art may have held for its creators. As Rubin wrote in the exhibition 
brochure:  
The term “primitivism” does not refer to tribal art itself, but only to modern Western 
interest in it. Our exhibition thus focuses not on the origins and intrinsic meanings of 
tribal objects themselves, but on the ways these objects were understood and 
appreciated by modern artists. The artists who first recognized the power of tribal art 
generally did not know its sources or purposes. They sensed meanings through intuitive 
response to the objects, often with a “creative misunderstanding” of their forms and 
functions.40 
 
The MoMA exhibit, in asserting the “timeless” and “transcendent” qualities of art, 
effaced the cultural context of “primitive” artworks (production, acquisition, display), just as it 
dismissed the cultural context of primitivist modernist art. As Clifford wrote, it thereby brought 
to the fore a “disquieting quality of modernism: its taste for appropriating or redeeming 
otherness, for constituting non-Western arts in its own image, for discovering universal, 
ahistorical ‘human’ capacities.’”41 This is manifest in the prefatory comment by Varnedoe: 
We should recall that modernist primitivism ultimately depends on the autonomous 
force of objects—and especially on the capacity of tribal art to transcend the intentions 
and conditions that first shaped it. This phenomenon not only testifies to the inventive 
power of tribal artists, humbling in its denial of Western presumptions linking human 
potential to technological progress. It also honors the modernist artists who, subverting 
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their received traditions, forged a bond between intelligences otherwise divided by all 
the barriers of language, belief, and social structure. On the one hand, the power of art 
to surpass its cultural confines; on the other, the ability of a culture to see beyond, and 
revolutionize, its established art.42 
 
What was admirable in the “tribal” artists was their inventiveness (seen as surprising, in 
light of their lack of “technological progress”), an instinctual inventiveness which enabled them 
to transcend their context and create universal art. Modern artists, on the other hand, through 
their perspicacious recognition of what was valuable in other cultures, were able to “subvert” 
their society’s traditions. In other words, although the exhibition saw itself as deconstructing 
the difference between the Tribal and the Modern by demonstrating affinities, what they 
produced was a vision in which modern artists could be admired for their ability to 
“recuperate” or tap into the  lost primitive, and primitive art could be admired where it 
revealed its essential “primitiveness.” 
Clifford emphasized that the MoMA’s critique of the anthropological approach to 
“primitive” objects was deceptive. The exhibition’s disinterest in the anthropological 
understanding of primitive objects was in fact merely the inverse of anthropology’s long 
disinterest in these objects’ aesthetic qualities. The perceived distinction between the aesthetic 
and the anthropological interpretation of “primitive” objects was reinforced by the perceived 
schism between the institutional domains of the art gallery and the anthropology museum: in 
ethnographic museums, the cultural context of the objects’ production, use, and symbolism 
was the primary focus; in art museums, the same objects were appreciated solely for their 
aesthetic qualities. While both could claim to be doing greater “justice” to their material, 
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anthropology and modernism, Clifford argued, worked in tandem to deny subjectivity to the 
“primitive” other:  
Since the early years of modernism and cultural anthropology non-Western objects have 
found a “home” either within the discourses and institutions of art or within those of 
anthropology. The two domains have excluded and confirmed each other, inventively 
disputing the right to contextualize, to represent these objects. . . . Both discourses 
assume a primitive world in need of preservation, redemption, and representation. The 
concrete, inventive existence of tribal cultures and artists is suppressed in the process of 
either constituting authentic, “traditional” worlds or appreciating their products in the 
timeless category of “art.”43 
 
In other words, in the eyes of its critics, the exhibition revealed  the insidious dynamics 
of anthropology, empire and art. 
 
Part 2.  The Persistence of Primitivism in Contemporary Theory 
 
Primitivism Revealed and Reviled 
 
In the years after the 1984 MoMA exhibition, several important works appeared 
exploring the constructedness of the primitive “other” and the complicity of ethnography, art 
and imperialism more generally. Anthropologists and historians of anthropology, building off of 
Fabian’s work, examined the history of the concept of primitive and how the supposedly 
objective science of anthropology had been shaped by ideological influences of class, gender 
and race. Adam Kuper, in The Invention of Primitive Society, sought to account for “the genesis 
of the illusion, and more particularly for its persistence. The persistence of the model is 
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peculiarly problematic since various of its basic assumptions were quite directly contradicted by 
ethnographic evidence and by the logic of evolutionary theory itself.”44  
Other studies, more oriented towards primitivism in art and literature, paid greater 
attention to the role of popular culture.45 Sally Price’s Primitive Art in Civilized Places (1989) was 
one of the first works to articulate this argument for a broad audience. Widely reviewed in the 
academic and popular press, the short book evoked a mixed reception at first, drawing ire from 
those anthropologists and art critics who continued to assert the validity of the concept of 
“primitive” art and society.46 Torgovnick’s Gone Primitive (1990) offered a sweeping and 
rigorous examination of the most well-known examples of primitivism from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. She looked at anthropologists such as Bronislaw Malinowski, Margaret 
Mead, and Claude Lévi-Strauss; popular culture, such as the Tarzan novels; the psychology 
theories of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung; art critics such as Roger Fry, Michel Leiris, and William 
Rubin; and novelists such as Joseph Conrad and D.H. Lawrence. Torgovnick was the first major 
writer on primitivism to bring into the foreground the many ways that constructions of gender 
and sexuality informed primitivist tropes. Finally, whereas Kuper had confined his study to the 
theoretical developments in anthropology, Torgovnick, following Said, emphasized the cultural 
pervasiveness of the discourse of primitivism: 
The primitive is in our museums and homes, in our closets and jewelry boxes, in our 
hearts and minds. The primitive is everywhere present in modernity and postmodernity, 
as impetus or subtext, just as modernity or postmodernity forms the subtext of much 
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ethnological writing and thinking. Interest in the primitive cuts across levels of culture—
from the high to the low and vice versa—with the gap between the statements made by 
“low” culture and those made by “high” culture narrower than we might intuitively 
expect. A voyeuristic interest in the primitive surrounds us in what we see and hear, 
what we learn and read, from the cradle to the grave: it is part of our atmosphere, of 
the culture we live and breathe. We have no need to “go primitive” because we have 
already “gone primitive” by the fact of being born into our culture.47 
 
As we have seen, the outcome of this work has been a much deeper understanding of 
the constructedness of the primitive.  This has not simply been a matter of obscure academic 
interest, but one with serious political concerns of global scope. Primitivism, at its most basic, in 
its application to contemporary human societies, constitutes an ideological distortion of the 
world—an ethnocentric, class-centric, male-centric tool for cultural and social domination.  
Historically, primitivism, as a product of imperialism, has worked to legitimate colonialism, 
exploitation, and violence. Today, in the absence of formal imperialism, the specter of 
primitivism continues to undergird global hierarchies, as developed nations and the West 
dictate the fates of the Third World or the Global South. Whether through hard power or soft 
power, primitivism bolsters geopolitics and, as Johannes Fabian writes, accommodates “the 
schemes of a one-way history: progress, development, modernity (and their negative mirror 
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The primitive, then, was a concept whose time had come. As Kuper wrote, “If this book 
helps to explain the persistence of an illusion, then perhaps it may even hold out the promise of 
an escape from illusion.” Torgovnick expressed a parallel desire in Gone Primitive: 
[This study] asks precisely that we understand the rules governing the exchange 
between the modern West, the postmodern West, and the versions of the primitive 
they have created or endorsed. It seeks to make impossible innocent reenactments of 
the dramas of us and them that have been staged and restaged in the modern West’s 
encounters with primitive Others.49 
 
To some in the heady days of postmodernism, buoyed by the swells of self-reflexivity 
and “incredulity toward metanarratives,” it seemed that primitivism was at last poised to fade 
away—if not because of the onslaught of theoretical criticism and scholarship, surely as the 
inevitable result of globalization and the final disappearance of  those imagined “primitive” 
societies to which the concept had once referred, societies which could no longer be seen as 
isolated, authentic, natural, pure.50 For Fredric Jameson, the triumph of Western modernity 
and globalized capitalism had produced: 
a situation in which the survival, residue, the holdover, the archaic, has finally been 
swept aside without a trace . . . Ours is a more homogeneously modernized condition; 
we no longer are encumbered with the embarrassment of non-simultaneities and non-
synchronicities. Everything has reached the same hour on the great clock of 
development or rationalization (at least from the perspective of the “West”).51 
 
For the postmodernists, the disappearance of the imagined “primitive,” the impossibility 
to believe  in the myth of the primitive, posed a deep epistemological problem for postmodern 
                                                     
49 Torgovnick, Gone Primitive, 41. 
50 The quote is from Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv. 
51 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1991), 309-10, quoted in Li, Neo-primitivist Turn, 33. Jameson also writes: “In modernism, . . . some residual zones 
of ‘nature’ or ‘being,’ of the old, the older, the archaic, still subsist; culture can still do something to that nature 
and work at transforming that ‘referent.’ Postmodernism is what you have when the modernization process is 
complete and nature is gone for good” (ix). 
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culture. The receding of primitivism was less a liberation from imperialist thinking than a curse 
of capital, because the primitive, the fundamental form of alterity, had been rendered a 
commodity, and an impossibility. Alterity, that radical alternative which is deemed necessary to 
critique Western modernity, seemed to have vanished along with it. As Jean Baudrillard wrote: 
 
There has been a beautiful moment of culture . . . . [I]t is between the seventeenth and 
the nineteenth centuries. Here we find exchange, cultures bump into each other, and 
considering also the irruption of primitive cultures, it is a very interesting moment. But 
today, with globalization, all differences are annulled, or else it is a game of differences, 
but there is no longer a real clash, an alterity of cultures . . . . But there can’t be identity 
without alterity; if there is no other, there is no self. Today one does not know where 
the other is, because with globalization there is no other.52 
 
 
The Primitive Refrain : Primitivism without Primitives 
 
Yet for all that, primitivism hasn’t disappeared, not from theory, nor from popular 
culture. In 2005 Kuper issued a revised edition of his earlier work, now titled The Reinvention of 
Primitive Society: Transformations of a Myth, in which he wrote:  
The first time around, I made the . . . error of supposing that the idea of primitive 
society was on its last legs. “My aim,” I wrote in the final paragraph of The Invention of 
Primitive Society, “has been to free us from some of our history. Anthropologists 
developed the theory of primitive society, but we may make amends if we render it 
obsolete at last, in all its protean forms.” This was a vain hope.53 
 
                                                     
52 Jean Baudrillard, “An Interview with Jean Baudrillard: Europe, Globalization and the Destiny of Culture,” by 
Monica Sassatelli, European Journal of Social Theory 5, no. 4 (2002): 526-27, quoted in Li, Neo-primitivist Turn, 1. 




On the one hand, Kuper expressed confidence that anthropology as a discipline had for 
the most part overcome its reliance on the model of primitive society. Although he noted that 
some anthropological research on hunter-gatherers continues to be informed by classical 
conceptions of the primitive,  
this branch of anthropology seems to have parted company from the mainstream. 
Anthropology can no longer be defined as the study of primitive societies. . . . Cultural 
and social anthropology today has very largely abandoned the study of social 
institutions. American anthropologists typically define their discipline as the study of 
culture, by which they mean systems of values and symbolic representations, and they 
struggle, probably unavailingly, to assert a proprietary interest in this glamorous if 
slippery property. However, since they preach that every culture has equal value, they 
are inclined to regard any attempt to distinguish “primitive culture” from “civilisation” 
as not only mistaken but oppressive.54 
 
Outside of the discipline, Kuper’s assessment was less sanguine. He documents the 
continued popular romanticization of “indigenous” societies, concluding that “the ghostly 
category of ‘primitive peoples’ [has] been restored to life under a new label.”55 While the 
increased political efforts to empower and provide sovereignty to several formerly marginalized 
indigenous groups (such as the creation of Nunavut territory in Canada in 1999) have had 
laudable intentions, Kuper draws attention to the questionable rhetoric behind some of these 
movements, noting for example that in a 1994 essay, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali wrote: “It is now clearly understood that many indigenous people live in greater 
harmony with the natural environment than do the inhabitants of industrialized consumer 
societies.”56  
                                                     
54 Ibid., 223. 
55 Ibid., 204. 
56 Ibid., 207. 
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Kuper cites Boutros-Ghali to underline the public prominence of such views. Aside from 
this romanticized view of contemporary indigenous people and lifestyles, the image of the 
primitive as the antitheses of modern life continues to shape discussions reflecting the 
widespread unease about technology, the rapid pace of modern life, and the alienation of 
urban life. One could point to the anti-civilization manifestos of anarcho-primitivist John 
Zerzan.57  The primitive equally remains a focal point in popular art, whether in terms of 
content or form.  An example of the former would be the films of Werner Herzog, including his 
recent documentaries Cave of Forgotten Dreams (2010) or Happy People: A Year in the Taiga 
(2010); an example of the latter would be Brian Jungen, Prototype for New Understanding #9, 
1999.58 (See fig. 2.3) 
Primitivism has yet to be dislodged from popular culture. The problem extends further, 
however. For even in spite of the impressive body of critical scholarship cited above, there is a 
                                                     
57 John Zerzan, Future Primitive and Other Essays (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1994); Zerzan, Running on 
Emptiness: The Pathology of Civilization (Los Angeles, CA: Feral House, 2002). Zerzan’s views of the “pathology” of 
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thousands of generations of forager (hunter-gatherer) life is staggering. There is no dispute that these ancestors 
put sharing at the center of their existence. Throughout the anthropological literature, sharing and equality are 
synonymous with the forager social organization, characterized as bands of 50 or fewer people. In the absence of 
mediation or political authority, people enjoyed strong expressive bonds face-to-face with one another and in 
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contemporary hunter-gatherer groups—in particular, the branch of anthropology which, in Kuper’s terms, “seems 
to have parted company from the mainstream,” yet which enjoys popularity with a broader audience outside 
academia. To take an example: “Hewlett and Lamb (2000) explored the levels of trust and compassion in an Aka 
band of foragers in central Africa. The physical and emotional closeness between Aka children and adults, they 
concluded, is closely related to their benign orientation to the world. Conversely, Aka people see their 
environment as generous and supportive, at least in part, because of the unrestricted bonds among themselves. 
Colin Turnbull observed a very similar reality among the Mbuti in Africa, who addressed greetings to ‘Mother 
Forest, Father Forest.’” 




lingering and entrenched primitivism which contemporary theory itself seems unable to escape. 
This is the argument put forth by Victor Li in his recent book, The Neo-primitivist Turn. Li writes: 
“Our awareness of the chronopolitics and geopolitics of primitivism . . . has not led to the 
disappearance of primitivism but to its deeper imbrication in contemporary theoretical 
discourses that appear to be anti-primitivist and politically progressive.”59  
Li applies the term neo-primitivism to contemporary theorists who, although they 
critique primitivism and the primitivist discourse from various angles, nevertheless resuscitate 
the very discourse which they try to overcome. Li focuses on the work of such theorists as 
Torgovnick, Baudrillard, Jean-François Lyotard, Marshall Sahlins, and Jürgen Habermas, and 
argues that in spite of their attempts to dispense with the primitive, their formulation of 
concepts like alterity, culture, and modernity nevertheless remain entrenched in primitivist 
thinking. Li’s book attempts to explain “why primitivism keeps reappearing even after it has 
been uncovered as a myth, a projection, or a construction necessary for establishing the 
modernity of the West.”60  
Thus, to take Kuper’s comment above, for example, the anthropological focus on the 
ostensibly neutral category of “culture” actually covers up the fact that the concept serves the 
same ends that “primitive” once did. Li wavers on whether this is a fundamental feature of the 
concept of culture, or is simply a result of the inability of anthropologists to reflect neutrally on 
other societies or their own.61 His critique of the use of the culture concept in anthropology is 
                                                     
59 Li, Neo-primitivist Turn, viii. 
60 Ibid., viii. 
61 Li argues that in Sahlins’ case, which is presented as the archetypal cultural relativist case, it is a fundamentally 
impaired concept. At the same time Li would have to admit that Sahlins is not representative of the discipline as a 
whole, and so here Li leans on the latter suggestion, although the argument isn’t fully developed in Li’s critique; it 
is therefore this latter suggestion that I aim to elaborate on here. 
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focused on the work of Marshall Sahlins, who in a series of books and essays prominently 
defended an idea of cultural particularity; to assess the validity of Li’s critique it will be 
necessary to look briefly at Sahlins’ development of the culture concept in these texts.   
The focal point of Sahlins’ argument was the eighteenth-century British naval explorer 
Captain James Cook, his visit to Hawai'i Island in 1779, his alleged deification by the natives, and 
his eventual murder shortly thereafter.  Sahlins specifically sought to make the case that the 
beliefs and thought-systems of eighteenth-century Hawaiians must be understood as crucially 
different from a European mentality marked by bourgeois rationalism, secularism, and 
empiricism.  
Although Li’s argument implies that Sahlins may be read a spokesman for anthropology 
and the culture concept, Li would have to acknowledge that a critique of Sahlins is not a critique 
of anthropology writ large. Li devotes considerable attention to the fact that Sahlins’ culture 
concept was far from universally accepted, but was in fact part of a major and contentious 
disciplinary debate between Sahlins and Princeton anthropologist Gananath Obeyesekere, 
about the nature of rationality and the ability of anthropologists to interpret different cultural 
belief systems and behavior. Sahlins’  How “Natives” Think: About Captain Cook, for Example 
(1995) was written as a rebuttal of Obeyesekere’s The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European 
Mythmaking in the Pacific.62 Sahlins argued that the Hawaiians had perceived Captain Cook as 
the incarnation of the fertility god Lono (due to his arrival at a particular moment in the 
Hawaiian calendar honoring the god), and that when Cook later returned to Hawaii, the natives 
                                                     
62 Marshall Sahlins, How “Natives” Think: About Captain Cook, for Example (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995); Gananath Obeyesekere, The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European Mythmaking in the Pacific (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
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killed him because his reappearance conflicted with the ritual calendar.63 His murder could 
therefore be explained, Li writes, as “a ritual solution to the cosmological crisis occasioned by 
[his] out-of-season return.”64  Obeyesekere responded vituperatively to Sahlins’ “apotheosis” 
argument, accusing him of perpetuating a Eurocentric belief that the “natives” were “so blinded 
by their myths that they could not distinguish a British naval captain and his crew from their 
own gods.”65 Obeyesekere argued that Sahlins had upheld the “nefarious side of the Western 
‘civilizing mission,’” and added “new dimensions of arrogance to the European myth of the 
indigenous people’s irrationality.”66  
In order to prevent such primitivism, Obeyesekere insisted that practical rationality, 
“the process whereby human beings reflectively assess the implications of a problem in terms 
of practical criteria,” must be understood as a pan-human capacity.”67 Sahlins responded in 
turn that Obeyesekere had in doing so produced a more insidious type of primitivism, that by 
endowing Hawaiians with “the instrumental, empiricist rationality of the West” he had covertly 
assimilated “Hawaiian difference into the likeness of the West.”68 Obeyesekere had therefore 
dispensed with the Hawaiians’ cosmology, and hence their own voices and unique perspective 
on their history. 
Li finds in Sahlins a prominent example of, and a rich theoretical defense of, the cultural 
relativist argument, and an argument for “unaltered” cultural particularity. For Sahlins and 
cultural relativists like him, the insistence on culture as radical difference produces a “back-
                                                     
63 Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
64 Li, Neo-primitivist Turn, 89. 
65 Ibid., 90. 
66 These are Sahlins’ words. Sahlins, How Natives Think, 1. 
67 Obeyesekere, quoted by Li, Neo-primitivist Turn, 100. 
68 Li, Neo-primitivist Turn, 91. 
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door” ethnocentrism: “What this means in effect is that [the] avoidance of ethnocentrism 
depends paradoxically on the other (native) culture’s resolute ethnocentrism, its assimilation of 
all events into its own pre-existing cosmology.”69 The result, Li writes, is that: 
Even as the culture concept opposes domination by Western universalism, it also 
engages in the project of exoticism by emphasizing the otherness of societies that have 
not completely lost their cultural uniqueness or particularity in the face of historical 
changes and the global threat posed by the culture of modernity.70 
 
Li’s critique of Sahlins, based on the above claims, seems at first unjustified. It will be 
helpful to acknowledge where Li’s argument unintentionally misconstrues the issue, in order to 
highlight where it has the most traction. On the one hand, the texts of Sahlins upon which Li 
chooses to focus are from the mid-1990s at the latest; this is recent to be sure, but a lot has 
happened in anthropology in the meantime.71 Moreover, Li suggests here that Sahlins and 
others continue to emphasize an untouched “particularity” in presumably isolated groups, 
unaltered by history and cultural interaction. Neither Sahlins nor any other mainstream 
anthropologist today would support such a view. Anthropological theory in general has 
embraced the realities of cultural interaction and exchange and many anthropologists have 
even critiqued the problematic concept of culture. As Matti Bunzl writes:  
At the turn of the century, the intersubjective coevalness of anthropological Self and 
ethnographic Other is no longer in question. There are indications, however, for an even 
more lasting Aufhebung of the traditional configurations. For scholars like Arjun 
Appadurai and Ulf Hannerz, the global dimensions of cultural developments are at the 
center of anthropological inquiry . . . and, as such, their ethnographic descriptions 
require the development of concepts that can grasp and render the complex coevalness 
of cultural realties. Appadurai famously identifies five dimensions in this context—the 
                                                     
69 Li, Neo-primitivist Turn, 142. 
70 Ibid., 44. 
71 Torgovnick registers this point as well in her critical review of Li’s book: “Most of the theory Li discusses was 
written during the lively theory crucible of the 1980s or 1990s—not so very long ago, especially because theory has 
been quieter since, but long enough to make a difference.” Marianna Torgovnick, “On Victor Li’s The Neo-
Primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity,” Criticism 49, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 548. 
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“ethnoscapes,” “mediascapes,” “technoscapes,” “financescapes,” and “ideoscapes” that 
configure transnational fields and their cultural flows. . . . Appadurai and Hannerz see all 
of the world’s groups as part of the global integration effected by late capitalism, a 
circumstance that not only renews attention to power differentials but necessitates the 
effective abandonment of particularized investigations of supposedly isolated peoples. 
As Hannerz asserts, there is no “really distant Other,” no “Primitive Man,” in the “global 
ecumene” but only combinations and continuities from “direct and mediated 
engagements.”72 
 
Second, Li’s suggestion that cultural relativism in inherently tainted with primitivism is 
inaccurate. Li bases his argument on Sahlins’ own claims that the notion of anthropological 
difference is central to the discipline’s aims: 
Sahlins’s debate with Obeyesekere over Cook’s fate and his writings on Hawaiian history 
and culture thus serve primarily to defend the idea of anthropology as the study of 
cultural differences. What is crucially at stake is not just the question of historiographic 
or ethnographic accuracy, but also the very raison d’être  of anthropology itself. 
Without a relativistic concept of cultural difference we would end up with an anti-
anthropology, a “common sense bourgeois realism . . . [which] is a kind of symbolic 
violence done to other times and other customs.” Anthropology must, therefore, always 
begin by considering “ideas, actions, and ontologies that are not and never were our 
own”; guarding against ethnographic incorporation, its slogan must always be: 
“Different cultures, different rationalities.”73 
 
In this reading, Li misconstrues the meaning of anthropological notion of relativistic 
difference. For Sahlins, it is true that the anthropologist must insist on difference. Needless to 
say, the anthropological interest in “culture” only makes sense if that culture is construed as 
different from the anthropologist’s own. Li suggests, however, that any ascription of difference, 
or different rationalities, entails an assertion of primitivism. This clearly is not the case. A more 
defendable claim would be a modification of Li’s argument to the effect that the culture 
concept often does not merely posit difference, but a determinate and evaluative difference. 
The problem is not difference per se, but arises when that difference is understood in terms of 
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a loaded binary opposition. Li explains, “Though indigenous or native culture may no longer be 
the untouched and unchanging primitive culture of evolutionary anthropology, its role is still 
that of representing alterity, of being the Other of modernity.”74 The anthropological ascription 
and valorization of difference becomes primitivism when that which is different is defined as 
different from modernity. The assertion of a normative modernity may not be the author’s 
intent, but when one targets (and these are Sahlins’ words) “ideas, actions, and ontologies that 
are not and never were our own,” it is the seemingly innocuous “our own” and the temporal 
“never” that usher modernity into the bargain. 
Moreover, as Li points out, in the case of anthropologists like Sahlins, the discipline of 
anthropology serves a manifestly political purpose, which is the critique of  “Western 
bourgeois-utilitarian reason and its claim to universality.”75 The point is not that the “culture” 
of the other is unchanged by history, but that it is seen as a tool for the critique of “Western 
modernity.” Not all anthropologists conceive of their work in this manner; but just as with the 
postmodern proclamation about the totality of global capital, the acknowledgement that there 
is no longer any existing “Primitive Man” hasn’t eroded the ubiquitous tendency to conceive of 
global modernity as the totality of civilization, and the tendency to imagine its opposite in 
terms of the primitive. 
In other words, it isn’t when anthropologists are looking at the cultural other that they 
are secretly thinking about the primitive, it’s when they are looking at the other, and thinking 
about themselves—which is to say, when they are thinking about the problems of modernity. In 
this sense, the primitive is more of a problem for theory than anthropology. As a (non-
                                                     




anthropologist) example, Li cites literary theorist Gayatri Spivak, who, in thinking about 
globalization and ecological destruction, is led to invoke the idea of the aboriginal as offering an 
alternative relationship to the “sacred”: 
Nature is no longer sacred for civilizations based on the control of nature. The result is 
global devastation due to a failure of ecology. It is noticeable that less advanced groups 
in the fourth world still retain this sense as a matter of their cultural conformity. I am 
not exoticising or romanticizing the aboriginal, they are not all “radicals” . . . What we 
are dreaming of here is not how to keep the aboriginal in a state of excluded cultural 
conformity, but how to learn and construct a sense of sacred nature by attending to 
them . . . We want to open our minds to being haunted by the aboriginal. We want the 
spectral to haunt the calculus.76 
 
Although there may not be any “true” aboriginals, Spivak suggests that the idea of the 
aboriginal remains relevant as a tool of critique. Spivak’s language also highlights that this is less 
of a theoretical choice than a matter of desire—we want the imaginary aboriginal, because it 
offers the means of critiquing the rational, the calculable. It is in this sense that Li writes: 
Neo-primitivism has become an attractive theoretical option precisely at a time when 
“primitives,” defined as belonging to authentic, primordial cultures yet untouched or 
uncontaminated by modernity, can no longer be called upon to act as pure forms of 
otherness. . . . Neo-primitivism can thus be seen as a primitivism without primitives 
insofar as it forwards a concept of the primitive so pure that no empirical referent or 
actual primitive can contradict or refute it.77 
  
Li’s book, it should be noted, received a rather haughty dismissal from at least two of its 
targets, Kuper and Torgovnick  (and it’s fair to assume that Sahlins and Li’s other targets would 
object as well). There is a certain irony here; just as Torgovnick and others had rankled art 
historians and anthropologists who felt comfortable speaking about all things primitive, they 
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themselves were now the ones accused of partaking in the insidious and offensive discourse of 
primitivism. 
If Li’s critique of anthropology is potentially limited to its protagonist, Sahlins (who, for 
all his prominence as a theorist, cannot be said to be representative of the discipline at large), 
Li’s critique of Torgovnick demonstrates the wider traction of his argument. And if the critique 
of Sahlins is judged to be weakened for its focus on dated material, then an examination of 
Torgovnick’s recent response to Li’s 2006 book should validate Li’s claim that primitivism 
remains a problem for theory even today. 
Torgovnick, as mentioned above, embraces the idea that the primitive is a projection of 
the West. One of our most astute observers of primitivism, she illuminates not only its history 
but its contemporary resurgence as a popular phenomenon:  
What we are seeing in the United States today is the full-tilt exploration of patterns 
formed in the 1920s: fascination with the primitive as an expression of fears about what 
the West has wrought in the world, even of white European self-loathing—often with an 
accompanying utopian impetus for change. Utopian desires are emerging strongly once 
again at the end of the twentieth century, in movements that envision the primitive as a 
locus of harmony and a shelter from the dangers and fragmentation of modern life.78 
 
Torgovnick indeed sees her work as “[closing] down certain possibilities—like vampiric 
hunger for the exotic Other.”79 Yet, Li argues, she makes use of a concept of alterity which 
serves to perpetuate the discourse of primitivism. Li’s critique is based on Gone Primitive and 
her follow-up study, Primitive Passions: Men, Women, and the Quest for Ecstasy (1997). In the 
latter, she aims to map out “a comprehensive psychology of the West’s fascination with the 
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79 Ibid., 19. 
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primitive.”80 The root of this fascination, she argues, is the desire for what early-twentieth-
century thinkers termed the “oceanic” — which she defines as “a dissolution of subject-object 
divisions so radical that one experiences the sensation of merging with the universe.”81 She 
explains: 
My claim in Primitive Passions is that the West has tended to scant some vital human 
emotions and sensations of relatedness and interdependence—though it has never 
eliminated them. These sensations include effacement of the self and the intuition of 
profound connections between humans and land, humans and animals, humans and 
minerals, of a kind normally found in Europe and the United States only within mystical 
traditions.82 
 
The deep desire for the oceanic has led Westerners to project their fears and longings 
onto the imagined “primitives.”83 Torgovnick rejects any implication that her account is 
primitivist, because she insists that the “alterity” of the oceanic experience is not only to be 
found in primitive societies, but has been present in certain underground traditions within the 
West itself: “The perceived ‘collectivity’ or ‘spirituality’ of primitives may be no greater than 
what has existed at different times in the West, and still does, albeit often in a displaced or 
distorted form.”84 
 Li argues, however, that this notion of the oceanic as alterity, although it doesn’t require  
a belief in actually existing primitives, is conceived in terms of the primitive: 
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Even as Torgovnick incisively critiques Western primitivism’s ethnocentric construction 
of an exotic Other, she also asserts that “what has been sought elsewhere may yet be 
found in the folds and creases of the West’s own neglected traditions.” In short, the 
West’s primitive Other disappears to become the Other within the Western self. 
Primitive alterity is to be sought not outside but inside the West itself. In Torgovnick’s 
version of a primitivism without primitives, primitive others—geographically, 
temporally, or culturally separated from us—are no longer needed because the so-
called primitive quest for oceanic ecstasy is to be found as much in the West as 
elsewhere. We no longer need to go in search of primitives because they have been 
generalized or universalized to the point where we can now say, “primitives are us.”85 
 
Torgovnick, in her review of Li’s book, objected strongly to Li’s interpretation of her 
work, and claimed he had misread her arguments. She responded: 
When I talk, for example, in Primitive Passions, about traditions that recognize “the 
oceanic” within premodern cultures and within the West, I’d hate to be seen as 
maintaining that tribal peoples exist constantly and continuously within states of mind 
accessed mostly during ritual and meditation, states of mind not coextensive with or 
fully viable in quotidian life. I state, or thought I did, quite clearly, that such a belief in 
the continuously spiritual primitive is in itself a major form of primitivism.86 
 
Torgovnick misses the point, however. Li is not claiming that she asserts that “primitive” 
peoples actually live in a continuously oceanic experience. He argues that her notion of alterity 
preserves a dichotomy in which the primitive is positioned as outside of the West, outside of 
modernity. This can be made more clear by attending to the way in which this alterity is 
defined. She writes: 
My broadest claim, then, is this: the primitive is the sign and symbol of desires the West 
has sought to repress—desires for direct correspondences between bodies and things, 
direct correspondences between experience and language, direct correspondences 
between individual beings and the collective life force.87 
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The oceanic is present in the West, but only in “neglected” fissures, “displaced or distorted.” It 
is continuously “repressed” and “hounded out of institutionalized religions.” The oceanic is a 
figure of alterity because it is radically other. The force responsible for the neglecting, the 
hounding, is the West itself.  
The ubiquitous figure of the “The West” in Torgovnick’s framing of the issue is telling. 
Interestingly, in Gone Primitive, she had commented on the problematic nature of the concept, 
especially when writing about primitivism: “In fact, funny things begin to happen when 
primitive goes into question marks. The first thing is that all other constructed terms—
especially terms like the West and Western—seem to require quotation marks as well.”88 Yet 
she opted not to adopt such a practice, finding it “a technique that despite its seeming 
sophistication ultimately relieves writers of responsibility for the words they use.”89 It is no 
doubt true that putting a word in quotation marks can be a smokescreen, making it look as if 
one questions its validity when in fact one continues to endorse its implications (as we might 
say was the case with the “primitive” of the MoMA exhibit); yet the problem is deeper. For 
writers like Torgovnick, and myself, the West appears to be too fundamental of a concept; it 
shakes off any attempt to put it in a harness.90  
                                                     
88 Torgovnick, Gone Primitive, 20. 
89 “The heritage of Western domination,” Torgovnick writes, “cannot be abolished by wishing or by typography.” 
Gone Primitive, 20. 
90 My objection is not that Torgovnick doesn’t put quotations around the West – the task is obviously more 
complicated than this. For as she says, quotations alone can dissemble. It’s a commonplace now that the West is 
imagined, so perhaps quotations are superfluous.  And surely not everything that is imagined must go into 
quotation marks, else we may need to begin to speak of the “United States” (or perhaps that too would be a good 
thing?). Clearly it depends upon the context in which one is working. I wish, however, to draw attention to a 
particular meaning of “the West” in Torgovnick’s work, as the imagined community of modernity. By failing to use 
“the West” in quotations, she affirms the identification of “the West” with modernity, and the identification of 
others, those who experience the oceanic (both in the West and elsewhere) as primitive. I should add that just 
because a community is imagined doesn’t mean one must or should or can disbelieve in it. Community 
membership is a powerful thing. Yet as with all imagined communities, it also sometimes helps to be reminded of 
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 “The West” as a term seems straightforward enough at first – Torgovnick defines it in 
Gone Primitive as “dominant Euro-American cultures.”91 She adds that “the term Euro-
American denotes Europeans, Americans of European ancestry, and others of European 
ancestry who may be citizens of countries outside Europe.”92 In Primitive Passions, she writes 
that “‘Western’ refers to the sum total of European and European-American traditions; ‘the 
West’ to nations populated largely by people of Western European descent.”93 But under 
scrutiny these boundaries fray; to draw a line around nations and populations defined by 
descent seems to make sense, but when she defines it by “cultures” and “traditions” it 
becomes more slippery, especially, it would seem, in the modern era. One might point to the 
Young Turks, for example, who hoped to modernize the Ottoman Empire through appropriating 
major features of “Western” culture in combination with Islamic belief and an Ottoman 
heritage. Or one might point to Taha Hussein, the celebrated twentieth-century Egyptian 
novelist and figure head of the Arab Renaissance (a movement which aspired to European 
modernity and modernization), who declared: “We must follow the path of the Europeans so as 
to be their equals and partners in civilization, in its good and evil, its sweetness and bitterness, 
what can be loved or hated, what can be praised or blamed.”94 Similarly, what of Rabindranath 
Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, Naguib Mahfouz? Not “Westerners” under Torgovnick’s description, 
but their involvement with “Western” culture and modernity is undeniable. My point of course 
                                                                                                                                                                           
their constructedness, to empower one to judge for oneself what defines the community, and whether one wishes 
to belong. I have a hope that the time has come in which “The West” will be appearing more often within 
quotations, yet what such a consciousness would portend, what new identities would emerge, is an open question. 
91 Torgovnick, Gone Primitive, 256n41. 
92 Ibid., 253n19. 
93 Torgovnick, Primitive Passions, 221n2. 
94 Saree S. Makdisi, “The Empire Renarrated: Season of Migration to the North and the Reinvention of the Present,” 
Critical Inquiry 18, no. 4, Identities (Summer, 1992): 806. 
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is not a radical one, simply that “the West” implies more than a geographical region or a people 
with a presumed biological ancestry; it evokes a culture, a perspective, and a condition—
namely, the condition of modernity.  
 In the face of the perceived reality of “the West,” which is to say, modernity, the 
primitive “projection” begins to take on substance once more. That “the West” serves as a 
sobriquet for modernity becomes clear through the structure and terms of Torgovnick’s 
argument, the opposition of “the West” and the “primitive,” and the resurgence of the idea of 
“primitives.” Even though she has rejected the idea of “primitives” existing out there in the 
world, they are in fact still lurking on the periphery. In Primitive Passions, she writes, “Do 
groups that have been described as primitive have a special, continuous access to the spiritual, 
cosmic world—or do Westerners just see it that way?”95 Although the projectionist argument 
(which she developed to great length in her previous book) would have to affirm the latter, this 
time, she remains surprisingly agnostic: “There are simply no reliable sources which would 
allow me to decide these points for sure.”96 
In her review of Li, Torgovnick defends herself from Li’s criticism by quoting from a 
section in Gone Primitive in which she explained her use of the word “primitive.” She states 
that, although she would “want to make some nips and tucks and alterations,” she would “by 
and large . . . stand by it.”97 She explains: 
Given the mixed history of the word primitive, the urge to jettison it is understandable. 
But before we could responsibly do that we would need a viable alternative to designate 
the kinds of societies it describes. Currently, we do not, since all its synonyms are either 
inexact or duplicate in various ways the problematics of the term primitive itself. And 
                                                     
95 Torgovnick, Primitive Passions, 18. 
96 Ibid., 18. 
97 Torgovnick, “On Victor Li’s The Neo-Primitivist Turn,” 549. 
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here I include savage, pre-Columbian, tribal, third world, underdeveloped, developing, 
archaic, traditional, exotic, “the anthropological record,” non-Western, and Other. Some 
of these alternatives (third world, underdeveloped, exotic) blur necessary, indeed vital 
distinctions between third world nations (which are often urban and industrial) and the 
remote, relatively primitive societies they may still harbor. All take the West as norm 
and define the rest as inferior, different, deviant, subordinate, and subordinatable. We 
simply to not have a neutral, politically acceptable vocabulary.98 
 
Her point makes sense. But what is entailed here? She says in effect that we might as 
well use the word primitive because, after all, we don’t have any good way of talking about 
primitive societies. It is clear to her that there are such societies, the only question is over what 
we ought to call them. What exactly are the “kind of societies it describes”? She explains that 
“Third world” is a poor designation because it occludes the fact that such nations are  often 
urban/industrial—in other words, if a nation is urban/industrial, it is not primitive; although 
these nations probably harbor “relatively primitive societies.” Thus a rough outline of what 
constitutes the primitive begins to emerge – that which is non-urban, non-industrial.  
A fuller picture emerges when, in Gone Primitive, Torgovnick offers the following 
working definition of primitive societies. They are marked by:  
the legality of custom, the presence of traditional leadership roles, the paramount 
importance of kinship in social and economic organization, widespread and diffuse 
social and economic functions assigned each individual, the importance of ritual for 
individual and group expression (rituals which often include dance and the expression of 
ambivalence), and a relative indifference to Platonic modes of thought – in short, the 
condition of societies before the emergence of the modern state. Additional markers, 
such as rudimentary technology and (frequently, though by no means always) a 
nomadic or village life with agrarian, herding, or hunting economies, can also be noted. 
Such societies clearly once occupied much of the earth; today they survive in fewer and 
more isolated spaces and are often marked by contact, however minimal, with modern 
(urban and industrial) cultures.99 
 
                                                     




For Torgovnick, then, there are still a few examples of this “kind of society” in the 
world—isolated, with minimal contact with “modern cultures.” The primitives are the non-
urban, the non-industrial, and the non-technological. Note also the evocation of the passing of 
time – the primitive is something before “the emergence of the modern state.” And there is 
also the interesting allusion to a different way of knowing—marked by indifference to Platonic 
modes of thought. What could it mean, Platonic modes of thought? One suspects a 
euphemism—an indifference, presumably, for rational thought.100 In this latter remark 
Torgovnick’s idea of the primitive as alterity clearly recalls Sahlins concept of culture. 
Why is such a definition troubling? Torgovnick is quick to point out, she is merely 
describing an observable spectrum of material culture, but one which is loaded with value 
judgments:   
For me, as narrative voice, theorist, and critic, [the “primitive”] exists only along a 
continuum of terms from the technologically replete, perhaps now overly replete, and 
the relatively free of technology. It’s a central contention of my work that no choice of 
words to describe the continuum can be entirely neutral or objective. In the preceding 
sentences, for example, “replete” is more neutral than “overly replete,” and 
                                                     
100 There is no doubt that not all humans experience or think in the same way, yet to posit these binaries (Platonic 
and non-Platonic) is a precarious move, which reveals its nefarious implications most clearly when encountered in 
a political context. Li points to just such an uncomfortable example in Torgovnick’s critique of his book: “We can 
take as a case in point what Torgovnick describes as her own ‘loaded but not inapt example’ of primitivism’s role in 
America’s invasion of Iraq. She argues that the Bush administration failed to take cultural differences into account 
when it decided to invade Iraq in 2003. She explains that Bush and his planners assumed that Iraq ‘was secular and 
middle-class enough to allow for rapid rebuilding after a U.S. invasion.’ Now, four years later, with no end to 
carnage in sight, the consequences of that failure are all too horrifically clear. Torgovnick thus concludes that the 
failure to see cultural differences is also, ironically, ‘the failure to be primitivist enough.’ ‘Indeed,’ she adds, ‘one 
could say that in this instance a larger dose of primitivism—a belief in the difference of Others and their adherence 
to nonmodern values—might have done the Bush administration some good!’” (Victor Li, “A Necessary Vigilance: A 
Response to Torgovnick and Kuper,” Criticism 49, no. 4 [Fall 2007]: 562.) One might compare Henry Kissinger’s 
related remark in a 1974 article for American Foreign Policy, quoted by Said in Orientalism: “’Cultures which 
escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking have retained the essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real 
world is almost completely internal to the observer.’ Consequently, [Kissinger] adds,  ‘empirical reality has a much 
different significance for many of the new countries than for the West because in a certain sense they never went 
through the process of discovering it.’” (Said, Orientalism, 47, quoting Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and 
Foreign Policy," American Foreign Policy [1974].) 
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“technology-free” has, in 2008, a positive connotation that “non-technological” does 
not always have and would generally not have had in 1900 or 1920 or even 1980.101 
 
For starters, she says the primitive exists “along” this continuum, but it does not. The 
primitive is  not sharing space with technologically replete, it is at the far end, with the 
relatively technology-free. She acknowledges that the terms she uses can never be neutral. But 
this doesn’t go deep enough into the epistemological problem. It is not enough just to 
acknowledge it; this is like putting a word in quotes, to absolve oneself of dealing with its 
implications. This is clear from the fact that in the very next paragraph, she slides down from 
this self-reflective height and is mired again in primitivism. She writes that: 
My use of the term “authentic primitive” needs to be understood within the framework 
of a continuum from the patently fanciful (for example, the belief that Atlantis could be 
found in the core of Africa) to the ethnographically demonstrable (for example, 
communal dance as ritual).102 
 
It may be demonstrable that a certain group engages in communal dance, but the idea 
that, compared to a fanciful projection, this can be deemed “authentic primitive” is itself a 
fancy. The implication is that the designations of “communal,” “ritual,” and the ethnographic 
are enough to identify something as “primitive.” In this way, the technology-free is stitched up 
with the ethnographic, “oceanic,” primitive. 
The perception that a “continuum of technology” is a meaningful observation is itself 
the problem, because it implies that one end of the continuum is meaningfully different from 
the other – namely one end is more alienated, the other, more authentically human. On one 
end a hunting spear, on the other, a smart phone. The problem here is that the characteristics 
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102 Torgovnick, “On Victor Li’s The Neo-Primitivist Turn,” 548. 
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which the primitive is said to oppose—urban life, industrialism, technology, the state—are 
themselves far from neutral. As soon as one puts down Torgovnick’s book, or perhaps the 
electronic device one is using to read it, one might feel a stirring of gratitude for living in a 
modern, “technologically replete” society, or lament the alienation caused by the proliferation 
of technology and desire a return to a more natural existence. Torgovnick’s sophisticated and 
historically-informed understanding of primitivism, in its perpetuation of a desire for an oceanic 
experience equated with the primitive, is therefore not so very far from the primitivism of 
Zerzan. 
As we saw with Sahlins’ case above, primitivism isn’t so much a problem in thinking 
about others; the problem manifests when thinking about modernity. Primitivism, all are 
agreed, is a projection. Modernity, however, is not. Thus Li’s tripartite analysis of neo-
primitivist concepts is somewhat misleading. It isn’t the concepts of culture (Sahlins) or alterity 
(Torgovnick) in themselves that are the problem; it is only when these are posed as counter to 
modernity that they adopt the features of primitivism.  
 
Christopher Miller, in his important study of primitivism, Blank Darkness: Africanist 
Discourse in French, optimistically wrote, “The idea that Europe is an idea is one whose time has 
come.”103 But, he continued, “to reach back to the point of its origin is not an easy task. A more 
feasible project is to observe Europe in the act of reaching back or out toward an idea of what 
Europe is not: the ‘primitive,’ the ‘Orient,’ ‘Africa.’” The key insight from decades of studies into 
primitivism was that it formed a projection, a mirror of the West. One implication from this 
                                                     
103 Miller, Blank Darkness, xi. 
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scholarship has been that the awareness of the constructedness of the primitive should reveal 
the constructedness of the West.  Yet the West refuses to let go. The reason, I believe, is that 
the West itself is a product of the primitive refrain. The primitivist discourse must be seen, not 
as a mirror, but as a lamp, illuminating the territory of modernity—this argument forms the 
focus of the next section.104  
My aim in what follows is to carry Li’s project forward. Although Li says he aims to 
explain “why primitivism keeps reappearing,” his critique more accurately demonstrates that 
primitivism keeps reappearing, in new guises—the why remains unresolved. Below, I shall 
outline a theory to account for the lingering power of primitivism. I attempt to explain, first, 
why the scholarly critique of primitivism hasn’t dislodged primitivism; namely, that through the 
continued association of primitivism with modernism it appears less as a projection and more 
as a project. Second, I argue that this primitivist discourse is responsible for the continuing 
concreteness of the imaginary edifice of Europe, the West, and modernity. 
  
                                                     
104 My use of “refrain” is intended to evoke the writings of philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who 
elaborate the idea in their work A Thousand Plateaus. It is a concept, I find, particularly suited to theorizing the 
persistence, power, and playfulness of the discourse of primitivism. Jane Bennett’s brief illumination of the idea, 
drawing together the conceptual links between the “refrain” and enchantment, is itself enchanting: “One also 
notes,” she writes, “that the word enchant is linked to the French verb to sing: chanter. To ‘en-chant’: to surround 
with song or incantation; hence, to cast a spell with sounds, to make fall under the sway of a magical refrain, to 
carry away on a sonorous stream. [Deleuze and Guattari] describe the refrain as having a transformative or 
‘catalytic function: not only to increase the speed of the exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it, but 
also to assure indirect interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural affinity, and thereby to form 
[new] organized masses.’” Bennett uses the concept to describe the role that sound plays in theorizing sources of 
enchantment; this forms part of her argument for a “weak ontology” of enchantment. My own usage is meant to 
aesthetically theorize the enchantment to be found even within disenchantment, which is to say, primitivism. It is 
also an attempt to provide a new ontological understanding of this discourse, which is necessary to critique the 
ontological faith in modernity. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, Trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); Jane 
Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 6. 
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Part 3.  From Modernism to Modernity: The Mirror and the Lamp 
 
A. Modernism: “The Projection of the Primitive” or the “Primitivist Project”? 
 
Primitivism, as I have been using the term, refers to more than the aesthetic movement 
that appeared in the early years of the twentieth century. It designates a broad cultural 
discourse of alterity: a set of ideas and images, circulating in academic,  literary and artistic 
discourse as well as in popular culture, from novels and films to dreamcatchers and tee-shirts, 
all of which draw upon a cohesive set of signifiers which mark out the “primitive” from the 
“civilized.” The topic of primitivsm has thus moved from an issue for art historians to an issue 
for cultural analysis.  
Contemporary efforts to theorize primitivism, however, remain influenced by the 
historical circumstance that it was through primitivist art, and the critique of it, that primitivism 
came to be understood as a larger cultural discourse of alterity. The double reference of 
primitivism (to an artistic movement and to a cultural discourse) becomes problematic in 
contemporary theory because the effort to link aesthetic primitivism to modernism has the 
result of linking modernism to cultural primitivism. 
At the same time that the body of critical scholarship on the conceptual constructedness 
of the primitive was being produced, research on aesthetic primitivism sought to articulate the 
relationship of primitivism to modernism, as a set of aesthetic practices and principles. A good 
example of how these two lines of inquiry were interlocked can be seen in the recent collection 
of essays edited by Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush, Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist 
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Project and the Culture of Modernism (1995). The interdisciplinary contributions analyze the 
role of the primitive in literature and painting, the central role of anthropology in the 
development of the primitive projection, as well as its expression in both academic and popular 
arenas, from sociology and politics to photography and travel engravings, ragtime music and 
the performances of Josephine Baker. Throughout these essays, the authors acknowledge that 
primitivism must be understood as a projection. Barkan and Bush state at the outset in their 
introduction: “primitivism denotes an Occidental construction, a set of representations whose 
‘reality’ is purely Western,”105 and in the accompanying footnote they clarify, “In this essay, as 
ought to be self-evident, the terms primitive, savage and civilized are always to be understood 
as constructions, never as ‘reality.’”106 
Yet uniting the diversity of approaches and topics is the drive to link primitivism to 
modernism—casting it as the “primitivist project.” As Barkan and Bush write in the 
introduction’s final paragraph: 
Acknowledging the complexities, political and otherwise, of the primitivist project, the 
essays in this book suggest that primitivism has always involved contested ideological 
forces and that the process seems to have generated a set of responses inseparable 
from what we have come to call modernism. . . . As Edward Said wrote in a text 
subsequent to Orientalism, “Europe and the West” were forced “to take the Other 
seriously,” and this “is the fundamental historical problem of modernism.”107 
 
Before I attend to the consequences of this fusion confusion, I would point out that 
there are two important factors behind the drive to link primitivism to modernism. The first is a 
long-standing dismissal of the importance of primitivism to modern art. As William Rubin 
announced in the opening sentence to his introduction to the MoMA 1984 exhibition 
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106 Ibid., 375n2. 
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catalogue: “No pivotal topic in twentieth-century art has received less serious attention than 
primitivism—the interest of modern artists in tribal art and culture.”108  
This denigration of primitivism’s artistic value, it may be noted, is as old as the 
recognition of primitivism as an artistic movement. Contemporary critics and artists often 
denigrated primitivist art for its perceived artificiality. The German painter Max Beckmann, for 
example, in a popular 1912 article, condemned what he saw as an unhealthy “dependence on 
ancient primitive styles which in their own times grew organically out of a common religion and 
mystic awareness”:  
 [I find it] weak because Gauguin and the like weren’t able to create types out of their 
own confused and fragmented times which could serve us in the way that the gods and 
heroes served the peoples of old. Matisse is an even sadder representative of this 
ethnography museum art—from the Asian department.109 
 
In the years that followed, some important former exponents turned into detractors. Most 
notably, Wilhelm Worringer, the German art critic whose dissertation, Abstraction and Empathy 
(Abstraktion und Einfülung), written in 1907 and published as a best-selling book in 1908, was a 
major expression of, and influence upon, primitivist modernism. 110 As Mary Gluck has written,  
No manifesto of the pre-war years did more to define the meaning of the primitive for 
European educated opinion . . . [It] succeeded in giving powerful expression to the two 
central preoccupations of early-twentieth-century modernism: the impulse to 
abstraction and the fascination with the primitive.111   
 
                                                     
108 Rubin, "Primitivism" in 20th Century Art , 1. Rubin continues, “The immense bibliography of modern art lists 
only two instructive books on the subject: the pioneering text by Robert Goldwater, first published  almost half a 
century ago, and that of Jean Laude, written two decades ago, considerably more limited in scope, never 
translated from the French, and long out of print.” 
109 Max Beckmann, “Gedanken” über zeitgemäße und unzeitgemäße Kunst,’ Pan 2 (March 1912), 499ff, quoted in 
Lloyd, German Expressionism, 85. 
110 Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraktion und Einfühlung ein Beitrag zur Stilpsychologie (Munich: Piper, 1908). 
111 Mary Gluck, "Interpreting Primitivism, Mass Culture and Modernism: The Making of Wilhelm Worringer's 




By 1920, however, Worringer had become deeply disillusioned with Expressionism, primitivism, 
and modern art in general, declaring that the artists of his day had become: 
refined specialists on the margin of what is necessary and immediate to life for us today. 
Let us not confuse these marginalia of our culture with its proper text. Art once stood 
within the text—in the very middle of it—today it stands irretrievably at the margins, 
and any assertions to the contrary are based on an unconscious fiction. 112 
 
In 1934, Georg Lukács cited Worringer’s “funeral oration” over Expressionism in his own 
essay on the topic, “Greatness and Decline of Expressionism,” providing what may have been 
the most crushing critical blow to modernist primitivism. Lukács gave voice to the increasingly 
prevalent perception (in the wake of Dadaism) in which Expressionism seemed an aesthetically 
naïve claim to authenticity of expression; he joined this with a Marxist-influenced critique 
which derided the movement as a garish bourgeois fantasy of harmony with nature evading the 
reality of imperialist violence and racism.113 Lukács’ essay led to a much-noted 1938 debate 
between Lukács and Ernst Bloch in the pages of Das Wort; the focus of the debate was 
Expressionism, not primitivism per se, but in the terms of the debate the two were ideologically 
linked. Bloch defended Expressionism as a robust modernist critique of contemporary society; 
Lukács excoriated Expressionism as not only a veiled form of decaying bourgeois ideology and a 
“pseudo-critical, misleading abstract mythicizing form for Imperialist pseudo-opposition,” but 
as a precursor to fascism in general and Nationalism Socialism in particular.114 Expressionism, 
and modernist primitivism along with it, were slow to recover; the current of criticism has 
                                                     
112 Wilhelm Worringer,  “Questions about Contemporary Art” (Künstlerische Zeitfragen), 1921, quoted in Charles 
W. Haxthausen, “Modern Art After ‘The End of Expressionism’: Worringer in the 1920s,” in Invisible Cathedrals: The 
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114 Lukács, quoted in Lloyd, German Expressionism, viii. 
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remained a steady force which art criticism has been unable to shake. Of course, popular 
interest in primitivism continued to grow in the years following World War 1, in conjunction 
with the négrophilie sweeping the US and Europe, and after World War 2, the market for 
“primitive” objects themselves blossomed. But, as Rubin observes, critical appreciation, 
although far from absent, was never widespread.  
The second factor behind the drive to link primitivism to modernism, ironically perhaps, 
was the MoMA exhibition itself.  As previously discussed, primitivism became the target of 
much heated criticism following the exhibition. Art critic Hal Foster expressed the sentiment in 
a prominent article for October: when discussing Les Demoiselles d’Avignon as “a primal scene 
of modern primitivism,” he wondered if the “aesthetic breakthrough” of primitivism was “not 
also a breakdown, psychologically regressive, politically reactionary.”115 More accurately, then, 
we might say that following the exhibition, the fates of modernism and primitivism were fused; 
but the problem now became how to assess the value of primitivism, both aesthetically and 
politically, given that its association with imperialism and racism (not to mention sexism and 
classism) had been driven into the foreground. 
Jill Lloyd explored this issue in the German context in her important study German 
Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity (1991).116 Referring to the Das Wort debate, she 
writes: 
Bloch and Lukács formulated a central question which must be posed in a critical 
examination of modernist primitivism. Could the inspiration the Expressionists drew 
from non-European and folk art be used as a disruptive strategy to challenge the norms 
and values of European culture? Or was it, as Lukács suggests, merely an appropriative 
device, reaffirming precisely those values they set out to undermine? . . . The relevance 
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of these questions to an understanding of the political status of modernism continues to 
occupy us today.117 
 
That the debate has not been settled is attested by the attitude of no less a respected 
authority on modernism than T. J. Clark.118 In his sprawling monograph, Farewell to an Idea: 
Episodes From a History of Modernism, he devotes but one paragraph to primitivism— 
which is to say, a largely parasitic and second-rate imitation of objects from the 
colonies, by artists who lacked the skills to do the job of imitation properly, not having 
so much as the beginnings of an understanding of what was being imitated – not 
thinking such an understanding necessary.119 
 
Against this criticism, then, recent research on primitivism has sought to assert its 
aesthetic and political value through establishing its crucial place in the history of modernism, 
and this has largely been through the trope of the “primitivist project.” Lloyd, to take a 
paradigmatic example, argued that primitivism (namely that of the German expressionist group 
die Brücke) was not an aesthetic dead-end nor an “escapist” flight from modernity, but rather 
an engagement with the fundamental concerns of modernism:  
Conventional interpretations of the primitivist impulse in European culture as an 
imaginative alternative to the changes underway in the modern world fail to take on 
board the complex, dualistic character of modernity itself. Far from presenting simply 
imaginative counter-images, primitivism provided modern artists, as I hope to show, 
with a means of negotiating the internal paradox of modernity, of spanning between its 
positive and negative, its forward- and backward- looking tendencies.120  
 
Whereas Lukács had seen primitivism as a passive, uncritical reflection of a damaged 
modernity, Lloyd’s line of argument takes the notion of primitivism as a projection, as an 
inverted mirror of the West, one step further, and suggests that some forms of aesthetic 
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primitivism can be understood as using that mirror progressively, in an avant-garde critique of 
the West. She writes, “In a positive sense, primitivism could be used to engage with the 
contradictions of modernity.” She admits that “the danger of false reconciliation, of a retreat 
from the real complexities of history into lazy universalism, remained,” but concludes that 
“Primitivism could be used as a critical tool to question the dominant values of Western 
bourgeois society.”121 
The problem in this, I would suggest, is that even if the mirror of primitivism can be used 
as a tool of critique, it remains a mirror. Primitivism, even where it is a critique of modernity, is 
perceived as a product of modernity, because modernism is theorized as a product of 
modernity. Charles Harrison expresses this understanding of modernism in his definition of the 
term for Critical Terms for Art History:  
Modernism is used to refer to the distinguishing characteristics of Western culture from 
the mid-nineteenth century until at least the mid-twentieth: a culture in which 
processes of industrialization and urbanization are conceived of as the principal 
mechanisms of transformation in human experience.122  
 
This interpretation of modernism, ubiquitous in the scholarship, is usually traced back to 
the nineteenth and early twentieth-century theorists who are credited for first articulating it. 
Harrison cites the German sociologist George Simmel, whose work is often seen to encapsulate 
the modernist predicament. In his essay “The Metropolis and Modern Life” (1902-3), Simmel 
wrote: “The deepest problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual to 
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preserve  the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social 
forces.”123 Harrison concludes:  
In this form modernism is regarded both as a condition consequent upon certain broad 
economic, technological, and political tendencies and as a set of attitudes towards those 
tendencies. . . . In [this] sense, then, “modernism” is the substantive form of the 
adjective “modern,” while the condition it denotes is virtually synonymous with the 
experience of modernity.124 
 
In other words, modernism is product of civilization—a particularly advanced type of 
civilization, characterized by a certain social/economic/political developments, which when 
viewed together are referred to as the historical period/experience known as modernity. The 
recent spate of research, despite a diversity of particular aims, shares this unifying conceptual 
framework. Modernism is identified as a set of aesthetic practices produced by of the 
conditions of modernity. Secondly, insofar as primitivism is figured as a branch of modernism, 
primitivism is theorized as  1) a product of modernity, and often 2) a critique of modernity. The 
difference between product or critique, however, is irrelevant, being a matter of passive 
reflection or active critique, the degree to which a certain work or artist merely expresses a set 
of contradictions (like symptoms), or uses the primitive to critique the ailments of modern 
society. The key is that in both cases, primitivism as modernism functions as a mirror of 
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modernity, a condition whose contours are seen as evident, and whose reality is judged 
obvious. 
It is one thing to link primitivism to modernism, but quite another to link it to 
modernity.  The difference is that in the case of the former, one is concerned to identify the 
relationship of primitivism to a specific set of historically demarcated aesthetic practices. In the 
case of the latter, one is concerned to identify the relationship of primitivism to the project, or 
experience, of modernity. On the surface, this seems quite familiar and unproblematic; surely 
primitivism, like modernism, is a product of the “economic, technological, and political 
tendencies” of its time. And yet, this formulation has turned us back against our original aim, 
suggested by Miller—to better understand the constructedness of “the West.” 
I argue that primitivism should not be seen as a tool of critique, nor a mirror of 
modernity, but as itself a discourse productive of the experience of modernity. This idea in itself 
isn’t new; Foster identified this possibility in his 1985 essay.125 However, as the above 
discussion has attempted to show, the imbrication of the cultural studies approach to 
primitivism and the drive to link aesthetic primitivism to modernism has inadvertently thwarted 
the articulation of this argument about the constructedness of modernity.  
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“As for ‘primitives,’” to quote Barkan and Bush once more, “they never existed. Only 
Western ‘primitivism’ did. . . . Primitivism denotes an Occidental construction, a set of 
representations whose ‘reality’ is purely Western.”126 This formulation brings us back to 
Torgovnick’s dilemma about quotation marks. Putting quotation marks around “primitives” 
would properly require us to do the same with “Western,” yet this is resisted. What happens to 
analytical weight of this observation when both go into quotations, when we write that “only 
‘Western’ ‘primitivism’ existed”? We are dealing with what seems a projection of a projection.  
The concepts of “the Occident” and “the West” are left standing because they 
presumably convey an ontological reality. How is this reality specified? We might here return to 
Torgovnick’s definition of the primitive from Primitive Passions: 
My broadest claim, then, is this: the primitive is the sign and symbol of desires the West 
has sought to repress—desires for direct correspondences between bodies and things, 
direct correspondences between experience and language, direct correspondences 
between individual beings and the collective life force.127 
 
What is it, then, that produces these desires? The longing for “direct correspondences” 
is the result of the “Western” individual’s alienation from nature (bodies and things), alienation 
from meaning (through language), and alienation from spirit. The sources of this alienation 
need not be specified because they are taken for granted—they are those outlined by Harrison 
above, the “economic, technological, and political tendencies” of the time of modernity—in 
short, capitalism, urbanization, bureaucracy, rationalization, secularism, and so on. 
However, Torgovnick’s construction of the primitive in terms of desires and repressions 
provides a direction for rethinking primitivism and its relation to modernity. We must first 
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approach the phenomenon of primitivism with the same hermeneutic suspicion that Michel 
Foucault brought to his analysis of the history of sexuality, or the history of punishment. 
Foucault argued that one could read the history of sexuality, and in particular the sexuality of 
the 18th and 19th centuries, not as a history of the repression of sexuality, but as the 
production of a discourse about sexuality. In Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
writes: 
Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in 
check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the 
name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to 
grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification 
of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the 
strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with 
a few major strategies of knowledge and power.128 
 
If we can view the desires of “Westerners” for the “primitive” not as originating in a 
“natural given,” a condition of alienation produced by modernity, it becomes possible to grasp 
the construction of these desires. From this perspective, the primitive appears not as “sign or 
symbol” of desire, but as a discourse productive of these desires—in this case, desires for direct 
correspondences. It becomes possible to envisage how the primitive constructs the modern, to 
suggest that when a “modern” or “Western” subject contemplates such features of modernity 
as technology, urbanization, bureaucracy, rationalization, secularism, and so on, the experience 
of these features is structured by the discourse of primitivism.  
The above discussion set out to account for one of the reasons that theoretical writing 
on primitivism hasn’t fully succeeded in embracing the insight that the primitive, and hence the 
modern, are equally constructed. Yet it becomes apparent that the problem extends beyond 
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the domain of theory, however; at its root the problem is about the experience of modernity, 
or to be specific, the projection of a particular experience of modernity—one popularly 
identified in Max Weber’s phrase, “the disenchantment of the world.”129 
 
B. Primitivism and the Critique of Modernity 
 
In the accepted interpretation of primitivism understood as modernism, European 
artists are described as either arriving independently at (in Rubin’s “affinity” hypothesis), or (in 
the eyes of Rubin’s many critics) appropriating, “primitive” aesthetic forms and styles as a way 
to critique not only the classical aesthetic tradition, but the many problems of European 
civilization: artificiality, anonymity, and alienation; the disintegration of community; the failures 
of rationalism, secularism, and science to provide some kind of meaningful human fulfillment; 
the failure of industrialized or bureaucratic society to provide satisfactory modes of 
employment or an authentic experience of life. The implication in this view is that modernity’s 
problems were obvious, and that primitivism offered one way of expressing these discomforts 
within a rapidly changing industrial, urban, metropolitan civilization. Had there been no 
encounter with the primitive, other artistic forms or styles would have sufficed.  
In other words, in this interpretation, even if the “primitive” was not truly a discovery, 
primitivism itself is still understood and presented as a discovery, as a mode of aesthetics 
responding to the ailments of modernity—it is seen as a deus ex machina: the right thing at the 
right time. 
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I argue that this view is a product of teleological historical hindsight which should be re-
examined—that the experience of modernity’s “problems” must be seen as not immediately 
obvious or necessary, but as in fact a result of the primitivist discourse and the 
primitive/modern dichotomy. Thus, rather than a mirror, we might see primitivist discourse as a 
lamp—a discourse which is not just a reflection of self, but itself a source of light and energy. 
Perhaps a lamp like Wittgenstein’s, which has no firm boundaries, yet for all that, illuminates a 
terrain.  
This conceptual play is intended as an ironic reference to M.H. Abrams’ celebrated 1953 
work on literary Romanticism, The Mirror and the Lamp. “The title of the book,” Abrams writes, 
“identifies two common and antithetic metaphors of mind, one comparing the mind to a 
reflector of external objects, the other to a radiant projection which makes a contribution to 
the object it perceives.”130 Abrams argued that, whereas the former metaphor characterized 
the tradition of intellectual thought extending from Plato through eighteenth-century European 
philosophy, the metaphor of the lamp typified the “Romantic conception of the poetic mind,” 
which originated in the eighteenth but took hold in the early nineteenth century.131 Abrams 
described this as a historical shift in aesthetic theory, from a classical view based on mimesis, to 
a Romantic view based on expression. What was distinctive about the Romantic thought of 
poets like William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge was not simply the belief in a “life 
and soul” informing nature, “but the repeated formulation of this outer life as a contribution of, 
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or else as in constant reciprocation with, the life and soul of man the observer.”132 The 
Romantic poets, in other words, saw nature not simply as given, but as something constructed 
in the act of perception.  
I am suggesting that a similar move should be made in the theorization of primitivism. 
The discourse of primitivism is not simply like a mind reflecting reality (modernity), but should 
be seen, rather, as productive of it. There is an important irony implicit in my usage, however, 
which I must now address. According to Abrams, the Romantic poets were reacting to the 
“mechanistic” and “materialist” vision of the universe which had emerged in the work of 
scientists, social theorists and philosophers such as Rene Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Francis 
Bacon, Isaac Newton, and so on. Romantic poetry and philosophy were meant to counter the 
harm inflicted on the human spirit by the Enlightenment and its great philosophies of 
empiricism, materialism, and scientific rationalization. In this sense, Abrams writes, 
Romanticism was: 
an attempt to overcome the sense of man’s alienation from the world by healing the 
cleavage between subject and object, between the vital, purposeful, value-full world of 
private experience and the dead postulated world of extension, quantity, and motion. 
To establish that man shares his own life with nature was to reanimate the dead 
universe of the materialists, and at the same time most effectively to tie man back into 
his milieu.133 
 
Abrams, focusing on the example of Coleridge, explains that his theory of poetry was 
integrally related to this theory of mind. For Coleridge, the act of perception involved two 
distinct elements or moments: 
the primary and already creative act of perception yields the “inanimate cold world” of 
the ever-anxious crowd. This coincides roughly with the inert world of both empirical 
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philosophy and of common sense, which is perceived only in so far as it serves our 
practical interests and aims. . . . The subsequent and higher act of re-creation, among its 
other functions, by projecting its own passion and life, transforms the cold inanimate 
world into a warm world united with the life of man, and by that same act, converts 
matter-of-fact into matter-of-poetry—and according to Coleridge’s conception, into the 
highest poetry, because it is the product of the “secondary imagination.”134 
 
Thus for Coleridge and the Romantics, the poetic mind, as lamp, bestowed life on the 
material universe, which had otherwise been reduced to a cold and meaningless void in the 
intellectual developments of the day. The irony here, then, is that I argue the discourse of 
primitivism did not restore warmth to the void, but produced both the sense of disenchantment 
and the longing for harmony which found expression in Romanticism. The lamp of primitivism 
cast a powerful, alluring light, as well as deep shadows of disenchantment, across the terrain of 
modernity.   
It should be clear, then, that I have not cited Abrams simply to borrow his useful 
metaphor of the lamp. Rather, I wish to draw attention to the more important point, that my 
argument requires a rethinking not merely of primitivism but of Romanticism as well. Jill Lloyd, 
in speaking about aesthetic primitivism, writes: "All previous histories of primitivism have 
rightly located its beginnings in Romanticism.”135 Yet, I argue, it would in fact be more accurate 
to say that histories of Romanticism should be locating its beginnings in primitivism.  
Consulting any encyclopedia entry on Romanticism will provide the classic story of 
Romanticism versus Enlightenment with which we are familiar. Here, for example, is Richard 
Tarnas’s version of the story in his bestselling popular intellectual history, The Passion of the 
Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World View: 
                                                     
134 Ibid., 68. 
135 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 120. 
181 
 
Thus Bacon and Descartes—prophets of a scientific civilization, rebels against an 
ignorant past, and zealous students of nature—proclaimed the twin epistemological 
bases of the modern mind. In their respective manifestos of empiricism and rationalism, 
the long-growing significance of the natural world and the human reason, initiated by 
the Greeks and recovered by the Scholastics, achieved definitive modern expression. 
Upon this dual foundation, philosophy proceeded and science triumphed; It was not 
accidental to Newton’s accomplishment that he had systematically employed a practical 
synthesis of Bacon’s inductive empiricism and Descartes’ deductive mathematical 
rationalism, thereby bringing to fruition the scientific method first forged by Galileo.136  
 
However, this Enlightenment achievement called forth the inevitable Counter-
Enlightenment views, giving shape to a current of thought identified as Romanticism, which 
would develop over the ensuing centuries. The disenchantment for which the Romantics 
blamed Enlightenment philosophy would in the course of the nineteenth century be attributed 
more to the ills of industrialism, capitalism, and the rationalization of society: 
In the longer run . . .  the early Romantic sense of harmony with nature underwent a 
distinct transformation as the modern era grew old.. Here the Romantic temperament 
was complexly influenced by its own internal developments, by the sundering effects of 
modern industrial civilization and  modern history, and by science’s view of nature as 
impersonal, non-anthropocentric, and random. The overdetermined result was an 
experience of nature almost opposite from the original Romantic ideal: Modern man 
now increasingly sensed his alienation from nature’s womb, his fall from unitary being, 
his confinement to an absurd universe of change and necessity. No longer the 
Romantic’s spiritually glorious child of nature, late modern man was the incongruously 
sensitive denizen of an implacable vastness devoid of meaning.137 
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The sense of alienation which the Romantics of the early nineteenth century had 
attributed to the growth of materialist science and rationalist secularism, would, in the writings 
of sociologists a century later (such as Simmel) be attributed to the economy and social change, 
namely to capitalism, industrialism, and urbanization.  Nearly a century after that, this sense of 
alienation is discernible in the writings of postmodernists, in the “simulacra” of Baudrillard, or 
in Jameson’s critique of the global capitalist colonization of culture.138 
These are all variants on what political theorist Jane Bennett has termed the 
“disenchantment narrative,” in reference to its most well-known proponent, Max Weber.139 
The difference between them is seen as one of gradual disillusionment, from a Romantic faith 
in the redemption of the material world, through a social-science informed longing mixed with 
anxiety and despair, through a postmodern sense of malaise, nihilism, or liberation, as the case 
may be, brought on by the abandonment of Romantic aspirations. Whether alienation is 
attributed to a perceived separation from nature, the ill effects of industrialization, or systems 
of representation (language itself, the commodification of culture, or the ubiquity of mass 
media), all can be understood as variations on the concept of alienation produced in the 
primitivist discourse, the alienation of civilization from a primitive state.  The postmodern 
suspicion toward meta-narratives ironically failed to be suspicious of this meta-narrative, 
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partially explaining why postmodernism failed in its attempts to get past the modern. It is in 
this sense that I argue that primitivism has constituted a fundamental discourse of alterity since 
roughly the late eighteenth century. 
 
Primitivism, then, is not simply a product of romanticism, modernism, or 
postmodernism; rather, the discourse of primitivism has informed these various critiques of 
culture. Primitivism is certainly not the only factor behind such critiques, yet it has been a 
fundamental discourse in each instance, such that it is impossible to imagine them without it. 
Together they form the various elements of what we might call the critique of modernity. 
Primitivism has informed these discourses insofar as they have expressed a view of the world 
characterized by the “disenchantment” narrative. To demonstrate that these critiques share 
this common disenchantment narrative, and that this narrative is produced through the 
discourse of primitivism, I will turn to a closer examination of Bennett’s work.  
Bennett has compellingly argued that the disenchantment narrative is just that—a 
narrative, and not a necessary or binding one. She writes:  
Although the disenchantment story captures important features of contemporary life, it 
is also important to come to terms as closely as possible with enchanting events and 
affects residing within or alongside scientific calculation, instrumental reason, 
secularism, or disciplinary power. This seems advisable in order to induce a more 
visionary and expansive mood from the one that would be present if the 
disenchantment story held the whole field.140 
 
Although her work is historically minded and richly documented, it is essentially a work 
of political philosophy, a theoretical attempt to derive and develop an “enchanted 
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materialism.” She uses Max Weber, as well as the more recent writing of Hans Blumenberg and 
Simon Critchley, to characterize the disenchantment view, but her main concern is to scour 
history, philosophy, and contemporary culture in order to find and persuasively articulate 
counter-examples which challenge the disenchantment narrative—from the ancient writings of 
Lucretius to Renaissance physician Paracelsus,  from Henry David Thoreau to Franz Kafka; from 
the philosophies of Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari; 
even from seemingly unlikely places, such as the writings of Kant, or television ads for Gap 
clothing. As she explains, her motivation is ultimately an ethical one: 
The story I tell is of a contemporary world sprinkled with natural and cultural sites that 
have the power “to enchant.” It is a story born of my own discomfort in the presence of 
two images circulating in political and social theory. The first is the image of modernity 
as disenchanted, that is to say, as a place of dearth and alienation (when compared to a 
golden age of community and cosmological coherency) or a place of reason, freedom, 
and control (when compared to a dark and confused premodernity). For me the 
question is not whether disenchantment is a regrettable or a progressive historical 
development. It is, rather, whether the very characterization of the world as 
disenchanted ignores and then discourages affective attachment to that world. The 
question is important because the mood of enchantment may be valuable for ethical 
life.141 
 
I identify with Bennett’s project, and I see my work here as a supplement to her own. To 
that end, it seems to me that perhaps part of the difficulty “the West” has had in achieving a 
popular sense of “enchanted materialism” is to be found in the powerful hold the 
disenchantment story has held on “modern” individuals. Bennett, it should be noted, is keenly 
attuned to the power of affect, and the affective power the disenchantment narrative. She 
writes: 
The story of disenchantment represents and sustains a specific range of aesthetic 
sensibilities; it enters into moods, temperaments, habits, perceptual comportments, 
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and somatic predispositions that find expression or resistance in political choices, 
alliances, and policies. Some portions of those sensibilities and comportments are so 
sedimented that they are highly resistant to reform, but there also seem to be others 
that are more susceptible to techniques of the self. My project is premised on [the] 
existence of those latter portions, the hope and target of my alter-tale.142 
 
Bennett’s attention therefore is geared toward discovering and articulating the affective 
power to be found in the sites of resistance. Greater attention can be paid, I argue, to the 
affective powers that support the disenchantment narrative itself, an area she does not 
explore. As she explains: 
Rather than examine [the] political culture [of disenchantment] through specific events, 
or by means of a history of the ideas that shape them, or by a study of the institutional 
arrangements (of government, class, law, race, gender, consumption) that support 
them, I focus on a register of experience—the register of a cultural imaginary.143 
 
What seems useful, then, is a critical reassessment of the history of the disenchantment 
narrative, and in particular, a recognition that this history cannot be told without understanding 
the role that primitivism has played. For if the source of disenchantment is consistently 
attributed to the wrong sources (empiricism, rationalism, technology, secularism, and so on), it 
makes it that much more difficult to uproot. In the following chapter, I attempt to call this 
history into view through an examination of the primitivist traces in Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Through an examination of the text’s 
participation in the discourse of primitivism, I seek to draw attention away from the figure of 
rationality and toward the history of imperialism. 
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From Dialectic of Enlightenment to Dialectic of Empire: 




What has made it impossible for us to live in time like fish in water, like birds in air, like 
children? It is the fault of Empire! Empire has created the time of history. Empire has 
located its existence not in the smooth recurrent spinning time of the cycle of the seasons 
but in the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe. Empire dooms 
itself to live in history and plot against history. One thought alone preoccupies the 
submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era. 
 







In the previous chapter, I argued that the traditional interpretation of primitivism holds 
that primitivist discourse is a projection, a product of civilization—a response to living in a 
society characterized by such traits as rationalism, empiricism, technology, and secularism. 
These features of contemporary society, it is suggested, trigger emotional responses, and 
primitivism is therefore an evaluative, affective discourse. As such, examples of primitivism take 
the form of either a celebration of civilization’s achievement, namely autonomy and power, or 
as a nostalgic longing for a lost, unalienated mode of being. In the latter version, civilization is 
thought to have achieved too much knowledge and power, at the expense of detachment from 
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meaning, and hence individuals are alienated from nature, society, and self. In other words, this 
set of views is premised upon what I have been calling the disenchantment narrative. Whether 
expressed positively or negatively, primitivism is figured in this view as the product of a certain 
condition of knowledge and power.  
Through an examination of the contemporary theory of primitivism, I have argued that 
the consensus view embraces the idea that the “primitive” is a projection, but yet ascribes an 
unwarranted ontology to civilization. In other words, this causal view asserts that a condition of 
society (a condition of knowledge and power) is the source of the primitivist discourse. On the 
contrary, I maintain that primitivism has structured the evaluative discourse about this 
condition; that while there is no denying a history in which technological and social change are 
evident, the evaluation of these changes as moments of historical crisis producing increased 
autonomy and increased alienation—i.e., the disenchantment narrative—has in fact been 
structured by the discourse of primitivism, and hence, the history of imperialism. 
Thus far I have developed this argument through an application of the theoretical 
apparatus of colonial discourse analysis. The previous chapters have used this apparatus to 
diagnose a persistence of primitivism in contemporary theory, and made a theoretical case for 
reorienting the discussion of primitivism. In this chapter I shall begin to explore the history of 
primitivist discourse.  In particular I will examine the relationship of primitivism to the historical 
construction of the disenchantment narrative: the ethnocentric idea that a particular history, 
the history of Western civilization, is characterized by knowledge and power, too much 
knowledge and power, and that this excess is responsible for alienation. Through my analysis I 
will show how this disenchantment narrative was constructed historically—that primitivism, in 
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the era of imperialism, produces this narrative of disenchanted modernity. It is not civilization, 
or a surfeit of knowledge or power, that produces a condition of alienation, it is rather the 
discourse of primitivism that produces a narrative of disenchanted modernity.  
 In the above quote from Waiting for the Barbarians, J. M. Coetzee offers a moving 
expression of the disenchantment narrative. His imagery evokes a longing for an unalienated 
existence—to live like birds in the air, like children. In Coetzee’s reckoning, however, it is not 
civilization or rationality that severs humans from this experience, it is empire. In this chapter I 
will examine Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, and argue that 
their text offers an exemplary instance of primitivist discourse in which rationality is presented 
as a force of theoretical and social alienation; the text is, in this sense, a perpetuation of the 
disenchantment narrative.2 By adopting Horkheimer and Adorno’s own theoretical critique of 
what they call enlightenment, and applying it to their text, I will argue that they neglect the 
context of imperialism in which the “dialectic of enlightenment” emerges. I argue that the 
ethnocentric image of the West as defined by totalizing reason is in fact the product of the 
history of imperialism. In this sense, I seek to expand the frame of their critique, and shift the 
focus from the dialectic of enlightenment to the dialectic of empire. 
 It should be noted that my claim here is not that had there been no imperialism, there 
would be no disenchantment narrative. There would have been (and indeed have been) 
numerous particular expressions of disenchantment, from various sources, unrelated to any 
imperial context.  From the ancient Greek and Roman examples collected by Arthur Lovejoy and 
George Boas, to a great many of the world’s religions, there are no shortage of claims that 
                                                     
2 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
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thinking requires detachment, or that human life requires separation from nature.3 I argue that 
Empire, however, created the conditions in which such individual and particular assessments 
became collected into a whole, woven together into a narrative that was used to define and 
orient a people. In other words, imperialism can help explain how disenchantment becomes 
ethnocentric, how it becomes a sustaining narrative of “the West” and “Western rationality.” 
 There are different ways one could go about making this argument. One way might be 
to follow the path set by Fuyuki Kurasawa in The Ethnological Imagination and to examine the 
major thinkers of the theoretical tradition in which the disenchantment narrative emerges, 
from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Immanuel Kant, from Georg Friedrich Hegel to Karl Marx, from 
Max Weber to the present, and demonstrate that in each case, the discourse of primitivism 
structures their understanding of society.4 As I noted in chapter 1, however, in many ways this 
has already been done. Kurasawa draws attention to the various ways in which thinking about 
ethnographic others shaped the social theory of these thinkers. From Kurasawa’s perspective, 
however, this seems to suggest that these thinkers had achieved some kind of “cross-cultural” 
understanding; their ability to empathize with different societies enabled them to develop a 
critical perspective on their own. Such an account is of course mired in its own primitivism, 
suggesting that these thinkers’ ability to appreciate the supposed simplicity, collective sociality, 
or meaningful lives of various ethnographic others enabled the theorists to critically diagnose 
the ills, and achievements, of the West, its alleged rationalism, empiricism, individualism, and 
secularism. 
                                                     
3 Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity (New York: Octagon Books, 1965). 
4 Fuyuki Kurasawa, The Ethnological Imagination: A Cross-Cultural Critique of Modernity (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2004). For the details of Kurasawa’s argument see my discussion in chapter 1.   
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If Kurasawa’s case is typical, it is clear that demonstrating the presence of a primitivist 
discourse at work in the history of social theory is not sufficient. What is necessary, for starters, 
is the theoretical framework derived from colonial discourse analysis, demonstrating that these 
thinkers’ “knowledge” of primitive societies was a discursive construct; and that accordingly, 
the “knowledge” produced about their own society was equally a discursive construct. 
There is a further problem, however. It would also be insufficient merely to rewrite this 
historical tradition of social theory as the tradition of primitivist/modernity discourse, accepting 
the facts of Kurasawa’s connections, but insisting at each point along the way upon their role as 
discursive constructions. The problem here is that doing so would perpetuate a particular linear 
history of the West, a Eurocentric perspective of history that colonial discourse analysis has 
tried to displace. This is not to say that historicism is the product of primitivism, but rather that 
historicism has been inflected by imperialism. Although linear concepts of history are by no 
means unique to the West, it is imperative in the present moment to critique this particular 
version of linear history, because of the way in which the narrative has absorbed to itself the 
identities of rationality, progress, and autonomy, and in so doing has justified imperial power 
and violence.  
 In order to make my argument, therefore, I will begin with a theoretical critique of a 
particular instance of primitivism in a particular text, and from here will let a historical horizon 
come into view.5 The point of departure will be Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of 
                                                     
5 This method is in fact shaped by the very object of my critique, the Dialectic of Enlightenment. As Simon Jarvis 
observes,  in noting that the book draws upon the historical but is explicitly not attempting to provide historical 
narrativity: “Instead of telling a story, which would start from some distant and inevitably hypothetical ‘origin’ and 
then eventually arrive in the twentieth century, [Dialectic of Enlightenment] starts out from where we are now, 
from the assumptions about concepts and about the world which we habitually deploy, very often without 
recognizing that we are making these assumptions. It sets out to give an account of how we got to these 
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Enlightenment, a notably challenging text, yet one that is especially relevant for the present 
discussion. I argue that their text offers an exemplary focal point for the analysis of primitivism 
in the German context. On the one hand, Horkheimer and Adorno provide the theoretical 
framework for the analysis of primitivism that I myself employ. In many ways their analysis of 
the operation of power and knowledge anticipates Foucault, and accordingly Said.  In addition, 
their argument that enlightenment and myth are mutually constitutive provides the framework 
for my own argument that primitivism and civilization are similarly co-constituted. Hence my 
own project is in fact premised upon their own. 
On the other hand, however, I argue that their text perpetuates the primitivist 
discourse. It does so primarily through the text’s association of mythic projection with 
instrumental reason, and the  identification of reason with “bourgeois Western civilization.”6 
Moreover, I suggest that the primitivism of the text emerges on account of an unstable 
combination in their text of a critique of theory and a critique of contemporary society. At the 
theoretical level, they seek to critique philosophy and yet make an argument for a new 
approach to philosophy, one that will overcome reason’s historical identification with alienation 
                                                                                                                                                                           
assumptions, but it does this by working back from these assumptions themselves. It asks: what must have 
happened for our thinking to have become what it is?” Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998), 21 (italics added). However, I do not claim to follow merely a “fragmentist” approach as do 
Horkheimer and Adorno, as I seek to go beyond merely a conceptual critique and to assert the connection of 
conceptuality to history, and thus provide a historical narrative of primitivism, in which this chapter is but one 
element. In this sense, while seeking to avoid universal linear history and yet maintain a historical argument, I 
generally follow Foucault’s genealogical approach, which of course is not without its own problems. As Robert 
Young explains, “Genealogy develops the possibility broached in the Archaeology that in a general history different 
significances can be accorded to events, depending on ‘their correlation with other previous or simultaneous 
events, discursive or not.’ Here it is the problem the historian poses that determines what constitutes an event and 
what status it has. Foucault’s genealogy means that by asking a question, posing a problem, you set up a generality 
against which you constitute events and arrange them in a series. The construction of that generality does not 
pretend to be the only possible one—the same event could operate in all sorts of different ways in different series, 
temporalities, which would mean that, strictly speaking, it was no longer the same event, for it would have 
dispersed in their different rarefactions.” Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West, 2nd ed. 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 118. 
6 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xviii. 
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and violence. “The critique of enlightenment,” they write, “is intended to prepare a positive 
concept of enlightenment which liberates it from its entanglement to blind domination.”7 
Contrary to many of their critics, I accept that this critique can function on a theoretical level; I 
am not asserting that their text is self-refuting. Their approach to philosophical critique, as 
Simon Jarvis has pointed out, is to inhabit and exhibit contradictions, not to “liquidate” them: 
as a result, “criticisms of [the text] in fact fall more helplessly, because unconsciously, into 
contradiction themselves.”8 I am interested, rather, in the form that their particular critique 
takes. I argue that it is the form of the argument—critiquing reason while rescuing a “positive 
concept,” in conjunction with their humanist critique of contemporary society—that  
perpetuates the primitivist discourse.  
Horkheimer and Adorno explain in the preface of 1944/47, “What we had set out to do 
was nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is 
sinking into a new kind of barbarism.”9 In the context of this merger of theoretical critique and 
social critique, the aim to prepare a “positive concept” leads to an argumentative framework in 
which the distinction between civilized and primitive is seemingly collapsed—“Myth is already 
enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology,” runs the core of the argument.10 Yet 
the distinction, I argue, is in fact reproduced at a higher level of meta-critique. The text 
presents an example of a “savage civilization” argument, in which the current state of 
civilization is analyzed to reveal that there is no fundamental difference between savagery and 
civilization; the distinction, they argue, was only ever a fantasy of reason. However, to critique 
                                                     
7 Ibid. 
8 Jarvis, Adorno, 42. 
9 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xiv. 
10 Ibid., xviii.  
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this state of affairs, Horkheimer and Adorno must posit an alternative, “truly human” state, 
even if they themselves do not claim to inhabit such a utopian position of critique. Their moral 
critique, in its attempt to negate the “savage civilization” in contrast to a utopian image of 
humanity, reproduces the terms of the primitivis discourse. In addition, their combination of 
this moral critique with a theoretical critique, in which instrumental reason is associated with 
alienation and domination, perpetuates the disenchantment narrative.  
  
 I will present this argument in three sections. In the first, I excavate the core argument 
of Dialectic of Enlightenment and explain how my own project is premised upon Horkheimer 
and Adorno’s text. I then highlight the text’s problematic relationship with the disenchantment 
narrative, and I argue that the form of the argument, as a critique of “savage civilization,” 
reproduces the discourse of primitivism. Finally I argue that the dialectic of enlightenment that 
Horkheimer and Adorno analyze should be repositioned as a product of imperialism and 
primitivism. 
In the second section, I distinguish my own critique of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
My interest here is not to object to the text as theory, but to draw out the traces of primitivism 
in the text’s conceptual framework. I must make clear at the outset that there is a simple sense 
in which the text appears primitivist, but that this is not my aim here. As Jarvis writes, tongue in 
cheek, the text is littered with “thinly sown references to often out-of-date historical and 
anthropological sources . . .  It looks as though the book is an outlandish survival of the 
nineteenth-century genre of speculative universal history – except that this time the story runs 
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not from barbarism to civilization but in the other direction.”11 This is of course a common 
misreading. I argue rather that their text is primitivist in a more robust sense, in that the 
theoretical framework reproduces the primitive-civilized distinction, and that their rhetorical 
work, while aiming to liberate conceptual thinking, nevertheless hinges upon the discourse of 
primitivism. When Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that the present state of society threatens 
to (or has already) regressed to barbarism, there are implicit quotation marks around the word 
“barbarism.” This is how the situation would appear from within the dialectic of enlightenment: 
that which enlightenment defined as barbaric, and excluded from itself, is now recognized as its 
own defining feature, as the return of the repressed. And yet the moral force of the argument 
relies upon the negation of barbaric society in the hope for a “truly human” state. 
Finally, I will make an excursus, away from the theoretical and into the particular work 
of conceptual signification, to disclose the traces of primitivism in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. For this part of the argument I examine Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of 
Homer’s Odyssey. Through contrasting their interpretation with my own reading of the 
Odyssey, I demonstrate how the lingering primitivism of their theoretical framework leads them 
to misread the Odyssey as merely expressive of the “enlightenment/myth” dialectic, when in 
fact it can be read as critical of it. I argue that Homer’s text rebukes Odysseus—not for his 
rationalism, but for his relations with alterity (the strange humans and creatures he encounters 
on his journey). Homer’s text therefore offers a critique of Odysseus’s primitivism, and links 
that primitivism not to rationality, but to empire.  This leads to an alternative ending: 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s text appears to hover somewhere in limbo, on the border between 
                                                     
11 Jarvis, Adorno, 20. 
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the aporetic and the apotropaic. My argument is that the answers one receives depend on the 
questions one brings to the text. When this text is approached from the question of 
enlightenment, the text succeeds as a critique of reason; yet when it is approached from the 
perspective of imperialism, it produces an apotropaic discourse of modernity. As a 
counterpoint, however, Homer’s Odyssey,  if we approach it from the question of empire, 
provides an example of aporia—how one might emerge from the encounter with alterity 
liberated from the discourse of modernity. 
 
Part 1.  From the Fault of Reason to the Fault of Empire 
 
The Critique of Enlightenment as a Model for the Critique of Primitivism 
 
 To begin, I argue that Horkheimer and Adorno’s text offers a critique of primitivism 
upon which my own critique is based, which can used against their own text to reveal the 
lingering traces of primitivism in their work. They argue that primitivist thinking is a product of 
enlightenment thinking. They do not use the term primitivism however, nor are they speaking 
specifically about the historical Enlightenment. Their text is an investigation of the concept of 
enlightenment understood as a particular mode of thinking, one which can be found exhibited 
in Homer’s Odyssey no less than in the writings of Francis Bacon:  
Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always 
aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. . . . 
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Enlightenment’s program was the disenchantment of the world. It wanted to dispel 
myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge.12  
 
Enlightenment, as a way of thinking, sets itself in opposition to myth, to mythic thinking. By 
overcoming such mythic thinking, enlightenment enables humanity “to use its knowledge for 
the betterment of its conditions.”13 
This ideal of a mode of critical thinking that conveyed power over nature, and over the 
self, was articulated in the historical Enlightenment, but was not unique to it: “What human 
beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human 
beings.”14 The historical Enlightenment, however, shares with the present moment of 
materialist, positivist thought a movement towards increased self-reflexivity, in which 
enlightenment’s attack against the mythic turns on itself, and recognizes that the very concepts 
of Enlightenment thought are equally mythic:  
Ruthless toward itself, the Enlightenment has eradicated the last remnant of its own 
self-awareness. Only thought which does violence to itself is hard enough to shatter 
myths. Faced by the present triumph of the factual mentality, Bacon’s nominalist credo 
would have smacked of metaphysics and would have been convicted of the same vanity 
for which he criticized scholasticism.15 
 
 The irony, however—and this is the primary polemic of their text—is that 
enlightenment, which defined itself in opposition to the mythic, is in fact permeated by the 
mythic. This forms the heart of Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument, which is that the concepts 
                                                     
12 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1. As Simon Jarvis explains: “Adorno and Horkheimer do not 
use the term ‘enlightenment’ primarily to designate a historical period ranging from Descartes to Kant. Instead 
they use it to refer to a series of related intellectual and practical operations which are presented as 
demythologizing, secularizing or disenchanting some mythical, religious or magical representation of the world.” 
Jarvis, Adorno, 24. 
13 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1. 
14 Ibid., 2. 
15 Ibid. They add, “Once the movement is able to develop unhampered by external oppression, there is no holding 
it back. Its own ideas of human rights then fare no better than the older universals. Any intellectual resistance it 
encounters merely increases its strength” (3). 
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of myth and enlightenment are involved in a dialectic. This is expressed, as they explain in the 
preface of 1944/47, in the work’s “two theses”: “Myth is already enlightenment, and 
enlightenment reverts to mythology.”16 By this combination of theses, Horkheimer and Adorno 
assert that while enlightenment defines itself in opposition to myth, magic, and animism, it 
succumbs to the very qualities that it fears. “The disenchantment of the world,” they write, 
“means the extirpation of animism.”17 In this project, enlightenment, paradoxically, both 
succeeds and fails. It disenchants the world—which it is to say, it objectifies the world; it 
assumes a cognitive stance that makes the world into material ready to be classified, mastered, 
and dominated. Yet enlightenment fails, because it itself remains mythic. The result of this 
bifurcation is historical catastrophe: “The wholly enlightened earth,” they write, “is radiant with 
triumphant calamity.”18  
 In Horkheimer and Adorno’s presentation, the way in which enlightenment defines itself 
in opposition to myth and magic can be understood as a type of primitivism. The attempt of 
enlightenment to distinguish between mythic naïveté and rational knowledge is in fact a 
projection and  a self-deception. Unlike the forms of primitivism I diagnosed in the previous 
chapter, therefore, Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of enlightenment acknowledges that not 
only the mythic “other” is a projection, but so is the concept of the “rational” enlightened self. 
In this my own critique follows theirs. 
 
                                                     
16 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xviii. 
17 Ibid., 2. 
18 Ibid., 1. 
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Perpetuating the Disenchantment Narrative 
 
 The problem with Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique, I argue, is twofold. On the one 
hand, in spite of their argument that myth and enlightenment are mutually constitutive, their 
dialectic links this mythic projection with rationality. This perpetuates the argument that it is 
rationality that is the cause of primitivism. The primitivism of Western civilization, in other 
words, is the product of a totalization of a culture of blind rationalism.  This leads to the second 
point, which is that Horkheimer and Adorno, although they critique the disenchantment 
narrative, end up reproducing it, through their critique of contemporary society.  
For Horkheimer and Adorno, the concept of enlightenment is not simply a problem for 
theory. Their materialist critique of idealism has led them to the understanding that concepts 
and conceptual analysis are not isolated from praxis; they seek “to gain greater understanding 
of the intertwinement of rationality and social reality.”19 This is because, as Jarvis explains, 
“concepts always carry buried in within them, even when they look entirely abstract, the traces 
of bodily pleasure or suffering, fear or desire, critically interpreting conceptual contradictions 
can be a way of critically interpreting our real social experience.”20  
Some readers of the Dialectic insist that whatever claims Horkheimer and Adorno make 
about social reality and history, these can only be understood as fragmentary moments that 
cannot be examined in isolation from what is essentially an epistemological critique (an 
important objection which I will examine below). Nevertheless, most commentators accept that 
the text is intended to critique the array of developments known as modernity, from the rise to 
                                                     
19 Ibid., xviii. 
20 Jarvis, Adorno, 6. 
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dominance in academic philosophy of an anemic positivism, to the blind will to power of 
science and technology, and the permeation of society by the ill effects of the latter, from the 
domination of the culture industry (see the chapter “Enlightenment as Mass Deception”), to the 
psychic violence of capitalism, to the physical violence of totalitarianism. As Gunzelin Schmid 
Noerr, editor of the volume of Horkheimer’s writings in which Dialektic der Aufklärung was later 
included, writes in an afterword: 
Reason appears as inextricably entangled with domination. Since the beginnings of 
history, liberation from the compulsions of external nature has been achieved only by 
introducing a power relationship of second degree. Both the repression of the internal 
nature of human drives, and social domination, are already at work in myth. Finally, 
fascism and the modern culture industry are the forms taken by a return of repressed 
nature. In the service of an advancing rationalization of instrumental thought modeled 
on the domination of nature and serving its purposes, enlightenment reason is 
progressively hollowed out until it reverts to the new mythology of a resurrected 
relationship to nature, to violence.21 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s own comments encourage such interpretations; as they 
wrote in the preface of 1944/47: “What we had set out to do was nothing less than to explain 
why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of 
barbarism.”22 Similarly, in the preface to the Italian edition (1962/66), they explain that the 
book “is shaped by the social conditions in which it was written. In keeping with its theme, our 
book demonstrates tendencies which turn cultural progress into its opposite.”23 They add that 
the twin focal points of their critique were “social phenomena of the 1930s and 1940s in 
America” and “the period of National Socialist rule” in Germany. 
                                                     
21 Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, afterword to Dialectic of Enlightenment, 218. 
22 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xiv.  
23 Ibid, xiii. 
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 Horkheimer and Adorno therefore on the one hand anticipate Foucault, in the 
understanding of power as not simply something that some people hold over others, but as a 
force embedded in knowledge production, and a force shaping social reality. The problem, 
however, is that their own account, as it veers from epistemological conceptual critique to the 
critique of contemporary civilization, ends up reinforcing the disenchantment narrative that 
their dialectic investigation was poised to unravel. This is the inevitable result of an 
investigation that posits reason as the defining feature of Western civilization, and yet at the 
same time insists that it is only through this reason (in a “corrected” form) that an avoidance of 
calamity is possible.  
 
The Persistence of Primitivism: The Critique of Savage Civilization 
 
 Horkheimer and Adorno’s text is a perpetuation of the disenchantment narrative, 
although not in a simplistic fashion. A common misreading of the text is to consider it to be a 
polemic against enlightenment, and against reason in all its forms. But this is not the case. 
Horkheimer and Adorno explicitly state that their aim is not to dispense with enlightenment, 
merely to suggest a path toward a necessary self-reflexivity. As Horkheimer and Adorno write: 
The aporia which faced us in our work thus proved to be the first matter we had to 
investigate: the self-destruction of enlightenment. We have no doubt—and herein lies 
our petitio principii—that freedom in society is inseparable from enlightenment 
thinking. We believe we have perceived with equal clarity, however, that the very 
concept of that thinking, no less than the concrete historical forms, the institutions of 
society with which it is intertwined, already contains the germ of regression which is 
taking place everywhere today. If enlightenment does not assimilate reflection on this 
regressive moment, it seals its own fate.24 
                                                     




Their philosophy is intended, therefore, as a “corrective,” as Jarvis explains: 
This “corrective” form has the advantage of allowing Adorno and Horkheimer to admit 
that all rationality to date has been entangled in some way with social domination and 
the domination of nature, while opening a space for them to suggest that, none the less, 
reason does not have to be like this.25 
 
This poses the following questions, however: what is this space? how precisely do they open it? 
The space, as others have noted, functions as a utopia, a negation of negation. In addition to 
this, however, I argue their tool for opening up this space is the affective moral critique 
launched against instrumental reason. Moreover, this moral critique is founded upon the 
discourse of primitivism.  
Horkheimer and Adorno, to advance their critique, must project a utopian image of 
humanity, in contrast to the “savage civilization” in which history is mired.  In their rewriting of 
the philosophy of history, there has been no progress—there has only been the dialectic, in 
which reason has imagined itself free from myth, and imagined for itself a history of progress. 
Their own critique reduces this image of progress to a grand, but horrific, illusion. And yet the 
dream image of freedom that the enlightenment wrests out of its dialectic is for them the only 
flicker of hope, the possibility that the image of progress that existed formerly only as myth, 
might one day begin as reality: “Critical thought, which does not call a halt before progress 
itself, requires us to take up the cause of the remnants of freedom, of tendencies toward real 
humanity, even though they seem powerless in face of the great historical trend.”26  
 The rhetorical form of the argument, therefore, is posed as a contrast between either 
self-reflection or regression to “barbarism.” In this sense, Horkheimer and Adorno replicate the 
                                                     
25 Jarvis, Adorno, 24. 
26 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xi. 
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primitivist dichotomy between civilization and primitive. This is not to deny the self-conscious 
deployment of such terms in Horkheimer and Adorno’s text; their own use of such binaries 
should, on the one hand, be seen as primarily rhetorical. However, even as a rhetorical 
construction, this rhetoric, according to the terms of their argument, must be investigated, to 
determine the traces it contains. 
On the one hand, Horkheimer and Adorno reveal the constructedness of the distinction 
between primitive and civilized, yet they also perpetuate this distinction through the moral 
force of their argument as a critique of modernity. On the surface, the text collapses this 
distinction between primitive and civilized: humanity, “instead of entering a truly human state, 
is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.” Horkheimer and Adorno do not argue, however, that 
civilization, in essence, is barbaric. Rather, it is specifically contemporary society that offers an 
image of this collapsed state, in which the civilized is primitive, and the primitive civilized. This 
collapsed state itself is identified as a specific historical crisis of rational civilization. 
 Their argument can thus be understood as a mode of the “savage civilization” argument. 
This argument seems to erase the distinction between primitive and civilized, while in fact 
preserving it. The primitive-civilized dichotomy is reinscribed through the evaluative force of 
the argument, through the very rhetoric which Horkheimer and Adorno’s dialectical work is 
intended to undermine. The equation that is posited in the “savage civilization” argument is not 
neutral; it is intended to suggest a negative assessment of the condition in question. In 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s case, the extreme violence of fascism and capitalism. The standpoint 
of this moral critique is in fact humanism—the aspiration to create a “truly human state.” They 
write, for example:  
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What is at issue here is not culture as a value, as understood by critics of civilization 
such as Huxley, Jaspers, and Ortega y Gasset, but the necessity of enlightenment to 
reflect on itself if humanity is not to be totally betrayed. What is at stake is not 
conservation of the past but the fulfillment of past hopes.27 
 
Through the utopian element in Horkheimer and Adorno’s text, and the desire to “fulfill 
past  hopes,” they envision a critical counterpoint to the current state of “savage civilization.” 
Critics are therefore too generous when they assert that Horkheimer and Adorno make no 
specific claims about this utopian counterpoint; it is envisioned quite literally as a refined or 
“corrected” mode of rationality. As Jarvis writes, “The point is that positivistic and rationalist 
conceptions of enlightenment are not enlightened enough.”28 As a result, however, the binary 
opposition between primitive and civilized is reinscribed. Their own theoretical work is 
therefore itself structured by the primitivist discourse. 
It should be clear that I am not arguing that Adorno and Horkheimer’s attempt to 
preserve a “positive concept” of enlightenment should be seen as an attempt to recuperate 
“culture as a value.” As Robert Witkin observes: 
It is misleading to identify Adorno’s critique of culture with cultural criticism that adopts 
apparently similar conclusions. Adorno  himself was especially critical of those who treat 
culture as a value, who deplore the decline of serious Culture and its displacement by 
the vulgarities of mass culture; this was a type of criticism that issued in nostalgia for 
things past. For Adorno, criticism that tacitly accepts the world as it is, that complains of 
it but embodies no real resistance to it, is actually complicit in reproducing the existing 
state of affairs.29 
 
I am not claiming that Horkheimer and Adorno merely want to preserve a kind of 
mandarin high culture. However, the distinction between Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
                                                     
27 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xvii. 
28 Jarvis, Adorno, 22. 
29 Robert W. Witkin, “Philosophy of Culture,” in Theodor Adorno: Key Concepts, ed. Deborah Cook (Stocksfield: 
Acumen Publishing Limited, 2008), 177. 
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disenchantment narrative and that made by other “critics of civilization” is above all one of 
method. From Horkheimer and Adorno’s perspective, it is not enough simply to critique culture, 
but one must do so in a way that resists the totalizing aims of enlightenment. It is only through 
one’s approach to conceptuality, therefore, that one can offer “real resistance.” Nevertheless 
the threat that one hopes to resist remains the force of a destructive rationality that is believed 
to objectify the world and alienate one from truth. 
 
The Fault of Empire 
 
 To summarize the foregoing argument: On the one hand, Horkheimer and Adorno 
present a critique of enlightenment in which primitivism (a distinction between a civilized self 
and primitive other) is presented as the product of instrumental rationality. Primitivism is the 
result of a certain mode of rational cognition, which denies its nature, and projects it onto the 
other. Their work thus provides the theoretical tools for undoing the primitivist discourse. Yet 
at the same time, they end up perpetuating the discourse of primitivism, through identifying 
Western civilization as characterized by a totalizing rationalism, and by a theoretical critique 
that is structured upon the primitive-civilized binary. 
I argue, rather, that primitivism is produced, not by rationality, but by imperialism. The 
very notion of a period of historical time (Enlightenment or modernity) and a people (the West) 
as defined by instrumental reason, mastery over nature, and alienation from nature—is itself a 
product of imperialism, not “reason.” It is not Western rationality (even as mythical self-
conception) that perpetuates primitivist thinking; it is empire. This is the point suggested by 
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J.M. Coetzee in Waiting for the Barbarians. It is not a particular kind of rational thinking that 
produces disenchantment and alienation—not even the supposedly ruthless “totalitarian” 
objectifying mentality of rationalism.30 Coetzee writes, “What has made it impossible for us to 
live in time like fish in water, like birds in air, like children? It is the fault of Empire.” The 
practice of empire—the encounter with cultural difference in the field of imperial power 
relations—converts a primitivist discourse into a historical narrative—the narrative of 
modernity. In doing so, “Empire dooms itself to live in history and plot against history” 31—the 
circumstance of empire, in other words, explains the paradoxical predicament in which 
Horkheimer and Adorno find themselves in the Dialectic of Enlightenment.  
 
Part 2.  Dialectic of Enlightenment and the Traces of Primitivism 
 
There are different ways in which one can interpret the Dialectic of Enlightenment; 
there would seem to be few ways, however, in which one can hope to critique it with any 
success. A puzzle box of contradiction and self-reflexivity, it tends to elude attempts to 
establish its meaning, to fix its concepts and thereby assess its achievements of failures.  
“Success,” however, depends of course on what we mean by critique. Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
text is, among other things, an attempt to redefine the criteria and practice of critique, and 
criticisms that fail to account for this fundamental reorientation can only produce 
unsatisfactory interpretations. It shall be useful therefore at the outset to distinguish my 
                                                     
30 Horkheimer and Adorno write, “No matter which myths are invoked against [enlightenment], by being used as 
arguments they are made to acknowledge the very principle of corrosive rationality of which enlightenment stands 
accused. Enlightenment is totalitarian.” Dialectic of Enlightenment, 3. 
31 Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians, 133. 
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argument from other common criticisms of the text—and to present my own critique as an 
extension of their work, an attempt to interpret and liberate concepts, rather than a criticism of 
it. 
My argument is essentially that although Horkheimer and Adorno diagnose a 
phenomenon of primitivism in the dialectic of enlightenment, they nevertheless recapitulate 
this primitivist discourse in their own critique. On the surface, this may look similar to other 
arguments that have been made regarding Horkheimer and Adorno’s text. It is important to 
make clear that I am not offering a critique of the text’s epistemological stance, but rather an 
extension of its own method of critique, to apply to the text itself.  
Several authors have argued, for example, that in Horkheimer and Adorno’s attempt to 
rescue a “positive concept” of enlightenment, they remain trapped in the dialectic of 
enlightenment, trying to wrest truth from myth, freedom from domination. Their project thus 
appears either self-refuting or self-exempting. This argument has been made, perhaps most 
notably, by Jürgen Habermas, who argued that their critique of rationality is the heir of 
Nietzsche’s totalizing and self-referential critique of enlightenment. Habermas argues that on 
their own view, “it is no longer possible to place hope in the liberating force of enlightenment.” 
This results in their being trapped in a performative contradiction: 
Horkheimer and Adorno find themselves in the same embarrassment as Nietzsche: If 
they do not want to renounce the effect of a final unmasking and still want to continue 
with critique, they will have to leave at least one rational criterion intact for the 
explanation of the corruption of all rational criteria. In the face of this paradox, self-
referential critique loses its orientation.32 
 
                                                     




Habermas argues that Horkheimer and Adorno’s response differs from that of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, for example, or Michel Foucault, who embrace the theoretical consequences of a 
theory based on the totalization of power, and thereby avoid the charges of self-contradiction. 
Horkheimer and Adorno, however, in their rejection of power as domination, their attempt to 
“rescue,” enlightenment, are compelled to take an alternative route, by “stirring up, holding 
open, and no longer wanting to overcome theoretically the performative contradiction inherent 
in an ideology critique that outstrips itself.”33 Habermas writes that theory at this level of self-
reflection is groundless, but that Horkheimer and Adorno try to inhabit this “groundless” 
position: “They therefore eschew theory and practice determinate negation on an ad hoc 
basis.”34 Habermas thus concludes that this position is theoretically untenable: “Anyone who 
abides in a paradox on the very spot once occupied by philosophy with its ultimate groundings 
is not just taking up an uncomfortable position; one can only hold that place if one makes it at 
least minimally plausible that there is no way out.”35 
Habermas is half right. It is important at this point to observe that Horkheimer and 
Adorno are engaged in both a critique of theory and contemporary society. Although the work 
pursues both simultaneously, for purposes of clarity, it will be useful for a moment to discuss 
them individually. I argue that Habermas is correct in questioning their theory of modern 
society, in that their account presents an image of reason in society as totalizing. It is incorrect, 
however, to suggest as Habermas does, that Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique, though it insists 
on theoretical self-referentialism, aims at totalization in the critique of theory. My point here is 
                                                     
33 Ibid., 127. 




not simply that they hold up the potential for a “positive concept of enlightenment.” Habermas 
acknowledges as much, but finds the position untenable.36 My point is rather that Habermas’s 
approach to their critique of theory is, in effect, too literal.  He fails to appreciate the literary-
philosophical techniques by which Horkheimer and Adorno resist the dogmatic claims of 
enlightenment reason. 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s approach to conceptual analysis in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment can be rather crudely understood as a synthesis of two separate strands of 
critique: immanent critique and the Hegelian notion of “determinate negation.” To begin with 
the latter, Horkheimer and Adorno distinguish determinate negation from a dogmatic critique:  
Determinate negation does not simply reject imperfect representations of the absolute, 
idols, by confronting them with the idea they are unable to match. Rather, dialectic 
discloses each image as script. It teaches us to read from its features the admission of 
falseness which cancels its power add hands it over to truth. Language thereby becomes 
more than a mere system of signs. With the concept of determinate negation Hegel 
gave prominence to an element which distinguishes enlightenment form the positivist 
decay to which he consigned it.37 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno therefore explicitly declare their intention to resist subsuming the 
results of their practice of determinate negation into a claim of systemic or historical totality. 
Horkheimer and Adorno therefore explicitly declare their intention to resist subsuming the 
results of their practice of determinate negation into a claim of systemic or historical totality. 
Indeed, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that Hegel, “by finally postulating the known result of 
the whole process of negation, totality in the system and in history, as the absolute, he violated 
the prohibition and himself succumbed to mythology.”  
                                                     
36 Moreover, Habermas’s own attempt to recuperate a positive concept of enlightenment leads him to construct a 
theory of modernity that is no less infused with primitivism, as it is premised upon a radical distinction between 
modern and premodern societies. See Victor Li’s critique in The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, 
Culture, and Modernity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 153ff. 
37 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 18. 
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Critics such as Habermas fail to observe, as Jarvis has argued, that the style of the work 
is just as important as the content of the critique.38 Habermas’s mistake is to presume that 
Horkheimer and Adorno offer a dogmatic critique of critique, but this is not the case; Habermas 
attempts to “reduce the critique of instrumental reason to this core”39—but this elides the 
crucial reorientation of theory that they propose, away from dogmatism. Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s approach here develops out of the notion of immanent critique that Adorno first 
began to articulate in  “The Actuality of Philosophy,” in which he argued for a rejection of 
philosophy as metaphysics in favor of philosophy as interpretation.40 Rather than establish a 
theoretical apparatus aimed at determining the essential signification of concepts such that 
they could then be applied universally, in order to subject a text to critique, Adorno focused 
instead on a practice of philosophy as interpretation of particulars.  
Adorno came to describe this approach to philosophy as “immanent” critique, which 
could be distinguished from “transcendent” critique. As Simon Jarvis explains: 
“Immanent” means “remaining within.” An immanent critique is one which “remains 
within” what it criticizes.  Whereas a “transcendent” critique, a critique from the 
outside, first establishes its own principles, and then uses them as a yardstick by which 
to criticize other theories, immanent critique starts out from the principles of the work 
under discussion itself. It uses the internal contradictions of a body of work to criticize 
that work in its own terms. . . . Unlike most “critiques,” that is, it is not so much trying to 
score a victory over the work criticized, as to understand the significance of the 
particular kinds of contradiction present in a given body of such work—in particular, to 
understand what these contradictions tell us about the social experience out of which 
the work was written.41 
 
                                                     
38 Jarvis, Adorno, 20-43. 
39 Habermas, Philosophical Discourse, 112. 
40 Theodor W. Adorno, “Die Aktualität der Philosophie” (1931), in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, eds. Gretel Adorno 
and Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970). See Jarvis, Adorno, 5ff. 
41 Jarvis, Adorno, 6. 
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The purpose of such a critique, as Jarvis explains, is not that it philosophically refutes a previous 
position (by highlighting its contradictions), but that through philosophical critique, the history 
embedded in such concepts could be interpreted and called into the open. 
To critique the Dialectic of Enlightenment, therefore, by pointing out such contradictions 
would amount to a futile exercise. These contradictions are written into the fabric of the text, 
as it were. As Jarvis points out, at a theoretical level, their aim is primarily to produce a type of 
philosophy that resists totalizing claims based on establishing connections between concepts 
and absolutes; this project of philosophical resistance to absolutes Adorno would later call non-
identity thinking. In his introduction to The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, Adorno 
writes: 
Amongst the moments which must remain common to philosophy and sociology if both 
are not to decline—the former to contentlessness, the latter to conceptlessness—one of 
the most important is that both contain something not wholly transformable into 
science. In both, nothing is meant entirely literally, neither statement of fact nor pure 
validity . . .  . This not entirely literal element bears witness to the tense non-identity of 
appearance and essence.42 
 
As Jarvis explains, Adorno is here suggesting that:  
the qualitative specificity of social experience is actually more likely to go missing in 
social science when it attempts to be absolutely literal in its presentation of its results. 
Without a certain self-reflective cunning in its deployment of concepts, social science is 
likely to end up without any concepts worthy of the name. It ends up, not in fact 
interpreting the experience it claims to be investigating, but rather classifying it.43 
 
This reconceptualization of critique therefore must be taken into account in any attempt 
to assess the achievements of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. The text is not an attempt to 
undermine the philosophical foundations of social theory; the argument of the text amounts to 
                                                     
42 Theodor Adorno, introduction to The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby, 
(London: Heinemann, 1976), 5-6, quoted by Jarvis, 21. 
43 Jarvis, Adorno, 21-22. 
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an admission that social theory, which aims at freedom, is a product of what Horkheimer and 
Adorno call enlightenment thinking. This type of thinking, they argue, has historically been 
implicated in domination, and theoretical work that imagines itself as autonomous, as free from 
mythical thinking, is partaking in the myth of enlightenment. This is why the style of their 
argument, presented as a literary-philosophical fragment, not dogmatic philosophy, is not 
arbitrary but essential to their project. Horkheimer and Adorno above all want to acknowledge 
this contingent history (of the association of knowledge with domination) as the source of their 
theoretical project, yet suggest that it need not be so; an alternative method can be followed, 
which does not “classify,” but which attempts to interpret and understand experience. It is in 
this sense, that their text can be read as a “rebellion of experience against empiricism.” This 
rebellion of “experience against empiricism” begins by the liberation of the concept.  
On the other hand, it would be disingenuous to suggest, as Jarvis seems to imply, that 
this position brackets the implied critique of contemporary civilization. For the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment is equally a critique of theory and a critique of society. Just as the text’s “two 
theses” demand to be thought together, these twin polemics are inseparable. In this sense, 
Habermas is closer to the truth when he writes that they wish to “abide in the paradox.”  
The paradox in which the text resides makes it difficult to pose certain questions. As 
John Abromeit notes, many critics have argued that the text posits “a transhistorical notion of 
instrumental reason as the domination of internal and external nature.”44 This is a complicated 
claim, one that, if made “dogmatically,” can only be satisfactorily answered with a yes and a no. 
                                                     
44 John Abromeit, Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 427. 
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I would argue, rather, that the text marshals a transhistorical notion to leverage a historically 
specified argument. As Abromeit concedes: 
Perhaps it would be a mistake to criticize Dialectic of Enlightenment for the 
transhistorical character of some of its central concepts because Horkheimer and 
Adorno were really only concerned with history, as Benjamin put it in his “Thesis,” as “it 
flashes up at moments of danger,” that is, only insofar as it can critically illuminate the 
present.45 
 
This is essentially the claim I am arguing. Abromeit, however, rejects this possibility: 
“Such an interpretation is plausible but it by no means obviates the necessity for 
historicization.”46 I would suggest in response that they do not want to obviate the necessity for 
historicization. Quite the contrary, they insist upon it. They present a critique of theory that 
calls for liberating the concept from totalizing claims, and yet they want to provide a critique of 
contemporary society in which reason appears totalizing. As they write in the 1969 preface,  
“What matters today is to preserve and disseminate freedom, rather than to accelerate, 
however indirectly, the advance to the administered world.”47 
Unlike Habermas, then, or critics that question their use of a “transhistorical notion” of 
reason, I have no objection to their “abiding” in this paradoxical position. And yet it is here that, 
insofar as their argument also makes particular claims about reason—linking reason to 
alienation, on the one hand, and on the other to a critique clearly aimed at “bourgeois Western 
civilization”—I find that their work is in need of a further corrective. In arguing that rationalism 
objectifies the world and alienates the subject from truth, they are invoking the 
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47Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xii. 
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disenchantment narrative. This is the case, even though their “cunning” deployment of 
concepts attempt to eschew claims of narrativity. 
My point is not that Horkheimer and Adorno are presenting a disenchantment narrative 
as a philosophy of history, as for example Herbert Schnädelbach has argued.48 Schnädelbach, a 
former student of Habermas, argues that, in spite of Horkheimer and Adorno’s attempts to 
preserve a positive concept of enlightenment, their text assumes a common form of critiques of 
human society, a tradition stretching from Rousseau and Hegel to Marx and Freud, in which a 
theory about the “nature” of society is premised upon a historical narrative. Schnädelbach 
writes, “in so far as the Dialectic of Enlightenment is narratively organized . . . it cannot be 
saved. As a social myth which wishes to enlighten us about the enlightenment, it only confirms 
the aporia.” Jarvis explains that according to Schnädelbach, for such a critique to succeed, it 
“can only be formulated theoretically, not narratively, and must be formulated not as a 
philosophy of history, but as social theory.” I am not arguing, like Schnädelbach, that 
Horkheimer and Adorno should jettison the “historical” aspect of the argument. To do so would 
be anathema to their insight that concepts are not simply abstract ideas in a void, but are the 
products of a real social history. Nor do I agree with Schnädelbach’s assessment that they 
present a narrative of philosophy of history. The work provides no narrative of development or 
decline, but proceeds through conceptual analysis; history appears only in the traces of 
concepts and their significations. 
                                                     
48 Herbert Schnädelbach, “Die Aktualität der Dialektik der Aufklärung,” in Die Aktualität der Dialektik der 
Aufklärung, eds.  Harry Kunnemann and Hent de Vries (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1989), 15-35. See 
Jarvis, Adorno, 40ff. 
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What I wish to draw attention to, rather, is how a potentially theoretically effective 
dissolution of the disenchantment narrative ends up transformed into a rehabilitation of that 
narrative. This takes place, I argue, on account of the affective register of the conceptual 
critique. As Horkheimer and Adorno argue, concepts contain, in Jarvis’s words, the “traces of 
bodily pleasure or suffering, fear or desire.” This insight enables their conceptual critique to 
reach out to a historical horizon. They leave undeveloped the corollary of this argument, 
however, which is that the same form of embodied history applies to the effects of concepts on 
readers. Theory, after all, is not read from a position of objective or emotionless neutrality. This 
affective register of discourse therefore, on their own grounds, must be taken into account in 
an assessment of their theory. The affective register that they employ, however, is one based 
on the fear of the primitive, and the desire for the autonomy promised by civilization. Their 
critique is an echo of the final words of Colonel Kurtz in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness: 
“The horror.” Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology—just as 
Kurtz in the jungle succumbed to barbarism; and the modern subject, which had thought itself 
rational, autonomous, and moral, wakes up in modernity to the frightening realization that it is 
none of these things. 
 I hasten to point out that I am not arguing that Horkheimer and Adorno should have 
abstained from a moral critique premised upon an affective register, or that their critique of 
disenchantment might succeed if they had not inveighed against it in emotionally laden terms. 
Rather, I am arguing that, as their own theory suggests, in the practice of theory, the affective 
level of meaning cannot be separated from the theoretical. Therefore it too must be subject to 
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critique. To critique, here, means to disclose the traces of primitivism residing in their 
argument.   
Horkheimer and Adorno’s text offers not only a powerful reorientation of the project of 
theory, but a vital and urgent critique of exploitation and violence in contemporary society. As 
Abromeit has observed,  
The uncompromising negativity of Dialectic of Enlightenment was without question a 
remarkable and thoroughly appropriate expression of the catastrophic historical events 
that were unfolding at that time. . . . Adorno’s provocative argument—that the social, 
psychological, and historical conditions that had made Auschwitz possible continued to 
exist after the war, and that, therefore, other historical catastrophes of similar 
magnitude were still possible—must be taken seriously.49 
 
I am not therefore arguing that Horkheimer and Adorno should have refrained from 
condemning the horrors of National Socialism and the Holocaust or the social and psychological 
violence of capitalism. Rather, I am arguing that they have grounded their critique in the 
affective terminology of the primitivist discourse, using the categories of primitive and civilized 
to underwrite a moral critique.  To put it another way, my objection here is not to their moral 
position, but their suggestion that the ills of modernity should be understood as the result of 
instrumental reason. This notion, that reason objectifies the world, producing violence and 
alienation, is a perpetuation of the disenchantment narrative. Moreover, in theorizing 
rationalism as the defining trait of “bourgeois Western civilization,” they reinforce the 
ethnocentrism of the disenchantment narrative. Through an affective moral critique of reason, 
buttressed by the discourse of primitivism, they inadvertently reaffirm the narrative of an 
imagined modernity. 
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 Finally, then, I am not critiquing their work from the position of dogmatism. I accept 
their reformulation of the role of theory, and thus try to subject their own work to an imminent 
critique.  To argue, therefore, that their argument perpetuates primitivism and the 
disenchantment narrative is not to find fault with their critique of theory; it is rather to pick up 
the tools of their own argument, and redirect attention to the historical traces of primitivism 
contained in the concepts (and conceptual framework) that they employ. As they attempt to 
liberate a positive concept of reason, I am attempting to here to liberate critique from the 
discourse of primitivism.  
 
Part 3.  Excursus: Odysseus, or Primitivism and Empire 
 
 Thus far I have argued that the Dialectic of Enlightenment participates in the discourse 
of primitivism, on account of its theoretical framework, and the perpetuation of the 
ethnocentrism of the disenchantment narrative. In critiquing enlightenment as mythic, as the 
primitive made manifest, they reinscribe the primitive as the foil, against which the image of a 
future “truly human” variation of enlightened theory must then contend. If the foregoing 
discussion engages with theoretical claims, it remains however to examine the particulars of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s essay. According to their own argument, a critique of their work (or 
any work for that matter) at only a theoretical level threatens to participate in the identity-
thinking of enlightenment, working at the level of absolutes, and effacing the particular, eliding 
experience. To remain faithful therefore to their aims, a theoretical critique must be wedded to 
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the particulars, in order to disclose the traces of conceptual history. In other words, philosophy 
as critical theory requires the excursus, or digression.50 
Accordingly, I will make a detour through Homer’s Odyssey—just as Horkheimer and 
Adorno do in their text. The Odyssey is itself the archetypal story of detour, as Odysseus is 
thrown off course time and time again on his journey back to Ithaca. He overcomes numerous 
obstacles to finally return home to his wife Penelope, and to slaughter the suitors that have 
been harassing her in his absence. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the purpose of examining the 
Odyssey is to present it as “one of the earliest representative documents of bourgeois Western 
civilization,” and Odysseus, as the symbol of enlightenment.51 This sounds anachronistic, but as 
mentioned above, enlightenment for Horkheimer and Adorno does not refer specifically to the 
historical Enlightenment, but rather to a mode of rational thought that they trace back as far as 
Homer. The aims of enlightenment were founded upon the liberation from a “mythic” 
consciousness. In this project, enlightenment, paradoxically, both succeeds and fails. It 
disenchants the world—which it is to say, it objectifies the world; it is a cognitive stance which 
makes the world into material ready to be mastered, or dominated. Yet it fails, because it 
represses its own dialectical relationship with the mythic; in doing so, it remains trapped in the 
mythic. 
In Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading of the Odyssey, Odysseus represents self-
preserving reason; his endless striving to return home, to flee from the mythic creatures he 
                                                     
50 As Adorno later expressed this in Negative Dialectics: “The matters of true philosophical interest at this point in 
history are those in which Hegel, agreeing with tradition, expressed his disinterest. They are nonconceptuality, 
individuality, and particularity—things which ever since Plato used to be dismissed as transitory and insignificant . . 
. . A matter of urgency to the concept would be what it fails to cover, what its abstractionist mechanism 
eliminates, what is not already a case of the concept.” Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton 
(New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 8. 
51 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xviii. 
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encounters, represents his failure (the failure of reason) to grasp that these mythical worlds are 
his own projections. Instead of achieving a self-reflective awareness of the dialectic that carries 
him along, he attempts to overcome myth through rationality, unleashing domination, 
exploitation and violence through his self-deception. In this way, the epic, according to 
Horkheimer and Adorno, “bears witness to the dialectic of enlightenment.”52   
I shall offer here a different reading of the Odyssey; my point is not that their own 
reading is wrong, but that alternative readings are possible. That being the case, I aim to show 
by way of contrast that their own reading reveals the persistence of primitivism in their 
critique. Their reading of Odysseus as self-preserving reason occludes the text’s concern with 
cultural alterity. Whereas Horkheimer and Adorno link primitivism to reason, Homer links it to 
ethnocentrism. Homer’s text, I argue, offers a perspective in which the dialectic of 
enlightenment is in fact a product of a dialectic of empire. 
 In the first place, Horkheimer and Adorno read the text as a naïve reflection of the 
dialectic (“bears witness”), rather than a critique of it. Second, they neglect an essential feature 
of the epic, which is that Odysseus’ journey is structured around the trope of the encounter 
with the foreign other; it is a narrative about the Greek fascination with cultural difference. 
Horkheimer and Adorno make the mistake of presenting Odysseus as a symbol of reason in an 
abstract form; if Odysseus can be said to represent reason, as they argue, it must said that he 
represents reason specifically in the context of cultural difference. 
                                                     
52 Ibid., 35. In the original German: “Wie die Erzählung von den Sirenen die Verschränktheit von Mythos und 
rationaler Arbeit in sich beschließt, so legt die Odyssee insgesamt Zeugnis ab von der Dialektik der Aufklärung” 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, in Max Horkheimer: Gesammete Schriften: 
Dialektic der Aufklärung und Schriften 1940-1950, Vol. 5., ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer 
Verlag, 1987), 67. 
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Moreover, Horkheimer and Adorno read the narrative as the celebration of Odysseus’s 
eventual triumph; this corresponds with their larger argument in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
an attempt to theorize the “triumph” (the attainment of dominance) of instrumental, self-
preserving reason in society. I argue rather that the Odyssey should be read, not only as a story 
about engaging with the cultural other, but a story in which Odysseus is in fact presented 
critically; he is condemned for continually failing to engage with the cultural other. If Odysseus 
represents Enlightened reason, he is reason engaged specifically with the problem of cultural 
alterity. Odysseus therefore can be said to represent not enlightenment, but the ethnocentric 
logic of empire.  
I agree with Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument that Odysseus’s encounters are marred 
by his projections. Odysseus’s failure to engage with the cultural other is shown to be the result 
of the projection of mythic qualities onto the other—in a word, primitivism. Yet they fail to 
observe that the epic itself criticizes Odysseus’s primitivism. Homer’s text suggests that it is not 
“reason” that compels Odysseus onward, but empire. This reading of the Odyssey therefore 
enables a critique of Horkheimer and Adorno’s text. The  colonial discourse of imperialism, I 
argue, picks up the distinction between rationality and otherness and inscribes it upon social 
relations; it produces the subject position of rationality as a cultural (or ethnic) identity. In other 
words imperialism can be said to produce the dialectic of enlightenment. Horkheimer and 
Adorno, in presenting Odysseus as a representative of enlightenment, are reinscribing an 
ethnocentric discourse of rationality upon knowledge and society. Without observing that the 
epic itself criticizes the error of Odysseus’s own forms of primitivism, Horkheimer and Adorno 
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end up recuperating that primitivism in their own analysis, and thereby reproduce the logic of 
empire. 
To demonstrate the primitivism at work in Dialectic of Enlightenment, I will focus on a 
salient example—Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading of the brief episode from the Odyssey in 
which Odysseus encounters a people referred to as the Lotus-eaters. In Book Nine of the 
Odyssey, Odysseus, “the great teller of tales,” begins to recount his nostos (or homecoming) for 
his hosts, the Phaeacians.53 According to his tale, after leaving Troy, Odysseus and his men had 
a series of exotic encounters. The first encounter with an unfamiliar people in a foreign land is 
that of the Lotus-eaters, who “live on a flowering food.”54 The island, according to Herodotus, 
was along the North African coast, near present-day Libya.55 Odysseus, who is narrating, 
explains that upon arriving, he sent three men to investigate, “choosing two, and providing a 
third as a herald. They straightaway went off and mingled with the Lotus-eaters.” 
The Lotus-eaters represent Odysseus’s first encounter with cultural difference. 
Odysseus and his men have come to this island after a previous encounter, but that was with 
the Cicones, allies of the Trojans who lived in Thrace, north of Troy. There, Odysseus had 
“sacked the city, killed the men,” and taken the wives and treasure for plunder. The Cicones 
recruited their neighbors and mounted a counter-attack, and the Greeks hastily sailed off.56  
                                                     
53 Homer, The Odyssey, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1996), 221 (9.1).  
54 The translation of the Lotus-eaters episode that I cite in this chapter has been generously provided by Matthew 
Newmann. I have preferred Newman’s more literal translation over more popular translations, such as that of 
Robert Fagles, because I have found that these often adopt the primitivist projection which I critique below. See 
also footnote 57. Cf. Fagles, 214 (9.92-117). 
55 Herodotus, The Histories (c.430 BCE), Internet History Sourcebook, ed. Paul Halsall. 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/herod-libya1.asp.  
56 As Glenn W. Most has argued, this marks the first of the “other-worldly” encounters; the structure of Homer’s 
epic is intended to draw a distinction between the “normal” Greek world and a “fantastical” or mythological world, 
of which the Lotus-eaters would be the first chronological example (although not the first narratively speaking). 
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The Lotus-eaters, however, present no threat of violence. Odysseus relates, “the Lotus-
eaters were not contriving destruction for our men, but they only gave them lotus to taste.” 
This presents, however, a new type of danger. Odysseus continues: 
Whoever of [the men] ate of the honeysweet fruit of the lotus 
was no longer willing to report back or to go home, 
but they preferred to remain right there beside the Lotus-eaters, 
grazing on lotus and to forget about homecoming. 57 
 
This Odysseus cannot allow. As he tells his hosts, he brings his men “wailing” back to the ships: 
I dragged them and fettered them beneath the benches in the hollow ships; and the 
other strong comrades I bid hurry up and get on the swift ships, lest somehow one of 
them eat lotus and forget his homecoming. Forthwith they got on and sat at the 
oarlocks, and seated in a row they beat the gray salt with their oars. From there we 
sailed onward grieving in our hearts... 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno interpret this episode as a paradigmatic encounter between reason 
and naivety, between work and idleness, and between historical progress and an imagined, 
timeless “prehistory.” Odysseus’ men, they write, are threatened by “forgetfulness and loss of 
will”: 
The curse [of the lotus] condemns them to nothing [other] than a primal state exempt 
from labor and struggle in the “fertile land.” . . . Self-preserving reason cannot permit 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Glenn W. Most, "The Structure and Function of Odysseus' Apologoi," Transactions of the American Philological 
Association 119 (1989): 15-30. 
57 A comparison of Newmann’s translation with Fagles’ reveals that Fagles incorporates the subtle form of 
primitivism I am attempting to draw attention to. Fagles translates this portion: “Any crewmen who ate the lotus, 
the honey-sweet fruit, / lost all desire to send a message back, much less return, / their only wish to linger there 
with the Lotus-eaters, / grazing on lotus, all memory of the journey home / dissolved forever.” (Fagles, 214.)  He 
thus interposes a declarative clause about forgetting (“all memory of the journey home dissolved forever”), 
whereas the original Greek suggests that they “preferred” to forget. Similarly, Fagles’ version emphasizes a “loss of 
desire,” phrasing that leans more toward the “loss of will” interpretation adopted by Horkheimer and Adorno, 
undermining the sense that the men may be making a conscious decision; in Fagles’ translation, the will to remain 
becomes a “wish” to linger. The tradition of interpreting the lotus as inducing forgetfulness has been reified in 
criticism  through numerous studies of the “forgetting-remembering” motif in the Odyssey, yet the text itself is 
minimalist. Horkheimer and Adorno, as it happens, cite a German translation that does not make this emendation, 
although they fail to follow the lead (unfortunately they do not name the translator): “‘Wer des Lotos Gewächs 
nun kostete, süßer als Honig, / Nicht an Verkündigung weiter gedacht der, noch an Zurückkunft; / Sondern sie 
trachteten dort in der Lotophagen Gesellschaft, / Lotos pflückend zu bleiben und abzusagen der Heimat.” 
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, 86. 
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such an idyll—reminiscent of the bliss induced by the narcotics, by which subordinate 
classes have been made capable of enduring the unendurable in ossified social orders—
among its own people. And indeed it is only an illusion of bliss, a dull aimless vegetating, 
as impoverished as the life of animals. At best, it would be an absence of the awareness 
of unhappiness.58 
 
Odysseus, as reason, rejects the island because it represents the antithesis of reason. It is a 
place with nourishment, but no critical awareness. Interestingly, however, Horkheimer and 
Adorno find themselves agreeing with Odysseus in principle—that the island represents an 
illusionary existence, and is anti-reason. They see it as not only the antithesis of enlightenment 
reason, but of their own dialectical concept. Horkheimer and Adorno conclude:  
The enduring Odysseus is therefore right not to endure life among the Lotus-eaters. 
Against [the men] he asserts their own cause, the realization of utopia through historical 
work, whereas simply abiding within an image of bliss deprives them of their strength. 
But in being exerted by rationality, by Odysseus, this right is inevitably drawn into the 
realm of wrong. His immediate action is one which reasserts domination.59  
 
Horkheimer and Adorno argue that on the one hand, Odysseus was “right not to endure 
life among the Lotus-eaters,” because to do so would be merely to accept a fantasy; more 
specifically, this would mean allowing his men, representative here of humanity as the working 
class, to forgo their destiny and exist on illusions. It would amount to treating the fantasy of 
idleness and happiness as a reality, which, they argue, is unattainable. Odysseus is “right” in the 
sense that he recognizes this as an illusory projection. They see this as the positive aspect of 
reason, liberating humanity from a mythicized non-existence. Odysseus is “wrong” however, in 
his exertion of rationality in the form of domination.  
I argue that Horkheimer and Adorno may have misread this pivotal encounter. Although 
they are correct to point out that Odysseus here is presented as making a projection onto the 
                                                     




other, they fail to observe that Homer offers a subtle critique of Odysseus’s primitivism. 
Homer’s critique of Odysseus, however, differs dramatically from their own. Although 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s description of the Lotus-eaters is intended to represent how the 
island would appear to Odysseus (to reason), a close analysis reveals that their characterization 
of the island as a primitivist idyll represents not Odysseus’ primitivist projection, but their own. 
Their own sense of the island as the antithesis to even dialectical reason compels them, at this 
point, to agree that Odysseus was “right” to move on; they too don’t want to leave his ship, as 
it were, for fear of the natives. 
 The text itself, I argue,  is surprisingly silent about the specifics of life among the Lotus-
eaters. The ambiguity of the text creates an island populated by projections. Peeling back these 
layers will reveal that Odysseus’ projection is not identical with that made by Horkheimer and 
Adorno. Moreover, Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of Odysseus, as failing to achieve self-
reflexivity, differs from the critique of Odysseus provided by the text itself. The conspicuous 
silences of the text in fact suggest that the problem for Odysseus is not a matter of his “reason” 
or even his lack of self-reflective reason, but more specifically, a failure to try and listen to the 
voice of other. It constitutes, in other words, what we might call a failure of ethnocentrism. 
 The difference between Homer’s critique of Odysseus, and that made by Horkheimer 
and Adorno, can be glimpsed initially in the fact that Horkheimer and Adorno invoke the idea of 
the lotus as a narcotic, producing a state of forgetful bliss.  The text itself (in which is Odysseus 
is the speaker) gives no suggestion about a narcotic stupor or sedation. It merely states that 
those who ate the flower wanted to linger. Homeric scholars have identified three possible 
varieties of lotus to which Homer might have been referring, the most likely being the Zizyphus 
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lotus, indigenous to northern Africa and southern Europe. As Emma Converse writes, this 
variety: 
produces fruit in great abundance. The fruit is a drupe, about the size of a wild-plum, 
with a globose kernel. It is farinaceous, and the taste is sweet and mucilaginous. The 
Arabs call it nabka, and, from the earliest times, it has served as an article of food to the 
inhabitants of the north of African, where it is still a principal part of the nourishment of 
the poor.60 
 
A second possibility is that Homer refers to the Egyptian white water-lily, Nymphae lotus, found 
along the shores of the Nile. This strain produces no fruit, but the root is edible and was 
consumed by the region’s inhabitants. A third possibility is the Egyptian blue water-lily, 
Nymphae caerulea.  The blue water-lily is the only form of lotus that contains narcotic alkaloids, 
which can produce mildly sedative effects. 
The current consensus among Homeric scholars is that Homer refers to Zizyphus lotus, 
as Homer specifically mentions the flower, the sweetness of the plant, and on account of the 
North African location. It is interesting, then, that Horkheimer and Adorno would suggest the 
possibility that Homer references the narcotic variety. They are of course not alone in doing so. 
Many readers of the Odyssey have assumed that Homer was referring to the Nymphae 
caerulea. The image of the narcotic lotus was perhaps most memorably expressed by Tennyson 
in his poem of 1832, “The Lotos-Eaters.” As Converse writes, “The spell of the gentle sedative 
breathes in every line of the poem. A voluptuous languor, a sweet forgetfulness, a soft slumber, 
takes possession of the senses, until we are ready to sing with ‘the mild-eyed, melancholy lotos-
eaters.’”61 
                                                     
60 Emma M. Converse, “The Lotus,” The Art Journal, New Series, Vol. 5 (1879): 246. 
61 Ibid., 247. 
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  Significantly, however, the Greek word Homer uses, lôtos, is ambiguous in its referent. 
In the face of an indeterminate text, Horkheimer and Adorno allude to the possibility of a 
narcotic plant, no doubt because it corresponds with their own perception of the island, as a 
place lacking rationality. It will be noted that Horkheimer and Adorno do not state that the 
flower was in fact narcotic, merely that it was “reminiscent of [such] bliss.” Indeed, they invoke 
commonplace Orientalist themes to designate the island’s lack of rationality: 
Lotus is an oriental food. . . . The eating of flowers, as is still customary during dessert in 
the East and is known to European children from baking with rosewater and from 
candied violets, bears the promise of a state in which the reproduction of life is 
independent of conscious self-preservation, the bliss of satiety uncoupled from the 
utility of planned nutrition.62 
 
In addition, in Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading, the island represents a “loss of will,” a 
lack of autonomy. Homer’s text, however, through its intentional ambiguity, leaves open the 
possibility that the islanders are indeed rational and autonomous. In Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
interpretation, the scouts’ lack of desire to communicate is interpreted as an inability to 
communicate, a loss of rationality. Their unwillingness to return to the ship is interpreted as a 
lack of will. Their decision to abide with the islanders is interpreted as a rejection of work in 
favor of idleness. The island is interpreted as the negation of autonomous reason. 
On the one hand, Homer’s text presents Odysseus as sharing a similar projection, in 
which the island appears as a threat to both rationality and autonomy. He sees a place where 
men are reduced to animality—Odysseus uses the word “grazes.” (The theme of fear at being 
reduced to animality is encountered again in the meeting with Circe in Book 10, in which half of 
                                                     
62 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 50. 
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Odysseus’s men are turned into swine.63) As Horkheimer and Adorno suggest, Odysseus seems 
to fear “a dull aimless vegetating, as impoverished as the life of animals.”  
Beyond this, however, Odysseus’s description of the encounter is remarkably tentative. 
He does not directly state that the lotus caused the men to forget; he states that the men were 
“no longer willing to report back or to go home, but they preferred to remain right there . . . 
and to forget about homecoming.” They were not unable to report back, through a loss of will, 
rationality, or inability to communicate, but, rather, no longer “wanted” to do so. They 
“preferred” to stay, and “preferred” to forget. In other words, Odysseus’s words suggest a 
degree of volition that Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading neglects. 
The text thereby leaves open the alternative that this was a conscious, autonomous, and 
possibly rational choice. Horkheimer and Adorno, by suggesting the lotus’s narcotic effect, on 
the one hand, or its “Oriental” origins on the other, foreclose on such an interpretation. Homer, 
however, presents this island not as the absence of rationality, but rather as a different kind of 
rationality. On this reading, it is not rationality that separates Odysseus from the islanders, it is 
his fear of difference, the inability to imagine an alternative rationality. 
Odysseus’s view of the island, in contrast to Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading, is 
noticeably diffident. This degree of uncertainty becomes more clear in comparison to the 
descriptions Odysseus uses to describe his subsequent encounters; from Polyphemus the 
Cyclops to the cannibalistic Laestrygonians, Odysseus’s interpretations become more 
descriptive, the details provided about the other more concrete. The minimalism of this first 
                                                     
63 Moreover, it will be noted that Odysseus’s subsequent escape from Polyphemus, the Cyclops (and son of 
Poseidon), requires him to disguise himself as an animal, which in this context reads as injunction to face his fear. 
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encounter seems to serve as a reminder of the world of the other before it is draped in 
projection. As he progresses, his projections become more effacing. 
Homer’s text not only suggests that Odysseus misconstrues the Lotus-eaters, but, 
contrary to Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading, criticizes him for this misunderstanding. Homer’s 
critique of Odysseus, however, differs from their own. The specific mention of the fact that 
Odysseus dispatched a messenger, for example, followed by his silence, is uncanny; it draws our 
attention to Odysseus’s failure to question the messenger, and thus his failure to attempt to 
understand the Lotus-eaters. In effect, the text suggests that Odysseus was not right to depart 
from the Lotus-eaters’ shores in haste, but should instead have lingered. This is indeed the first 
in a series of encounters that represent Odysseus’ continual failure to engage with a foreign 
cultural other, due to his own projections. To linger, in other words, is not presented as an 
impossibility, as Horkheimer and Adorno suggest; it would not mean to let oneself slip into an 
illusory state, an animal-like existence. It would mean, rather, the possibility for an encounter 
with cultural difference. 
In this initial encounter, the only certainty for Odysseus is that the Lotus-eaters 
represent a threat to the continuance of his journey; as such, he sees them as a negation of his 
nostos, as do Horkheimer and Adorno. Yet the text implies that the island is not, in its essence, 
a negation; it is merely an alternative. It is Odysseus’s monolithic focus on nostos that leads to 
set of binary projections in which alternatives become seen as negations. The men’s desire to 
not to return to the oars is interpreted as indolence—since the men refuse this particular form 
of work, the island is envisioned as place in which there is no work. Similarly, the returning men 
are wailing—rather than identify this as sorrow about this particular fate,  their suffering is 
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inverted to into the notion that the island must represent bliss, the absence of all sorrow. In 
this way the negations multiply inexorably. Since Odysseus’s journey home requires history, the 
island is figured as a place without history, a place where one can only “linger” indefinitely. 
Beneath the binary projections of Odysseus, as well as Horkheimer and Adorno, the text 
leaves open the possibility that one could live in nature, without being absorbed into it, without 
succumbing to natural, or mythic, consciousness, and without giving up communication, 
rationality, work, and suffering. Odysseus’s self-centered, goal-oriented journey leads him to 
the binary thinking which dismisses the specificity of the Lotus-eaters’ world. There is only one 
choice: the journey home. The journey home is not viewed as one reality among many, but as 
the only possible reality. (This is amplified by the fact that Odysseus’s next encounter after the 
Lotus-eaters is with Polyphemus, the fabled one-eyed Cyclops—an image of the monocentric 
vision that Odysseus is himself developing.) Odysseus’s exclusive obsession with home, an 
obsession that prevents him from fathoming the possibility of other perspectives, represents a 
form of ethnocentrism. From the perspective of the text, it is not reason that leads to 
projections; it is this form of rigid ethnocentrism, which clings to the identity of reason that it 
has postulated for itself.  In Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of Odysseus, the proper goal of 
reason is to become self-reflective; in Homer’s critique of Odysseus, the goal is to listen to 
alterity. 
 
A further comparison of the Lotus-eater episode with the other episodes of the Odyssey 
dealing with Africa clarifies what Odysseus might have done, but did not. The comparison 
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makes clear precisely the way in which Homer’s text critiques Odysseus, not for a lack of self-
reflection, but for a lack of attention to alterity.  
My contention that the encounter with cultural difference plays a central role in the 
Odyssey is supported by the fact that the theme is conjured in the opening passage of the epic. 
Directly after Odysseus is introduced as “the man of twists and turns,” Homer mentions that 
Poseidon, Odysseus’s nemesis, misses a meeting of the gods up on Olympus: 
Poseidon went off to the Ethiopians living far away, the Ethiopians who are divided into 
two people, men at the farthest edge: some of them live at the setting of Hyperion (the 
sun god), others at his rising. He met with a hecatomb of bulls and rams there; seated 
beside the feast he took delight.64 
 
The Ethiopians are not simply far away, but indeed exist at the “farthest edge,” a location 
defined not just as a liminal space but a liminal time. They live in a land imagined as the other 
side of the world, where the sun sets and where it rises. It is where the ends of the world meet, 
an evocative image of duality and unity.  
In other words, the Ethiopians are presented as an archetypal example of cultural 
difference. They represent an encounter that challenges rational thinking (the fundamental 
logic of identity and duality). But most important, they are not in fact out of reach. Poseidon 
visits them and enjoys a feast in their company. The implication, I argue, is that Homer does not 
represent them as the absence of rationality; rather, in Homer’s text, it is the idea of rationality 
(the idea of a singular rationality) that presents a barrier to those who might seek an encounter 
with otherness. This barrier, however, can be overcome, and the company of others can be 
enjoyed.  
                                                     
64 Translation by Matthew Newmann. Cf. Fagles, 78. 
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In most interpretations of the epic, Poseidon is seen as the “villain,” the one responsible 
for forcing Odysseus to endure such endless suffering. As I have suggested above, however, the 
epic critiques Odysseus for his failures to engage with cultural difference; in this sense, 
Poseidon actually appears as the model for the protagonist, and his catalyst for transformation. 
Poseidon’s ability to associate with the Ethiopians, the most radical example of cultural alterity, 
represents his achievement and wisdom; the experience is one of “delight.” This is further 
borne out in the fact that Poseidon is set apart at the beginning of the epic from the other gods, 
who will come to appear as the forces of discord, sometimes helping, sometimes hindering, as 
Odysseus tries to get home. Poseidon’s antagonistic relationship with Odysseus can thus be 
better understood as a veiled mentorship, in contrast to Athena, his explicit “mentor” 
throughout his journey. 
If the epic makes the Ethiopians the archetype of cultural difference (a symbol of both 
distance and delight), the Odyssey offers a privileged position to Africa in general.  Two major 
characters, Menelaus and Helen, have encounters with Africa. In neither case is the African 
other portrayed as negative, as a negation, as something to be feared and avoided.  Africa and 
its inhabitants are presented as foreign and exotic, but not as pre-civilized or pre-historical. Nor 
are they presented as lacking rationality or autonomy. The stories of Menelaus and Helen 
depict Africa as an exotic, unfamiliar land, but more importantly, a place (and a people) with 
which one can engage65; in fact, the stories present the necessity of making this engagement, 
as it is only through such engagement that transformation is possible. 
                                                     
65 In Helen’s account, the inhabitants are civilized, technological, and historical; Menelaus’s episode does not treat 
Africans but rather a mythological being that nevertheless represents Africa, a being that Menelaus must seek out 
while marooned off the coast of Egypt after initially failing to make the proper sacrifices. 
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In Book Four, Telemachus (the son of Odysseus) visits Menelaus and Helen, the king and 
queen of Sparta. At one point, as the heroic men are sharing stories about Odysseus, Helen 
makes an attempt to participate. When the men try and silence her, Helen secretly drugs the 
men’s wine, enabling her to participate in their conversation. Interestingly, her achievement is 
contrasted to a similar incident earlier in the epic, when Penelope, wife of Odysseus, had tried 
to participate in men’s conversation, but was rudely silenced.  Helen, on the other hand, is able 
to speak and participate in the conversation and tell her story about Odysseus. The drug, the 
narrator explains, was a gift to Helen from “a woman of Egypt, land where the teeming soil 
bears the richest yield of herbs in all the world; many [are] health itself when mixed in the wine, 
and many deadly poison. Every man is a healer there, more skilled than any other men on 
earth.”66 Here the cultural other is represented as a potential source of danger, but also as a 
source of empowering knowledge and technology. 
Menelaus’s encounter with Africa proves equally transformative. During the same visit 
from Telemachus, Menelaus recounts for his guest how he was marooned on an island off the 
coast in Egypt during his own return from Troy; he explains that eager as he was to voyage 
home, he had failed to make the proper sacrifices.  He learns that he cannot return home until 
he’s wrestled with Proteus of Egypt—the “immortal Old Man of the Sea who never lies, who 
sounds the deep in all its depths.”67 If Menelaus can force Proteus, a servant of Poseidon, into 
conversation, Menelaus will be able to ask him what he must do in order to leave the island and 
return home. Menelaus is instructed to pick three of his best men and grab hold of Proteus: 
“Hold him fast, wildly as he writhes and fights you to escape. He’ll try all kinds of escape—twist 
                                                     
66 Homer, The Odyssey, trans. Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1997), 131 (4.254-259). 
67 Ibid., 136 (4.431). 
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and turn into every beast that moves across the earth,  transforming himself into water, 
superhuman fire, but you hold on for dear life, hug him all the harder!”68  
Menelaus follows the advice, and discovers that “the old rascal [had lost] none of his 
cunning quick techniques! First he shifted into a great bearded lion, then a serpent—a 
panther—a ramping wild boar—a torrent of water—a tree with soaring branchtops—but we 
held on for dear life, braving it out.”69 Proteus, surrendering, begins asking Menelaus questions, 
and Menelaus can then question him about how to get off the island—enabling him to continue 
his journey. In other words, Menelaus succeeds in his nostos due to his willingness to engage 
with Proteus, to hold on through a bewildering array of what amount to  illusory or mythic 
projections, to arrive at the point of conversation.  
The argument that these episodes should be read as foils for Odysseus is supported by 
the fact that they both come in Book 4, the final book of the Telemachy (the part of the epic 
devoted to the education and preparation of Telemachus). They come in the form of speeches 
by the two most important and powerful figures in the Greek world, the king and queen of 
Sparta. Menelaus’s encounter is presented as a direct foil, from the circumstance that he too is 
stranded on an island on his way home from Troy, to the detail that he too selects three men to 
help him. 
Unlike Helen, for whom the encounter with the foreign other reveals an exchange of 
goods that provides her a voice; or Menelaus, who engages with this dynamic projectionist, 
wrestles with it, and ultimately converses with it, Odysseus flees. Whereas Menelaus and Helen 
are empowered by their experience, Odysseus emerges as a failed hero, a figure who makes the 
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69 Ibid., 138 (4.511-515). 
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journey home, but yet is suspended in a state of arrested development, having failed to learn 
the lessons he is intended to learn.70 Odysseus fails because he didn’t take the detour he 
needed to take—the detour outside of his own ethnocentric logic. I use the term ethnocentric 
because, as I mentioned above, the unifying feature of Odysseus’s many encounters on his 
travels back from Troy is their foreignness, their difference from the familiar Greek world. The 
fact that these encounters all take place under the framework of the “mythic” portion of the 
epic confirms that in his encounters with cultural difference, Odysseus remains trapped in his 
projections.71 He remains trapped in ethnocentrism because he has been unable to understand 
a non-Greek cultural encounter outside of the framework of the mythic. All his encounters 
therefore remain “mythical” in his recollections. 
 This reading is finally supported by the prophecy Odysseus receives from Tiresias in the 
underworld. Odysseus is directed to the prophet by Circe, who informs Odysseus that Tiresias 
alone can tell him what he needs to know in order to finally make his way back to Ithaca. The 
visit to the underworld comes in Book XI, about the mid-point of the epic’s 24 books, and the 
mid-point of Odysseus’s own narrative to the Phaeacians about his series of mythological 
encounters (see fig. 3.1, “The Ring Structure of Odysseus’s Tale”). The symmetry of the 
                                                     
70 Odysseus, as it happens, when he is back on Ithaca, invents a false story about his nostos in which he was 
marooned in Egypt. (In Ithaca, Odysseus disguises himself while he prepares his attack on the suitors; as part of his 
disguise, he invents this alternative narrative.) While temporarily stopped at the head of the Nile, Odysseus 
explains, his men went berserk—“They promptly began to plunder the lush Egyptian farms, dragged off the 
women and children, killed the men.” The nearby city sent an army upon them, slaughtering his men. Odysseus 
saved only himself by tearing off his armor and making himself a suppliant to the king, appealing to laws of 
hospitality, which were punishable by Zeus. (Fagles, 309-10; 14.279-319) Odysseus thus tells of an encounter with 
Africa that amounted to a campaign of excessive and unnecessary violence, which only Odysseus survived, by the 
surrender of his autonomy to authority. In other words, his “false” story reads like a terse allegory of his failure—
or as perhaps the repressed “true” story behind the “mythic” narrative he presents to the Phaeacians. 
71 Most, "The Structure and Function of Odysseus' Apologoi." 
234 
 
narrative structure around this visit emphasizes its role as a pivotal point—albeit not, as I will 
argue, a turning point—in Odysseus’s journey. 
Horkheimer and Adorno interpret the visit to the underworld as the “farthest point” of 
Odysseus’ journey, as the moment when he comes closest to overcoming himself.72 He makes 
appropriate sacrifices in order to speak with the shades of former warriors, wise men,  
matriarchs, and finally Tiresias. On the one hand, the visit to the underworld discloses to 
Odysseus, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, the very image of his own self overcoming. The 
sacrifice enables the shades to speak to him from beyond the grave; here he has the 
opportunity to learn from them, while recognizing them as dead, as illusions:  “Only when 
subjectivity masters itself by recognizing the nullity of images does it begin to share the hope 
which images vainly promise. The Promised Land for Odysseus is not the archaic realm of 
images.” 73  In other words, Odysseus glimpses the proper relationship to representation. 
Yet Odysseus, as reason, fails (again) to understand the truth contained in the image:  
“Having recognized them as dead he dismisses them with the lordly gesture of self-
preservation. . . . In such knowledge the power of myth, transposed into mental forms, survives 
only as imagination.”74 Thus Odysseus is the closest yet to a wake-up call, and yet the truth is 
now at its farthest removed, confined to the imagination, the underworld. Horkheimer and 
Adorno thus read the visit to the underworld as enlightenment’s greatest goal, the desire to 
force open “the gates of hell” as a symbol of enlightenment’s wish to abolish death. Odysseus 
                                                     





at this point represents the penultimate moment of reason engaged in its campaign to abolish 
myth. 
 This highest point of reason’s “antimythological” campaign, they argue, is contained in 
Tiresias’ prophecy to Odysseus, which was after all the focal point of the trip to the underworld. 
Tiresias informs Odysseus that he will make it home to Ithaca, but warns him that when he and 
his crew must take shelter on Thrinacia Island, they are not to harm the cattle of Helios. 
Otherwise, “you’ll come home late, and come a broken man—all shipmates lost, alone in a 
stranger’s ship—and you find a world of pain at home, crude arrogant men devouring all your 
goods, courting your noble wife.”75 Tiresias says he has no doubt that Odysseus will slaughter 
the suitors—but that his journey will not in fact be at an end. He will be compelled to “go forth 
once more . . . carry your well-planed oar until you come to a race of people who know nothing 
of the sea, whose food is never seasoned with salt, strangers all to ships with their crimson 
prows and long slim oars.”76 Here, Odysseus will receive a sign: “When another traveler falls in 
with you and calls that weight across your shoulder a fan to winnow grain, then plant your 
bladed, balanced oar in the earth.”77 Only then will Odysseus be able to return home, live out 
his remaining days, and die peacefully. 
A winnowing fan was an oar-shaped tool, resembling a shovel, which farmers used to 
toss grain, and let the wind separate the wheat from the chaff. Horkheimer and Adorno 
interpret this as a joke, designed to placate Poseidon, in the hope that “his anger might be 
                                                     
75 Fagles, 253 (11.129-134). 
76 Ibid. (11.138-142). 
77 Ibid. (11.145-147). 
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dispersed in laughter.” 78 Laughter, in other words, is reason’s final weapon against myth. If the 
underworld relegated the mythic to the merely “imagined,” now laughter renders myth 
powerless, something no longer a threat, something no longer to be even feared. It, becomes, 
as this point, mere entertainment. 
Horkheimer and Adorno move on to discuss the climax of the epic, in which Odysseus, 
his son, and their helpers slaughter the suitors. The scene is a brutal one, in which the 
treacherous goatherd Melanthius and the household’s faithless maidservants (who serviced the 
visiting suitors) are killed in particularly gruesome fashion, the former mutilated, the latter 
hung. The narrator recounts the killing of the maidservants by Telemachus:  
Then, as doves or thrushes beating their spread wings against some snare rigged up in 
thickets—flying in for a cozy nest but a grisly bed receives them—so the women’s heads 
were trapped in a line, nooses yanking their necks up, one by one, so all might die a 
pitiful, ghastly death . . . they kicked up heels for a little—not for long.79  
 
In this scene of cruelty, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, the laughter that Odysseus 
directs at Poseidon emerges as the fundamental “voice,” or even the “origin,” of epic: “The cold 
detachment of narrative, which describes even the horrible as if for entertainment.” Thus, 
Horkheimer and Adorno argue, the genre of epic itself represents reason’s conversion of myth 
into harmless entertainment. In this way the Odyssey not only “bears witness to the dialectic of 
enlightenment,” but participates in it.80  
                                                     
78 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 60. 
79 Fagles, 453-54 (22.494-500). 
80 Horkheimer and Adorno interpret the callousness of Homer’s narrative as an anticipation of the novel, “the 
unmoved composure [of the epic] comparable in its inhumanity only to the impassibilité of the greatest narrative 
writers of the nineteenth century” (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 61). The novel, they suggests, represents an even  
greater effacement of the mythic potential for horror, which in Homer’s epic they suggest still lingers in the subtle 
sense of unease contained in the phrase, “not for long.” 
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I agree with Horkheimer and Adorno in regards to the injustice of the suffering that is 
inflicted upon Melanthius and the housemaids. Yet Horkheimer and Adorno are mistaken to 
conclude that “over the raveled skein of prehistory, barbarism, and culture, Homer passes the 
soothing hand of remembrance, bringing the solace of ‘once upon a time.’”81 Their argument 
presumes that Homer presents this episode naively and uncritically; yet, as I have argued, 
Homer is in fact critical of Odysseus. The callousness on display here is not Homer’s, but 
Odysseus’s (or more specifically that of Telemachus, acting on orders from his father). On the 
one hand, the image of the housemaids as doves, “flying in for a cozy nest,” suggests at least 
some possibility that their death is rendered with sympathy, and that Telemachus has gone too 
far. (Telemachus, in hanging the women, has in fact overruled his father’s orders to kill with 
swords, a more “clean” death). 
The degree to which Homer’s similes can be used to ground interpretations based on 
sympathy is a matter of some debate among Homeric scholars. Yet beyond this point, there 
remains the fact that the narrative itself has suggested that the hero has yet to learn—this was 
above all the lesson of Tiresias, whose prophecy prepares the reader for the wisdom that the 
end of the epic is not the end of Odysseus’s journey. Tiresias’s prophecy has in all ways come 
true—Odysseus’s men did indeed carelessly slaughter the cows of Helios, and he has thus 
returned to Ithaca “a broken man.” His men have all died; one of the themes of the narrative is 
a question as to Odysseus’s responsibility for their death, yet whether or not he can be held 
responsible, yet for any leader the complete loss of one’s crew surely must rest upon one’s 
conscience, and publicly undermines his success as a leader. He arrives in Ithaca in a stranger’s 
                                                     
81 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 62. 
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ship, a metonym perhaps for his own recourse to disguise as soon as he arrives upon his home 
shore.  Odysseus, I argue, is not presented as a successful hero in this act of vengeance. The 
climax, significantly, does not represent the end of the story—not only are there two further 
books (the reunion with Penelope, the testing of Laertes), but the reader knows from Tiresias 
that Odysseus’s journey is not at an end. Horkheimer and Adorno, in claiming for themselves an 
ironic approach to conceptuality, are here denying to Homer the possibility of attaining any 
such narrative irony. 
The end of Odysseus’s journey, as foretold by Tiresias, will arrive when, far from the sea, 
he encounters “another traveler” who will call his oar a winnowing fan. On the one hand, 
Horkheimer and Adorno are correct: Tiresias’s prophecy is not without humor. A man of the sea 
could not help but be amused by the thought of digging one’s oar into the ground as though it 
were water; and at the level of the narrative, to dig an oar into the ground offers a surefire 
image of a journey brought to a standstill. More importantly, however, this is also the crucial 
moment marking the protagonist’s final achievement, his willingness to engage with other ways 
of thinking. Odysseus’s journey will only end with a genuine cultural encounter. He grasps that 
what for him was always an oar, for another could be a fan. When the voice of the other is 
finally listened to, it triggers the aporia which is transformative.  Odysseus, at last, is able to 
return home, a “free man.” 
On the one hand, this moment represents an important shift, from the tool of forward 
progress, the oar, to a tool of nourishment, the winnowing fan. One might read this in 
reference to the Lotus-eaters episode, as an affirmation of the possibility of genuine 
“nourishment” available in what was before imagined as only a fanciful idyll. The fan moreover 
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offers a symbol of discrimination: it separates the wheat from the chaff. Discrimination 
suggests the existence of rationality in what had been imagined as the negation of all 
rationality.  
However, although I believe Odysseus’s new understanding serves as a counterpoint 
and corrective to his earlier error, it would be incorrect, I think, to read this encounter as a 
moment of cross-cultural understanding. Odysseus does not proceed to use the oar as a fan. He 
buries it in the ground, and walks away. It becomes, in other words, an aesthetic object. As an 
aesthetic object, it is an object that inhabits the significations applied to it, and yet which holds 
these significations at bay. It insists upon the paradox of its complete “objectness” and inherent 
participation in “subjectivity.” In this image, Homer leaves open the distance between different 
cultures, leaves it as a liminal space. The oar in ground becomes a symbol of the liminality in 
play. This is not presented as a moment of direct translation, of cultural “understanding”; it is 
rather a cultural encounter that calls into question Odysseus’s own narrative. Once turned into 
an aesthetic object, the narrative of the oar, of forward progress, loses its hold over Odysseus. 
Odysseus’s encounter with alterity, therefore, is the key to undoing his imagined identity, to 
separating him from his narrative of progress, domination, and finally his exclusive 
identification of home with “rationality.” 
 
In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno set out to critique the self-
preserving instrumental reason, a force of totalizing violence that they argue is embodied in 
Odysseus, in his restless progressive striving for domination, for mastery over nature and 
himself, as well as in his progressive striving for knowledge, but knowledge as a form of 
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absolutist thinking that in the process abolishes the particulars of experience, reducing 
knowledge to merely entertainment. To counter this dark swath of destruction (and self-
destruction), Horkheimer and Adorno attempt to prepare a “positive concept” of 
enlightenment, one that, through an awareness of its place within the dialectic, and a 
paradoxical insistence upon deploying concepts while refusing the totalizing claims of 
conceptualization, might in the end succeed in liberating thinking from domination. 
I argue, however, that in the process of pioneering this fundamentally valuable 
contribution to critical thinking, their own text inadvertently perpetuates the discourse of 
primitivism. This is revealed in their reading of the Odyssey, which discloses their own 
projections of a primitive idyll as something anathema to even dialectical reason. In their 
condemnation of the Homeric epic tout court, as an insidious form of reason’s attempt to 
dominate and abolish myth, they fail to consider that Homer himself presents a subtle critique 
of Odysseus. Whereas Horkheimer and Adorno see in Odysseus the forward march of totalizing 
reason, which fails to achieve self-reflexivity, Homer sees in Odysseus a flawed figure who 
journeys through a series of failed encounters, the result of an ethnocentric refusal to engage 
with others; the violence of his return to Ithaca is not the triumph of instrumental reason, but 
the failure of ethnocentric logic.  
Thus while Horkheimer and Adorno critique the onward drive of the Odyssean dialectic 
of enlightenment, they nevertheless find themselves carried along in its wake. By focusing on 
enlightenment, they recapitulate the primitivism of empire. It seems, then, that they are left 
holding still an oar. It remains for the rest of this dissertation to plant the oar in the ground. If 
the first section of this study has been geared toward demonstrating that the encounter with 
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the other in era of imperialism can lead to the imagined community of a disenchanted 
modernity, then Homer’s text offers an example of how an encounter with alterity can in fact 
carry one in precisely the opposite direction. Odysseus’s conversion of an oar into an aesthetic 
object provides a paradigmatic example of an aporetic discourse. In the following section, I will  
locate examples of primitivism that function aporetically; these modes of primitivism turn 
discourse into an aesthetic object, severe it from its significations, and in so doing, bring the 
discourse to an impasse. If Tiresias’s prophecy holds up, the impasses is not the end of the 
story; yet it may let Odysseus at last make his way home—or, in the case of the present study, 
free from the disenchantment narrative of modernity.82  
 
                                                     
82 A final clarification: I argue that Horkheimer and Adorno recapitulate, rather than capitulate to, the discourse of 
primitivism (with thanks to Zachary Sng for pointing out the difference, although I would not presume that my 
revised reading fully attends to his criticisms of an earlier draft.) Horkheimer and Adorno’s work exhibits the traces 
of the primitivist discourse; yet it is far from surrendering to such discourse. Indeed, as I have argued above, their 
theoretical critique provides the foundation for my own attempt to diagnose the operations of primitivist 
discourse as a complex system of power and knowledge. Moreover, I see my critique here as merely using the 
theoretical tools they have developed to draw attention to historical traces upon concepts that their original text 
did not attend to. I don’t believe such a project would run counter their work, but rather carry it forward. As they 
write in the Preface (1969), “We do not stand by everything we said in the book in its original form. That would be 
incompatible with a theory which attributes a temporal core to truth instead of contrasting truth as something 
invariable to the movement of history.” The movement of history has drawn forth important questions about the 
persistence of primitivism, and thus a reexamination of their text from the perspective of imperialism, primitivism, 
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The Darkness of Time: Aporetic Primitivism 




The origin of sculpture is lost in the darkness of time; it is 
therefore an art of Caribs. . . . 
 
—Charles Baudelaire, 1846 
 
 
What a tremendous and exciting advance could be made if we 
could assemble an index, or statistic, of ideas which showed the 
same number of psychological elements (like cells of a plant) is 
circulating in regular and uniform rotation in the heads of all 
people, and that is so for all times and places! 
 
—Adolf Bastian, 1860  
 
 
Part 1.  Defining the “Primitive” and the Denial of Coevalness 
 
 In 1846, in an essay on the inferiority of sculpture to painting, Charles Baudelaire 
remarked: “The origin of sculpture is lost in the darkness of time; it is therefore an art of Caribs. 
Indeed, we see that all peoples carve fetishes very skillfully long before they take up the art of 
painting, which is an art of profound reasoning and one whose enjoyment demands a particular 
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initiation.” 1 The “Caribs”—the dark-skinned former inhabitants of the Caribbean islands, 
believed to have migrated there from South America, and in the popular imagination associated 
with cannibalism and fetishism—seemed to Baudelaire and his contemporaries an archetype of 
“primitive man.” 2 Baudelaire here gives voice to the intertwined set of concepts that, in the 
course of the nineteenth century, solidified into the imaginary boundaries that separated the 
European from the primitive: time, reason, and art. Above all, it was the Europeans’ imagined 
achievement of reason that had brought them out from a benighted past, enslaved to nature 
and misled by myths. The achievement of reason delivered the Europeans into progressive 
time, into history, and ensured that the European enjoyed the privileged possession of art, 
whereas the Caribs had only the fetish.   
  Although conceptions of cultural difference based on hierarchical and binary thinking 
were certainly not new to the nineteenth century, it was at this time that they found their 
clearest articulation in the emerging science of ethnology, and in particular, in the theory 
known as cultural evolutionism. Evolutionist thought, which achieved prominence in British 
anthropology in the latter half of the nineteenth-century (but had popular exponents in 
Germany as well),  envisioned a gradual historical progress of “man,” stretching from his origins 
in the pre-historical past, to the current heights of modern European civilization, defined by 
                                                     
1 Charles Baudelaire, “Pourquoi la sculpture est ennuyeuse,” Salon de 1846, Critique d’art, ed. Claude Pichois 
(Paris, 1965), 166. Translation is adapted from that of Frances S. Connelly, The Sleep of Reason: Primitivism in 
Modern European Art and Aesthetics, 1725-1907 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 29. 
In French: “L’origine de la sculpture se perd dans la nuit des temps; c’est donc un art de Caraïbes. En effet, nous 
voyons tous les peuples tailler fort adroitement des fétiches longtemps avant d’aborder la peinture, qui est un art 
de raisonnement profond et dont la jouissance même demande une initiation particulière.”   
2  See chapter one for commentary on Baudelaire’s relationship to the figure of the “primitive.”  
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unprecedented technological and material progress.3 Cultural evolutionists ostensibly linked 
“modern man” with his “primitive” counterpart, through the narrative of historical, teleological 
devepment, and nineteenth-century anthropologists professed to study the “psychic unity of 
mankind” from a universalist perspective. As recent historians of anthropology have argued, 
however, such claims of universalism obscured the ways in which ethnographic discourse 
erected unbridgeable gaps between the civilized, “modern” subject and the ethnographic 
subject of study, the “primitive”—gaps premised upon a fundamental distance in terms of 
reason and time. 4  This recent body of work, partially inspired by postcolonial theory and 
Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism, has trained an eye on the anthropology’s implicit and 
sometimes explicit collusion with European imperialism, casting light on how the history of 
anthropology theory buttressed forms of political and cultural power. Johannes Fabian, in his 
pioneering work Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object, articulated this 
argument most forcefully; moreover, he argued that nineteenth-century cultural evolutionism 
was not an exception, but in fact the distancing devices deployed here, which he labeled a 
                                                     
3 For British evolutionary anthropology see George W. Stocking, Jr., Race, Culture and Evolution: Essays in the 
History of Anthropology (New York: Free Press, 1968); Stocking, Victorian Anthropology (New York: Free Press, 
1987); Stocking, The Ethnographer’s Magic and Other Essays in the History of Anthropology (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1992).  
4 Henrika Kuklick, The Savage Within: The Social History of British Anthropology, 1885-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991); Andrew Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001); George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., Colonial Situations: Essays on the Contextualization 
of Ethnographic Knowledge (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); Peter Pels and Oscar Salemink, eds., 
Colonial Subjects: Essays on the Practical History of Anthropology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); 
For an examination of the relationship between pre-colonial imaginaries and anthropological discourse, with a 
focus on tropes of gender and nationalism, see Susanne Zantop, Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation 
in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). 
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“denial of coevalness,” were endemic to the history of anthropology as a discipline, and the 
hermeneutic and representation practices it deployed.5   
Fabian’s work has had a major impact in the critique of anthropology by drawing 
attention to deeply embedded epistemological collusions with imperial power. In this chapter I 
will argue that not all ethnologists can be subsumed into Fabian’s account: in particular, 
Fabian’s critique fails to distinguish an idiosyncratic strand in the distinctive work of Adolf 
Bastian (1826 – 1905), generally recognized as the founder of nineteenth-century German 
ethnology. The idiosyncracy of Bastian’s approach, combined with his institutional prominence 
in the field of nineteenth-century German ethnology, call for a reassesment of his particular 
contributions to the history of the discipline. Bastian’s work on theorizing (and un-theorizing) 
cultural difference can also offer important insights into the ambivalent operations of colonial 
discourse in the era of German imperialism. 
The significance of Bastian’s unusual approach to the problem of conceptualizing the 
primitive can be glimpsed most clearly by contrasting it with cultural evolutionism. The figure of 
“primitive man” has a long pre-history, with origins stretching back far before the nineteenth 
century.  It was not until the 1860s and 1870s, however, that a new and more clearly defined 
science of ethnology took shape, which took the “primitive races of man” as its main focus. The 
nineteenth century ushered in a new paradigm of historical thinking, and with the ascension of 
evolutionary theory, the image of the “primitive” solidified as a category of the other which was 
not simply strange and different, but somehow behind, in time and in mental capability. This 
new science carved out a space for itself, distinct from the philosophical Anthropologie of the 
                                                     
5 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, with a new foreword by Matt Bunzl 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1983; 2002).  
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Enlightenment. Intellectually it was shaped by a host of factors, including the historicist critique 
of the Bible; a positivist orientation shaped by Auguste Comte; advances in geography, zoology, 
and botany; and Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. Other social influences included 
institutional changes and professionalization within the educational system, as well as 
increased exploration and trade, heightened colonial involvement, and greater state interest 
and support of anthropology as a result.  The seedbeds of this new science of anthropology 
were primarily Britain and Germany. In England, its greatest spokesperson was  E. B. Tylor, 
whose Primitive Culture (1871) essentially established the particular concept of “culture” which 
became the focus study; in Germany, the leading exponent was Adolf Bastian.6 While these two 
figures shared a common interest in understanding the “primitive” people of the world, the 
differences between them were significant. 
In drawing out the contrast between Tylor and Bastian, it will be helpful to follow for a 
moment George W. Stocking, Jr., who, in his classic work on the nineteenth-century British 
tradition, Victorian Anthropology, makes an evocative and illuminating association between 
British cultural evolutionist theory and the Crystal Palace, the monumental construction built to 
house the first of what would come to be known as the “World’s Fairs.” Held in London in 1851, 
the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations was rich with symbolism, primarily 
                                                     
6 France indeed produced important nineteenth-century thinkers who shaped the history of anthropology, yet for 
various reasons, not least of which was a stricter divide between theorizing and fieldwork, it remains difficult to 
speak of a French anthropological tradition before the work of Marcel Mauss and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in the 
twentieth century. The work of Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), the closest contemporary equivalent of Bastian or 
Tylor, was deeply infused with the figure of the “primitive,” yet his overriding focus on European society generally 
earns him recognition as the founder of French sociology rather than anthropology. See Robert Parkin, “The 
French-Speaking Countries,” One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, French, and American Anthropology 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), ed. Fredrik Barth, et al. 157-208. For surveys on the British tradition, 
see Stocking (1987); Fredrik Barth, “Britain and the Commonwealth,” One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, 
French, and American Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); For an overview of the German 
tradition, see Andre Gingrich, “The German-Speaking Countries,” One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, 
French, and American Anthropology, ed. Fredrik Barth, et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 61-153. 
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intended to celebrate the great technological and economic achievements of British civilization. 
As Stocking writes, quoting Prince Albert, “The purpose of the Exhibition was to ‘give a true test 
and a living picture of the point at which the whole of mankind has arrived in this great task, 
and a new starting point from which all nations will be able to direct their further exertions.’” 
Yet as Stocking wryly observes, “The most obvious lesson of the Exhibition, however, was that 
in pursuing their sacred mission, not all men had advanced at the same pace, or arrived at the 
same point.”7 The Palace, showcasing the various arts and industries of the world’s nations, 
amounted to a glorious edifice intended to reify the boundaries of Time and Rationality which 
divided the primitive from the civilized. “It is hardly surprising,” Stocking writes,  
that the Exhibition forced some to think about the origins and progress of the civilization 
it epitomized. Much in the Crystal Palace encouraged speculation of a more specific 
sort: the overall system of classification, which forced jurors to compare the same 
functional object in a variety of national forms; the character of the different national 
exhibits, which led one along a line of progress from Tasmanian savage through the 
“barbaric” civilizations of the East, northwest across the European continent toward an 
apex in Great Britain. 8 
 
Stocking’s tour of the Crystal Palace presents the discursive reification of time and 
reason as boundaries of difference, and points to the co-production of “primitive” and 
“civilized” with which this dissertation is concerned.  Moreover, as a symbol of British cultural 
evolutionary ethnology, it offers a vivid contrast to the ethnology being developed in Germany 
by Tylor’s contemporary, Bastian. The aim of Tylor’s comparative science was to assemble data 
that would reveal cultural differences, and thereby make it possible to locate the position of 
any particular human group or society on the scale of evolution. Bastian’s comparative 
approach, however, was interested in locating fundamental similarities, rather than differences. 
                                                     
7 Stocking, Victorian Anthropology, 3. 
8 Ibid., 5. 
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Bastian conceived of ethnology as a form of philosophical psychology; the project of ethnology, 
as he outlined in a steady flow of books and articules, should be understood as the search for, 
and study of, “elementary thoughts” (Elementargedanken), which were the foundational 
elements of culture.  These elementary thoughts, however, were not immediately discernable, 
but contained within the observable creations of culture, which Bastian termed the “folk ideas” 
(Völkergedanken). Through a rigorous comparative analysis of the diversity of the latter, the 
ethnologist would be able to approach the singularity of the former. 
  Both Bastian and Tylor ascribed to the belief in the “psychic unity of mankind,” but 
whereas for Tylor this was a connection across evolutionary time, a model for schematizing 
difference, for Bastian, the connection was a psychological one. The result was that for Tylor, 
this unity was nominal. Tylor’s theory of cultural evolutionism, and his concept of cultural traits 
as “survivals,” erected an unbridgeable distance in time between civilized and primitive; and his 
analysis of primitive culture preserved the distinction between rationality and irrationality. 
Bastian’s ethnological theory, however, problematized the categories of difference and 
identity; in doing so, it called the boundaries of time and reason into question. 
As Fabian has argued in Time and the Other, this reification of time as distance (which 
we can see in construction of space in the Crystal Palace), was not a random characteristic of 
nineteenth-century thought, nor confined to cultural evolutionism, but in fact can be seen as an 
inherent hallmark of ethnology from its origins up through the present (Time and the Other was 
published in 1983). Fabian, as part of an early wave of postcolonial critiques of the discipline, 
approached the history of anthropology with the aim of understanding its political and 
colonialist imbrications; he compellingly argued that ethnological discourse has routinely 
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deployed time as a distancing device, confining the other to a separate and subordinate state. 
Fabian suggested that the temporal structures frequently employed in ethnographic texts were 
marked by what he called a “denial of coevalness.” As Matti Bunzl explains in his foreword to 
the 2002 re-issue, “The temporal structures so constituted thus place anthropologists and their 
readers in a privileged time frame, while banishing the Other to a stage of lesser development. 
This situation is ultimately exemplified by the deployment of such essentially temporal 
categories as ‘primitive’ to establish and demarcate anthropology’s traditional object.” 9 
This distancing function is evident in the tradition of British sociocultural evolutionism, 
as is apparent in Stocking’s account. Yet, as this chapter will argue, regarding the work of Adolf 
Bastian, Fabian’s thesis falls short.  Bastian was the leading figure at the founding of German 
ethnology, a prolific writer whose output of monographs and journal articles one could easily 
label “monumental”10; in addition, his construction of the guiding principles shaped the 
collection of ethnographic objects and their display in Germany’s premier ethnology museum 
for decades. Despite Bastian’s affinity with Tylor on some accounts, often leading scholars to 
lump him in, erroneously, with evolutionist ethnology, Bastian in fact rejected the sociocultural 
evolutionist framework. In both his theoretical and textual practices, the commonly invoked 
boundaries dividing the civilized and the primitive—time and reason—were in fact 
disarticulated. 
 
                                                     
9 Matt Bunzl, “Foreword to Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other: Syntheses of a Critical Anthropology,” in Fabian, 
Time and the Other, xi. 
10 H. Glenn Penny notes, “By 1985, Bastian had over 230 publications to his credit, and by 1905 his books took up 
three to four feet of shelf space and included over 10,000 pages.” H. Glenn Penny, Objects of Culture: Ethnology 
and Ethnographic Museums in Imperial Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 19. 
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Part 2.  Adolf Bastian and the Ambiguities of German Anthropology 
 
The formation of anthropology as a formal scholarly discipline in Germany occurred in 
sync with the creation of the German Empire. Prussian military victories over Austro-Hungary in 
1866 and France in 1871, through the leadership of Otto von Bismarck, prepared the way for 
the unification of German lands under the Prussian king, Wilhelm I, crowned the new German 
emperor. During this period of national delimitation and definition, the science of Völkerkunde 
(ethnology) was established, also with its headquarters in Berlin. In 1867, the Berlin Society for 
Anthropology, Ethnology and Prehistory was founded, along with the journal Zeitschrift für 
Ethnologie, which quickly became the leading periodical in the field. In 1873 the Royal Museum 
of Ethnology was established in Berlin; the museum was the largest and best funded of 
Germany’s several ethnological museums, and quickly achieved world renown. Up through the 
early decades of the twentieth century it was considered the largest ethnographic museum in 
the world.11  This concurrence of events highlights important questions about the place of 
German anthropological science in relation to German national identity on the one hand and 
the connection of ethnology to state and imperial power on the other.  
If Berlin was from the start the heart of German anthropology, at the heart of the Berlin 
establishment was Adolf Bastian. The first German to pass the habilitation (venia docendi) for 
Völkerkunde, in 1869, he was also the first professor of Völkerkunde as an academic subject in a 
German university. Bastian served as the first director of the Berlin Museum of Ethnology, from 
1873 until his death. (He had since 1869 directed the ethnographic collection in the royal  
                                                     
11 Andre Gingrich, “The German-Speaking Countries,” One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, French, and 
American Anthropology, ed. Fredrik Barth et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 61-153.  
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museums.) He was the leading member of the Berlin Geographical Society (Gesellschaft für 
Erdkunde), and one of the founding members of the Anthropological Society in Berlin.   
There were of course important precursors in the field. Gustav Klemm, a Leipzig 
librarian, had authored a massive multi-volume work on “the history of culture” (Allgemeine 
Cultur-Geschichte der Menschheit, 10 volumes, 1843-1852), and assembled Germany’s second-
largest ethnographic collection. Theodor Waitz, a philosopher based in Marburg, had pioneered 
Völkerkunde in his six-volume study, Die Anthropologie der Naturvölker (1859-1872). Both, 
however, were ethnological philosophes and armchair anthropologists, unlike Bastian, whose 
constant travels earned him a reputation for being away from Berlin more than he was in it.12 It 
is also true that Bastian shared center stage in Berlin with Rudolf Virchow, but the latter’s 
domain was the field of Anthropologie, the German designation for physical or biological 
anthropology. A medical student, Virchow reignited the debates about identifying racial 
features that had been introduced in the work of Blumenbach and Christoph Meiners. 13 But as 
H. Glenn Penny writes,  
It was unquestionably Bastian who set the central trends in German ethnology from the 
1860s through the 1880s as he sketched out his vast empirical project, established 
extensive international networks of collection and exchange, created an ethnographic 
institution that became the critical point of comparison for all others, and helped to 
train a number of Germany's first professional ethnologists and encourage them to 
harness this new science in pursuit of self-knowledge.14  
                                                     
12 Bastian made eight major expeditions outside of Europe and spent at least twenty-five years of his life abroad. 
(Penny, Objects of Culture, 20). Walter Benjamin in his essay on Eduard Fuchs offers the following anecdote: 
“Bastian acquired legendary fame for his readiness to pack a suitcase and go on expeditions when it was necessary 
to clarify a question, even if it kept him away from home for months. Similarly, Fuchs obeyed his impulses 
whenever they drove him to search out new evidence. The works of both these men will remain inexhaustible 
treasures for research.” Benjamin, “Eduard Fuchs: Collector and Historian,” New German Critique, no. 5 (Spring, 
1975): 40. 
13 Gingrich, “The German-Speaking Countries,” 79ff.  
14 H. Glenn Penny, Objects of Culture: Ethnology and Ethnographic Museums in Imperial Germany (Chapel Hill: 




Bastian’s prominent role in ethnology remains indisputable, yet the current assessment of 
Bastian’s place in the history of ethnology remains not only ambiguous, but contradictory. The 
two most important recent works in English on the history of German anthropology,  Andrew 
Zimmerman’s Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany and Penny’s Objects of 
Culture: Ethnology and Ethnographic Museums in Imperial Germany, offer conflicting 
interpretations of ethnology’s aims in general and Bastian’s position within it in particular. 15  
Zimmerman finds in nineteenth-century anthropology an antiliberal and antihumanist 
orientation that gestures towards the racialist and eugenic bent of anthropology under National 
Socialism. He argues that "while the discipline of anthropology emerged all over Europe in the 
nineteenth century, it was above all in Germany that it functioned as a new antihumanist 
worldview, and it was in Germany that this anthropological antihumanism had some of its most 
important and far-reaching effects." 16  German anthropology, he writes, under the auspices of 
its two leading figures, Bastian and Virchow, adopted a new approach, inspired by the natural 
sciences, and conceived in opposition to the perceived limitations of traditional humanism.  
These anthropologists rejected historicism, which they saw as unnecessarily confined by its 
narrow focus on European and classical history. Instead, they opened up the possibility of 
                                                     
15 Andrew Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001); Penny, Objects of Culture, 2002. 
16 Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 1 (emphasis mine). Zimmerman’s interest in “continuities as well 
as discontinuities” led him to reject earlier accounts which had “described a cataclysmic break between the 
avowedly antiracist German anthropology of 1870s and 1880s and the increasingly biologistic and racist 
anthropology of the 1890s and after.” (253n27). Zimmerman refers here to Benoit Massin, “From Virchow to 
Fischer: Physical Anthropology and ‘Modern Race Theories’ in Wilhelmine Germany,” in Stocking, ed., Volksgeist as 
Method and Ethic, 79-154; and Robert Proctor, “From Anthropologie to Rassenkunde in the German 
Anthropological Tradition,” in Bones, Bodies, Behavior: Essays on Biological Anthropology, ed. George W. Stocking, 
Jr. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 138-79. 
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knowledge to be gained by studying the non-European other. At the same time, he argues, their 
theoretical work continued to draw firm boundaries between Europeans and others, only now 
the distinction was between Naturvölker, or natural peoples, and the Kulturvölker, the people 
with culture. They thus embraced the non-European other, while at the same time excluding it; 
by linking the non-European “primitive” other with nature, they fancied they could study other 
groups of people “objectively,” using the methods of natural science. 
A contradictory account of German ethnology emerges in Penny’s Objects of Culture and 
in Penny’s edited anthology with Matti Bunzl, Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in 
the Age of Empire.17 Penny and Bunzl argue that the German tradition contains elements of 
tolerance and pluralism, an orientation towards difference that they trace back to the German 
philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder. Herder, they argue, offers an example of nascent cultural 
relativism, formulated in opposition to the “homogenizing tendencies” of such French theorists 
as Voltaire and Nicolas de Condorcet: 
Against [the French theorists’] inclination to view all of humanity as progressing along a 
set path toward civilization, Herder posed a vision of historical specificity and cultural 
incommensurability. . . . This Counter-Enlightenment stance persisted through the 
emergence of German anthropology and ethnology as scientific disciplines in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. 18 
 
Thus, whereas Zimmerman sees Bastian as leading the charge in anthropology’s 
antihumanist turn, Penny and Bunzl place him squarely in the humanist tradition of Herder and 
Alexander von Humboldt. Penny cites Bastian’s conviction that “human nature is uniform all 
over the globe,” and that “if there are laws in the universe, their rules and harmonies should 
                                                     
17 H. Glenn Penny and Matti Bunzl, eds., Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003). 
18 Matti Bunzl and H. Glenn Penny, "Introduction: Rethinking German Anthropology, Colonialism, and Race," in 
Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire, eds. H. Glenn Penny and Matti Bunzl (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 11; Penny, Objects of Culture, 2002. 
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also be in the thought processes of man.”19 This discrepancy with regards to the philosophical 
orientation  of anthropology in the late nineteenth century, and Bastian’s role in particular, 
suggests that his legacy requires closer scrutiny.   
Penny and Zimmerman have both illuminated certain aspects of German anthropology, 
although both also obscure certain features. On the one hand, Penny’s depiction of a 
disciplinary change after the turn of the century more accurately reflects the increased 
attention to nation and race which developed in the year leading up to World War I. However, 
their argument that nineteenth-century anthropology on the whole was marked by a Herdian 
cultural relativism or pluralism neglects the ways in which such “pluralist” views could (and 
generally did) cohabitate with ethnocentric and racial thinking. Similarly, Penny and Bunzl’s 
narrative neglects the existence of such variants in nineteenth-century anthropology as the 
evolutionary and antihumanist thinking of figures like Gustav Klemm, the most important 
precursor to Bastian; it also fails to provide a satisfying explanation for such figures as Friedrich 
Ratzel, whose diffusionist approach ultimately eclipsed Bastian’s ethnology in the twentieth 
                                                     
19 Penny, Objects of Culture, 22, quoting Bastian, Alexander von Humboldt: Festrede (Berlin: Wiegandt and Hempel, 
1869),  23-25. Other recent works on Bastian have emphasized different aspects of this multi-faceted figure’s life 
and career.  Marie-France Chevron has analyzed Bastian’s work in the context of contemporary debates about 
evolution, and elicited his differences from his most important successor, Friedrich Ratzel. Klaus Peter Buchheit has 
produced a philosophically suggestive monograph exploring Bastian’s idiosyncratic style of writing and thinking. 
Christine Stelzig has offered a detailed history of the Berlin Ethnological Museum’s African department, in which 
Bastian figures as a “visionary globe-trotter.” Klaus-Peter Köpping’s work offers a thoughtful analysis of Bastian’s 
theoretical framework, stressing Bastian’s commitment to understanding the “psychic unity of mankind” and 
connecting him with contemporary anthropological developments. Although Köpping’s presentist attempt to 
reconstruct Bastian’s relevance is less convincing, his nuanced readings regarding the tensions and overlooked 
aspects of Bastian’s work have inspired my analysis. See Marie-France Chevron, Anpassung und Entwicklung in 
Evolution und Kulturwandel: Erkenntnisse aus der Wissenschaftsgeschichte für die Forschung der Gegenwart und 
eine Erinnerung an das Werk A. Bastians (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004); Klaus Peter Buchheit, Die Verkettung der 
Dinge: Stil und Diagnose im Schreiben Adolf Bastians (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005); Christine Stelzig, Afrika am 
Museum für Völkerkunde zu Berlin: 1873-1919: Aneignung, Darstellung und Konstruktion eines Kontinents 
(Herbolzheim: Centaurus, 2004); Klaus-Peter Köpping (Adolf Bastian and the Psychic Unity of Mankind: The 
Foundations of Anthropology in Nineteenth Century Germany (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005). 
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century, and whose theory seems to combine cultural pluralism and a de-emphasis on race with 
a nevertheless intensified articulation of a primitivist discourse. 
On the other side of the debate, Zimmerman’s impressive argument helps to 
understand the direction and self-conception of ethnology among Bastian’s colleagues and 
successors (such as Virchow and Felix von Luschan), and remains cognizant of the important 
influences of imperialism on anthropological knowledge production. Zimmerman’s account, 
however, fails to do justice to Bastian’s thought, and the significance that humanism held in 
Bastian’s ethnological theory.  Bastian, in spite of his interest in object collection, did not reject 
humanism, but rather sought to expand it to include non-Europeans. This is an important 
distinction, not only for setting the historical record straight, but also because a closer 
examination will reveal Bastian’s particular place in an important epistemological change.  
Although a part of my argument will be to restore Bastian to the humanist tradition (and 
thus parallels Penny’s work), my argument more broadly reframes the debate, by adopting a 
theoretical framework that resists the supposed binary between humanism, pluralism, or 
liberalism on the one hand, and the “turn” to nation or race, on the other. Instead, I have made 
the discourse of “primitivism” the focus, a shift which in some ways broadens the scope, 
bringing together both humanist discourses and discourses about nation and race; in other 
ways, this approach offers greater potential for making useful new distinctions in different 
types of primitivism, allowing for a narrative that is 1) able to highlight important relationships 
and connections between different moments of primitivism discourse; and 2) able to note 
where such discourse can be read as resistance to ethnocentric modes of thinking (in particular, 
the notions of time and reason, mentioned above), without positing such resistance as 
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somehow outside the sphere of colonial discourse, or part of an unsullied tradition of 
Enlightenment humanism.  
The concept of primitivist discourse therefore is intended to reorganize and 
reconceptualize these elements in a new and productive way. In thus shifting the theoretical 
framework, some traditional associations are problematized, while other ideas previously dealt 
with separately can find themselves profitably conjoined.  A humanist theory, for example, may 
still adopt a form of primitivism, and different types of primitivist discourse may make use of 
racial or national concepts in different ways. Primitivism, as an ethnological mode of defining 
the other, primarily refers to concepts of culture and cultural difference. To fully grasp the ways 
in which ideas about racial and national differences solidified in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, it is important to understand how they drew upon and interacted with 
primitivism, which offered a fundamental discourse about cultural difference and otherness.  
To briefly summarize the theoretical approach (presented in greater detail in chapter 
one), I have employed a basic taxonomy of primitivist discourse, isolating two roughly-hewn 
categories of negative (or imperialist) primitivism and positive (or romantic) primitivism. To 
these we may now add scientistic primitivism, to refer more specifically to ethnology, as a 
mode of primitivism that aspires toward objectivity, yet which is premised upon the notion of a 
“primitive” object of study. I have argued that these foregoing categories can be understood as 
examples of apotropaic primitivism—primitivism that upholds the distinction between primitive 
and civilized. In contrast to these, Bastian’s approach exemplifies the concept of aporetic 
primitivism. These terms are not intended as distinct categories within which various authors, 
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artists, or theorists should be placed; rather, any particular text, image, or theory may be seen 
to incorporate one or more of these modes. 
I use the terms negative or imperialist primitivism to designate the commonplace 
negative views of primitive society that have been expressed from the fifteenth century up to 
the present, in particular the ways in which European individuals constructed a subject identity 
founded on a belief in civilization, progress, rationality, and autonomy, in opposition to a 
primitive “other” lacking these traits, and therefore an object of aversion or disgust. An 
example would be the images of cannibals which filled European travelogues in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, or in the mocking comments made by a critic of T. E. Bowdich’s 
1819 study of the Ashanti of West Africa: “The ‘history’ of the Ashantees, to which Mr. Bowdich 
has dedicated a whole chapter, is, like that of all other savages who can neither read nor write, 
the history of a day, and little worthy of notice.”20 Another example would be Christoph 
Meiners, an eighteenth-century popularizer of the hierarchical racial theory in which white 
Europeans (and especially Germans) occupied the highest place. Linking physical and cultural 
traits, Meiners wrote: “Even if we had no idea that the Negroes are uglier in body and 
countenance than the Europeans, and that they have smaller skulls, a smaller and less pliant 
brain and coarser nerves than these, we would still be bound to conclude from their entire 
mode of living and acting that Negroes are significantly less sensitive and more irritable than 
whites.”21 
                                                     
20 Unsigned review, in Quarterly Review 22 (January 1820), 286; quoted in Frances S. Connelly, The Sleep of 
Reason: Primitivism in Modern European Art and Aesthetics 1725-1907 (University Park, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 15. 
21 Christoph Meiners, Grundriss der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1785, quoted in Zantop, Colonial Fantasies, 84. 
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I use the terms romantic or positive primitivism, on the other hand, to designate an 
opposing view: eighteenth-century fantasies of the noble savage, for example, or Paul 
Gauguin’s Post-Impressionist paintings of idyllic Polynesian scenes. More recently, United 
Nations Secretary-General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote (in a 1994 essay): “It is now clearly 
understood that many indigenous people live in greater harmony with the natural environment 
than do the inhabitants of industrialized consumer societies.”22 It should be clear that both 
negative and positive primitivism involve an inherent imposition of a hierarchy between self 
and other. The difference between negative and positive primitivism is only that the latter 
reverses the value judgment of the former; hierarchy and otherness are preserved, casting the 
other as an object of desire rather than fear.  Thus the timelessness which Bowdich’s critic 
despised in the report on the Ashanti becomes in Gauguin’s work an idealized, desirable, 
dreamlike state. 
What we may call “scientistic primitivism” refers to that mode of discourse which treats 
the “primitive” yet ostensibly seeks to bracket positive or negative judgments. A primary 
example of this would be nineteenth-century evolutionary anthropology, which sought to 
“objectively” analyze primitive societies, not to explicitly condemn them or praise them, but 
simply to learn from them—to observe how they function, to compare them, in order to locate 
their position on an evolutionary timeline of humanity, ascending from lowly primitives to 
advanced modern Europeans. 23  As Fabian has argued, even where such ethnologists sought to 
                                                     
22 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Foreword,” Voice of Indigenous Peoples, edited by Alexander Ewen (1994); quoted in 
Kuper, 207. 
23 I have opted for the term “scientistic” to suggest this mode’s aspirations to analyze the primitive “other” with 
scientific objectivity or neutrality; calling it “scientific,” “objective,” or “neutral” primitivism would convey an 
unwarranted sense of having accomplished that aim. (Even where scientific discourse refrains from condemning 
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withhold value judgments, the very framework of their approach employed a clearly 
hierarchical construction of the scientific, European self and the primitive other, and used the 
notion of time as a device to maintain difference.24 (Fabian finds this mode of distancing not 
only in the cultural evolutionary thought of the nineteenth century, embodied in the ethnology 
of E.B. Tylor, but in twentieth-century anthropology as well, whether the cultural relativism of 
the Anglo-American school or the taxonomic approach of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism.)   
I have adopted the notion of aporetic primitivism to designate a mode of primitivism 
that strictly speaking is not a fourth category on par with the previous three, but rather a 
mobile, meta-category; it is intended to suggest moments of discourse in which one or more of 
the previous modes of primitivism is evident but is also paired with a destablizing counterpoint. 
Aporetic primitivism is thus a mode of primitivist discourse in which hierarchy and otherness 
are articulated, but simultaneously undermined through various aesthetic strategies. Whereas 
modes of imperialist, romantic, and scientistic primitivism all uphold the distinctions between 
civilized (self) and primitive (other), modes of aporetic primitivism employ these distinctions 
while calling their tangibility into question. 
I have termed these modes primitivism “aporetic,” and not merely paradoxical, because 
aporetic suggests more clearly the productive power of a paradox. The point is not simply to 
locate intellectually interesting contradictions in a text (i.e., that a discourse of primitivism can 
both support a modern subject position, and undermine it), but to argue that a moment of 
discourse which undermines its own primitivism can be aporetic, in the sense of producing 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the primitive as negative or extolling its traits as desirable, it erects a clear boundary between knower and known 
that involves an epistemological hierarchy.) 
24 Fabian, Time and the Other, 2002. 
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impasse, the moment through which the discourse cannot pass. I am not therefore offering a 
deconstructionist reading of Bastian’s discourse, as though it were one example of the general 
discourse of primitivism, which was premised upon the inevitability of contradictions, which can 
be revealed to the critic. Rather, I am arguing that Bastian’s discourse works against particular 
claims of the primitivist discourse. The notion of aporia is intended to suggest the ensuing 
disorientation (or vertigo, as I have called it below), as well as the opening up of new 
interpretive possibilities. 
As the previous chapter argued, primitivism has been a historically fundamental 
discourse of alterity, producing a modern subject position—which is to say, one defined by 
critical awareness, autonomy, historical progress, and alienation (from nature, from 
community, from the self). If that is the case, then a discourse of aporetic primitivism, I argue, 
works to undermine the construct of an imagined modernity. In so far as empire has historically 
claimed a monopoly on “modernity,” invoking it to maintain power hierarchies, as the state to 
which all civilizations must strive, then a discourse which challenges the existence and teleology 
of modernity should be seen as a radical project. 
 
Part 3.  Vertigo:  Time, Reason, and Bastian’s Acronych Ethnology 
 
Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object helped spur 
a radical re-evaluation of the history of anthropology. Influenced by Foucault, and working with 
an intent and method similar to that of Edward Said in Orientalism, Fabian turned his attention 
to a historical and philosophical analysis of the uses of the concept of Time in anthropological 
262 
 
discourse. As Matti Bunzl writes in his introductory comments to the 2002 reissue, “Time and 
the Other functions both as a meta-analysis of the anthropological project at large and as a 
deconstruction of its enabling temporal formations.” 25 
 Fabian begins his critique with the fundamental, if commonplace, observation that 
knowledge is power. “Anthropology’s claim to power,” he declares, “originated at its roots. It 
belongs to its essence and is not a matter of accidental misuse. Nowhere is this more clearly 
visible, at least once we look for it, than in the uses of Time anthropology makes when it strives 
to constitute its own object—the savage, the primitive, the Other.” 26 Fabian highlights a 
contradiction inherent to the practice of ethnography.  As Bunzl explains:  
On the one hand, anthropological knowledge is produced in the course of fieldwork 
through the intersubjective communication between anthropologists and interlocutors; 
on the other hand, traditional forms of ethnographic representation require the 
constitutive suppression of the dialogic realities generating anthropological insights in 
the first place. In the objectifying discourses of a scientific anthropology, “Others” thus 
never appear as immediate partners in a cultural exchange but as spatially and, more 
importantly, temporally distanced groups. 27 
  
Fabian refers to this contradiction, between the reality of shared time in fieldwork and 
the mode of temporal distancing employed in anthropological texts, as the “schizogenic use of 
Time.” Fabian terms this particular feature of anthropological writing the “denial of 
coevalness.”  He explains this as “a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) 
of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological 
discourse.”28 This can be seen, he argues, in the recurrent use of such terms as “primitive”; 
other times it is less obvious, as in the “walled gardens” of cultural relativism, or the taxonomic 
                                                     
25 Bunzl, “Foreword,“ Time and the Other, x. 
26 Fabian, Time and the Other, 1. 
27 Bunzl, “Foreword to Johannes Fabian‘s Time and the Other,“ x. 
28 Fabian, Time and the Other, 31 (italics in original). 
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approach of Claude Lévi-Strauss.  This consistent denial of coevalness, based on a perceived 
distance in Time, Fabian terms the “allochronism” of anthropology.29  
 Fabian’s diagnosis, although he makes some qualifications, is intended to describe the 
history of anthropology tout court. It is interesting in this regard that he in fact focuses on the 
British/American and French traditions.30 He neglects to note that there was indeed an 
alternative, markedly different methodology, which in fact defined nineteenth-century German 
anthropology—the universalist, humanist approach of Adolf Bastian.31  Bastian’s conception of 
ethnology as a mode of humanistic, scientific psychology effectively incorporated the 
"primitive" other within the European concept of self; this stood in contrast to the cultural 
evolutionary model, which figured the primitive as separate, distanced from the European in 
                                                     
29 Evolutionary time, Fabian writes, “promoted a scheme in terms of which not only past cultures, but all living 
societies were irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of Time—some upstream, others downstream. 
Civilization, evolution, development, acculturation, modernization (and their cousins, industrialization, 
urbanization) are all terms whose conceptual content derives, in ways that can be specified, from evolutionary 
Time.” He goes on to highlight the lasting effects of this development: “A discourse employing terms such as 
primitive, savage (but also tribal, traditional, Third World, or whatever euphemism is current) does not think, or 
observe, or critically study, the ‘primitive’; it thinks, observes, studies in terms of the primitive. Primitive being 
essentially a temporal concept, is a category, not an object, of Western thought.” Fabian, Time and the Other, 17. 
30 The omission is noteworthy, all the more so considering the international prominence of German ethnology in 
the nineteenth century. (Fabian does discuss German diffusionism, which comes to the fore in the German field in 
the early twentieth century.) The neglect of German-language sources also offers an interesting parallel with Said, 
whose Orientalism also rather notoriously failed to examine German texts, despite the major contributions of 
German authors. For Said, Germany seemed to pose a problematic case, in that the nation’s late entry into 
colonialism suggested no "protracted sustained national interest in the Orient"—a perspective which later 
scholarship has overturned. (Edward Said, Orientalism [New York: Vintage, 1978], 19. Italics in original.) Fabian’s 
neglect appears more a sin of omission than comission. For Said see Jennifer Jenkins, “German Orientalism: 
Introduction,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24, No. 2 (2004): 97-100; Suzanne L. 
Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
31 In some ways, it should come as no surprise that Fabian fails to consider Bastian, whose prominent role in the 
history of German ethnography has only become the study of research in the last decade or so, after some years of 
neglect.  This is in part due to Bastian’s notoriously obscure and ponderous writing style (a point to which I return 
later in this chapter). His contemporary Ernst Haeckel mocked him with the title of “Geheimer Oberkonfusionsrat.” 
Robert Lowie, whose History of Ethnological Theory (1937) was the authoritative source in its day, wrote of 
Bastian’s style: “At its worst it is surely inconceivably crabbed. To confront Bastian in some of his lucubrations is a 
never-to-be-forgotten experience. The astounded reader runs into sentences twenty lines and more in length and 
hacks his way through bracketed quotations in Latin, Greek, or Polynesian, only to find that he has yet to extricate 
himself from the maze of some major parenthesis.” Robert H. Lowie, The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: 
Rinehart & Co., Inc. 1937), 32-33. 
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evolutionary time. Accordingly, I will argue that Bastian’s theory remains a key moment in 
which this allochronic discourse did not appear—or to be more precise, in which a “denial of 
coevalness” was combined with its opposite, an a theoretical discourse based on identity and 
coevalness. Bastian was no relativist—he adopted a colonial ethnological discourse which pre-
supposed a hierarchical difference between civilized Europeans and uncivilized primitives; his 
writing thus constitutes a form of primitivism, a fact which is neglected in arguments which only 
focus on his humanist tendencies. Yet unlike the British evolutionary model of primitivism, 
Bastian’s discourse did not establish distancing devides along the boundaries of time and 
rationality.32 Here, on account of his humanism, Bastian’s theory collapsed boundaries and 
theorized coevalness. 
To call Bastian a humanist, however, demands a reconsideration of Andrew 
Zimmerman’s argument, which casts a tradition of German anthropology as fundamentally 
antihumanist—and Bastian as “the greatest spokesman of the anthropological critique of 
                                                     
32 It should be noted that the history of ethnography which tends to fall out from Fabian’s indictment (as expressed 
in Bunzl’s forward) is in fact surprisingly whiggish, tending to follow the development of ethnographic writing as it 
progressed from early, confused, allochronic beginnings, to an enlightened, more open-ended, multi-vocal 
ethnography, in which ethnographers adopt the autobiographical voice. Bunzl highlights  Anna Tsing’s In the Realm 
of the Diamond Queen (1993) – “a ‘classic’ monograph of a small indigenous group, the Meratus Dayaks, who live 
in near isolation in the southeast of the Indonesian part of Borneo. . . . Tsing resolutely protests the allochronic 
assumption that the Meratus Dayaks are ‘anybody’s “contemporary ancestors”’; moreover, her rhetorical 
strategies strive for the constant transmission of coevalness. Through the use of innovative narrative approaches 
(a creative symbiosis of analytical and reflexive elements), the concrete dialogical dimensions of her fieldwork 
remain accessible. Informants thus  become complex and grounded subjects.” (Bunzl, xxiv). Without detracting 
from Tsing’s achievements, I argue that it behooves the historian to reject this simple progressive development, 
and instead to look for moves in different and unexpected directions. Fabian himself, in fact, has already distanced 
himself from the whiggish tendency and explored these contradictory trends. In Out of our Minds: Reason and 
Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), he 
reveals traces of intersubjectivity in texts from the turn of the twentieth century. Thus, in thinking against the grain 
of Fabian’s argument, I rely upon Fabian himself for inspiration. However, whereas he focuses on these marginal, 
albeit significant moments, I have found a counter-example in the heart of the discipline, in the writings of what 
many consider the founding father of German ethnology. 
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humanism.”33 Anthropology, in the time of Bastian, became increasingly focused on analyzing 
objects and the physical characteristics of people, not interpreting texts, which had been the 
purview of humanism.34 This methodological difference, applied to anthropology, helped 
anthropologists create a simple distinction between the Kulturvölker, the people with culture 
and history, and the Naturvölker or Naturmenschen, the people without history. Whereas 
humanism, according to Zimmerman, was engaged in the interpretation of texts, and 
“depended on a hermeneutic identification of scholars with their objects of study, the natural 
scientific methods that anthropologists applied emphasized the separation of the knowing 
subject from the known object.”35  According to Zimmerman, the rejection of textual and 
historical study in favor of natural scientific methods enabled German anthropologists to 
envision their new science as more “objective” than humanism: “Anthropology was thus 
conceived as a natural science of natural peoples, which eschewed what practitioners held to 
be ‘subjective’ historical narratives in favor of ‘objective’ observations of people uncomplicated 
by culture and historical development.”36 
                                                     
33 Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 47.  
34 Zimmerman points, for example, to the growing interest in skull measurements to determine racial categories, a 
practice that led to the official establishment of a common method in the 1883 Frankfurt Agreement.  This new 
method, Zimmerman writes, “provided an epistemological role different from that of the traditional humanities. 
Their studies of the skull allowed them to escape their own subjectivity and to avoid the subjectivity of the people 
they studied.” (Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 106)  Zimmerman also describes the vast study 
conducted by Virchow on behalf of the German Anthropological Society in the 1870s, in which six million German 
schoolchildren were examined to record their hair, eye, and skin color in order to “determine the fate of the fair-
skinned, blond, blue-eyed ‘classic Teutons’ (classische Erscheinungen des Germanen) described by Tacitus and the 
origins of the brown-skinned, brown-haired, brown-eyed individuals who had become so preponderant in 
Germany.” (135, quoting from Virchow, “Die Ziele und Mittel der modernen Anthropologie”). Felix von Luschan 
crafted similar questionnaires that field anthropologists were instructed to use in order to regularize and 
systematize the type of ethnographic knowledge produced by practitioners. (54-55) 
35 Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 240. 
36 Ibid., 38. 
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Bastian was, like his colleagues, interested in modeling anthropology after the natural 
sciences. He criticized the “subjectivity” of humanist philosophy, and he was interested in 
collecting ethnographic objects, which would furnish the raw data for anthropological study. 
Yet, I will argue, his version of anthropology was not a rejection of humanism, but rather, in 
fact, an expansion of it. He hoped to maintain the humanist goal of self-knowledge, but through 
epistemological critique to provide a new theoretical foundation, and to establish what he 
thought of as a more empirical basis. 
Bastian, indeed, was interested in the collection and examination of ethnographic 
objects—almost to the point of caricature. He is frequently remembered for his ardent 
admonitions to collect as many ethnographic objects as possible, before time had run out. He 
gave an early voice to what was later termed the “salvage paradigm” in anthropology, referring 
to a sense of the urgent need to gather up artifacts for study before the objects (and societies 
in which they originated) had disappeared due to the effects of European imperialism and 
expansion.37  In an 1885 article, for example, Bastian issued a clarion call for increased 
collection of ethnographic objects. After explaining that ethnology had finally appeared on the 
scene to join “anthropology and psycho-physics for the inductive formation of a scientific 
psychology,” which will offer a new hope for “the science of man,” he states that, “the 
fulfillment of such hope, however, remains dependent upon the prior question, whether it will 
be possible to procure the ethnic material in sufficient amounts, in order to examine them 
                                                     
37 The term is more commonly applied to early twentieth-century American anthropology. See for example 
Stocking, The Ethnographer’s Magic and Other Essays in the History of Anthropology (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1992), 118-119. 
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according to the demands of the comparative-genetic method.”38 Bastian calls for the 
collection of “tangible, sensory objects” which, “for illiterate people, are the only expression of 
their Volksgeist.” Indeed, “thus far [these are] the only documents and models which are 
available, with which the mental creations can become understandable.” Urgency is crucial in 
this “critical moment of danger,” as these cultural documents “perish before our eyes daily.”39 
Leaving aside for the moment Bastian’s talk of “psycho-physics” and “scientific 
psychology,” it should be clear that for all his enthusiasm for collecting ethnographic objects, it 
was ultimately ideas he was after. Not only is it clear from the above that objects are important 
for offering insights into “mental creations”; moreover, his interest in objects comprised only 
part of his research agenda. Much of his ethnographic writing concerns the “narrative” 
elements of culture as well. In Der Mensch in der Geschicht (1860), his second major publication 
and his first formal organization of his thoughts into an ethnographic treatise, he explains:  
In incidental features of narration, in nursery tales and proverbs, sayings and modes of 
speech, we encounter the same idea, be it in England or Abyssinia, in India or 
Scandinavia, in Spain or Tahiti, in Mexico as well as in Greece. If we look carefully 
enough, it will be the same idea which emerges from the hiding place of ethnic 
peculiarities and manifests itself in the thoughts of mankind in a fashion that, unless 
perceived as being part of cosmic harmony, appears to be incomprehensible.40 
 
Objects were important, but only insofar as they disclosed insights into the creations of 
the human mind. In the 1885 article Bastian begins in fact not with a discussion about objects, 
but about the challenges involved in gaining an understanding of the Naturmenschen: “Only he 
who has understood, to place oneself sufficiently in the thought process of a natural people, in 
order to follow involuntarily their idea associations, will be in the position to present an 
                                                     
38 Bastian, “Über Ethnologische Sammlungen,” Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, 17 (1885), 38. 
39 Ibid., 40. 
40 Bastian, Der Mensch in der Geschichte, Vol. 1 (1860), 10, translated in Köpping, Adolf Bastian, 180. 
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unfalsified picture . . .  [one that is] useful and correct, in order to be valuable for scientific 
examination.”41 Such skill, he continues, “to contemplate the thought process of the 
Naturmenschen, is therefore a ‘conditio sine qua non,’ as I have often emphasized.” In the 
absence of written texts, objects become especially important, but only because, “in the 
collection of ethnological museums, some psychological secret [psychologische Geheimniss] 
may be divulged.”42 
Bastian, perhaps realizing that his interest in ideas could make him vulnerable to 
criticism that he was engaging in merely subjective philosophical speculation, cites an earlier 
work in which he provided an explanation of how his approach to ideas can be said to function 
like a natural science:  
Should there be for this purpose [of collecting and analyzing objects] a sufficient count 
of workers ready to sacrifice themselves, then maybe the coming generation might 
achieve the same, which has already been successful in chemistry, namely: to establish 
an accurately researched electrochemical series of psychological basic elements [Grund-
Elemente], and with it for the first time to lay a strong basis for a scientific psychology, 
which despite its many-sided procedure has still not found such a basis. From these 
elementary foundations we could then move outward, progressing carefully from the 
simple to the various combinations, gradually then to specify the thought-structure of 
humanity in its double and triple bonds, and thus to come back to the current height of 
culture, to bring to it the gift of self-understanding, as the gain of the research. This 
alone is the way, which the sciences have taught, the way of experience (instead of 
speculation), in order not to lose, during the investigations, the safe shelter of control in 
rectifying comparisons.43  
 
On the one hand, Bastian’s comment confirms Zimmerman’s contention that there was 
indeed a movement in the field toward reconceptualizing anthropology along the lines of 
natural science. Bastian too embraced the notion of putting anthropolgical thought on a 
                                                     
41 Bastian, “Über Ethnologische Sammlungen,” 38. 
42 Ibid., 41. 
43 Ibid., 39n1 (citing Das Beständige des Menschenrassen und die Spielweite ihre Veränderlichkeit [1868], 70-71). 
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“strong” empirical foundation. However, it is important to observe that Bastian did not see 
himself as abandoning the original humanist philosophical project, which is to say, attaining 
knowledge of the fundamental structures of the human mind; nor did he abandon the humanist 
interest in narrativity and the pursuit of knowledge as self-knowledge. Narrativity, however, 
could be approached just as well through the study of cultural objects. Bastian wanted to 
substantiate the humanist project by incorporating more empirical methods of study.  
To briefly summarize the theoretical framework of Bastian’s project, the goal was to 
understand the form, patterns, and structures of human thought. Bastian sought to study the 
myths, customs, and practices of a society in order to discover the “elementary thoughts” 
(Elementargedanken). These were the foundational elements of culture.44 These elementary 
thoughts, however, were not immediately apparent, but hidden or within the observable 
creations of culture.  The “folk ideas” (Völkergedanken) are those ideas which present 
themselves most readily to the observer of culture; these are the myths and religions of diverse 
ethnic groups. The aim of a scientific ethnology was to reconstruct the elementary ideas from a 
thorough comparative study and analysis of the variety of folk ideas as they existed in the 
world’s human populations. This analysis would reveal the common collective representations 
(Gesellschaftsgedanken)45  which would ultimately lead to the elementary ideas. Therefore, “An 
unconditional prerequisite is a complete survey of the whole of mankind’s mental creations 
through time and space, geographical variations and historical influence.”46 Although the folk 
ideas may differ, the elementary ideas should be universal; this was the meaning behind 
                                                     
44 Bastian’s theory has sometimes been compared to the structural psychology of Claude Lévi-Strauss, a not 
entirely accurate comparison but one that is helpful in grasping the thrust of his project. 
45 Sometimes compared to Carl Jung’s “collective unconscious.” (Bastian was in fact an influence on Jung.) 
46 Bastian, Controversen in der Ethnologie, Vol. 1 (Berlin: Wiedmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1893), 14, 
translated in Köpping, Adolf Bastian, 30. 
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Bastian’s belief in the “psychic unity of mankind.” Bastian’s goals were still essentially those of 
the humanist philosophical project of the Enlightenment: the analysis of the fundamental 
structures patterns of cognition, in order to better understand humanity’s place in the world.  
Bastian explicitly positioned his work as an extension of that begun by Alexander von Humboldt 
(to whom Bastian dedicated his first important publication, Der Mensch in der Geschichte, 
1860), and Bastian often invoked Johann Gottfried Herder as a primary influence: 
The very thought that man as mankind is the essential object of study if man is to 
understand himself as a social animal appears as an almost intuitively conceived 
elementary idea all over the world. This implies that we ethnologists should look for 
Man in the average man who represents the mean of the whole of mankind; for this we 
need a “social physics.” As Herder said with some amazement, it is about time that, 
having studied the kingdom of minerals, plants and animals, we make an attempt to 
understand man .47 
 
At the same time, however, Bastian wanted to base his philosophical-anthropology on 
the positivist model of the natural sciences; it was to be collaborative, comparative and 
inductive. If the aims of philosophy were still good, what needed improvement was the 
methods, and a new focus on the “objective realizations” of the human spirit: “Where 
therefore must psychology, if it is to become a natural science, gather its building blocks? This is 
the crucial question around which everything turns. Such building blocks are to be found in the 
folk ideas (Völkergedanken), which are to be procured through the comparative psychology of 
ethnology.”48   
Bastian’s image of a natural science, however, was not a materialist vision; as noted 
above, he conceived of ethnology as a form of psycho-physics, a scientific psychology pioneered 
                                                     
47 Ibid., vol. 1, 95, translated in Köpping, Adolf Bastian, 28. By “social physics” (physique socialie) Bastian refers to 
the early work of Auguste Comte. 
48 Bastian, Heilige Sage, 219. 
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by the anti-materialist experimental psychologist Gustav Fechner (1801-87), notably in his work 
Elements of Psychophysics (1860).49  Fechner rejected mind-body dualism and argued for a 
unity of physical and psychic events (he remains known today as the originator of Fechner’s 
law, a system for quantifying subjective sensation and linking it to the intensity of a phyical 
stimulus).50 Fechner’s work belonged to a growing trend of anti-materialist thought, including, 
for example, the monist philosophy of Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919). As Woodruff D. Smith writes, 
for many intellectuals of the day, radical materialism seemed “intellectually unsatisfactory, 
politically suspect, and inconsistent with the philosophical idealism that held pride of place at 
German universities in the later nineteenth century.”51  
Fechner’s work was important to Bastian primarily as a theoretical framework for a 
research agenda, asserting the unity of mind and body in order to pursue empirically 
quantifiable principles or “laws” of psychic life.  Bastian declared allegiance to such a view in 
the opening pages of Der Mensch in der Geschichte (published the same year as Elements of 
Psychophysics): 
The difference in subjective perceptions has since olden times given rise to the 
postulate of an essential opposition between the consciousness of purely mental 
concatenations of thought and the physical oscillatiosn of the nerves. Thus an 
independent microcosmic realm was postulatd against the macrocosmic one. Yet the 
microcosmic realm is in reality only a mental distillation of the macrocosmic realm in an 
individuality which is but a part of it. Properly speaking, the mind and the body are one, 
and together make the man. This unity of mind and matter, created anew each 
moment, is the essence of the nature of man.52 
                                                     
49 Gustav Fechner, Elemente der Psychophysik (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1860). 
50 For Fechner’s influence on Bastian, see Köpping, Adolf Bastian, 88-94. 
51 Woodruff Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 1840-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 207.” 
52 Bastian, Der Mensch in der Geschichte: Zur Begründung einer Psyhologischen Weltanschauung, Vol. 1 (Leipzig: 
Otto Wigand, 1860), 1, translated in Köpping, Adolf Bastian, 179. Köpping adds,“One can only marvel at the speed 
with which Bastian became familiar with the current scientific results; he had just returned from a world-trip of 




In spite of his appreciation for Fechner’s work, however, Bastian argued that 
philosophical psychology had thus far proven a dead-end. The problem, he argued, was that 
research into psychology had approached the problem from the perspective of individual 
psychology, rather than an anthropological focus on collective or social manifestations. 
Reflecting on the shortcomings of scientific pscychology in the late 1880s, Bastian praises 
pioneers in the field as Friedrich Beneke (1798-1854) and Theodor Waitz (1813-66), for realizing 
that “psychology had to become a natural science,” and yet Bastian concludes: 
The reason for their failure was their lack of materials to establish a truly inductive 
science. Beneke hoped to find the material by self-observation, though Kant had already 
pointed out the inherent delusions of such attempts. Besides, these researchers fell 
back upon data about the soul as provided by psychiatry and by pathological 
aberrations, they compare man’s progress with the development of children or animals. 
All this is of very limited value.53 
 
Bastian argues that, while practictioners of scientific psychology from Beneke through 
Fechner may not have succeeded thus far in demonstrating conclusively the link between mind 
and matter, his own approach addressed the fundamental obstacle, focusing not on individual 
psychology but on the empirical study of collective cultural representations, and attempting 
therefore not simply to theorize but to document the unity of the human mind, through the 
collection of objects and the recording of folk ideas on a mass scale.  Through the analysis of 
the folk ideas, the ethnologist would be able to formulate the essential cognitive structures or 
elementary ideas. The concept of the elementary idea was therefore the key, able to unite 
“both the physical and the psychic realm.”54 Bastian explains that,  
                                                     
53 Bastian, Der Völkergedanke im Aufbau einer Wissenschaft vom Menschen und seine Begründung auf 
ethnologische Sammlungen (Berlin: Ferd. Dümmler, 1881), 4, trasnlated in Köpping, Adolf Bastian, 89. 
54 Bastian, Controversen, vol. 1, 95. 
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the new psychology based on the principles of the natural science will in the further 
development of psychic-physics eventually unravel the unseen universe of the world of 
the mind. The main object of psycho-physics has become research on patterns of 
thought as they are acquired in socialization processes and as they are manifested in the 
collective representations of man as social animal.55 
  
Importantly, the “empiricism” of Bastian was not intended to draw a firm boundary 
between the knowing subject and the known object.  Zimmerman has argued that, in Bastian’s 
perspective, “History was entrapped in subjectivity, both because it dealt with the national self 
and because it had necessarily to describe the subjective experiences of the period that it 
portrayed.”56 While Bastian would have agreed with the criticism of historicism’s subjectivity, 
the suggestion that Bastian therefore dimissed “subjective experience” appears incorrect. As 
the 1885 article suggests, Bastian was very much determined to understand the subjective 
experience of his “object,” the ethnographic other. This is not to say that Bastian saw himself 
entering into the “subjectivity” of the other, to the extent that it offered an “equally valid” 
worldview, as the term is used in contemporary discourse. True, in his writing, Bastian often 
seems to enter into the shoes of the other, imagining how some feature of European life would 
look from an outside perspective, as it were, but this sense of “relativism” is a variable, not 
uniform, feature of this thought, and not necessarily a part of its theoretical framework. 
However, in the more limited sense, Bastian’s ethnology was premised upon understanding 
subjectivity, understood as the subject’s manifold perceptions, interactions with, and 
interpretations of the world—this subjectivity was, after all, the substratum of the folk ideas. 
“It is true,” Bastian writes, “that the natural sciences have become the dominant form 
of thought in our times, but they tackle the merely material realm, and have not yet touched on 
                                                     
55 Bastian, Controversen, vol. 1, 4, translated in Köpping, Adolf Bastian, 171. 
56 Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 48. 
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the essential qualities of man as human being, qualities which are seen in the social realm as 
collective representations.”57  The distinction Bastian makes here is not against the 
“subjectivity” of historicism, but its failure to recognize subjectivity in the ethnographic other, 
the object of anthropological knowledge. Bastian writes:  
If we are to achieve a genuine science of man, we must take cognizance of the 
subjective angle. The psychic or intersubjective element which is both the core of the 
individual and the reflection of him and in him of the ethnic horizon, is manifested in the 
collective representations (Gesellschaftsgedanken) as these appear in specific folk ideas, 
these nodal points of the interplay between the physical organism and the total 
environment.58  
 
Ethnology’s niche was to bring a clearer focus on “the world of ideas, that world which other 
sciences study from the outside.59 Bastian did not reject historicism’s interest in subjectivity, 
therefore; rather, he objected to historicism’s Eurocentricism. Bastian argued that the new 
science of man must include all people, and all of world history. “The human qua human,” 
Bastian explained, “does not live only in Europe and part of Asia.”60  Bastian’s ethnology was 
intended as a clear attack against the historical tradition, which had focused exclusively on 
Europe and classical civilization: “The stately building in which the honored discipline of history 
was enthroned [admitted few] newcomers among the carefully ordered, stately row of 
historical peoples.”61 
Bastian critiqued humanist philosophy, but it would be incorrect to say that he rejected 
it. On the one hand, Bastian argued humanist philosophy could not answer the fundamental 
questions about the harmony between the human and the world because these had not been 
                                                     
57 Bastian, Controversen, translated in Köpping, Adolf Bastian, 172. 
58 Bastian, Controversen, vol. 1, 7, translated in Köpping, Adolf Bastian, 29. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Bastian to General Administration of the Royal Museums, December 1894, MfV, XIIa, 1178/95, quoted in 
Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 47. 
61 Bastian, Die Vorgeschichte der Ethnologie, 56, quoted in Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 47. 
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pursued in an empirical fashion. On the other hand, humanism was narrowly Eurocentric, a 
framework that had undermined humanist ambitions. But Bastian did not reject humanism; he 
saw his own work as an enhancement of the humanist project of self-knowledge, albeit on a 
firmer empirical basis, and with a broader scope, focused, as he argued humanism should be, 
on all of humanity. 
However, it may here be objected that my argument that Bastian envisioned an 
expanded humanism is belied by the simple fact that he employed the hierarchical distinction, 
commonplace in anthropological discourse of the period, between Kulturvölker and 
Naturvölker.  Zimmerman makes this argument, writing that, “Instead of studying European 
‘cultural peoples’ (Kulturvölker), societies defined by their history and civilization, 
anthropologists studied the colonized ‘natural peoples’ (Naturvölker), societies supposedly 
lacking history and culture.”62 This distinction, Zimmerman argues, allowed anthropologists to 
conceive of the object of their study as natural objects, rather than humans, and thus 
corresponded with anthropological aspirations towards an “objective” mode of natural science. 
It was thus a lynchpin of their antihumanism, enabling them to draw a firm boundary between 
self and other.  
Interestingly, Zimmerman argues that the Naturvölker/Kulturvölker distinction 
constituted a deliberate rejection of the evolutionary framework and its conceptual focus upon 
the “primitive,” which seemed to suggest a connection in time:   
While the German term Naturvölker referred to roughly the same societies as the 
English term primitives, the two terms had fundamentally different meanings. Whereas 
primitives were the earliest actors in a narrative that also included Europeans, 
                                                     
62 Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 3. 
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Naturvölker were, by definition, excluded from the narrative of progress central to 
German self-understandings.63  
 
Zimmerman’s argument raises an important point, which is that German 
anthropologists, including Bastian and Virchow, did indeed reject British theories of cultural 
evolution. However, whereas Zimmeman suggests that evolutionary theory joined the civilized 
and primitive in a narrative of historical connection, Fabian has demonstrated that evolutionism 
in fact worked against such a connection through the “denial of coevalness.” Thus, rather than 
suggest a contrast between German primitivism (the Naturvölker/Kulturvölker distinction) and 
cultural evolutionism, both should be seen as similarly erecting an epistemological distance 
between anthropologists and their objects of study.  
 
While the Naturvölker/Kulturvölker distinction was frequently deployed by German 
ethnologists, however, the clear dichotomy the terms suggest is not in fact an accurate 
portrayal of their use in Bastian’s writings, nor does it align with his theory of anthropology as 
the study of universal psychology. Not only did Bastian generally qualify his use of these terms 
in his written work, but his theoretical framework was premised upon a fundamental 
connection between the two, not a division. Therefore, while his colleagues often used these 
terms for the demarcating purpose Zimmerman describes, I argue that Bastian’s use of the 
terminology was ambivalent. He used it by default—it was the commonly used vocabulary—but 
in conjunction with his universalist psychology, it acquired a dynamic tension. In his hands, it 
did indeed constitute a rejection of the evolutionary framework, but in a difference sense than 
Zimmerman suggests. If we accept Fabian’s argument that evolutionary discourse created 
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above all a distance in time, despite the implied narrative connection, it will become clear that 
Bastian’s terminology resisted this allochronic distance, even while it worked with hierarchies, 
in terms of the level or degree of “cultural” complexity, which verged on allochronism. In this 
sense, Bastian’s terminology was heuristic; it did not label a clear division among peoples, but 
was a model that Bastian used to work out the contradictions within his thinking. 
In his 1871 article, “Die Cultur und ihr Entwicklungsgang,” for example, Bastian explains 
that “the difference between the so-called Culturvölker and Naturvölker is only a relative one, 
since the possibility of human existence always requires at least a minimum of culture, and the 
accompanying necessary artifices which make up linguistic exchange in social intercourse.”64 
Bastian here calls the distinction into question with his qualification, “so-called,” while  
asserting quite plainly that all forms of human life exhibit culture. Later in the text, he observes:  
The primitive conditions of life now on the Polynesian islands do not preclude previous 
relations to the sophisticated Malay regions by past sea-voyages, as the linguistic 
connection indicates, or even a culture-historical connection to America; it is a known 
fact that enforced isolation can quickly lead to the impression of primitiveness. 
  
It is significant here that Bastian says that isolation may lead to the “impression” (scheinbare) of 
primitiveness, the implication being that a Naturvolk may appear to lack culture to the 
untrained eye—thus revealing a certain nominalism, or at the least that these designations can 
be misleading.  
Such hesitancy, of course, is not sufficient to conclude he rejected the use of these 
categories; indeed he speaks of the “primitive” (primitiven) conditions, affirming a hierarchical 
division. This tension permeates the text, as Bastian feels compelled, on the one hand, to 
                                                     
64 Bastian, Die Cultur und ihr Entwicklungsgang auf ethnologischer Grundlage, in: Supplementband zur Zeitschrift 
für Ethnologie, Vol. 3 (1871), II. 
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recognize the validity of the distinction, while on the other, his other theory pushes him toward 
resistance to it.. After a series of similar cultural comparisons, he observes, “The contrast 
between savagery [Wildheit] and culture seems to be clearly delineated, yet it would indeed be 
difficult to draw a definite borderline.” He goes on to contemplate what should be the obvious 
difference, the use of reason:  
The Eskimo has been forced on account of the climate to develop certain skills (without 
which his existence would be impossible), and in comparison with the naked, wandering 
Indian of the bush, with only his weapons in his hand, has built through his artistry a 
liveable environment. Nevertheless, it would seem that the former ought to be classed 
with the latter, in the class of cultureless peoples, since the differences between them 
are attributable to the differences in the environment, and the mind has not yet soared 
to free-willed action.65 
 
Thus the figure of autonomous reason appears to Bastian as a necessary distinguishing factor, 
although, as we will see below, the distinction becomes a difficult one for him to maintain. 
Bastian’s work is characterized by such contradictory statements. He qualifies his usage of 
Naturvölker and Kulturvölker, but just as often speaks negatively about “primitive” Africans and 
other “less-developed” peoples. It would seem that the designations of humanist or 
antihumanist fail to convey this recurrent tension. Although Bastian is not an evolutionist, it is 
true that much of his thought is based on notions of cultural development; he does not 
embrace the framework of evolution, but speaks of “development” and cultural “blossoming.” 
Moreover, although he broadened the scope of humanism to incorporate non-Europeans, and 
conceived of ethnology as based on a universalist study of the full variety of human societies, 
he clearly thinks hierarchically about the Natur/Kulturvölker distinction. Some societies, namely 
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the European, exhibit a more “complex” culture than the less-developed Naturvölker. 
Psychological unity does not seem to entail cultural incommensurability. 
It should be clear, however, that Bastian does not use the terms Naturvölker and 
Kulturvölker in the generic way Zimmerman describes. These contradictions can be better 
understood by reframing the question in terms of the modes of primitivist discourse which 
Bastian employs—namely, as an aporetic primitivism which combines the allochronic discourse 
of negative primitivism with a self-other identification that negates it. Bastian’s primary 
conceptual tool is to distinguish between a notion of “culture” in the broad, indeed universal 
sense—the idea of culture as it developed in the historical and aesthetic writings of Herder, and 
which in the late nineteenth century became the organizing concept of anthropology—and 
culture in a narrower sense, which would apply to more “advanced” or “complex” societies. 66 
The latter represents the more common nineteenth-century use of the word, in which culture 
referred to the various artistic, scientific, literary and philosophical achievements of society.67  
In a publication from 1878 Bastian writes:  
Under the term natural people [Naturvölker] are the so-called savages [Wilden], the 
people without culture, or rather, people with a minimum of culture, because without 
any culture, the existence of man as a “toolmaking animal” would be unthinkable, for 
the . . . Culture in the narrower sense arises when man is no longer preoccupied with 
survival tasks and has time to contemplate in comfort. 68  
 
As noted before, Bastian qualifies his use of the term “savages” and argues that culture, 
strictly speaking, is a universal feature of “man as a toolmaking animal.”  At the same time, 
however, he explains that he has in mind two these senses of culture, one which is shared by all 
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societies, and one which is the result of contemplation and leisure. Bastian here preserves a 
boundary between Europeans and primitives, by making leisure time and its accompanying 
“contemplation” (or rationality) the dividing line. This was also noted in the quote above, where 
he writes that, regarding the Eskimos and the natives of South America, both must be classed 
as cultureless (culturlosen), as the mind is not yet fully awakened to “free and deliberate 
activity.” 
In the 1871 publication Bastian makes a similar distinction:  
As with the physical demands, so also the spiritual needs:  they cannot be absent even 
on the lowest scale of humanity; and they find expression originally in the demonic 
images created by the religious impulse (in the transition to mythological poetry), but 
the culture (as such) sprouted only if, after the satisfaction of basic needs (and thus the 
enabling of life at all), the spirit/mind became the more receptive to subtle charms of 
Kalon k’agathon (Greek for “the good and the beautiful”), and the body, in addition to 
the basic needs of life's required maintenance, was drawn to the unnecessary, but 
seductive luxuries.69  
 
Spiritual needs, and mental activity, are present even at “the lowest scale” of human 
development, but “culture as such” is something distinct from mental activity in the broad 
sense. The Naturvölker share in the broad sense of culture, a universal form of culture and 
mental activity, but not in this narrow sense. The difference is the relationship of the 
Naturvölker to nature. The Naturvölker do not belong to nature, but they are closer to it. In this 
way Bastian’s theory is indeed allochronic. Yet this allochronism is not stable, but consistently 
countered by Bastian’s psychological theory, for it is the Naturvölker’s very proximity to nature 
that makes them the ideal subject for humanist knowledge; and this theory rests upon a 
premise of coevalness. 
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The above examples, which fall under what I have termed negative primitivism,  are 
intended to emphasize that Bastian’s humanism should not be confused with a facile cultural 
relativism or a pluralist conception of cultural incommensurability—a temptation to which even 
Köpping, whose elucidation of Bastian’s “psychic unity of mankind” has greatly influenced my 
own argument, succumbs, when he writes that “Bastian emphatically denies the imputation of 
the superiority of the European value system or the possibility of measuring the one against the 
other.”70 This negative primitivism, however, was combined with Bastian’s theory of 
psychological unity to produce a dynamic tension. 
Bastian’s interest in the elementary ideas was based on the premise of psychological 
unity. “The subject matter of psychology,” he writes in 1873, “lies in the ideas: it is therefore 
necessary, in order to collect the ideas in their totality, first to establish a statistics of ideas to 
show how the developmental process operates, tracing it back from the complex products to 
the rudimentary and primary ones, and secondly to study the laws, which govern thought 
processes.”71  Psychological unity didn’t apply only to Kulturvölker, but to Naturvölker as well. 
Bastian’s humanistic theory therefore brought Naturvölker and Kulturvölker, Europeans and 
non-Europeans, within the same category of thought. His approach, which he called 
“comparative-genetic” produced an ethnographic coevalness, a result of the following three 
theoretical elements: (a) His comparative approach was premised upon establishing identities 
between the thought processes and products of Naturvölker and Kulturvölker;  (b) He rejected 
the linear models of evolutionary cultural development and its implied allochronism; his genetic 
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71 Adolf Bastian, “Die Grundlage der Ethnologie in den geographischen Provinzen,” Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 5 
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theory of ideas emphasized contingency in development, which entailed that Naturvölker 
shared historical, developmental time;  and (c)The Naturvölker, although “closer to nature” 
(which is to say their character and folk ideas result primarily from geographic or environmental 
influences), are also subject to cultural influences, and must be considered therefore a part of 
cultural history. The following section takes up each of these three arguments in greater detail, 
before returning to the main argument, where I propose a reading of Bastian’s aporetic 
ethnology not as allochronic but “acronych.” 
___ 
 
To take the first of these theoretical elements, Bastian’s comparative theory required 
that the mental processes and their products be viewed on the same level, not hierarchically. 
Many nineteenth-century anthropologists adopted what would be termed a comparative 
approach, yet with different aims. The goal of Tylor’s comparative science was to assemble data 
which would reveal cultural differences, and thereby make it possible to locate the position of 
any particular human group or society on the scale of evolution. Bastian’s comparative 
approach, however, was interested in locating similarities, not differences—as is evident in his 
conception of ethnology as psychology, and his search for the common collective ideas as well 
as the universal elementary ideas underlying the different varieties of folk ideas. This is on 
display, for example, in the following discussion of Buryat shamanism in Siberia, which 
appeared in Geographische und Ethnologische Bilder (1873): 
In the whole region from the central Asian steppes to the east of Siberia, the cult of 
fire has a deeply religious significance. When kindled, it is not supposed ever to be 
quenched with water: this was considered a grave offense. The inhabitants of the Amur 
region feared to share the fire of their huts, and among the Buryat we find an old yearly 
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festival during which the sacred fire was kindled anew. In Europe the sacred fire that 
burned at Uppsala [in Sweden], as well as in every Icelandic temple, did not cease to 
burn until the conversion of Yagellow after his baptism in Wilnas in 1386. During their 
prayers, the Buryat invoke the fire, a practice followed by adherents of shamanism as 
well as of Buddhism.  
 The latter have incorporated the whole pantheon of tengri, the heaven of the 
Buryat and Mongols, into their own system. In a longer poem which the priest Orlow 
related to me, this Buryat Firdausi extols the “high-minded hero Sam who climbed the 
steep slopes of Mount Altai.” According to the Buddhist scripture Uligerun-Dalai, 
shamanism was the pre-eminent religious cult during the last five hundred pre-existing 
stages of Shigemuni (Shakyamuni). Their priests knew that written laws and treatises on 
magical practices impressed the Mongol people mightily. Since the contact with the 
Russians the Buryat call the god of thunder Provoc (“prophet”) Eliya, and they see in the 
thunderbolts the rolling of wheels of fire (as do the people of the Caucasus region). 
Between gods and men stand the mediators of god and bad demons which are 
represented by the innumerable ongon who constantly recruit new members from 
deceased shamans.72 
 
Bastian’s typical method is to report a string of cultural “facts.” Whether or not his 
observations are valid or accurate is not here the point, but rather his method. Bastian doesn’t 
try to explain these facts, let alone place these ideas in an evolutionary sequence. For him the 
import and significance of these observations is simply that they are examples of “folk ideas” 
which will eventually lead toward understanding of the elementary ideas. In the meantime, the 
reader is simply treated to what amounts to a phantasmagoria of ideas and impressions, 
stories, myths, and observations. The future ethnologist, which is to say, the reader, is intended 
to contemplate these impressions and their meaning. There are some connections to be found 
here, between meaning attributed to fire among the Buryat priests, for example, and the fires 
burning in Sweden and Iceland. Further on, Bastian recounts a myth: “A converted shaman who 
was a schoolteacher among the Buryat in Irkutsk, told me the following about the cosmogony 
of the Buryat Mongols.” The myth describes the origin of man, who was created with a pure, 
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beautiful body, though initially without a soul. When the divine creator went to heaven to fetch 
the soul, an evil spirit, jealous, spits upon the beautiful creation. The creator returns, and 
because “he did not want to leave his creation, thus sullied, in its former perfect beauty, [he] 
therefore turned the body upside-down and inside out. Although he let the soul now enter the 
body, the seed for disease and death was sown, and man remained spoiled since then.”  
Although Bastian does not say so directly, the point is to consider how this story of “the 
creation of man” compares with other creation stories. Sometimes he encourages the reader 
more explicitly: “I also collected from this shaman a story which has uncanny parallels to the 
Scandinavian pair of children, Bil and Hinki, and to the German thief of fire-wood.” The reader, 
therefore, should be looking for “connections,” but not in the logical patterns as outline by Lévi-
Strauss. Bastian is content to merely suggest “uncanny parallels.” 
This quote leads to the second theoretical element, that Bastian’s genetic theory of 
ideas emphasized contingency in development, which meant that even the Naturvölker 
participated in historical, developmental time. This contrast can best be made by returning to 
Fabian, who argues that allochronism marks not only evolutionism, but the twentieth-century 
school of anthropology known as structuralism, as found in work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Fabian 
writes: “Rather than walling-in the Time of others so that it cannot spill over into ours [as in 
cultural relativism], this school simply preempts the question of coevalness. Its strategy is to 
eliminate Time as significant dimension of either cultural integration or ethnography.”73 
Bastian’s thought seems to closely resemble Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism, as Köpping has 
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argued.74 Whereas Bastian sought elementary ideas, Lévi-Strauss sought to identify elementary 
structures of thought, which formed a system of binaries. Fabian argues that Lévi-Strauss 
practiced the most devious form of allochronism, and thus it must be considered whether his 
critique applies to Bastian as well.  
 Fabian argues that Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism is based upon the linguistic principles of 
Ferdinand de Saussure, the distinction of diachrony and synchrony.  Lévi-Strauss’s argument 
contrasts diachrony and synchrony, connecting history with the former, and ethnology with the 
latter. Fabian argues that this is a disingenuous contrast: “Ever since Saussure canonized the 
opposition between synchrony and diachrony it [has] served, not as a distinction of temporal 
relations (as one might expect from the presence of the component chrony in both terms), but 
as a distinction against Time.”75  That is, they both bracket Time, to take as their focus a set of 
purely logical relationships, whether distributed vertically or horizontally. But though diachrony 
may imply sequence, it does not entail Time. As Fabian writes,  
Time . . . is a mere prerequisite of sign systems; its real existence, if any, must be sought 
where Lévi-Strauss likes to locate the “real”: in the neural organization of the human 
brain being part of nature. Structuralism thus . . . naturalizes Time by removing it from 
the sphere of conscious cultural production. Lévi-Strauss . . . maintains that forms of 
thought reflect natural laws. Consequently it is futile to use our (cultural) conceptions of 
temporal relation for the purpose of explaining relationships between things.76 
  
 Lévi-Strauss writes that while the historical approach seeks “to make out contingent 
links and the traces of a diachronic evolution,” the structuralist discovers “a system that is 
synchronically intelligible. . . . In doing this we have merely put into practice a lesson by 
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Ferdinand de Saussure . . .  As one considers the subject matter of linguistics more deeply one 
gets more and more convinced . . . of a truth which gives us much to think, namely that the link 
one establishes between things pre-exists . . . the things themselves and serves to determine 
them.”77 Fabian concludes, “If the proper subject matter of anthropology is the study of 
relationships between cultural isolates, and if these relationships rest on principles or laws that 
pre-exist their actualization in ‘contingent’ history, then Time is effectively removed from 
anthropological consideration.”78  
Here the contrast with Bastian becomes apparent. Bastian does not view the 
elementary ideas as something that “pre-exist” their actualization in “contingent” history—they 
exist only in that actualization. As Köpping notes, he defines the Elementargedanken as 
“thought-seeds” or logoi spermatikoi—a Greek term, originally appearing in ancient Stoic 
philosophy, suggesting that ideas existed in a state of potential.79 Bastian writes: “By patient 
collecting of the facts of man as the ‘logical animal,’ we are rediscovering those initial idea-
complexes, those thought-seeds or logoi spermatikoi which encapsulate the inherent  potential 
for the growth of man’s mind.”80 According to Orlando O. Espín and James B. Nickoloff, the 
concept of logoi spermatikoi “was first used by the Stoic philosophers to explain how the Logos 
(God) was active in individual things. . . The idea was picked up by Plotinus to explain how the 
transcendent, unchanging God could possibly be connected to a changing universe.” 81 
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 The elementary ideas, therefore, cannot be observed in “pure form,” but only insofar as 
they have been actualized and manifested in the folk ideas. Bastian writes: “Only when the 
elementary ideas of the savage tribe come into contact with outside stimuli do they develop 
their inherent potential through a growth process in historical forms of cultural 
development.”82  This contact of the elementary ideas with outside stimuli—either the natural 
environment or other human populations—is what produces the folk ideas.  
 Bastian’s theoretical approach, as noted earlier, can be best understood in the context 
of nineteenth-century monism, an orientation which he shared. Monism, broadly speaking, is a 
philosophical belief that everything belongs to a single, organic whole. Traditionally associated 
with Spinoza’s rejection of Descartes’ mind-body dualism, in the late nineteenth century it 
came to be associated with Haeckel, who would form the German Monist League in 1906. 
Despite Bastian’s disagreements with Haeckel about evolution, he shared the general outlook, 
which was quite popular at the time.83  As early as 1860, in his second publication, Der Mensch 
in der Geschichte, Bastian wrote, “Properly speaking, the mind and the body are one, and 
together make the man. This unity of mind and matter, created anew each moment, is the 
essence of the nature of man.”84 This unity of mind and matter necessarily shaped his theory of 
ideas.  “The introduction of the concept of elementary ideas unites both the physical and the 
psychic realm,” he wrote in a later volume. “If we are considering elementary ideas in relation 
to geographical provinces, we would say that they grow from the environmental conditions as a 
kind of crystallization of them. If we look at elementary ideas in relation to the laws of cultural 
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evolution they then become the individual cells or atoms which evolve, according to organic 
laws of growth, into different streams of ideas.”85 
Finally, Bastian’s genetic theory of ideas is equally informed by the idea of entelechy, an 
Aristotelian concept intended to address the problem of causality, in which the development of 
any particular organism is said to result from both an inner and an outer cause. As Köpping 
explains, “The inner cause, the final end, contains the potential which is set in motion by the 
outer or sufficient cause.”86 Bastian explained in a 1900 publication:  
Because Plato’s soul, as “self-moving principle of all movement” had flown to the “world 
beyond the arc of heaven”—to a metacosmic location (topos, see Philo)—,  had flown, 
that is, to the “chorismos,” dualism was to be the next suggestion, that dualism which 
was to reach its most harsh expression in the separation of the “extended” and 
“thinking” substance (of matter and spirit) in the modern and fashionable expression, 
while the monistic unity was preserved in the psychic “entelechy” of Aristotle (for the 
“influxus physicus”), that monistic unity which has since then found its scientific 
foundation in modern psycho-physics.87 
  
 Fabian had argued that with Lévi-Strauss, “The possibility of identifying and analyzing 
semiological systems is unequivocally said to rest on the elimination of Time and, by 
implication, of such notions as process, genesis, emergence, production, and other concepts 
bound up with ‘history.’ Diachrony does not refer to a temporal mode of existence but to the 
mere succession of semiological systems one upon another.” As a result, “Time is removed 
from the realms of cultural praxis and given its place in that of pure logical forms.” 88 But by 
now it should be clear that Bastian doesn’t make this move. The obvious difference is that he is 
not after semiological systems; despite his interest in philology, he is of course pre-Saussure 
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and before philosophy’s linguistic turn. More importantly, the elementary ideas are only 
understandable insofar as they are expressed in the folk ideas. The folk ideas are inherently 
shaped by all of the notions which Lévi-Strauss dismisses: process, genesis, emergence, 
production. Bastian’s genetic theory of ideas, with its emphasis on “contingency,” not only 
distances him from the evolutionists, with their notion of an inherent and hereditary law of 
cultural development, but also from Lévi-Strauss, with his naturalized and predetermined 
“structures of mind.” Bastian’s genetic theory brings psychology into history, and brings the 
Naturvölker into historical, developmental time—and thus cannot be classed as allochronic. 
This brings us to the third theoretical element, which is primarily a clarification: 
although Bastian’s theory emphasizes the contingency of ideas, there remains a further 
dilemma, in that Bastian distinguishes two ways in which the elementary ideas may be 
actualized—through contact with the natural environment and through encounters with other 
human populations. Bastian writes in an essay of 1877: “The geographical province imprints its 
character on the Naturstamme (natural tribe), while the Culturvolk, on the other hand, lives in 
the sphere of its historical horizon.”89  This seems to have hoisted the boundary back in place—
to confine the Naturvölker to the realm of “nature” by saying that their folk ideas are only a 
response to the natural environment, whereas civilized societies respond to historical 
encounters.  
This interpretation is belied by a more thorough survey of his writings. In that same 
essay, he goes on to explain that although his terminology regarding this distinction has 
changed over time, “With ethnology, it must be admitted that the interpenetration of 
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geography and history is stressed; regarding this, above all, Ritter’s great oeuvre shall be of 
much importance for cultural history.” He adds that "Ethnology is less of a zoological science of 
Man, than that history on a geographical basis, as envisaged by K. Ritter in his work, and it will 
have included the people in all their colors, shimmering over the earth's surface.”90 Karl Ritter, 
who held the first chair in geography at the University of Berlin from 1825 until 1859 (and was 
one of the teachers of Heinrich Barth, whose ethnographic writings will be examined in the next 
chapter), focused on the effects of geography on human history. That Bastian is eager to 
consider Ritter’s work a major contribution to culture history makes clear that the “natural” 
peoples’ responses to geography or the environment cannot simply be grouped under nature, 
but are indeed a manifestation of culture. Bastian writes: “This aspect of the intimate 
interaction of geography and history, and the implementation thereof in ethnology, has for me 
always been so decisive, that I have touched upon it in one way or another in almost all of my 
work, as often as it related to the geographical or ethnological field.”91 He then produces a 
series of selections of his own writings, attesting to a view in which the natural people no less 
than the cultural people are shaped by both environmental and historical/cultural factors. The 
Kulturvölker were subject to natural, environmental influences, though they were harder to 
discern beneath the historical elements; likewise, although Naturvölker were closer to nature, 
they were also subject to contingent, historical, cultural influences.  
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Bastian’s Acronych Ethnology 
 
Bastian’s thought is characterized by its remarkable ambivalence. On the one hand, 
Bastian rejected cultural evolutionism (and its allochronic orientation). He nevertheless 
employed the common Naturvölker / Kulturvölker terminology, which can also be understood 
as a mode of allochronic discourse, as Zimmerman has argued, insofar as it erects a temporal 
gap between cultural, historical people and natura, ahistorical people. However, the 
allochronism of this primitivist discourse was undermined by Bastian’s own unique theoretical 
contribution, which was a mode of psychological humanism. His interest in “primitive” 
subjectivity (the connection between the Völkergedanken and Elementargedanken) made it 
impossible for him to deny the presence of “culture” in the broad sense (as opposed to “high 
culture”). At the same time, it undermined the alleged boundary of rationality as well, since the 
thoughts of both primitive and civilized were essentially the same.  
Indeed this complexity has led to the contrary interpretations mentioned above, where 
on the one hand Bastian is made out to be a universalist or relativist, and on the other, an 
antihumanist specializing in crafting hierarchical boundaries. Clearly the answer must be to 
acknowledge that his work swings, erratically albeit seamlessly, between these poles. One 
could say that whereas Fabian diagnoses the schizogenia of anthropology as a whole (the 
contradiction between the intersubjectivity of ethnographic practice with the denial of 
coevalness in ethnographic writing), with Bastian, the writing itself is schizogenic.  
Despite Bastian’s distinction between Naturvölker and Kulturvölker, a distinction 
between higher and lower, simpler and more complex forms of culture (thus marked by a 
292 
 
certain allochronism), the hierarchy of cultures is consistently countered by the unity and 
identity employed through the psychological basis of the theory.  In the evolutionary 
framework, the “primitive” society is at one end of the line, and civilization on the other; they 
are inherently distanced in Time. Bastian’s psychological framework places the primitive not 
“behind” temporally, but “within,” psychologically.  Bastian’s use of the Naturvölker/ 
Kulturvölker terminology indeed works to avoid the allochronic implications of the evolutionary 
term “primitive,” while at the same time making possible the tension between identification 
and difference. 
In an 1869 essay in praise of Alexander von Humboldt, Bastian observes:  
In the diaphanous and simple forms of social life among savages without culture we can 
find the red thread which can become the methodological tool for unraveling the more 
complex civilizations. The basis of this assumption was acknowledged by Humboldt: 
human nature is uniform all over the globe. This point is driven home by him not only in 
his scientific writings but also in his emotional plea against forms of slavery in Venezuela 
and Cuba.92 
  
This quote captures well Bastian’s contradictions. He makes a clear distinction between 
the “savages without culture” and the “more complex civilizations.” Yet he affirms that beneath 
the veneer of civilization, “human nature is uniform all over the globe.” Bastian’s use of the 
“red thread” metaphor in this context is significant. The two categories that are here 
connected, the “savages without culture” and “complex civilizations,” are connected regardless 
of time or place, despite the appearance of distance in developmental time or geographic 
space. Bastian’s ethnology therefore does not align with the nineteenth-century trends of 
evolutionist allochronism or antihumanism. 
                                                     




 Moreover, this dynamic contrast was not only a matter of his theory, but was manifest 
in the style of his writing as well. Bastian’s theory of ideas led him to focus on form and 
structural similarity across time and location. From his earliest writings, his method is to 
chaotically juxtapose examples from Naturvölker with Kulturvölker. In his later writings, this 
practice became so pronounced that it made his colleagues dizzy. Karl von den Steinen, a 
younger colleague, lamented:  
The countless parentheses made for a labyrinthine construction rather than for clear 
divisions. The reader was beset by names, key words, jargon, sentences of such a kind 
that he was overcome by vertigo. On the one hand, the Greek-Roman, medieval, 
Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, Mexican philosophies of religion as well as the mythology of 
the natural peoples, whether Negro or Eskimo, American Indian or Polynesian or 
Siberian; on the other hand citations, oblique references to the entire historical, 
sociological, natural scientific world literature. This flood of thoughts waltzed through 
hundreds of pages, branching out without order.93 
 
As an example of what von Steinen is referring to, Zimmerman quotes a typical passage from 
one of Bastian’s later works:  
In the sign language (of the American Indians) the mime speaks (in “mimetic dance”) as 
a translator (in the time of Nero), and as the King of Dahomey receives his guests 
dancing, the art of dancing was so highly regarded in Thessalonia that the leading men 
in the state and the champions in battle were even called head dancers (see Lucian) = 
Meoh in Indonesia.94  
  
It is perhaps no surprise that Robert Lowie, in his 1937 history of ethnology, exclaimed: “To 
confront Bastian in some of his lucubrations is a never-to-be-forgotten experience.”95 Bastian’s 
contemporary Ernst Haeckel mocked him with the title of “Geheimer Oberkonfusionsrat.” 
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Bastian’s style was clearly disconcerting. Yet I argue for a reevaluation of the significance of 
Bastian’s style in terms of aesthetics; the form was after all inseparable from the content. 
Critics such as Zimmerman, Penny, and Klaus Peter Buchheit have commented on Bastian’s 
writing, but to different ends. Zimmerman, for example, writes:  
In a single sentence Bastian juxtaposes languages, continents, and historical epochs. He 
obscures and subverts the basic subject-verb structure that makes ordinary sentences 
essentially narrative and seeks instead a new language commensurate with 
anthropological counterhumanism. His writing was a modernist experiment in the 
nonnarrative modes of perception wrought by anthropologists.96 
 
These observations highlight this fascinating feature of Bastian’s writing—the remarkable ease 
of juxtaposition across time and place. Yet Zimmerman’s assertion that Bastian’s main goal was 
to bolster anthropological counterhumanism misses the radicality of Bastian’s thinking. For it is 
not merely juxtaposition at work, but an emphasis upon connections and linkages (=). Thus not 
only Bastian’s theory but his textual practices had the startling effect of placing savage and 
civilized, Naturvölker and Kulturvölker, in the same time; the use of time as distancing device 
that Fabian finds to pervade anthropological writing is not to be found.  
As Zimmerman asserts, Bastian’s paratactic writing challenges the narrative logic of 
humanism. Also important however is that the textual subject-object dichotomy breaks down; 
the privileged allochronic standpoint of the ethnographic authorial subject is submerged in the 
flow of ideas and images. Temporal boundaries dissolve as it becomes increasingly difficult to 
locate what is self and what is other. 97 His writing thus works against the allochronism that 
Fabian identifies in anthropological writing.  
                                                     
96 Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism, 56. 
97 Klaus Peter Buchheit has written on the disintegrated Ich in Bastian’s philosophical ethnology. See Buchheit, Die 
Verkettung der Dinge: Stil und Diagnose im Schreiben Adolf Bastians (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005). 
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 The vertiginous quality of Bastian’s writing was not simply that it was hard to follow; his 
style of thought was bound up with his ethnological theory, which unraveled comfortable 
boundaries. Bastian’s theory and writing, examined aesthetically, constitute an aporetic 
primitivism—a challenge to the allochronism which supports the subject identity of modernity. 
This isn’t to say there are no distancing devices, as noted above. Time, however, is not the tool. 
In this sense, Bastian’s thought could almost be described as achronic, were that a word.  Yet 
Bastian’s thought isn’t marked by Timelessness (which, according to Fabian, characterized the 
more devious allochronism of structuralism as well as cultural relativism). Rather than achronic, 
one might substitute acronych—an astronomical term which refers to a celestial rising in the 
evening, of a star for example, while the sun is setting. This term is apt, for Bastian’s theory, 
which differentiates while it conflates, is, if anything, dialectical. The image conveys Bastian’s 
idiosyncratic contradictions, his theory of self and other which share the same time and space, 
at one minute coeval, the next minute not. With his search for the core of humanity in the 
universal elementary ideas, to which both Naturvölker and Kulturvölker were simultaneously 
connected and distanced, Bastian unfolded a mode of primitivism that finds a star appearing 
when the sun is setting, which is to say, in the darkness of time, in the allochronic discourse of 
primitivism, he locates the elusive self. 
 
Conclusion: Bastian’s Aporetic Primitivism 
 
Bastian’s ethnology, due to its psychological, humanist conception as well as an 
increasingly paratactic mode of expression, constitutes a rejection of the allochronism of 
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cultural evolutionism. Bastian thereby undermines the invocation of Time and Rationality as 
boundaries for establishing the subject position of the European self in opposition to the 
primitive. While employing the culturally pervasive hierarchical distinction of imperialist 
thought, between the civilized and primitive, the Kulturvölker and the Naturvölker, Bastian also 
puts both categories in connection, sharing the same time, and sharing the same mental 
framework. In doing so, he deconstructs the primitivist assertion of opposition between them. 
This helps explain why Bastian’s thought roams so wildly between here and there, near 
and far, past and present. The effect of such writing, both theoretically and aesthetically, from 
our analytic perspective and also in the eyes of his contemporaries, was a form of interpretive 
vertigo. What I have termed Bastian’s acronych ethnology proves to be a form of aporetic 
primitivism. This must be seen as an accompanying factor, not only in explaining the failure of 
subsequent attempts to appreciate and make sense of Bastian’s thought, but also in the 
explanation of why Bastian’s ethnology was supplanted at century’s end by new models that 
sought to reinscribe hierarchical boundaries through ideologies of race, nation, and scientific 
authority. It is not sufficient to say that the growing racism, nationalism, and scientism of the 
late nineteenth century transformed ethnology (as Penny, Zimmerman, and others have 
argued), but rather that some currents of ethnology, through problematizing cultural 
difference, influenced these very developments. 
The discipline of nineteenth-century ethnology, as has been argued in a growing body of 
scholarly research, produced a vision of modern civilization in opposition to the primitive. The 
following chapter will explore how ethnology, which established itself as the authority over this 
discourse, influenced the subsequent attempts of twentieth-century artists and social theorists 
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to articulate their experience of this modern subjectivity. The legacy of German ethnology in 
this history is ambivalent, however. One of the ways in which various cultures at various times 
have historically produced subjectivity is by defining a relationship to Time. These relationships 
can take various forms: by focusing on beginnings, such as genesis stories and foundational 
moments; by focusing on movement through time—in which past, present, and future are 
conceived in spatial terms; by focusing on power, the ability to shape time; and by focusing on 
the relationship to non-Time—to a supernatural or spiritual world, which is outside of Time.98 
Classical cultural evolutionism is ostensibly a theory of subject position based on beginnings, 
linking modern civilization to its distant origins in primitive life. Yet due to the inherent 
allochronism in evolutionist ethnology, as diagnosed by Fabian, this purported “connection” is 
forever postponed, delayed, and unfulfilled. As a result of this denial of coevalness, a 
dichotomy is produced. The image of modernity that emerges in ethnology is founded on a 
belief in civilization, progress, rationality, and autonomy, in opposition to a primitive “other” 
lacking these traits; at the same time, the primitive is thereby ascribed to the realm of nature, 
community, body, and naïve or supernatural mentality.  
Social theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth century, insofar as they sought to 
describe modernity, engaged with this conception of the modern subject, whether explicitly, as 
in the classical sociology of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, or implicitly, in the critical theory of 
the Frankfurt School. The dichotomy produced by the allochronic construction of the modern 
subject is visible in social theory in the form of modernity’s alienation from nature, community,  
                                                     
98 For this conceptual framework I am indebted to the recent exhibition at the University of Michigan Museum of 
Art, “African Art and the Shape of Time,” curated by Prita Meier and Raymond Silverman. See Prita Meier and 
Raymond Silverman, African Art and the Shape of Time (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Museum of Art, 2012). 
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the body, and meaning (the rift between signifier and signified). Moreover, as civilization begins 
to take on the appearance of an “iron cage,” authentic autonomy begins to appear over the 
horizon, or in the distant past, in the primitive’s freedom from societal constraints. The various 
strands of contemporary “post-” theories (poststructuralism, postcolonialism, post-
foundationalist philosophy, and most recently the posthuman or new materialist turn) have in 
common the aim to overcome these seemingly unbridgeable dualities.  
Bastian’s ethnology, in refusing the cultural evolutionary perspective, is therefore of 
historical importance, for offering an example of thinking against the allochronic construction 
of the modern subject, and hence providing avenues toward unthinking “modernity” and its 
correlated self-definition as a time marked by the achievement of reason and historical 
progress, divorced from nature and “mere” existence. The history of ethnology’s subsequent 
“forgetting” of Bastian is equally noteworthy; the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
ideological boundaries of race, nation, and science that were deployed to reify modern 
subjectivities must be seen in the context of the vertiginous encounter with the ambiguities of 
cultural difference. These discursive attempts to assert fixed hierarchies were not aimed at 
preserving allochronism, but emerged as replacements for it. At those junctures where the 
discourse of allochronism breaks down, then, racism, nationalism, and the cultural sciences 
sometimes stepped into the breach, providing alternative means to serve the same ends; they 
aimed at a reformulated denial of coevalness, and hence recapitulated the subject position of 












Refraiming Primitivism and German Expressionism, 1905-1913: 




There was never any more inception than there is now, 
Nor any more youth or age than there is now, 
And will never be any more perfection than there is now, 
Nor any more heaven or hell than there is now. 
Urge and urge and urge, 
Always the procreant urge of the world. 
Out of the dimness opposite equals advance, always 
     substance and increase, always sex, 
Always a knit of identity, always distinction, always a breed 
     of life. 
 
—Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself,” from Leaves of Grass, 18551 
 
 
I know of no “new art program.” I have moreover absolutely no 
idea what it could be. If one could speak of such a thing as an “art 
program,” then in my opinion it would be as old as the hills and 
eternally the same. 
 






In February of 1905, Adolf Bastian died in Port of Spain, Trinidad. His idiosyncratic 
approach to ethnology passed away along with him, having been officially eclipsed in 1904 by 
                                                     
1 Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass: Comprehensive Reader’s Edition, ed. Harold W. Blodgett and Sculley Bradley 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1965), 30-31. From “Song of Myself,” Section 3. 
2 Karl Schmidt-Rottluff, “Das neue Programm,” Kunst und Künstler, XII, Heft 6 (1914): 308. 
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the ascendance of diffusionist theory, and new attempts to theorize racial and cultural 
differences. In June of of that year, however, a group of young artists joined together in 
Dresden, calling themselves the Brücke—the artists had no direct connection with Bastian, but 
their art bears a striking similarity to Bastian’s ethnology. The Brücke, like Bastian, made use of 
a primitivist discourse, but did so in a way that undermined the discourse and its oppositions 
between primitive and civilized. If Bastian’s discourse worked to unravel the imaginary 
boundaries of time and history, culture and nature, the Brücke’s images of the primitive did so 
as well; moreover, their work questioned the notions of authenticity and alienation, the terms 
in which the primitive other was imagined in opposition to modernity. 
The Brücke originated as the alliance of four young architecture students in Dresden—
Ernst Ludwig Kirchner (1880–1938), Fritz Bleyl (1880–1966), Erich Heckel (1883–1970) and Karl 
Schmidt-Rottluff (1884–1976). They initially called themselves the Künstlergruppe “Brücke” 
(Artists’ group “Bridge”), though they soon dropped the Künstlergruppe. The Brücke represents 
the first collective of German visual artists known as expressionists, although the term 
Expressionism is used to designate an aesthetic trend that encompasses literature, poetry, 
music and film. The Brücke were also the first group of visual artists in Germany to express a 
heightened aesthetic interest in the life and art of the Naturvölker (natural people) or the 
Wilden (savages or natives). 
Critical discussion of the Brücke has routinely characterized their work as a type of 
romantic primitivism, an idealization of the “primitive” other as authentic and unalienated, in 
opposition to an alienated modernity. This poses two distinct yet related questions, the 
significance of the Brücke’s primitivism, and their understanding of modernity. This 
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interpretation of the Brücke has been too willing to identify Brücke’s aesthetic aims (the desire 
to produce an authentic art) as a critique of modernity—a misleading yet entrenched 
misperception. Historians have consistently interpreted the Brücke as shaped by contemporary 
critiques of modernity, whether those from the left (such as that of Georg Simmel) or the right 
(such as Julius Langbehn). Scholars have also interpeted their work through the lens of early 
critics who wrote about the expressionists, above all Wilhelm Worringer and Wilhelm 
Hausenstein, both of whom emerged as early spokespersons for the new art of Expressionism, 
yet subsequently came to view it as a failure. These critics initially shared a belief that 
Expressionism espoused a revolutionary utopianism or messianism; however, since European 
culture and society not only failed to be transformed, and in fact seemed to have deteriorated 
in the wake of World War I, these critics turned against Expressionism, convinced that the 
dream must have been fatally flawed. These critics however projected their own fears and 
desires onto the artists that fascinated them, but as a result, this “critical illusion,” to borrow 
Charles Haxthausen’s term, has had a major impact on the interpretation of German 
Expressionism.3 From these first attempts at theorizing Expressionism, interpretations have 
inevitably cast it as caught up on a dramatic pendulum veering between utopia and despair. 
The following argument endeavors to chip away at this illusory account. The concepts of 
utopia and despair are only applicable if the Brücke shared a fundamentally critical 
interpretation of modernity, as something that either must be overcome, or to which one was 
condemned. This was not in fact the outlook of the Brücke. Part of the problem has been that 
                                                     
3 Charles W. Haxthausen, “A Critical Illusion: ‘Expressionism’ in the Writings of Wilhelm Hausenstein,” in The 
Ideological Crisis of Expressionism: The Literary and Artistic German War Colony in Belgium, 1914-1918, ed. Rainer 
Rumold and O.K. Werkmeister (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1990), 169-191. 
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this interpretation finds support in the espoused positions of the Blaue Reiter (Blue Rider), a 
group of contemporary expressionist artists who formed in Munich in 1911, led by Franz Marc 
and Wassily Kandinsky. Marc and Kandinsky both articulated clear and strident critiques of 
contemporary society as a moment of historical and spiritual crisis. There is however a lack of 
programmatic writings by the members of the Brücke regarding their aims in developing a 
primitivist aesthetic. Although they could be critical of bourgeois values or the urban 
environment, their critiques were not posed as stark rejections of modernity or as narratives of 
historical crisis.  
There is thus a tendency to read backwards, as it were, from the Blaue Reiter to the 
Brücke, to let the vocal aims of the former stand in for the more ambiguous aims of the latter. 
Whereas the Blaue Reiter largely embraced a messianic or utopian critique of modernity, it is a 
mistake to assume they spoke for the Brücke as well. To make this argument, I offer an 
alternative cultural context for interpreting the Brücke, emphasizing their roots in Jugendstil (in 
particular the influence of Hermann Obrist) and other late-nineteenth century cultural sources 
(including the writings of Walt Whitman)—sources which, while they could be critical of 
contemporary art and society, did not embrace the assumptions made by the critique of 
modernity cited above—namely, the radical oppositions between authenticity and alienation, 
nature and society, primitive and modern. The Brücke emerged from a context in which the 
merger of art and life was not a utopian dream, but a recognition of present experience, an 
embrace of the now.4  
                                                     
4 This notion of “embracing the now” may sound utopian, but this reading depends upon the perspective I seek 
here to critique. As an ethos, “embracing the now” can only seem utopian from a perspective in which modernity 
(in particular, one of modernity’s features, namely civilization, rationality, secularism, capitalism, etc.) somehow 
303 
 
The point of this critique is to show that the primitivism of the Brücke was not an 
expression of the romantic belief in an authentic or unalienated primitive, in opposition to 
modernity. I shall thus argue that rather than a critique of modernity’s ailments, the work of 
the Brücke deploys a type of primitivism that calls into question the opposition of primitive and 
modern—it is in this sense an example of aporetic primitivism. Although they emerged from 
ubiquitous romantic primitivist discourse, in which the “primitive” commonly signified 
“authenticity” and “unalienated” existence, their own work, through such techniques as 
parataxis and a modernist self-reflexivity regarding medium and representation, in fact 
dismantled such significations.  
This argument is divided across two chapters. In this chapter I re-evaluate the Brücke’s 
relationship to primitivism and modernity. To excavate the Brücke’s positions I examine their 
available programmatic writings and delve into the interpretation of numerous images, in order 
to demonstrate that their work should not be seen as participating in the contemporary 
critique of modernity. I emphasize their connections to Jugendstil and Walt Whitman in order 
to reveal the vital materialism expressed in their images. The chapter explores the history of 
the Brücke’s founding, their interest in non-European objects, their visits to museums and 
suburban lakes, their move from Dresden to Berlin. This account attempts to bring together a 
narrative of the group’s historical development with a theoretical reexamination of the ways in 
which their works have been interpreted.  While their aesthetics emerged from the context of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
prevents such an embrace from taking place. For the Brücke, this was not a utopian project to be achieved against, 
or in spite of, modernity, but was simply a way of experiencing, participating in, and depicting life in the moment, 
something that they saw their aesthetic work achieving. As an example of this kind of resistance to utopian 
thinking, see also the epigraph from Walt Whitman that opens this chapter. I will develop the connection between 
Whitman and the Brücke later in this chapter. 
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naïve primitivism, regarding ideas of “authenticity” and “immediacy,” from very early on their 
images and artworks began to undermine the stability of such signifiers.  
The Brücke’s work therefore stands in marked contrast to the aethetic theory of 
Worringer and the art of the Blaue Reiter. The latter were equally drawn to primitivist images, 
yet their aesthetics, driven by a transcendentalist motivation, departs from the Brücke’s 
embrace of the present. The Blaue Reiter’s aesthetics thus turns away from the disruptive 
aporias found in the Brücke’s work, enacting instead a reification of the distinction between the 
primitive and the civilized; it thus constitutes what I have called apotropaic primitivism, in that 
it serves to perpetuate the subject position of modernity. Whereas theories of Expressionism as 
a critique of modernity may accurately describe the Blaue Reiter (with the notable exception of 
Macke and perhaps Klee), they fail to account for the uniqueness of the Brücke’s work. 
In chapter six, I examine the specific features that constitute the Brücke’s aporetic 
primitivism, in conjunction with the German Expressionist poet Georg Heym and the writings of 
Friedrich Nietzsche. Through a combination of formalist qualities—a parataxis of contrasts and 
a self-reflexive modernist attention to demonstrating the constructedness of representation, 
the art of the Brücke produced an aporetic primitivism—a bridge, yet not from an alienated 
modernity to a regenerated utopia; it was rather an aesthetic technique which produced an 
interpretive impasse. 
 
Interest in the Brücke has grown considerably in the last decade. With the opening of 
the Neue Galerie in Manhattan in 2001, German and Austrian Expressionism achieved, in the 
words of Neil H. Donahue, “a permanent, centrally located showcase for German painting,” 
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serving as “a visible landmark in the steady incorporation of German Expressionism into 
American culture.”5 The year 2003 witnessed the first non-commercial public exhibition in 
Great Britain devoted exclusively to Kirchner’s work.6 In 2005 numerous major exhibitions were 
staged, including Brücke und Berlin: 100 Jahre Expressionismus at the Neue Nationalgalerie, 
Berlin, and the touring exhibition Brücke: Die Geburt des deutschen Expressionism.7 More 
recently, in 2009 the Neue Galerie hosted a retrospective, Brücke: The Birth of Expressionism in 
Dresden and Berlin, 1905-1913, marking the first major exhibition in the United States devoted 
to the Brücke.8  
This blossoming of curatorial activity and critical scholarship has in part been due to the 
inevitable opportunity presented by the centenary of the Brücke’s founding, enabling Brücke 
enthusiasts to seize the current of contemporary interest. The centenary also offers an 
important opportunity for a new perspective on the Brücke’s aesthetic achievements. By 
making the case for the Brücke’s primitivism as a mode of aporetics, I draw upon recent new 
materialist theory, and also hope to present the Brücke’s aesthetics as a contribution to the 
new materialist project. These instances of aporetic primitivism in the art of the Brücke, I argue,  
can be seen as networked to the contemporary theoretical efforts of new materialists and 
others to rethink and dismantle the distinctions between modern and primitive, nature and 
                                                     
5 Neil H. Donahue, ed., A Companion to the Literature of German Expressionism (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 
2005), 1. 
6 Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years, Royal Academy of Arts, London. Curated by Jill Lloyd , 
Magalena M. Moeller, Andrew Robison, and Norman Rosenthal. For the catalogue, see Jill Lloyd and Magalena M. 
Moeller, eds., Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years (London: Royal Academy of the Arts, 2003). 
7 Anita Beloubek-Hammer, Magdalena M. Moeller and Dieter Scholz, eds., Brücke und Berlin: 100 Jahre 
Expressionismus (Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2005); Magdalena M. Moeller and Javier Arnaldo, eds., 
Brücke: Die Geburt des deutschen Expressionismus (Munich: Hirmer Verlag, 2005). 




society, human and non-human.9 The historical relevance of this is that, even before the 
appearance of what Matt Biro has called the “Dada Cyborg,” the artists of the Brücke were 
preparing the way for post-human and new materialist critiques.10  
 
 
Part 1.  German Expressionism and the Concept of the Aporetic 
 
In a 2003 publication marking the first exhibition in Great Britain devoted to Ernst 
Ludwig Kirchner, Norman Rosenthal observed, “Of all the vital movements in the visual arts that 
flourished in the first decade of the twentieth century, Expressionism is still the least 
understood and appreciated, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world on both sides of the 
Atlantic, where the move towards abstraction has consistently held the forefront of the 
modernist debate.”11 Those aspects of German Expressionism which played a role in the 
development of abstraction, in particular the work of Wassily Kandinsky (cofounder the Blaue 
Reiter), have garnered greater critical attention than the more “figurative” wing of the 
movement, which would include Kirchner and other members of the Brücke, the artists’ group 
to which Kirchner belonged. 
                                                     
9 The body of new materialist scholarship is growing. Some representative works include Donna J. Haraway, 
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991); Bruno Latour, We Have 
Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); Bruno Latour, 
Inquiry into Modes of Existence, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013); Diana 
Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2010). 
10 Matthew Biro has recently argued that the Berlin Dadaists can be understood as developing an iconogaphy of 
the cyborg that in some ways prefigured contemporary post-human critiques, such as that of Donna Haraway. See 
Matthew Biro, The Dada Cyborg: Visions of the New Human in Weimar Berlin (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009). 
11 Norman Rosenthal, “Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Expressionist,” in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, 1880-1938, eds. Jill Lloyd et 
al. (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 2003), 9. 
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Part of the difficulty in adequately interpreting Expressionism is attributable to the 
sheer diversity of the work; unlike Futurism, Dadaism, and other avant-garde movements, it is 
more difficult to discern unifying traits or a shared vision. Expressionism was a name coined by 
critics in an attempt to make sense of clear changes in style and content that began taking 
place, primarily in Germany (but not only there), in the years leading up to World War I. It was a 
name that, unlike Impressionism or Cubism, was not widely adopted by its early practitioners. 
As Charles W. Haxthausen has argued, “to be faithful to its original usage, it is best to regard 
‘expressionism’ not as the name of a coherent art movement, nor as a consistent aesthetic 
theory, let alone as an identifiable style, but above all as  a theory of the avant-garde.”12 
Haxthausen draws attention the important German art critic Wilhelm Hausenstein, one of the 
early defenders of the German avant-garde, who had argued that, in many ways, the idea of 
Expressionism as a cohesive movement “was an illusion generated by dialectical thinking, a 
phantom defined only by a dialectical construction of antitheses to impressionism.”13 
Hausenstein, originally a fervent champion of Expressionism as the precursor of a new utopian 
culture, subsequently turned against the movement, disparaging it as a symptom of the 
disintegration of culture itself. As Haxthausen explains, “Impressionism had been a precise 
concept with precise objectives; the term signified a concrete, specific relation to the world.” 
Expressionism on the other hand, according to Hausenstein: 
hardly knows how much it knows of God and of things. It is a convulsion that comes just 
as close to the all as to the void. Thus the diversity of the attempt; the elusiveness of the 
                                                     
12 Charles W. Haxthausen, “A Critical Illusion: ‘Expressionism’ in the Writings of Wilhelm Hausenstein,” in The 
Ideological Crisis of Expressionism: The Literary and Artistic German War Colony in Belgium, 1914-1918, ed. Rainer 
Rumold and O.K. Werkmeister (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1990), 172. 
13 Haxthausen, “A Critical Illusion,” 185. 
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concept; the immeasurable span between Picasso and Nolde, Kandinsky and Rousseau, 
Klee and Meidner, Seewald and Kokoschka. The common denominator vanishes.14 
 
Haxthausen’s astute identification of Expressionism as a particular theory of the avant-
garde, emerging in the work of such critics as Hausenstein and the popular art theorist Wilhelm 
Worringer, will be examined in greater detail below, where I shall argue that this particular 
theory of Expressionism as a critique of modernity, veering between utopian hope and despair, 
between longing for a spiritually renewed culture and a subsequent disillusionment, has 
exerted an unacknowledged yet profound influence even on contemporary accounts. In 
addition, I shall return to Hausenstein’s own vivid image of Expressionism as “convulsion”; for 
the moment, it will suffice to observe that, on the issue of delimiting Expressionism, 
Haxthausen espouses agreement with the art historian Donald Gordon, who once concluded 
that “there is a . . . question as to whether the ‘movement’ itself can be considered as historical 
fact.”15 Gordon, however, subsequently reversed his view, and theoretical objections such as 
Haxthausen’s notwithstanding, the label has stuck. This is not to discount the productive 
attempts to bolster the critical utility of the term through theoretical distinctions. Starr Figura, 
for example, has suggested in a recent important volume that the following can be posited as 
common denominators: “Directness, frankness, and a desire to startle the viewer characterize 
Expressionism in its various branches and permutations.”16  
Leaving aside the matter of precise definitions, there is the matter of appreciation, and 
this has largely been determined by the fact that subsequent historical developments cast a 
                                                     
14 Wilhelm Hausenstein, “Die Kunst in diesem Augenblick,” Der neue Merker 3, Sonderheft “Werden,” undated 
(late 1919), 120, translated by Haxthausen, “A Critical Illusion,” 184.  
15 Donald E. Gordon, “On the Origin of the Word ‘Expressionism’,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 
29 (1966): 377, quoted in Haxthausen, “A Critical Illusion,” 172. 
16 Starr Figura, ed., German Expressionism: The Graphic Impulse (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2011), 10. 
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deep shadow on Expressionism, which came to be seen as a highly questionable movement, 
both aesthetically and politically. Aesthetically, Expressionism was characterized by an interest 
in “traditional” forms, such as the woodcut and conventional printmaking. This provides a 
marked contrast, as other avant-garde artists, especially Dada, moved onto such new 
techniques as photomontage and photolithography. Indeed, from the perspective of 
subsequent developments, more skeptical and cynical, Expressionism seemed to cling to an 
outdated belief in the place of art in society, an uncritical faith in its ability to effect change. As 
Figura writes, by the mid-1920s, “the nostalgic, Germanic, and handmade were rejected in 
favor of the international, future-looking, and machine-made.”17 
Although the politics of individual expressionists varied considerably, the Brücke has 
generally been seen as ambiguous, suspiciously so. It hasn’t helped matters that for some of 
the early expressionists, strong associations with developing a “German” identity have led 
critics to tie it to nationalist and conservative tendencies, in contrast to more international 
outlook of other avant-garde movements. While it is true that before World War I the group 
was not notably politically active, afterwards several members took more explicit positions. 
One can point to the socialist leanings of Max Pechstein, who helped found the 
Novembergruppe (November Group) in 1918, a collection of revolutionary-minded artists and 
architects. Karl Schmidt-Rottluff helped establish the Arbeitsrat für Kunst (Work Council for 
Art), which sought radical social change, in particular regarding the public role of art. Erich 
Heckel and Emil Nolde also belonged to the Arbeitsrat—and yet, in a sign of the indeterminacy 
and instability of political ascriptions during the interwar period, Nolde would in 1935 become a 
                                                     
17 Figura, German Expressionism, 33. 
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member of the National Socialist Worker’s Party (NSDAP). Nolde’s turn to fascism was not 
unique; some of the most well-known literary expressionists, such as the poet Gottfried Benn 
and the art critic and writer Carl Einstein, became Nazis; the ease with which expressionist 
ideals seemed to coalesce with Nazi ideals has been among the leading reasons for lingering 
suspicion, a critical stance voiced most memorably by Georg Lukács, a point to which we will 
return. Though it should be noted that in the long run the National Socialists themselves 
unintentionally helped to turn the critical tide as a result of their condemnation of the majority 
of expressionist artists in the notorious Entartete Kunst (Degenerate Art) exhibition, which was 
staged first in Munich in 1937 and subsequently toured through Germany. 
 Perhaps most problematic for the critical reception of German Expressionism and the 
Brücke has been the issue of cultural politics—and in particular, the primitivism which pervades 
a great deal of their art. Beginning with the Brücke, many expressionist artists took an avid 
interest in the life and art of so-called “primitives”—a designation primarily referring to the 
certain people from regions of Africa, Oceania, and the Americas. There are and can be no 
acceptable (which is to say, not ideologically loaded) replacements for the word “primitive,” 
because it designates an entity which does not exist except from the perspective of a particular 
subject position, that of the equally constructed “Europe,” “West,” or “modernity”; suffice to 
say that the primary signification of the term “primitive,” for those who used it, was the alleged 
lack of “civilization.” 18   
                                                     
18 To add to the confusion, the notion of the “primitive” was in flux at the turn of the century. In modern art there 
had developed a general interest in “exotic” art, most prominent in the the Japonisme of the impressionists. 
Japanese woodblock prints in particular exerted a storng influence on the development of Art Nouveau across 
Europe. In the early years of the twentieth century “exotic” art would have included not only Asian art, but  
Islamic, Egyptian, pre-Coluimbian, and ancient Iberian art. (See Rhodes, Primitivism and Modern Art, 114ff, and 
Rubin, "Primitivism" in 20th Century Art, 2-3.)  We can see this fluidity reflected in some of die Brücke’s early 
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The concept of the “primitive” or “savage” (most commonly die Primitiven, Wilden, or 
Naturvölker in German) had solidified during the nineteenth-century in the discipline of 
anthropology as a scientific category, the object of anthropological study; the “primitive” 
designated the “other” of European or Western civilization, defined by rationality, technology, 
and historical progress. Around the turn of the century, many avant-garde artists reversed this 
value judgment, and the “primitive” became something positive, a source of inspiration. 
However, postcolonial studies and the critique of modernism that developed in the wake of the 
1984 MoMA exhibition “Primitivism in 20th Century Art,” have together revealed the 
problematic aspects of this artistic primitivism, which although rejecting the anthropological, 
imperialist, or evolutionary view, nevertheless perpetuated traditional hierarchies of power and 
knowledge. Thus, for many critics, whatever aesthetic achievements the German expressionists 
had made, these were tainted with the movement’s complicity with imperialism and racism.19 
At the heart of these debates is the meaning that the “primitive” held for the artists of 
German Expressionism. In the following I will seek to dislodge a ubiquitous interpretation about 
                                                                                                                                                                           
experiments with other “exotic” subjects, such as Kirchner’s Japanisches Theater (1909) or Russische Tänzerinnen 
mit Turban (1910). Yet these forays are outnumbered by the majority of die Brücke’s “primitivist” works which 
take an interest more particularly in the art and people of Africa and Oceania. It is worth noting that, during this 
period, to take the English example, such tems as exotic, primitive, and savage were often used interchangeably, 
yet in the first decades of the century the notion of primitive crystallized around a conception of uncivilized and 
“tribal,” and thus did not apply to other “civilizations,” no matter how exotic, whether contemporary or ancient. In 
German the situation is similar, with artists and critics using such terms as die Primitiven, die Wilden, die exotischen 
Völker, occasionally Naturvölker and Urzeit. In German, significantly, we also find more frequent use of such terms 
as Urmenschen and ursprünglich (for example in the writing of Friedrich Nietzsche or Hermann Obrist); although 
Urmenschen would translate as prehistorical man, ursprünglich generally means “original” or “primal”; together 
these terms are sometimes used to suggest primordiality, often as an explicit rejection of primitiv with its 
evolutionary connotations which would draw firm boundaries between between “evolved” and “primitive” people, 
in contrast to the more universalist implications of “primordial” humanity. On Nietzsche’s use of ursprünglich see 
David Pan, Primitive Renaissance: Rethinking German Expressionism (Lincoln and Nebraska: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2001), 32ff.   
19 William Rubin, ed., "Primitivism" in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern, 2 Vols. (New York: 
Museum of Modern Art, 1984); for a review of the controversy surrounding the exhibition and selected excerpts 
from the critical discussion, see Jack Flam with Miriam Deutch, eds., Primitivism and Twentieth-Century Art: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003), 313-413. 
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the significance of primitivism for German Expressionism, focusing in particular on the visual art 
of the Brücke (often in comparison with that of the Blaue Reiter).20 The prevailing critical view 
interprets this primitivism as a romantic view of the “primitive,” a reversal of anthropological 
primitivism; in this view, primitivist expressionists admired above all the “authenticity” and 
“naturalness” of the “primitive,” in contrast to the “alienation” of modernity. It participated, in 
other words, in a set of cultural discourses that can be called the critique of modernity. This 
claim will form a primary target of my critique. I shall argue, rather, that this view fails to 
distinguish between romantic primitivism and what I have termed aporetic primitivism. 
Although this prevailing interpretation emphasizes the difference between anthropological and 
romantic primitivism, it neglects that both modes preserve a categorical, hierarchical 
opposition between the primitive and the modern. I argue that some types of primitivism, 
rather than simply accepting the ontology of this framework (e.g. critiquing the alienation of 
modernity by celebrating primitive authenticity), in fact call the opposition into question; they 
are in this sense aporetic. 
According to the scholarly consensus on German Expressionism, these artists had not 
one but two ambitious goals: to overthrow the tenets of classical aesthetics, and to critique 
modern society; the “primitive” seemed to offer the perfect weapon. I shall attempt to prise 
apart these two claims. While the artists sought to initiate a new aesthetics, the goal was not to 
critique modern society. Accordingly, their use of the figure of the “primitive” in their work 
requires a reconsideration.  
                                                     
20 German Expressionism encompasses not only visual media but literature, theater, film and aesthetic theory; 
some of what I have to say will apply to these other media as well, but in what follows I restrict myself to 
Expressionism in the visual arts. 
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The consensus view holds that, for most of these artists, the “primitive” seemed to 
embody something that had been lost to modern civilization, caught up in the harsh, 
mechanical grip of capitalism, industrialism, urbanization, and rationalism. The artists are seen 
as responding, above all, to the fragmentation and alienation of modernity.  It is, according to 
this view, in the context of modernity’s dehumanizing forces and artificiality, that the artists 
looked to the art and objects from “primitive” societies. Such accounts are ubiquitous in the 
literature on Expressionism. Rose-Carol Washton Long, for example,  writes: “From the very 
beginning, artists associated with Expressionism attacked not only the conventions of art but 
also the conventions of a society they found materialistic and dehumanizing.”21 She goes on to 
explain that “The rapid industrialization of Germany at the end of the nineteenth century set up 
conditions that paved the way for art movements that questioned authority,” leading to an 
interest in anarchism, socialism, and theosophy. It is important to note that Washton Long here 
joins together an attack on artistic conventions with a critique of modern society. While the 
former is indisputable, the latter claim, I will show, is questionable, and in fact, unjustified. 
While it is quite clear that the expressionists advocated a new aesthetics, we must distinguish 
between this aesthetic interest and the critique of modernity—the view of modern, industrial 
society as materialist and dehumanizing—with which the aesthetic goal is uniformly conjoined 
in critical scholarship. 
This critical apparatus has overwhelmingly situated German Expressionism in the 
context of sociologist Georg Simmel’s critique of modern life, art historian Wilhelm Worringer’s 
defense of visual abstraction, and Julius Langbehn’s strident denunciation of liberalism, 
                                                     
21 Rose-Carol Washton Long, ed., German Expressionism: Documents from the End of the Wilhelmine Empire to the 
Rise of National Socialism (New York: G.K. Hall & Company, 1993), xxi. 
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materialism, and mass culture. The effect has been to pose expressionist art as emerging from 
an intense longing for “renewal” and “spiritual rebirth,” brought about through the stresses of 
modernity. The interest in the “primitive,” in this interpretation, is thus seen as a figure for such 
renewal. Starr Figura expresses this view in the introduction to German Expressionism: The 
Graphic Impulse, where she writes: 
Heeding a Nietzschean call for a transformation of values, many artists shared a hope 
for renewal and believed that the arts would play a central role. Their goal was to upend 
social norms, and, through an acute attention to thoughts, feelings, and energies that 
had long been repressed, to achieve a heightened understanding or awareness of what 
it was to be human. In their efforts to tap into “vital forces” or “inner feelings,” many 
Expressionists shared an interest in art of non-European or “primitive” cultures, which 
they felt offered a more immediate and authentic mode of expression, in contrast to 
centuries of academic refinement in its various branches and permutations.22 
 
While this narrative may adequately account for a selection of the art of German 
Expressionism (especially that of the Blaue Reiter), it is not an adequate characterization of the 
work produced by the Brücke. Although I would not deny that the Brücke artists participated in 
this romantic primitivist discourse, in which the “primitive” was coded as authentic, natural, 
and unalienated, it is nevertheless incorrect to say that their work was simply an expression of 
this set of ideas. Although it emerged from the discourse of romantic primitivism, this was 
paired with a counter-discourse, one which called into question this naïve understanding of the 
primitive. In these works, romantic primitivism itself become caricature; in this sense it 
becomes rather a self-reflexive primitivism. Through an aesthetics of parataxis, the hierarchical 
and oppositional relationship of primitive and civilized, and the categories they are intended to 
represent, are undermined. 
                                                     
22 Starr Figura, “German Expressionism: The Graphic Impulse,” in German Expressionism: The Graphic Impulse, ed. 
Starr Figura (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2011), 10. 
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I shall therefore seek to make a distinction between modes of primitivism which view 
the primitive as desirable—that is, which envy “primitive” life for its supposed naturalness, 
freedom, community, for its incarnation of an unalienated, authentic existence—and modes of 
primitivism which emerge from the encounter with the “primitive” with questions—primitivism 
which asks, what is natural? what is freedom? What is authentic existence? Put simply, the 
distinction I want to make is between modes of primitivism which preserve these distinctions, 
and those which cultivate aporia. 
The notions of aporetic primitivism and naïve primitivism are not intended as blanket 
categories, but rather currents or qualities which are present to varying degrees in different art 
works, different artists, at different times, sometimes greater than others. I shall argue that this 
mode of aporetic primitivism is most evident in the works of original Brücke members, 
Kirchner, Schmidt-Rottluff, and Heckel, yet this is not to say that there work didn’t at times 
reveal a more commonplace naïve primitivism.  Moreover, with later Brücke members Max 
Pechstein and Emil Nolde, their primitivism already begins to reveal a resurgence of a reified 
primitive-civilized binary, although not necessarily in the romantic mode; with Otto Mueller the 
romantic primitivist tendency predominates. Finally, the artists of the Blaue Reiter (with August 
Macke and Paul Klee being important exceptions) do not follow the aporetic aesthetics of the 
Brücke; Franz Marc and Wassily Kandinsky, voicing specifically spiritual aims, embraced 
revolutionary-tinged anti-modernity critique, and their primitivism serves to reify the 
distinction between the primitive and the modern.   
The significance of aporetic primitivism is not merely that it questions such ideas as 
natural and authentic, but that it does so in the context of a discourse that has historically 
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defined modernity. In other words, it calls into question a prominent conception of modernity. 
Thus, while most scholars have argued that the Brücke, and German Expressionism in general, 
made use of primitivism as part of a critique of modernity—a vivid expression of, and reaction 
to, alienation and fragmentation—I argue that their aporetic primitivism in fact called this 




This aporetic primitivism is apparent in the work of the Brücke.  The jarring polarities of 
the Brücke, both aesthetically and ideologically, have long been noted by critics, and have been 
the subject of evocative interpretations. These contradictions have most commonly been 
explained by identifying thematic similarities or through narratives of chronological artistic 
development. Thus for example, much is made of the difference between the works produced 
in Dresden, where they originally came together in 1905, and the works made after the group 
moved to Berlin, in 1911. The Dresden period is identified by the group’s initial forays into 
“primitive” themes and styles, especially evidenced in a series of bather scenes, depicting their 
summer sojourns to the Moritzburg lakes, beginning in the summer of 1909. Here, at this 
popular spot for nude bathing in a wooded locale outside of Dresden, the artists, their models, 
lovers, and friends would draw and sketch each other while cavorting in nature. Interpretations 
routinely emphasize the way in which the scenes show humans and nature existing in an ideal 
harmony (see fig. 5.1.). Heller writes: 
The Brücke’s impulse to follow the “primitive” precedent of Naturvölker, the 
harmonious engagement, or even fusion, of men, women, and children with the 
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elements of nature—trees and meadows, ponds and marshes—is manifested in their 
scenes of bathers, in which human figures often take on the color of their surroundings 
and blend into them.23 
 
After the group moved to Berlin, the idealized nature scenes gave way to more complex 
images of the agitations and anxieties of city life in the metropolis. The primitivism of the 
Dresden period is seen as exhibiting a “back to nature” ethos, in Lloyd’s phrase, or an “escape 
to nature,” as Rhodes terms it. This is then replaced by darker, more aggressive and edgy 
depictions of city life after the move to Berlin. Lloyd articulates this prevalent “Dresden to 
Berlin” narrative in a recent essay, speaking of Kirchner:  
During his greatest years in Dresden and Berlin, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner’s art was 
characterized by dramatic contrasts and polarities. Images of the city, such as Kirchner’s 
colouful cabaret and circus scenes or his threatening paintings of the urban crowd, 
alternate with images set in an ideal natural world. Liberated from the urban throng, the 
men and women in Kirchner’s bather paintings frolic beneath the trees, swim naked in 
the sea, play with bows and arrows or make love in the open air, cut loose from the 
constraints and taboos of civilisation.24 
 
Such interpretations of the Brücke, however, clearly fall within the rubric of romantic 
positivism, in which the primitive is said to represents a nostalgic longing for harmony with 
nature, an aversion to the complexities of modernity. The contrasts between the earlier and 
later period are merely resolved through positing a shared thematic unity, a primitivist 
response to the modernity.   
Most interpretations of the Brücke embrace this standard approach. In her earlier work, 
however, Lloyd had offered a more nuanced interpretation. In German Expressionism: 
                                                     
23 Reinhold Heller, “Brücke in Dresden and Berlin, 1905-1913,” in Brücke: the Birth of Expressionism in Dresden and 
Berlin, 1905-1913, ed. Reinhold Heller, on behalf of the Neue Galerie New York (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2009), 31. 
24 Jill Lloyd, “Kirchner’s Metaphysical Studio Paintings,” in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years, eds. 
Jill Lloyd and Magalena M. Moeller (London: Royal Academy of the Arts, 2003), 15. 
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Primitivism and Modernity, she sought to critique the claim that the Brücke embodied a 
romantic primitivism: 
All previous histories of primitivism have rightly located its beginnings in Romanticism; 
but conventional interpretations of the primitivist impulse in European culture as an 
imaginative alternative to the changes underway in the modern world fail to take on 
board the complex, dualistic character of modernity itself. Far from presenting simply 
imaginative counter-images, primitivism provided modern artists, as I hope to show, 
with a means of negotiating the internal paradox of modernity, of spanning between its 
positive and negative, its forward- and backward- looking tendencies.25 
 
Lloyd’s argument in German Expressionism, the most thorough study to date of the Brücke’s 
interest in primitivism, comes closest to articulating the complex relationship between 
modernity and primitivism in the work of the Brücke. However, she continues to frame the 
primitivism of the Brücke as a naïve primitivism, in that “modernity” itself remains an 
unquestioned reality rather than an interpretation which is interrogated. 
Lloyd’s argument here assumes the familiar trope of the “primitive within”—a 
theoretical approach which, on the surface, seems to suggest that the aesthetics in question 
undermine difference; in fact, however, the notion of the “primitive within” preserves the 
polarity of the opposition. This comes across clearly in Lloyd’s discussion of Kirchner’s famous 
Berlin street scenes, a series of extraordinary paintings made between 1913 and 1915, which 
many consider to be his most important artistic achievement (figs. 5.2–5.5). Large, striking 
works, the paintings are noted for their strong contrasting colors, intense angularity, and 
elongated human forms.  According to Lloyd, 
The real friction and energy of the paintings comes from their combination of rational 
compositional geometry and powerful gestural brushwork, from their exaggerated 
colours set against sombre surrounds. In this way Kirchner conveys both the regulation 
                                                     
25 Lloyd, German Expressionism, vii. 
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and the potential wildness of the city crowd, which Simmel described as a complex 
organism threatening to erupt into chaos if not controlled and disciplined by the 
impersonal rationality of urban lifestyle, with its punctuality, exactitude, and “fixed non-
subjective framework of time.”26 
 
Thus for Lloyd the sense of an urban enchantment is apparently undermined by the threatening 
perception of a teeming chaos. The street scenes are also notable for their depiction of 
prostitutes, a familiar feature of Berlin city life.  Lloyd argues that Kirchner’s metropolitan 
women “are caricatures of artificiality, genuine manikins based partly on the iconography of 
contemporary fashion plates,” referencing their seeming allusion to an image from the 
contemporary fashion magazine, Damenmode (fig. 5.6). But, Lloyd explains, “a tribal rawness 
replaces the elegant mannerism of Kirchner’s source, and the women, although constructed 
from artifice, are also the focus of powerful ‘uncivilized’ instincts of sexuality and aggression 
with the mask-like faces, ‘tribal’ costumes and spiky primitivist forms.”27 
Thus for Lloyd, Kirchner’s Berlin street scenes evoke the urban “alienation” identified by 
Simmel, while they also discern a “primitive” energy whirling beneath the surface. This 
“primitive” energy is figured as a latent force, a repressed “primitive” vitality; whereas in the 
bather scenes, the “primitive” represented a rejuvenating force, something that needed to be 
released in order to renew society and achieve a merger of art and life, here it represents a 
threatening force, which must be controlled and contained. Lloyd associates their Berlin street 
scenes with the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud, who had “begun to make connections 
between the neuroses of modern man and his ‘primitive’ roots.”28 She also connects them with 
the works with Gustav le Bon’s La Psychologie des Foules (1895; translated as The Crowd: A 
                                                     
26 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 153. 
27 Ibid., 150.  
28 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 150. 
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Study of the Popular Mind), which “spoke of the loss of individuality in modern industrial 
society, maintaining that this wore away the behavioral characteristics of civilization to reveal 
savage and primitive instincts.”29 
 The “primitive within” interpretation, however, although at first seeming to suggest an 
undermining of difference, fails to perceive the ways in which the Brücke’s primitivism 
dismantles the polarities between primitive and civilized.  According to the notion of the 
repressed “primitive,” as adopted by Lloyd and others, modernity is defined by its rationalism 
and regularity, its attempt to control the forces “beneath the surface.” Although at first Lloyd 
attempts to invoke a parallel to  Simmel as a way of separating the Brücke from the 
“disenchantment” narrative and the Romantic anti-capitalist critique of modernity, her 
interpretation nevertheless sees the art of the Brücke as responding to  the problems of 
modernity. For Lloyd, the Brücke is still bound up in a naïve primitivism. Both the backward- 
and forward-looking elements, in other words, are ultimately romanticist, primitivist 
viewpoints, united in their rejection of modernity. 
Thus, whereas Lloyd sees the Brücke artists as engaging with the contradictions of 
modernity, I argue that their aesthetics actually worked to prise apart this definition of 
modernity, to unravel the tightly woven narrative linking capitalism and urbanization, 
rationalism and positivism, to the experiences of alienation and liberation. They should not be 
situated as sharing Simmel’s or le Bon’s critique, but as producing works which question the 
assumptions upon which Simmel’s critique is based. It is a subtle distinction, yet a significant 




one. Their work was about calling this very prevalent worldview into question. It wasn’t simply 
naïve primitivism, but an aporetic primitivism. 
 
Part 2.  Re-evaluating Origins, Aims, and Influences 
 
The Brücke brought together four young men who shared a devotion to renewing 
German art, based on an ethos of artistic “honesty” and a commitment to exploring new ideas 
and new ways of living; they aspired, foremost, to a merger of art and life. When they first 
organized themselves as the Künstlergruppe “Brücke,” Ernst Ludwig Kirchner was 25 years old, 
the son of a chemical engineer from Aschaffenburg.30 Kirchner had grown up in Chemnitz, 
Saxony (since the age of 10), after which he entered the Technische Hochschule (Technical 
College) in Dresden in 1901, to study architecture. It was there that he first met Bleyl, a young 
man from Zwickau. Both Bleyl and Kirchner had taken to architecture in order to appease their 
parents; both dreamed of becoming artists. As Bleyl later recalled their first meeting, in 
Kirchner’s studio, which had been converted from a former butcher’s shop:  
I met a well-built, upright young man full of self-confidence and the most extreme 
passions, who had a wonderfully carefree nature and a capacity for infectious, guileless 
laughter, and who was possessed with a furry for drawing, for painting, for exploring, 
and grappling with artistic things and concepts. His “pad” was that of a real bohemian, 
full of brightly colored paintings lying all over the place, drawings, books, painting and 
drawing materials—more like a painter’s romantic lodgings than the home of a well-
organized architecture student.31 
                                                     
30 The following biographical material is drawn primarily from Heller, Brücke: the Birth of Expressionism in Dresden 
and Berlin; Figura, German Expressionism: The Graphic Impulse; and Lloyd and Moeller, eds., Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: 
The Dresden and Berlin Years; and Donald E. Gordon, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: A Retrospective Exhibition (Boston: 
Museum of Fine Arts, 1968). 
31  “Aus den ‘Erinnerungen’ von Fritz Bleyl,” in Hans Wentzel, ed. Bildnisse der Brücke-Künstler voneinander 
(Stuttgart, 1961), 23, quoted in Nicole Brandmüller, “The Early Years,” in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: Retrospective, ed. 




In 1903-04, Kirchner spent two semesters studying architecture at the Technical University in 
Munich. While there, he also took courses in life drawing and composition at the  where he 
attended Lehr- und Versuchs-Atelier für angewandte und freie Kunst), founded by Wilhelm von 
Debschitz and the Jugendstil architect and designer Hermann Obrist. (Kirchner would later state 
that his stint at the Technical University was in fact merely a pretext to enable him to join 
Obrist’s school.32) In 1904, back in Dresden, Kirchner and Bleyl made their first summer visit to 
the Moritzburg lakes.  At the University, they soon met and befriended fellow student Erich 
Heckel, the son of a railroad construction engineer from Döbeln, near Chemnitz. Heckel, an 
ardent admirer of Friedrich Nietzsche and Fyodor Dostoevsky, joined the others in their 
drawing and painting sessions. In 1905 Heckel introduced them to a friend, Karl Schmidt (who 
would later append Rottluff, his birthplace, to his name). It was Schmidt-Rottluff who would 
suggest the name “Brücke,” and on June 7, the four friends officially marked the creation of 
their new artists’ group by penning the name, in Jugendstil-inspired lettering, upon a modest 
sheet of stationary (fig. 5.7). 
Bleyl did not remain long with the group, however. In 1906 he began offering courses at 
the architectural school in Freiberg, in Saxony, and in 1909 he resigned from the group 
completely to focus on teaching, also eventually working for various architecture firms. 
Meanwhile, Kirchner emerged as the leader of the group, on account of his strong personality 
and intense ambition. Heckel served as its business manager. The group decided they would 
only exhibit as a collective; Heckel later recalled that part of the reason was to increase their 
                                                     
32 E.L. Kirchner to Botho Graef, September 21, 1916, in Lothar Grisebach, ed., Von Munch bis Kirchner: Erlebte 
Kunstgeschichte in Briefen aus dem Nachlaß von Eberhard Grisebach (Munich, 1968), 49ff, cited in Brandmüller, 
“The Early Years,” 55. 
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profile: “Every individual among us would have had a much harder time being exhibited than 
several of us together . . . because no individual had enough pictures to fill a room . . . [and 
because] art dealers in general hesitated to exhibit unknown artists.”33 Heckel’s pragmatic 
reasoning was only half the story; the group also embraced the idea of working as a collective 
for ideological reasons, which were particularly important to Kirchner. 
The group began to make overtures to other artists whose work they admired. Having 
seen an exhibition of Emil Nolde at the Galerie Arnold in Dresden, the group invited him to join 
in 1906. Nolde, then 37, was from the village of Nolde, near Tondern, in the Danish-German 
border region of North Schleswig. Born Hans Emil Hansen, the son of a farmer, Nolde had 
trained as a woodcarver and designer before studying painting; he changed his name to Nolde 
in 1902. He showed the group new etching techniques, and introduced them to the art critic 
Gustav Schiefler and the collector Karl Ernst Osthaus. Seeking greater independence, Nolde left 
the group a little over a year later, although he remained on good terms with its members. 
In 1906, Heckel had met (Hermann) Max Pechstein, from Eckersbach, the son of a 
glazier. Pechstein had completed an apprenticeship as a scenic painter and joined Dresden’s 
Kunstgewerbeschule (School of Applied Arts) in 1900, and entered the Dresden Hochschule für 
bildende Künste (College of Visual Arts) in 1902. A student at Dresden’s Sächsischen Akademie 
der Künst, Pechstein was the most artistically trained member of the group, receiving in 1905 
the Saxon State Prize, also known as the “Rome Prize,” a fellowship which provided funds for 
study in Italy.   
                                                     
33 Erich Heckel, in conversation with Roman Norbert Ketterer, 1958, in Roman Norbert Ketterer, Dialoge, Bildende 
Kunst, Kunsthandel, vol. 1 (Stuttgart and Zurich: Belser, 1988), 42, quoted in Figura, Graphic Impulse, 11. 
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Pechstein joined the group in May 1906, followed later that year by Cuno Amiet (1868-
1961), an older Swiss painter. In that year the group introduced “passive membership,” issuing 
membership cards and a printed portfolio of the group’s work in exchange for a membership 
fee. (The passive members grew quickly; by 1910, there were 80.)34 The group published seven 
portfolios between 1906 and 1912.  
Pechstein moved to Berlin in 1908, where he worked to establish contacts for the group; 
he joined the Berlin Secession in 1909. Kirchner began to visit Pechstein in Berlin, sharing his 
studio there. In the summer Kirchner returned to Moritzburg with Heckel and Pechstein, as well 
as his new partner, and model, Doris Grosse (1884-1936), a milliner from Dresden also known 
as “Dodo.”  
In 1910, Pechstein, Nolde and other Brücke members were denied participation in the 
Berlin Secession’s spring exhibition, leading them to resign from the Berlin Secession and form 
the Neue Secession in order to exhibit their rejected works. Pechstein assumed leadership of 
the new affiliation. Kirchner and Heckel meanwhile began spending more time in Berlin with 
Pechstein. In the summer the group returned to the Moritzburg lakes, along with two of their 
models, the girls Fränzi and Marzella, the daughters of a Dresden artist’s widow (some scholars 
now speculate that these were in fact nicknames for the same girl).35 In September 1910, the 
largest Brücke exhibition to date opened in Dresden at the Arnold Gallery. Otto Mueller (1874-
1930) was invited to exhibit as a guest in 1910 (Mueller was born in Liebau, Silesia, in what is 
now the Czech-Polish border region.) Mueller’s work focused above all on the female nude in 
nature, often bathing scenes. 
                                                     
34 Heller, “Brücke in Dresden and Berlin,” 13. 
35 Lloyd and Moeller, eds. Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, 217. 
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In the summer of 1911, Heckel, Kirchner and Pechstein returned to the Moritzburg 
lakes. In the fall, Kirchner moved to Berlin, and the other Brücke members soon followed. In 
Berlin Kirchner met Erna Schilling, who would become his model and lifetime companion. In 
December, Pechstein and Kirchner founded MUIM (Modernern Unterricht in Malerie) in Berlin-
Wilmersdorf, but due to lack of students, they closed the school in September 1912.  
The year brought further difficulties, as Pechstein was expelled from the group in May 
for agreeing to exhibit his work independently at the summer exhibition of the Berlin Secession 
(thus breaking the Brücke’s policy of exhibiting only as a group).  The move to Berlin, whether 
or not the primary cause, seems to have coincided with increased diversification among the 
group members, which were in turn exacerbated by a complicated relationship with the Berlin 
Secession, as well as Galerie Der Sturm, which had closer ties to the Blaue Reiter. By 1913, 
tensions surfaced regarding Kirchner’s history of the group, Chronik der KG Brücke, with the 
other members strongly objecting to Kirchner’s self-centered version of events. In May 1913, 
the group officially disbanded, announcing the dissolution on a card distributed to passive 
members, signed by Amiet, Heckel, Mueller, and Schmidt-Rottluff. (Kirchner was not among the 
signees.) 
  The Brücke was the first collective of German visual artists to be labeled expressionists 
(although the term Expressionismus, in its earliest recorded usage, in 1911, referred not to 
German but French art, primarily those artists who would become known as Fauves or 
Cubists).36 The Brücke is now recognized as part of the first wave of German Expressionism, yet 
                                                     
36 The term appeared in the catalog of the 1911 Exhibition of the Berliner Secession, to designate French art that 
had diverged from Impressionism. The familiar use of the term suggests however that it had previously been in 
circulation.  By the end of 1911 it was being used to refer to international, although especially German, artists. It 
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in important ways, the aesthetics they pioneered was uniquely their own. There is a marked 
tendency in writing on Expressionism to interpret the Brücke through the lens of their 
successors in Munich, the Blaue Reiter. Despite important and undeniable similarities, not least 
of which is a shared enthusiasm for “primitive” art, I will argue that crucial distinctions can be 
made between them.  
Colin Rhodes, for example, in Primitivism and Modern Art, writes that Franz Marc “set 
the tone for the Primitivism of the first half of the twentieth century” when the artist declared:   
We are standing today at the turning point of two long epochs, similar to the state of 
the world fifteen hundred years ago, when there was also a transitional period without 
art and religion . . . The first works of a new era are tremendously difficult to define. . . . 
[But] they are the first signs of the coming new epoch – they are the signal fires for the 
pathfinders.37 
 
Rhodes goes on to explain, “It is no coincidence that an interest in alternative traditions and 
cultures often went hand in hand with artists’ Messianic desire to deliver a new beginning to a 
Europe they perceived as old and spent.” 
Yet, in the years before the Blaue Reiter formed, before this particular “tone” had been 
set, a different mode of primitivism was at work. This mode of primitivism, although it 
participated in the discourse of romantic primitivism, adopted a radically different approach to 
the present. The members of the Brücke sought a revolutionary aesthetics, one that challenged 
Impressionism as well as the classical tradition of realism or illusionism as the ideal mode of 
representation. Yet in spite of their faith in the relevance of art, and the desire to merge art and 
life, their aims were not messianic, in the sense of a spiritually-motivated rejection of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
was not until Paul Fechter’s book Der Expressionismus (1914) that the term became clearly associated with 
German art, namely the Brücke and the Blaue Reiter. See Thomas Anz and Michael Stark, eds., Expressionismus: 
Manifeste und Dokumente zur deutschen Literatur, 1910-1920 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1982), 14-17. 
37 Rhodes, Primitivism and Modern Art, 21. 
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contemporary society; nor was their interest in “primitive” art an expression of the popular 
critique of modernity, whether voiced by leftist critics such as Georg Simmel or conservatives 
such as Julius Langbehn (to name the two prominent figures with whose cultural politics the 
Brücke is most commonly associated). Instead of a rejection of the present, their work reveals 
an openness to possibilities of experience in the present, an attitude shaped above all by their 
Jugendstil roots, as well as their reading of the poet Walt Whitman (1819–1892). As Kirchner 
later wrote to world-renowned art dealer Curt Valentin, “I wanted to express the richness and 
joy of living, to paint humanity at work and at play in its reactions and interreactions and to 
express love as well as hatred.”38  
This openness to experience was combined, however, with several aesthetic features in 
which the discourse of romantic primitivism—a discourse which positions the “primitive” as a 
mode of authentic or immediate being in contrast to an alienated modernity—was dismantled. 
The discourse of primitivism, as part of a critique of modernity, insists upon the separation of 
human and nature, rationality and instinct, artifice and authenticity. Yet the Brücke aesthetics 
often worked to undermine these oppositions. Rather than participating in the critique of 
modernity, their work questions this particular narrative of modernity. To make this argument, 
it shall be necessary to reexamine the significance of the primitive for the Brücke (the focus of 
Part 3), as well as to examine their relationship to the various contemporary critiques of 
modernity (Parts 4–6).  
 
                                                     
38 Ernst Ludwig Kirchner to Curt Valentin, “Letter of April 17, 1937,” in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: April 16 – May 10, 
1952, ed. Curt Valentin Gallery (New York: Curt Valentin Gallery, 1952), unpaginated. 
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Part 3.  Brücke and Primitivism 
 
 In the literature on the Brücke, their fascination with the primitive is interpreted as a 
romantization, a simple inversion of nineteenth-century anthropological ideas about the 
Naturvölker (natural people) or the Wilden (savages or natives). Jill Lloyd argues, for example, 
that in their work, the primitive is imagined as “authentic” and “immediate”—a symbol of 
unalienated existence, in opposition to modernity, marked by artificiality, mechanization, 
rationalization, and urbanization.39 Similarly, Reinhold Heller writes: “the Brücke members had 
a naïve, idealistic perception of a utopian, ‘primitive’ life in which modernity’s central conflict—
humanity, industry, and civilization versus nature—did not exist.”40 Reinhold Heller, noting that 
the Brücke’s interest in “primitive” art informed their expressive scenes of bathing outdoors in 
natural settings, argues, “As women and men in these images cavort, dance, and bathe 
unclothed in verdant landscapes, they represent an idyllic natural life of primeval innocence 
and joy without shame, repression, or material need, in direct accord with the imagined life of 
Oceanic or African natives.” 
Although the Brücke members no doubt shared in this popular discourse of primitivism, 
the way in which this discourse became articulated in their aesthetics is another matter. It will 
thus be useful to briefly trace the history of their encounter with the “primitive,” in order to 
render an alternative hypothesis regarding its significance in their artistic creations. 
  
                                                     
39 Lloyd, German Expressionism. 
40 Heller, “Brücke in Dresden and Berlin,” 27. 
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i. Brücke and Primitivist Discourse 
 
In the Chronicle of the KG Brücke (fig. 5.8), Kirchner writes that in Dresden, he 
“continued to advance his compact compositions; he discovered a parallel to his own work in 
the ethnographic museum, in Negro sculpture and in carved beams from the South Seas.”41 
Kirchner’s recollections are notoriously untrustworthy, especially regarding dates; yet in this 
instance—and leaving aside for the moment his designation of the non-European artwork as 
“parallel” rather than an “influence”—his account is generally accepted. It is impossible to 
determine an exact chronological account of the Brücke’s developing interest in the “primitive.”  
Nevertheless identifiable references to non-European art first begin to appear in postcards, 
drawings, and Brücke studio decorations from around 1909, during the group’s Dresden period.  
It is the interest particularly in non-European art and aesthetics, and not simply in non-
Europeans, that makes the primitivism of the Brücke historically significant. The interest in 
“exotic” non-Europeans and “primitives” had been a common part of German and European 
culture. The Brücke were most certainly aware of, and influenced by, the popular discourse of 
primitivism, prior to their conscious inclusion of “primitive” or “exotic” non-Europeans in their 
work. In the memoirs of Fritz Schumacher, Kirchner’s instructor in Dresden, Schumacher recalls 
an incident that suggests Kirchner was already inspired by the “primitive” before completing his 
architectural studies in 1904: 
                                                     
41 Kirchner,  Chronik der KG Brücke. German: “Wahrenddessen führte Kirchner in Dresden die geschlossene 
Komposition weiter; er fand in ethnographischen Museum in der Negerplastik und den Balkenschnitzereien der 




One day [Kirchner] turned up in my office and spread out a folio of coloured drawings 
for a quite extravagant modern interior and told me this was his doctoral thesis. He 
asked to perform the necessary formalities so that he could assume his title. I had to 
inform him that the doctoral examination required scholarly research rather than an 
artistic sketch, which displeased him, I think. He made it clear that the civilized world 
only had disappointments in store and it was only with primitive people that some form 
of recovery could be found. I thought of Gauguin. He took this all so seriously that I 
certainly expected immediate departure from Europe when he left.42  
 
Whether or not Schumacher’s recollections (written decades later) are accurate, it is fair to 
assume that Kirchner and the other Brücke artists shared with their contemporaries a litany of 
popular ideas about “primitives”—their perceived naturalness, oneness with nature, open 
sexuality—in other words, an authenticity which had been lost in an alienated modernity. Ideas 
about the Primitiven or Wilden were an ordinary part of German popular culture, found for 
example in the novels of Karl May, Germany’s best-selling author in the nineteenth century, 
and the Völkerschauen, “human zoos” in which indigenous groups from such places as Samoa 
or Cameroon were put on display in zoological gardens in reconstructed “native” villages.43 The 
Völkerschauen toured through major cities, including Dresden, and were a popular attraction. 
In a letter to the art historian and Brücke supporter Botho Graef, Kirchner recalls his childhood 
fascination with non-Europeans at the zoo: 
As a child I was always at the window drawing what I saw, women with baby carriages, 
trees, trains, etc., etc. Later we moved to Frankfurt and I added the huge railroad station 
and people on the street and in the zoo. I was also impressed by the art in the Frankfurt 
museum, the pictures of Grünewald’s school. Old sculptures and foreigners in the zoo. 
From Frankfurt we moved to Switzerland with its huge mountains, its cows and pastures 
                                                     
42 Fritz Schumacher, “Aus der Vorgeschichte der Brücke,” Der Kreis 9, (January 1932), 10, quoted by Lloyd, German 
Expressionism, 15. 
43 Anne Dreesbach, “Colonial Exhibitions, ‘Völkerschauen’ and the Display of the ‘Other’,” in European History 




and stony paths. And from there to Chemnitz, where my artistic development was 
interrupted.44 
 
This fascination persisted into the artist’s days in Dresden. In a letter to Heckel and Pechstein, 
dated May 31, 1910, Kirchner wrote, “the circus is back, and at the Zoologischen Garten there 
will be Samoans, negroes, etc. this summer!”45 Kirchner reveals a common perception of 
foreigners as exotic; he also reveals a naïve Eurocentric acceptance of the status quo in imperial 
Germany, in which it seemed acceptable to display humans, like animals, in a zoo, for the 
entertainment of European spectators. Kirchner sketched some of these “inhabitants” and 
“performers” on postcards (figs. 5.9 and 5.10). 
Although the Brücke artists’ ideas about “exotic” foreigners were clearly informed by 
the popular primitivist discourse, it would be wrong to assume that their primitivism—the 
meaning of such “primitive” images in their own artistic creations—necessarily expressed this 
discourse in a straightforward manner. It is not until about 1909 that clear and consistent visual 
references to non-European artworks (as opposed to simply non-Europeans) begin to appear in 
the Brücke’s own artistic creations. There are earlier instances in which connections are likely, 
yet not verifiable. Lloyd notes, for example, “It is impossible to tell whether the decorative 
borders in brush and ink in Kirchner’s illustrations to The Arabian Nights, or the ornamental 
letter ‘M’ at the beginning of his Programm der Brücke, refer to tribal or Jugendstil models.”46 
(See fig. 5.11.) Lloyd adds that The Studio and other Jugendstil periodicals, such as Jugend and 
                                                     
44 Kirchner, Letter to Botho Graef, Jena, Sept. 21, 1916, translated by Victor H. Miesel, Voices of German 
Expressionism (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 17. 
45 Kirchner, Letter to Heckel and Pechstein in Berlin, March 31, 1910.  German: “Sonst weiter nichts neues, ein 
Cirkus ist wieder da und in den Zooligischen kommen Samoaner, Neger etc. diesen Sommer!” Reproduced in 
Annemarie Dube-Heynig, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: Postkarten und Briefe an Erich Heckel im Altonaer Museum in 
Hamburg (Cologne: DuMont Buchverlag, 1984),  235 (no. 30). 
46 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 15. 
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Kunstwart, which Bleyl recalls they read while in Dresden, contained references to non-
European art during the early 1900s.47 Similarly, Bleyl’s poster for the 1906 Dresden exhibition 
suggests the influence of Japanese prints, and he later claimed as much.48 However, the 
influence of Japanese prints may have reached Bleyl through the Vienna Secession rather than 
through any direct examination.  
Nevertheless, in 1909 and 1910, the Brücke members began to represent “primitive” or 
“exotic” figures and art works in their own artistic productions, including sketches, wood 
carvings, and studio decorations. The Brücke artists’ interest in the non-European art seems to 
have manifested itself most prominently in their studio decorations during the Dresden years. 
Art collector and Brücke patron Gustav Schiefler wrote about a visit to Kirchner’s studio at 
Berlinerstraße 80, in Dresden, in December 1910:  
The rooms were fantastically decorated with coloured textiles which he had made using 
the batik technique, with all sorts of exotic equipment and wood carving by his own 
hand. A primitive setting, born of necessity but nevertheless strongly marked by his own 
taste. He lived a disordered lifestyle here according to bourgeois standards, simple in 
material terms, but highly ambitious in his artistic activity. He worked feverishly, 
without noticing the time of day . . . Everyone who comes into contact with him must 
respond with strong interest to this total commitment to his work and derive from it a 
concept of the true artist.49 
 
Kirchner had moved to the studio in November 1909. He was excited about the move; he sent 
Heckel a postcard with a drawing of himself dancing naked in the one of the rooms. Visitors to 
                                                     
47 Fritz Bleyl, “Erinnerungen,” in “Fritz Bleyl: Gründungsmitglied der ‘Brücke,’” Kunst in Hessen und am Mittelrhein 
8 (1968), 94, cited in Lloyd, German Expressionism, 15. 
48 In 1948 Bleyl recalled the image: “A naked, young female form, emerging brightly white from a pale orange 
background, using a woodcut-like light-and-shadow concept, with a narrow vertical format, somewhat like a 
Japanese kakemono, a hanging for a pillar.” Fritz Bleyl, “Erinnerungen,” 89-105; quoted by Heller, “Brücke in 
Dresden and Berlin,” 20.  
49 Gustav Schiefler, in Postkarten an Gustav Schiefler, ed. Gustav Schack (Hamburg, 1976), 80, quoted in Jill Lloyd, 
“Kirchner’s Metaphysical Studio Paintings,” in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years, eds. Jill Lloyd 
and Magalena M. Moeller (London: Royal Academy of the Arts, 2003), 17. 
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Kirchner’s previous studio at Berlinerstraße 60 make no mention of particular decorations, so it 
is likely that the scene described by Schiefler began to take shape in the Berlinerstraße 80 
studio. The curtains, murals and other decorations are visible in photographs of the studio 
taken by Kirchner from 1910 and 1911 (figs. 5.12 – 5.14). Heckel, as usual, offered a more 
pragmatic explanation in an interview (1958/59),  namely their lack of money: “We needed 
somewhere to sit—so we made the stools ourselves, also the batik curtains.”50 Batik, a 
technique for decorating textiles derived from Indonesia, had been introduced to the European 
arts and crafts movement around the turn of the century by the Dutch-Indonesian artist Jan 
Toorop.51 Batik became popular in Jugendstil circles and especially with the Brücke, and this 
supports Lloyd’s argument that one of the main avenues toward the “primitive” for the Brücke 
was Jugendstil, the interest in ornament and simplicity of form.  
The photographs reveal other influences from non-European art, however. The wall 
hangings in the photographs depict nudes in erotic poses beneath trees and umbrellas.  
Hanging on the wall is a copy Kirchner had made of an Indian Buddha, derived from a book 
about Indian cave paintings. The color scheme, of chrome-yellow, red, and black, was likely 
inspired by a set of carved architectural beams from New  Guinea, which Kirchner had 
discovered at the Dresden Ethnographic Museum.52  
 
  
                                                     
50 Heckel, Kunstwerk (1958/59), quoted in Lloyd, German Expressionism, 23. 
51 Selz, German Expressionist Painting, 59. 
52 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 34. 
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ii. Encounters in the Ethnographic Museum 
 
It is likely that the Brücke members began visiting the Dresden Ethnographic Museum, 
(Völkerkundemuseum) as well as the Zoological Garden (Zoologische Garten) around the time of 
their first exhibition, in 1906, although possibly as early as 1904. Lloyd notes that entry was free 
and the museum was a short walk from their lodgings. In March 1910, Kirchner wrote to Heckel 
and Pechstein noting with enthusiasm that the ethnographic museum was open again: “Only a 
small part, but still a refreshing delight, the famous Benin bronzes, a few things by the Pueblos 
from Mexico are still exhibited, and some negro sculptures.” 53 The letter included drawings 
based on two museum artifacts, a Benin bronze relief and a Cameroon figure (fig. 5.15 and 
5.16). 
Kirchner was particularly captivated, however, by a set of carved and painted wooden 
beams from Palau, an island in  Micronesia, which he discovered in the Dresden museum (fig. 
5.17). (Palau was at the time a German colony.) The beams, which were taken from a men’s 
clubhouse (or bai), depict scenes from daily life and mythology, including, according to Lloyd, “a 
favorite local tale about a native with a giant penis capable of penetrating his wife on a 
neighboring island” (as depicted in the fourth beam).54 In June 1910, Kirchner made a drawing 
of a section of one of the beams on a postcard he sent to Heckel (fig. 5.18). However, Kirchner 
seems to have been aware of the beams before this date, as Kirchner wrote on the back of the 
                                                     
53 Kirchner, letter to Erich Heckel and Max Pechstein in Berlin, Mar. 31, 1910,  reproduced in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: 
Postkarten und Briefe an Erich Heckel im Altonaer Museum in Hamburg, ed. Annemarie Dube-Heynig (Cologne: 
DuMont Buchverlag, 1984), 78-81, 235 
54 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 29. Heller adds that the bai was a place “where the island’s men lived and slept 
(the men visited their own family homes only as guests, but received visits from the young women of neighboring 
villages at the bai).” Heller, Brücke: Birth of Expressionism, 26. 
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postcard, “the beam is beautiful every time” (“Der Balken ist doch immer wieder schön”).55 The 
beams had been brought to Germany by Carl Semper in 1862 and purchased for the Berlin 
Ethnographic Museum in 1881. According to Gordon, they had been in the Dresden museum 
since 1902.56 As Lloyd notes, the eroticism of the beams likely inspired some of the Brücke’s 
studio decorations.57 
In addition to the Palau beams, objects from Africa, in particular Cameroon, seem to 
have had the greatest impact upon the artists. In postcards and paintings from the time, studio 
decorations are clearly visible. For example, in Heckel’s Nude (Dresden), of 1910, Heckel’s 
girlfriend Sidi Riha appears with a painted face, behind her an African textile (fig. 5.19). In 
Heckel’s Still Life with Blue Vase (1910/13), a Tanzanian mask is visible. In an interview (June 12, 
1954), Schmidt-Rottluff stated that sculpture from the Cameroon had indeed provided the 
primary African source of inspiration for Brücke art.58 Postcards and sketches from 1910 reveal 
that Kirchner had begun to carve furniture and other objects in reference to African models, for 
example a fruit bowl and a carved female figure carrying a bowl on her head (figs. 5.20 and 
5.21). Britta Martensen-Larsen has argued that the latter is based on a Baluba throne from the 
Congo.59 The female figure appears in a photograph of Kirchner’s Berlin studio at Körnerstraße 
45, dating from 1914-15 (fig 5.22).   
                                                     
55 Kirchner, postcard to Heckel, June 20, 1910. Reproduced in Dube-Heynig, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, 142-43 (no. 50). 
56 Gordon, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, 21. Palau had been acquired by imperial Spain in 1885, when it was made part of 
the Spanish East Indies. Palau and surrounding islands were sold to Imperial Germany in 1899 under the terms of 
the German–Spanish Treaty. Ben Cook et al., Federated States of Micronesia and Palau (Other Places Publishing, 
2010).  
57 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 31. 
58 Gordon, “Kirchner in Dresden,” 354. 
59 Britta Martensen-Larsen, “Primitive Kunst als Inspirationsquelle der Brücke,” Hafnia 7 (1980): 101. 
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A drawing by Heckel from 1910 shows Kirchner seated on an Africanized stool, which is 
similar to the one that appears in Kirchner’s Fränzi in front of a Carved Stool (1910). 60 (Figs. 
5.23 and 5.24.) Kirchner’s Nude Girl in Bath, a 1909 woodcut, also shows a model sitting upon a 
carved stool. Lloyd notes however that this particular stool does not appear in other works, and 
thus was likely one that Kirchner had perhaps seen in the ethnographic museum, rather than 
one he had himself carved. She adds that a similar stool from Cameroon was in the Dresden 
Museum (figs. 5.25 and 5.26). Other sketches and paintings reveal that the studio contained a 
Cameroon leopard stool, which has been determined to be an original African piece.61 The 
leopard stool is visible in the photograph of Kirchner’s Körnerstraße 45 studio (fig. 5.22). It is 
important to note that the ethnographic museum was not the only means of exposure to 
African and other non-European objects. Lloyd notes, “Heckel’s brother Manfred, who was 
working as an engineer in German East Africa, visited Dresden in the summer of 1910 and 
probably gave the African objects in the Brücke artists’ studios as gifts. By the time of Gustav 
Schiefler’s visit in December 1910, Kirchner certainly possessed a leopard stool from 
Cameroon.”62 
 
iii. Stylistic Primitivism 
 
Non-European art objects not only appear as items within Brücke art works, however; 
around the same time, stylistic influences traceable to non-European art begin to appear. There 
                                                     
60 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 75. 
61 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 243n40. 
62 Lloyd, “Kirchner’s Metaphysical Studio Paintings,” in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years, eds. Jill 
Lloyd and Magdalena M. Moeller (London: Royal Academy of Arts, 2003), 46n8. 
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is a shift toward angular shapes and zig-zags, likely derived from the Palau beams, visible for 
example in Kirchner’s Nude Girl in a Bath or Heckel’s Female Nude in the Studio (fig. 5.27). In 
addition to the inclusion of ornamental zig-zags, the representation of human figures begins to 
change. The Palau beams inspired an earlier postcard to Heckel depicting bathers and a colored 
woodcut Kirchner made on the same theme, Bathers Throwing Reeds (figs. 5.28 and 5.29). As 
Lloyd notes, “the spiky figures in the drawing, with their jerky movements in a color scheme of 
yellow ochre and black, clearly refer in a quite literal way to the Palau beams.”63 Max Pechstein 
seems to have picked up on the theme in his 1909 painting, Das gelbschwarze Trikot, an 
outdoor scene where the bathers in the background echo the stiff and stylized movements of 
carved figures (fig. 5.30). In other works, faces become angular, contours and color schemes 
become bold and stark—all of which constituted a significant shift from the group’s earlier 
primary influences, for example the Fauves and impressionists. (See Heckel, Mädchen with 
Puppe (Fränzi), and Heckel, Atelierszene, 1910-11, figs. 5.31 and 5.32.) This is especially visible 
in woodcuts from the period, for example in the poster by Kirchner for the 1910 Galerie Arnold 
exhibition, and woodcuts by Heckel depicting Fränzi, one of the group’s adolescent models: 
Stehendes Kind (Standing Child, 1910/11, fig. II) and Fränzi liegend (Fränzi Reclining, 1910, fig. 
5.33). 
Lloyd notes that the earliest evidence of stylistic influences which refer to non-European 
art in relation to the studio decorations are found in Heckel’s attic rooms in his parents’ house 
in Dresden. A letter from Heckel in February 1909 includes the first sketch of a studio mural, 
                                                     
63 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 29. 
338 
 
along with a description of the colors: “overall tones zinc yellow, lime green, red, some black.”64 
(Fig. 5.34.) This sketch also reveals one of the other singularly important non-European stylistic 
influences for the Brücke artists. The standing female figures in the sketch are derived from the 
John Griffith’s Paintings in the Buddhist Cave-Temples of Ajanta, a book which Heckel 
discovered (before Kirchner, it would seem, although Kirchner claims to have discovered it on 
his own) in the Central Dresden Library in January 1908.65 In a letter to Amiet, Heckel had 
written: 
I admire Gauguin very much, I have seen some very beautiful paintings by him in the 
Folkwang Museum. Do you know Indian fresco paintings in the Buddhist temples? There 
is a . . . publication with photographs by Griffith . . . I discovered it recently in a library 
here. They are very good works.66 
 
Griffith’s book had a profound stylistic influence on both Heckel and Kirchner. 
Martensen-Larsen has noted that the influence of Ajanta is visible in Heckel’s 1909 painting 
Young Man and Girl.67 Griffith’s Paintings, actually a two-volume work, contained 91 plates and 
over a hundred illustrations depicting sixth-century Buddhist cave-temples in Ajanta, Indian (fig. 
5.35). Kirchner later wrote:  “These works made me almost helpless with delight. This unheard-
of unity of representation, this monumental tranquility of form, I thought I never would 
                                                     
64 Ibid., 23. 
65 John Griffiths, The Paintings in the Buddhist Cave-Temples of Ajanta, Khandesh, India, Vol. 1: Pictorial Subjects  
(London, 1896) and Vol. 2 Decorative Details (London: 1897). See Lloyd, German Expressionism, 24. 
66 Heckel, letter to Amiet, Jan. 30, 1908, quoted by Lloyd, German Expressionism, 24. “Gauguin bewundere ich 
sehr—ich habe ja von ihm einige wunderschöne Bilder – Folkwang Museum—gesehen. Kennen Sie die indischen 
Freskomalereien in buddhistischen Grabtempeln? Es existiert eine sehr. . . . Ausgabe mit Fotographien 
wiedergegeben von Griffith . . . Ich habe es vor nicht langer Zeit in einer Bibliothek hier entdeckt. Es sind sehr gute 
Werke.”  
67 Martensen-Larsen, “Primitive Kunst als Inspirationsquelle der Brücke,” 101. 
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achieve. All my endeavors seemed hollow and restless to me. I copied a lot from the pictures, 
only to gain my own style.”68 
 Kirchner made numerous drawings after the Ajanta images (fig. 5.36). The Ajanta 
influence is especially clear in one of Kirchner’s  most important works from the time, Five 
Bathers at the Lake (fig. 5.37). Donald Gordon notes that this was only the fifth canvas of this 
size—6 1/2 feet in width. The work reveals several important stylistic changes taking place. 
Gordon writes that “the new style is . . . for the first time, sculptural: the use of gray-blue 
‘hatching’ strokes adjacent to most of the contours of the bather’s bodies is sufficient to lend 




One question that has traditionally preoccupied Brücke scholars is the timing as well as 
degree of the influence of non-European work on the young Brücke artists. Donald Gordon, for 
example, has argued that the works of Gauguin, which were exhibited at the Galerie Arnold in 
September 1910, served as “the necessary catalyst in centering Kirchner’s attention on the 
fundamental stylistic and thematic possibilities to be found in non-Western art”—in other 
words, it was only through their exposure to Gauguin that the Brücke artists’ eyes were 
opened, not only to the primitive as theme but in terms of a primitive aesthetics.70 Although 
                                                     
68 E. L. Kirchner, “Die Arbeit E. L. Kirchners,” quoted by Gordon, “Kirchner in Dresden,” 357. Gordon notes that 
Kirchner may have had some previous knowledge of Indian temple architecture, and possibly also Ajanta wall 
paintings. Wilhelm Kreis, a professor in Dresden who was for a time Heckel’s employer, beginning around 1906, 
had previously visited India in order to study the temples. 
69 Gordon, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, 74. 
70 Donald E. Gordon, “Kirchner in Dresden,” Art Bulletin XLVIII (1966): 356. 
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Heckel had been interested in Ajanta since 1908, it was only between autumn 1910 and the 
spring of 1911 that Kirchner began to render copious drawings based on the Ajanta works. Jill 
Lloyd has argued persuasively against Gordon’s suggestion, however, noting that Kirchner and 
Heckel had already been making stylistic explorations in reference to the works of the Dresden 
museum before the Gauguin exhibition (as seen, for example, in Kirchner’s postcards from 
1909, or the images from the letter of March 31, 1910). Lloyd concludes that Gauguin’s work 
likely “provided confirmation that Kirchner’s interest in non-European art was an appropriate 
direction for a modern artist to be moving in, rather than a catalyst.”71  
Interestingly, Lloyd argues instead that it was “the experience at the Moritzburg ponds 
which seems to have been a necessary catalyst for their own creative use of this non-European 
visual stimulus.” In her view,  
The Moritzburg summers provided an opportunity for the Brücke artists to recreate 
their bohemian studio lifestyle in an open-air setting. Stripped of their clothes and 
“civilized” trappings, the artists and their models were “at one” with nature and led the 
live of modern “primitives” bathing in the nude and playing games with bows and 
arrows and boomerangs on the model of Karl May Red Indian stories.72 
 
I agree with Lloyd, that the important question in tracing the development of the 
Brücke’s primitivism is not to determine when exactly “primitive” motifs or styles appeared in 
Brücke artwork, but rather to ascertain their significance, for the artists as well as the viewers 
of these works. Lloyd, in her interpretation of the Brücke’s developing primitivism, sees the 
bathing excursions as a fantasy-image of oneness with nature, nudity, and a carefree sexuality. 
These ideas were epitomized, she argues, in the figure of the “primitive”—which therefore was 
understood as a source of “renewal” in opposition to modern, alienated, civilization. The 
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bathing scenes in some way represent a fulfillment of the forays in the studio, which she calls a 
“testing ground” for primitivism. Both the bohemian studio and the summer bathing sessions 
presented an “alternative” to modern life.73 In both cases, she argues that the driving impulse 
was the Brücke’s desire to merge art with life. She quotes a letter Kirchner wrote in 1923, 
recalling the group’s early days: 
It was a lucky coincidence that real talents met, whose character and gifts in human 
terms too, left them no other choice than to become artists. Their life style, home and 
work, which for “regular” people were unusual to say the least, did not involve a 
conscious “épater les Bourgeois,” rather the quite naïve and pure necessity to bring art 
and life into harmony. And it is this more than anything else that has had a great 
influence on the forms of contemporary art.74 
 
In Lloyd’s interpretation, the studio decorations (as well as the artwork centered there) and the 
“return to nature” ethos of the bathing scenes represented the aspiration to bring art and life 
into harmony. Lloyd argues, “References to non-European art appear first in the studio 
decorations because it was here, in the ‘unalienated’ artistic space of the studio that they 
attempted to bridge the gap between the decorative and fine arts, reintegrating art into life.”75 
Lloyd attributes the desire to reintegrate art and life to Jugendstil—“The primitivism of the 
studio space depends on . . . the notion of an ‘unalienated’ artistic environment in a Jugendstil 
tradition, where the barriers between art and life could be dissolved.”76 Their discovery of the 
“primitive” thus appears, in this view, as the right thing at the right time; the “primitive” 
seemed to offer the perfect symbol of merging art and life—creating an authentic alternative in 
opposition to the alienation of modernity. 
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In her analysis of the Brücke’s primitivist studio decorations and artwork, Lloyd makes 
two primary arguments. She argues that they reveal that the Brücke sought to express a 
conception of “primitive” sexuality, in opposition to the constraints of bourgeois modernity, 
and that the indiscriminatory use of “exotic” as well as “primitive” sources elided difference, 
thereby recapitulating the homogenous “other” of colonial discourse. In other words, they have 
merely inverted the discourse of anthropological primitivism: 
The association of women and children with their concept of the primitive, which we 
shall find constantly recurring in the studio, bather and street scenes, relates to the 
sexual and racial politics of social Darwinism, which regarded both women and native 
communities as “children” occupying a lower rung on the evolutionary ladder. For die 
Brücke these associations had positive rather than negative connotations, suggesting a 
life force and an intuitive, “natural” alternative to the rationalizing and calculating 
“masculine” temper of their times. But this touches the ambivalent and problematic 
heart of their primitivism: for the “attack” on bourgeois codes and practices inverted 
rather than truly subverted existing evolutionary criteria, and thus reproduced many of 
the ruling prejudices of their times in a new and “positivist” guise.77 
 
We should not be so quick, however, to dismiss Kirchner’s designation, in the Chronicle, 
of his discovery of the art of Africa and Oceania as a “parallel” to his own artistic developments. 
On the one hand, this seems an obvious Eurocentric attempt to dismiss the idea that a 
European might be influenced by such works. A few lines further on in the Chronicle, Kirchner 
notes that “in Cranach, Beham, and other German masters of the Middle Ages,” the Brücke 
“found its first art historical corroboration”—in other words, another rejection of influence. 
And the Chronicle ends with the bold statement: “Not influenced by today’s fashionable 
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tendencies, Cubism, Futurism, etc., [the Brücke] struggles for a human culture, which is the 
source of a true art.”78 
 Kirchner was a sensitive and self-centered individual. He often pre-dated his own works; 
he was clearly anxious to undermine any perception that he had been influenced from any 
direction. However, there is a difference between “not influenced”, “corroboration,” and a 
“parallel”—and Kirchner’s choice of “parallel” seems not to have been an arbitrary one: in a 
letter to Botho Graef in 1916, Kirchner used the same word: “I discovered parallels to my own 
work in rafters from Palau and in Negro sculpture.”79 The term “parallel” suggests a subtle but 
important recognition that these other artists are actually traveling the same trajectory; in 
other words, Kirchner seems to make a gesture of coevalness, to use Johannes Fabian’s phrase.  
Moreover, Kirchner does not suggest that primitive styles are somehow inherently more 
authentic. In a letter to Nele van de Velde (daughter of architect Henry van de Velde), Kirchner 
thanks her for sketches she sent him which she had made at the Ethnographical Museum in 
Basel, saying they made him “very happy.” Yet he goes on:  
If you want to get any benefit from such study you must examine and draw other works 
of art as if they were nature herself, that is to say, something where you capture feeling 
in only one of its thousand different aspects and by means of such study absorb life 
itself. The subject isn’t important. At best the attempt to reproduce it is a good exercise 
for the fingers and for your powers of comprehension.80 
 
For Kirchner, a recuperation of the “primitive” is not the key to authentic, unalienated art. They 
can offer one example, but there are others. The key is a mixture of work and intuition. 
“Remember Van Gogh,” he continues,  
                                                     
78 Kirchner, Chronik der KG Brücke (1913),  translation by Heller, Brücke: Birth of Expressionism, 213.  
79 Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Letter to Botho Graef, Sept. 21, 1916, in Grisebach, 53, translated in Miesel, Voices, 18. 
80 Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, letter to Nele van de Velde, no date (written summer 1919), in Briefe an Nele und Henry 
van de Velde, ed. Roman Norbert Ketterer (München: R. Piper, 1961), 19-22, translated in Miesel, Voices, 20-22. 
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who had his brother send him reproductions of drawing in order to copy them? Or 
Rembrandt, the way he copied the Indians and Italians? Certainly neither lacked 
material. They copied only to acquire “du corps.” To that end you have to draw 
constantly everything that impresses you: pictures, statues, objects, people, animals, 
nature, everything, everything because developing a calligraphic style is  just as difficult 
as learning to walk.81 
  
In other words, it is not “primitive” authenticity Kirchner is describing, but simply an aesthetic 
authenticity, which in his view could be found in “primitive” works from Africa and Oceania, as 
well as “exotic” Buddhist wall paintings or Japanese prints. The criteria for such authenticity 
was the artist’s participation in, and relationship to, contemporary life. Reinhold Heller, in a 
recent essay in which he subjects Kirchner’s Chronicle to a rigorous detailed analysis,  
has argued that Kirchner’s account of the group’s history in this document is interesting 
precisely because it differs from traditional art historical accounts: 
Unlike the standard genetic art historical evolution, which posits an immanent, 
autonomous process for the evolution of artistic forms and styles, of artworks shaping 
artworks in a self-contained process of perpetual change, Kirchner tells of an organic 
growth process defined by the artists’ spontaneous interaction with “Leben,” and 
submission to its “Erlebnis.” This is not an art historical transmission of forms, clearly, 
but rather what can be identified as a process whereby the Brücke artists allow 
themselves and their work to submit to, be submersed in, and be shaped by the 
Kunstwollen of their temporal era and national locality.82 
 
Heller here invokes the concept of Kunstwollen (artistic volition), an idea developed by the 
Austrian art historian Alois Riegl. Although Riegl had outlined the concept in Stilfragen: 
Grundlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Ornamentik (1893), it was not until Spätrömische 
Kunstindustrie (1901) that he fully developed the idea.83 Riegl conceived of the Kunstwollen as a 
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rejection of the materialist interpretation of the history of ornamentation of Gottfried Semper’s 
Der Stil in den technischen und tektonischen Künsten, oder Praktische Ästhetik (2 vols., 
1860/63). For Semper, historical changes in decorative forms could be explained as the result of 
changes in technique and material. Riegl essentially introduced a Hegelian notion of an artistic 
“spirit” driven by an internal will in a dialectical relationship to reality. According to Michael 
Ann Holly, Riegl interpreted changes in ornamental motifs “neither as a technical necessity nor 
as a ‘spiritless copy of nature’ but rather as a ‘goal’ of the ‘art spirit’ or the ‘tendency’ of the 
artistic will.” 84 The ramifications of this idea were profound, as Holly explains: 
One benefit of this scheme for the history of art resides in [its] refusal to regard any 
style of art as degenerative or devoid of artistic merit. Each period is its own testimony 
to an artistic intention. All is relative. Roman art does not represent a decline of the 
classical ideal, and the period between the Edict of Milan and the rise of Charlemagne 
demands recognition not conveyed by the appellation “Dark Ages,” with which it was 
condescendingly burdened. Works of antiquity must be judged only by “their 
materiality, their contour and color, on the plane and in space.” All ages have a part to 
play in the ongoing evolution of the artistic will.85 
 
Kirchner and the Brücke artists may not have been directly aware of Riegl’s works, 
although it is certainly possible Kirchner would have come across Riegl’s writings; it is 
interesting to note that Riegl’s initial discussion of geometric style in Stilfragen makes special 
note of the use of “primitive” zig-zag patterns.86 Nevertheless, Riegl’s ideas revolutionized art 
history, and the notion of a Kunstwollen was part of the general art historical discourse in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. It received perhaps its greatest popularity through its 
influence upon Wilhelm Worringer’s Abstraction and Empathy (1908).87 However, a similar 
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relativist notion of aesthetics informed other ethnographic-aesthetic studies, such as Ernst 
Grosse’s Die Anfänge der Kunst (1894), and the German ethnologist Paul Germann had applied 
Riegl’s concept to Cameroon artwork in particular in his 1910 article, “Sculptural- Figurative 
Handicrafts in the Grasslands of Cameroon.”88 
Whether Riegl was a direct influence or not, the concept of Kunstwollen seems to be 
operating in Kirchner’s Chronicle, as Heller suggests; the Brücke’s art is presented as evolving 
“vitalistically in spontaneous visualizations of the experience of life as witnessed and lived 
passionately by the artists in the milieu that they shape themselves or that is shaped around 
them.” Moreover, this perspective is expressed somewhat more explicitly in one of Kirchner’s 
sketchbooks, also from 1913, in which he wrote:  
Painting and sculpture are arts for the eye. . . .  The task of the painter is to use 
the means of painting to create a work that captures his sensory experience. 
Through constant work he knows how to use his means. There are no hard and 
fast rules for it. . . . The enduring art of any period of time has its own particular 
parlance.89  
 
Kirchner and his colleagues shared the common primitivist, Eurocentric attitudes of the 
day. Yet this in itself does not suffice to demonstrate that in their artistic creations, the 
“primitive” is imagined, as Lloyd argues, as an “authentic” and “immediate” alternative to 
modernity—a symbol of unalienated existence. Although they emerged from ubiquitous 
                                                                                                                                                                           
later developments, for example the theoretical  biology of Jakob von Uexküll; one should also add to the list the 
German ethnologist Leo Frobenius. Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History, 70.  
88 Ernst Grosse, Die Anfänge der Kunst (Freiburg and Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr, 1894); Paul Germann, "Das plastisch-
figürliche Kunstgewerbe im Grasland von Kamerun: Ein Beitrag zur afrikanischen Kunst," in Jahrbuch des 
Städtischen Museums für Völkerkunde zu Leipzig, vol. 4 (1910) 1-35. 
89 Ernst Ludwig Kircchner, Sketchbook 29, reproduced in Ernst Ludwig Kircchner: Die Skizzenbücher: ‘Ekstase des 
ersten Sehens.’ Monographie und Werkverzeichnis, ed. Gerd Presler (Karlsruhe and Davos, 1996), 400, translated in 
“No one else has these colors”: Kirchner’s Paintings, eds. Karin Schick and Heide Skowranek (Ostfildern: Hatje 
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romantic primitivist discourse, in which the “primitive” commonly signified “authenticity” and 
“unalienated” existence, their own work, through such techniques as parataxis and a modernist 
self-reflexivity regarding medium and representation, in fact dismantled such significations.  
To demonstrate this however, it is necessary to provide the discursive context in which the 
“primitive” functions; the notion of the “primitive” as a symbol of unalienated existence only 
makes sense within a broader framework, that is, a critique of modernity as alienated.  Only by 
situating primitivism as a feature of the critique of modernity will it be possible to re-evaluate 
the Brücke’s use of the primitivist discourse. Therefore, before addressing the prevalent 
interpretation of Brücke primitivism, it will first be helpful to consider their relationship to the 
critique of modernity. 
 
Part 4.  The Critique of Modernity 
 
 To reassess the aims of the Brücke, it is necessary to first prise apart the aesthetic aims 
from the cultural stance, which are so often conflated in the critical scholarship. A good place to 
begin is with their “founding” document, the “Programm der Künstlergruppe Brücke,” of 1906 
(fig. 5.38). A woodcut produced by Kirchner for the first group exhibition at the Seifert lamp 
factory in Dresden, the Program was subsequently printed and distributed at the group’s early 
exhibitions.90 The succinct Program, in spite of its brevity, supplies a keen insight into what the 
Brücke were up to, both through what it contains, and what it does not: 
With a belief in development, in a new generation of creators as well as appreciators, 
we call together all youth. And as youth who carry the future, we seek freedom of 
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movement and of life for ourselves in opposition to the older, well-established powers. 
Anyone belongs to us, who reproduces with immediacy and authenticity that which 
urges him to create.91 
 
This is perhaps the vaguest manifesto in a century of manifestos, providing little in the way of 
aesthetic principles. There is much that is ambiguous about the Brücke, their aesthetics, their 
goals, artistic and otherwise, and this opening artistic statement therefore provides a good 
beginning point for a critical re-examination. The following commentary engages in a critical 
archaeology, an attempt to peel back the layers of interpretation which have accumulated 
around the Brücke and their work. This type of deconstructive criticism is necessary to remove 
some of the many preconceptions which are routinely invoked to analyze the work. Having 
cleared the ground, I’ll emphasize an alternative cultural context and introduce a new critical 
vocabulary, in order to cast a new light on the group’s significance. 
The obvious criteria celebrated in the Program are youth, immediacy, and authenticity.  
Interpretations of this document tend to discern in it aesthetic principles as well as more 
ambitious cultural aims. Heller, for example, calls it concise summary of the group’s “messianic 
goals”—“It formulated a fervent faith in a better – if undefined – utopian future of freedom and 
sincerity.”92 It embodied their desire “to challenge the institutions and traditions of Dresden, of 
the world beyond the city, and of the still-young twentieth century.” Strictly speaking, however, 
the program espouses immediacy and authenticity in terms of artistic creation—one should 
produce “authentically” (unmittelbar und unverfälscht can also be translated as directly and 
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genuinely or unfalsified). Where Heller and others go wrong is in their reading of the Brücke’s 
interest in youth and authenticity as a messianic rejection of the present. 
 The first task then will be to make a distinction between the group’s aesthetic goals and 
their cultural goals. This will make it possible to tackle the two claims separately: that their 
aesthetics were shaped by the discourse of primitivism—an interest in immediacy and 
authenticity in terms of artistic production—and the argument that their primitivism 
constituted a nostalgic longing for an imagined “primitive” way of life, as a way of critiquing the 
problems of modernity (the romantic primitivism as specified above). In both cases, their 
primitivism clearly emerged from this discourse of romantic primitivism, but at times, in their 
most effective works, especially those of Heckel, Schmidt-Rottluff, and Kirchner, this naïve 
primitivism was called into question. I shall begin first to dismantle the second claim—that their 
work should be interpreted as a critique of modernity. 
 To begin with the document’s celebration of youth: scholars readily admit that “the 
Brücke’s progressive impulse toward artistic renewal clearly did not mean assuming the ‘down-
with-the-past’ position that so often typifies the agonistic stance of avant-garde movements, 
such as Futurism and Dadaism.”93 The group’s interest in the German “Gothic” woodcuts and 
the German visual canon, including such artists as Albrecht Dürer and Lucas Cranach, has been 
well studied. However, there is a residual inclination to see in the Brücke a “down-with-the-
present” position. Heller, for example, has written that:  
The optimistic, even messianic faith in modern art and its evolution implicit in the 
Brücke program’s first phrase is maintained throughout the text. It is joined by a 
similarly adulatory conviction that youth—Jugend—and a “new generation” as the 
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current phase of the evolutionary process are preordained to serve as carriers of the 
newly evolving art.94 
 
Heller sees the emphasis on youth and evolution as a rejection not only of the past, but of the 
present. The Brücke’s interest in youth was different, he asserts, from the “Young Germany” 
literary movement of the 1830s: “youth was [here] a means of preserving and revitalizing what 
already existed.” Heller cites the art nouveau periodical Jugend, which was the source of the 
term Jugendstil and a major influence upon the Brücke members, as embodying a new 
understanding of youth. In 1899, the journal had declared in its opening pages: “Our age is not 
old, not tired! We are not witness to the last breaths of a dying epoch! We stand at the dawn of 
a fundamentally healthy time! It is a joy to be alive!”95 The obvious reading of this would seem 
to be a rejection of utopian thinking and cultural discontent, and yet Heller insists it suggests a 
stance of rejection:  
Certainly a sense of transition is maintained here, but the emphasis is not on the 
previously existent, weakened entity—the nineteenth century in 1899 by definition 
doomed to die—but rather is on the new entity which is evolving. This, too, was the 
attitude expressed by Brücke’s program as it sought the displacement of older and 
“well-established powers.” It was an attitude of rejection, a conscious proclamation of 
Brücke’s “otherness,” which denied compromise or integration.96 
 
Yet what seems most striking in the quote from Jugend is the insistence upon the “joy” of living 
in a “fundamentally healthy time.” Heller is led to overlook such details, as are other scholars, 
through the practice of associating the Brücke with the many prominent critiques of modernity 
then in circulation. Heller in this instance invokes the figure of Julius Langbehn (1851–1907), the 
authorof Rembrandt als Erzieher (Rembrandt as Educator, 1890). The implication that Langbehn 
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96 Heller, Brücke: German Expressionist Prints, 6. 
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offers some insight into understanding the Brücke has been advanced most recently by 
Christian Weikop, one of the foremost scholars on German Expressionism.97  Langbehn 
vehemently critiqued science, rationalism, and materialism as the ruin of contemporary society; 
he held up Rembrandt as the exemplar of the Niederdeutsche, by which he meant 
northwestern Germany, as the spiritual educator for a new Germany. Langbehn announced in 
the opening pages: 
It has almost become an open secret that the spiritual life of the German people [Volk]  
today is in a state of slow—some would say rapid—decay. Science everywhere is 
splintering into specialization; epoch-making figures are missing in the fields of thought 
and literature; the visual arts, though represented by important masters, lack 
monumentality and thus their best effect; musicians are rare, performers many.98 
 
Weikop and Heller both connect Brücke to Langbehn, although the route is a circuitous one. 
Both produce quotes from the text which seem to carry reverberations for the Brücke; Weikop 
notes Langbehn’s remark, “A figure like Rembrandt, at least for Germany, can create a bridge 
between the fragmented man of today and the total man of the future.”99 Weikop admits the 
connection is tenuous: “Although Langbehn’s influence on the Brücke cannot be directly traced 
as he is not mentioned by name in the primary source material, his significance in helping shape 
the cultural milieu out of which the Brücke grew was considerable.”100 Langbehn’s popularity is 
unquestionable; between 1890 and 1909 his book went through 49 printings.101 Yet there are 
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reasons to doubt that this particular cultural milieu would have appealed to the Brücke; Weikop 
and Heller both admit that the Brücke (with the possible exception of Emil Nolde) hardly shared 
his particular brand of nationalism. More to the point, perhaps, the Jugend quote above clearly 
sets itself against such screeds.  
Langbehn, Weikop notes, influenced the artist known as “Fidus” (Hugo Höppener), 
whose “idyllic images of naked sun-worshippers” seem reflected in an early group insignia (then 
going by the name “Kuenstlervereinigung Brücke”) created by Kirchner in 1905 (figs. 5.39 and 
5.40).102 Fidus’s images of sunbathers had appeared in the pages of Jugend, and the Brücke 
members clearly enjoyed their escapes to the Moritzburg lakes, where they would bathe in the 
nude, seemingly part of the popular Freikörporkultur reform movement. Yet Fidus was not 
alone in such imagery. (In fact, the image referred to here, Fidus’ “Lichtgebet” (Prayer to the 
light), may not have been known to the Brücke artists at the time; although he had made 
similar images beginning in the 1890s, it was not until 1913, when this particular version was 
turned into a postcard, that it became widely known in Germany.)  A far more likely source for 
the Brücke artists would have been the periodical Ver Sacrum, the journal of the Vienna 
Secession. Although there are no references in the source material to lead to Langbehn (or 
Fidus for that matter), the Brücke’s aesthetics reveal a useful comparison with the Secession. In 
the first volume of Ver Sacrum (Sacred Spring, 1898), the opening statement is accompanied by 
an image by Austrian artist Koloman (Kolo) Moser (1868–1918), which features a similar figure 
with arms joyously upraised (fig. 5.41). In addition, on the first page an image by Joseph 
Engelhart (1864–1941) is reproduced, a silhouette which bears striking resemblance to the 
                                                     




Brücke’s poster which Bleyl designed for their first Dresden exhibition, in 1906 (figs. 5.42 and 
5.43). Although the Brücke had exhibited the previous year in Leipzig, the Dresden show was 
much more ambitious, in scope and aim, marking their true arrival on the German art scene. 
Bleyl’s image takes for its subject the nude figure, although the desexualized male in 
Engelhart’s image is now a sexualized female; even so, the figure is not sexualized in a typical 
sense, when compared to similar representations of the female nude appearing, for example, in 
the pages of Jugend (fig. 5.44). Arms spread, knees joined, the figure appears perhaps tentative, 
emerging into the light; yet looking straight at the viewer, the gaze is assertive, querying. The 
figure is half in shadow, yet this is not a sexual coyness. The frontality of the image implies 
directness, as well as possibly suggesting the frontality of the non-European carvings with 
which the Brücke were becoming aware.  In addition, Bleyl’s work makes greater and more 
dramatic exploitation of stark contrast, through the woodcut technique. The image stresses its 
two-dimensionality, yet the implied movement into light reminds the viewer of a three-
dimensional reality.  
Heller notes that the elongated verticality of the poster, which broke from standard 
proportions in German posters, seems to echo the practices of the Secession; although he  “to 
represent a ‘spiritual’ movement upward rather than a ‘material,’ earth-oriented 
horizontality.”103 In the next section I shall argue that this spiritualist interpretation very much 
distorts the materialist stance of the Brücke; for the moment, it is worth noting that in the 
opening statement of Ver Sacrum, Max Burckhard (formerly director of the Vienna Burgtheater) 
offered a paean to youth: 
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The spirit of youth, infused by the spring, which has brought the artists together; 
the spirit of youth, through which the present always becomes the “Moderne”—
which is the driving force of all artistic creativity.104 
 
In Ver Sacrum, modernity (die Moderne) is envisioned as being created in and through the 
present; it is the name for an artistic relationship to life which is being created now, not a 
utopia in the future or a nostalgia for the past. It is this particular Jugendstil ethos that is 
reflected and given new life in the Brücke. The important influence of Jugendstil upon the 
Brücke is well known. However, scholars tend to stress the aesthetic influence while neglecting 
the cultural outlook.  
 To continue with the analysis of the Program, then, there is the ambiguity of the word 
Entwicklung. In most contexts the word Entwicklung would be translated as development, 
however in many translations of the Program it appears as evolution, and not without good 
reason. Around the turn of the century, numerous works of art history explored the topic from 
a specifically evolutionary perspective, most notably Julius Meier-Graefe’s three volume 
Entwicklungsgeschichte der modernen Kunst, the first volume of which appeared in 1904.105 
Meier-Graefe, one of the founders of Pan in 1896, and founder of the periodical Dekorative 
Kunst in 1897, was an important figure in the Jugendstil movement and certainly known to the 
Brücke. In Entwicklung, Meier-Graefe presented a formalist analysis of the historical 
development of art, leading to the pinnacle of modern art, French Impressionism. (German art, 
in Meier-Graefe’s view, had failed to participate in this important  development, having been 
                                                     
104 Max Burckhard, Ver Sacrum 1, Heft 1 (January, 1898), 3. “Der Geist der Jugend, der den Frühling durchweht, er 
hat sie zusammengeführt, der Geist der Jugend, durch welchen die Gegenwart immer zur ‘Moderne’ wird, der die 
treibende Kraft ist für künstlerische Schaffen.” 
105 Julius Meier-Graefe, Entwicklungsgeschichte der modernen Kunst: Vergleichende Betrachtung der bildenden 
Künste, als Beitrag zu einer neuen Aesthetik, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: Verlag Julius Hofmann, 1904). 
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arrested on the path by the work of Adolph von Menzel and Arnold Böcklin).106 The discussion 
of art in terms of evolution owed much to the influence of biology and Charles Darwin on the 
development of art history, apparent in other major works such Evolution in Art (1895), by 
Alfred Haddon (who had trained as a biologist), and Henry Balfour’s The Evolution of Decorative 
Art (1893).107 
Nevertheless, I have adhered to the more neutral “development” for a few pertinent 
reasons.108  Evolutionary thought, as discussed in a previous chapter in regards to the 
ethnology of Adolf Bastian, posited a denial of coevalness—an epistemic denial that the 
anthropologist (or his/her audience) existed in the same time as the “primitive” subject of 
anthropological knowledge.109 Stated more simply, evolutionary thought, although it seemingly 
postulated a linear development of humanity, and thus a connection between a “primitive” 
past and a “civilized” present, in fact produced a radical ontological break between the two; as 
evolutionary theory developed under the ideological weight of demarcating the virtues of 
contemporary civilization, the purported connection in history was endlessly postponed, as the 
“primitive” other was shackled to a position of radical alterity, the antithesis of the civilized, 
modern self. 
To invoke “evolution” in this context is thus to prematurely associate the Brücke with 
particular view of the “primitive” which,  as I will show, they did not share. Suffice for the 
                                                     
106 Peter Paret, The Berlin Secession: Modernism and Its Enemies in Imperial Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1980), 170ff. 
107 Alfred Haddon, Evolution in Art (London: W. Scott, 1895); Henry Balfour, The Evolution of Decorative Art 
(London: Percival & Co., 1893). See Goldwater, Primitivism in Modern Art, 20-28. 
108 Others have done so as well: Magdalena M. Moeller, The Brücke Museum Berlin (Munich: Prestel, 2001), 10; 
and Nicole Brandmüller, “The Early Years,” in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: Retrospective, ed. Felix Krämer (Ostfildern: 
Hatje Cantz, 2010), 56. 
109 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, with a new foreword by Matt Bunzl 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1983; 2002). 
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moment to note that this view of evolution was rejected by Bastian himself, the most 
prominent German ethnologist of the late nineteenth century, founder and director of the 
Ethnology Museum in Berlin from 1873 until his death in 1905. The Brücke’s notions about the 
Primitiven or Naturvölker would have been profoundly shaped by Bastian’s ethnology (even had 
they not read his often abstruse monographs), through their experiences in the Berlin and 
Dresden Ethnographic Museums, the latter of which was organized along exhibitionary lines 
similar to those devised by Bastian. In addition, they would have been influenced by Karl Ernst 
Osthaus’ Folkwang Museum in Hagen, one of the important early sources for their knowledge 
of non-European art. Osthaus’s museum also dispensed with the evolutionary perspective. In 
different ways, both Bastian and Osthaus undermined the strict division between “primitive” 
and “civilized.”110 
 The Brücke’s conception of the “primitive” will be examined in greater detail below. For 
the moment let us return to the question of their conception of the “modern.” A second 
reason, therefore, for favoring “development” over “evolution” is precisely to diminish the 
purported connection of the Brücke with Meier-Graefe, because it is through this association 
that they are commonly attached to the critique of modernity. To dismantle this assertion, we 
must now look more closely at the critical relationship of Brücke with Jugendstil. 
 
  
                                                     
110 On the influence of Osthaus and the Folkwang Museum, see Lloyd, German Expressionism, 8-12, although her 
conclusion distorts its ultimate impact, suggesting it offered an ahistoricist and aesthetic (as in purely formal) 
appreciation of the “primitive,” whereas I argue that it primarily disrupted the distinction between form and 
subject, history and the ahistorical. 
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Part 5.  Jugendstil 
 
Julius Meier-Graefe was an important figure in the decorative arts movement, an 
international reform movement which in Germany was associated with Jugendstil. For many, 
the movement signified a rejection of industrialism and its effects on art.  As Jill Lloyd writes, 
Meier-Graefe “attacked the specialized and mechanized values of the new industrial age which 
he felt had ruptured the unity of art and society. He hoped to heal this rift by promoting the 
decorative arts.”111 As Lloyd points out, Meier-Graefe had attended Simmel’s lectures in Berlin 
in the 1890s, and thus “his ideas relate to Simmel’s critique of modernity which we find most 
fully developed in his Philosophie des Geldes.” Meier-Graefe, under Simmel’s influence, voiced 
“a longing for a ‘lost’ organic unity between art and life.”  
As noted above, Lloyd argues that Brücke’s connection to Jugendstil served as the root 
of their ambition “to bring art and life into harmony.”  But by associating the Brücke with 
Meier-Graefe, and through him, to Simmel, Lloyd takes the Brücke’s goal of merging art and life 
and turns it into an anti-modernity critique. As she writes:  
The principles underlying Jugendstil, such as anti-historicism, the cults of authenticity 
and renewal and the breakdown of traditional artistic hierarchies, were transformed in a 
general and particular way into Expressionist primitivism. The Expressionists' aim to 
equate art and life moved away . . . from Jugendstil ivory-tower aestheticism towards a 
new vitalism. At the same time, however, they found themselves lodged in a 
problematic zone between a private and a public world—affirming life but rejecting 
society.112 
 
But Jugendstil and the decorative arts movement were in fact ideologically diverse, and cannot 
simply be understood in terms of an straightforward opposition to modern industry and 
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economy, as may be the case with Meier-Graefe. For others associated with the movement, it 
represented above all a rejection of the traditional hierarchical distinction between fine art and 
ornament, and an interest in merging art and life, not as utopian vision, but applied in practice. 
A primary exponent of this view was Hermann Obrist, and Obrist in fact exerted a far greater, 
and historically demonstrable, influence on the artists of the Brücke. Kirchner had in fact 
attended for two semesters in 1903-4 the Studio for Teaching and Experimentation in the 
Applied and Fine Arts (Lehr- und Versuchs-Atelier für angewandte und freie Kunst), in Munich, 
which Obrist had co-founded with Wilhelm Debschitz in 1902.113 Graduates of the school were 
encouraged to find applications for their designs in industry. The intention was reform, but not 
rejection, of contemporary industrial society. The purpose of the school was, as the name 
implies, to develop practical applications of Jugendstil ideals.114 Obrist’s 1903 publication, Neue 
Möglichkeiten in der bildenden Kunst, a collection of his essays and lectures, outlined the 
principles of his aesthetic vision, not as utopian ideal but as practice in the present: 
Rarely has the moment been more propitious than it is today, when the initiative of 
powerful and enterprising corporate bodies has rescued the outskirts of our cities from 
the speculative builders of bleak apartment houses and has made them available for the 
building of homes fit for human beings to live in. In many of these developments the 
practical conditions of life at least come very close to the ideal that previous generations 
vainly longed for. In this new century let us take the chance that offers itself: let us 
prove ourselves worthy of social progress, by making these homes solid, true, 
contemporary, and individual, so that we may take pleasure in them and so that we may 
leave our descendants a memorial, not of the things we most liked to imitate, but of the 
way we were at the onset of the new century.115 
                                                     
113 Eva Afuhs and Andreas Strobl, eds., Hermann Obrist: Skulptur, Raum, Abstraktion um 1900 (Zurich: Scheidegger 
& Spiess, 2009); Brandmüller, “The Early Years,” 55. 
114 Cf. Lloyd, German Expressionism, 236n38. 
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Obrist’s numerous designs and sculptures, moreover, depicted forms in which the natural, 
human, and the material world (the built environment) existed in a synthetic harmony.116 In the 
margins of a sketch, he declared: “Everything spirals, radiates, swirls! Lines of force!”117 In this, 
as Annika Waenerberg writes, “Obrist’s own quest for forms differed from that of most of his 
fellow seekers,” a result of his appreciation for scientific naturalism.118 Natural objects, Obrist 
wrote, were “organized entries full of their own laws, full of structures, full of manifestations of 
the forces at work in them.”119 (See figs. 5.44 and 5.45.)  
Lloyd readily acknowledges Obrist’s important influence upon the Brücke. She cites a 
passage from Neue Möglichkeiten: 
We have already seen that there is little reason to admire or to regret the passing of the 
architecture and works of art made in recent times, although much of this is beautiful. It 
is much better to imitate the creations of relatively primitive peoples—like the early 
Greeks and medieval artists, or to go even further back to the ancient Vikings or even 
the natives from the South Seas. But this doesn’t mean that we should imitate their 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1919 (about rebuilding after World War I), in which he declared: “[Utopia] is, in fact, the only thing that survives. 
Let us then live in Utopia, let us fabricate plans, castles in Spain.” See Benson, 31. 
116 Hermann Obrist, Neue Möglichkeiten in der bildenden Kunst (Leipzig: Eugen Diederichs, 1903) 
117 “Alles spiralt, radiates, swirls! Kraftlinien!” Sketch, estate of Hermann Obrist, SGS Munich, Inv. no. 48816-fZ., 
translated by Annika Waenerberg, “Lebenskraft als Leitfaden: Naturpozesse und Konstruction in Obrists 
Formensprache,” in Hermann Obrist: Skulptur, Raum, Abstraktion um 1900, edited by Eva Afuhs and Andreas 
Strobl (Zurich: Scheidegger & Spiess, 2009), 46. 
118 Annika Waenerberg, “Lebenskraft als Leitfaden: Naturpozesse und Konstruction in Obrists Formensprache,” in 
Hermann Obrist: Skulptur, Raum, Abstraktion um 1900, eds. Eva Afuhs and Andreas Strobl (Zurich: Scheidegger & 
Spiess, 2009), 48. 
119 Hermann Obrist, “Die Lehr- und Versuch-Ateliers für angewandte und freie Kunst,” Dekorative Kunst, no. 12 
(1904): 229, translated by Waenerberg,  “Lebenskraft als Leitfaden,” 48. In a 1937 letter to Hagemann, Kirchner 
described the composition of his Berlin Street Scene (1913) in terms that echo Obrist’s: “I have the photo of the 
street scene in front of me . . . What a lot of authentic drawing is needed to make a picture like this! How the 
figures hold together and build the whole street with nothing other than two entrances. How the movement of the 
passers-by is captured by the rhomboid formed by their heads, which is repeated twice. In this way life and 
movement results from geometric, elementary forms. They rest on firm laws which precisely here, in this picture, 
are rediscovered, that is to say by the artist in light of his experience of nature. It is the task of the artist after all to 
sight the richness of nature and to order it anew, to reform it so that what is meant shines forth, clear and pure.”  
Kirchner to Hagemann, Davos, Feb. 27, 1937, quoted in Lloyd, German Expressionism, 146. 
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styles. Not at all. But we should create as they created—unconsciously, genuinely, 
simply, naturally, without thousands of stimuli and distractions.120 
 
The resonance with the Brücke Program is striking. Yet Lloyd suggests that while Obrist 
provided a basis for Brücke’s aesthetics, this was superseded by their turn to a new “primitive” 
vitalism. This turn brought them to Meier-Graefe and Simmel, and the practice of “merging art 
and life” in the present is thereby morphed in her interpretation into a nostalgic longing for an 
“unalienated” or “authentic” primitive state. But, as is clear from Obrist’s comment, the 
emphasis is on an experience of this vitalism in the present, in the act of creation. (In addition 
we should note his oscillation between Ursprüngliches and Wilden, which runs throughout the 
text, suggesting a more “primordial” than strictly evolutionary understanding of the 
“primitive.”) 
This sense of vitalism, which is linked to an experience of the present, in harmony with 
society rather than against it, is perhaps most clear in Obrist’s structural work. Although Obrist 
is largely known for his textile work, embroideries and furniture, around 1900 he began 
designing memorials and monumental outdoor structures, such as tombs, urns, and fountains. 
Today Obrist is widely recognized as the founder of twentieth-century architectural 
sculpture.121 Obrist’s sculptures and monuments featured architectural features such as 
                                                     
120 Obrist, Neue Möglichkeiten, 96, translation in Lloyd, German Expressionism, 5. “Wir haben gesehen, daß wir 
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121 Obrist trained as a sculptur. See Viola Weigel, “Herman Obrist und Die Fotografie zwischen 1900 und 1914,” in 
Hermann Obrist: Skulptur, Raum, Abstraktion um 1900, eds. Eva Afuhs and Andreas Strobl (Zurich: Scheidegger & 
Spiess, 2009),  177ff. 
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columns, capitals, and pyramids, demonstrating his concern with spaciality, a quality which has 
led critics to question “the erstwhile thesis of Jugendstil as a purely two-dimensional style.”122 
This was not lost on his contemporaries, however. The critic Willi Frank, writing for Deutsche 
Kunst und Dekoration about Obrist’s Oertel Monument (Grabmal Oertel, 1903/04 ), opined that 
“the work combines sculptural and architectural beauty in a completely new way.”123 (See fig. 
5.46.) Wilhelm Michel, writing for the same journal, observed that, regarding Obrist’s work, 
“the sculptors think it is not sculpture, the architects think it is not architecture.”124 (See figs. 
5.47 and 5.48.) Photographs of Obrist’s works were also frequently featured in Pan and 
Dekorative Kunst. Osthaus, as well, imagined a reform of industry through the reenvisioning of 
decorative arts, as did Fritz Schumacher, professor of structural engineering and Kirchner’s 
instructor at the Technical University in Dresden. This awareness of spaciality, and the 
importance of seeing art as part of its environment, was later expressed by Kirchner in his 
“Chronicle of the Künstlergruppe Brücke” (Chronik der KG Brücke, 1913, fig. 5.8), where he 
wrote that he and Heckel “attempted to bring the new painting into harmony with interior 
space.”125 
In other words, the work of Obrist, Osthaus and Schumacher does not neatly fit the 
label of  “ivory-tower aestheticism” with which Lloyd seeks to characterize Jugendstil. The 
vitalism that is found in the Brücke works should not, in this sense, be seen as a turning away 
                                                     
122 Willy Rotzler, “Hermann Obrist. Im Vorfeld abstrakter Skulpter,” in Aus dem Tag in die Zeit. Texte zur modernen 
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Obrist ,”180. 
124 Wilhelm Michel, “Eines neues Grabmal von Hermann Obrist,” in Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration, 
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125 Kirchner, Chronik der KG Brücke. “Heckel und Kirchner versuchten die neue Malerei mit dem Raum in Einklang 
zu bringen.” The original is reproduced in Heller, Brücke: Birth of Expressionism, 212. 
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from Jugendstil, but an extension of the ethos into a new terrain. It was not a shift towards a 
more nostalgic or romanticized critique of the present, in the vein of Meier-Graefe; the Brücke 
artists, like Obrist, pursued an application of Jugendstil ideals to art and life. 
 The relevance of this distinction, between a reform movement and a critique of 
modernity, is further demonstrated in the pages of Jugend: Münchner illustrierte Wochenschrift 
für Kunst und Leben, one of the leading journals of the Jugendstil movement (along with Pan 
and Simplicissimus), which was read by the Brücke members in their early days studying 
architecture at the Dresden Technical University.126 As Lloyd notes,  
Jugend proposed, on the one hand, a direct and immediate relationship with nature, 
expressed visually in the pantheistic and botanical designs which filled its pages. On the 
other hand Jugend illustrators embraced modern-life subjects—park, café and circus 
scenes.127  
 
This variety is apparent in the images from Jugend which Lloyd references (figs. 5.49 and 5.50).  
Lloyd poses this as a contrast, and yet as we have seen, the Jugendstil pioneers who had the 
most influence upon the early development of the Brücke did not in fact see an opposition 
here, but the potential for achieving harmonious experience, whether in natural settings or in 
urban ones. Lloyd is correct to point out, however, that in the images presented in Jugend, the 
natural world and the urban or social world are clearly separate “geographic locations”; but in 
both locations, the aim is to depict a harmony of form and content. 
Adolf Münzer’s Electrical Railway (Die Elektrische, 1900), although it is not in fact typical 
of his work, in particular demonstrates the Jugendstil synthesis of art and life, nature and 
society (fig. 5.51). Münzer generally favored images of young women, sometimes dancing or 
                                                     
126 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 6. Lloyd cites Fritz Bleyl, “Erinnerungen,” in “Fritz Bleyl, Gründungsmitglied der 
Brücke,” Kunst in Hessen und am Mittelrhein, vol. viii (1968), 95. 
127 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 6.. 
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elegantly riding atop horses, simple works which in the typical Jugendstil manner, with their 
ornamental and stylized quality, often to the point of caricature (and sometimes intentionally 
cartoonish).  Yet in this work, Münzer turns to examine a familiar scene of metropolitan life, 
and one in which, self-reflexively, Jugendstil design is in fact present in the subject itself. 
Münzer thus depicts the seamlessness between design and function, and the way in which the 
organic-botanical thrust of Jugendstil decoration blends into the urban environment. The 
familiar Jugendstil curves give shape not only to the windows of the tram but the tracks upon 
which it glides, and forms and objects which are distinct are brought into a formal harmony. 
There is for example the half-glimpsed wheel which visually joins with the curve of the track to 
seemingly suggest an organic-like spiral form (fig. 5.52). Less speculatively, there is the marked 
enthusiasm for industrial invention, for electricity, captured in the eagerness with which the 
children lean forward at the front of the train—and not only them, but the adult to the 
conductor’s left; even the conductor seems to be betray a familiar silent joy or pride in his 
work. 
 The point here is not to deny that the Brücke diverged from Jugendstil aesthetics; they 
clearly would do so. Aesthetically, they would reject the “cult of line, decoration, form, 
significance, beauty”128—the elegance and aesthetic harmonies would be replaced by rough, 
edgy angularity and jarring contrasts. The important point however is that they absorbed from 
Jugendstil the desire to bring art and society into harmony, and in a manner that celebrated the 
vitalism of the moment, which included both nature and contemporary society. Jugend was a 
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(1896-1944) and Jugend (1896-1940),” in The Oxford Critical and Cultural History of Modernist Magazines, Vol 3: 
Europe 1880 – 1940, Part II, eds. Peter Brooker, Sascha Bru, Andrew Thacker, and Christian Weikop (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 719. 
364 
 
product of bustling fin-de-siècle Munich, which brought together a robust economic and 
industrial center with (in Thomas Mann’s words) a “radiant” artistic community129; as Timothy 
W. Hiles writes, it was intended “to capture the vitality of this thriving atmosphere of 
innovation and cultural exchange.”130 George Hirth, who founded the journal in 1896, was a 
major promoter of the arts and crafts movement. Hiles notes, Hirth was “a progressive who 
saw the positive aspects of innovation in science, politics, and industry, he exemplified the 
quickly fading embodiment of the South German liberal thinkers.”131 In contrast to Munich’s 
other new journal, Simplicissimus (also founded in 1896),  with its biting satire and critical social 
and political commentary, Hirth’s journal reflected his liberal optimism through its embrace of 
the present (Daseinsfreude). Hirth hoped to propagate this philosophy and the journal’s low 
cost and accessible content (the editorial philosophy was “Kurz und gut,” or short and sweet) 
were intentionally aimed at reaching a broad public (unlike its Berlin counterpart, Pan, for 
example). 
 Jugend, however, was in many ways a self-contradiction. It aimed at merging art and 
life, yet the focus on the aesthetic and literary (in contrast to a journal like Simplicissimus) 
implied a separation of art and politics. Similarly, the  affirmation of the present could easily slip 
into the simplistic nature-worship of Fidus (a frequent contributor), or a sentimental escapism 
into a fantasy world—the pages were often populated with nymphs and satyrs, medieval 
knights and lovely maidens.132 The latter were nevertheless sandwiched between 
advertisements for such modern accoutrements as bicycles, fashionable chocolates and wines, 
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and the latest cameras—producing above all a sense of contrast with the “aesthetic” content 
(fig. 5.53). The synthesis of nature and society, of the human and the nonhuman world, 
although the informing principle of Jugendstil leaders such as Obrist, were at times 
unintentionally reinforced in the pages of Jugend. It many ways, however, it would be the 
sensitivity to contrast that shaped the Brücke aesthetics even more greatly than Jugendstil’s 
harmonies, a point to which I will return below. 
 Lloyd interprets Jugend’s aesthetics as “an alternative to the charade of historicism”: “In 
Jugend,” she writes, “country and city subjects were located in opposite geographic locations, 
but they were analogous in terms of the double-pronged attack on historicism.”133 Two errors 
must here be noted. First, the division between country and city is less clear than she suggests; 
as we saw both in Münzer’s image and in Obrist’s work, natural forms were discernible in the 
human environment, and architectural, structural principles were visible in nature. Second, 
Lloyd’s interpretation of the “attack” on historicism plays upon multiple meanings of the word. 
She means, initially, the rejection of the nineteenth-century tendency in art to return to 
historical subjects as well as recreate particular historical styles. She cites Nikolaus Pevsner, for 
whom historicism “is the tendency to believe in the power of history that suffocates originality 
and replaces it by an activity that is inspired by the precedent of a particular period.”134 Yet she 
slides from this definition of anti-historicist aesthetics into the suggestion that die Brücke 
evinced a “turning away from history,” which is taken to mean “rejecting society.” It will 
therefore be necessary to once more distinguish between aesthetic aims and cultural 
orientation. 
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 Aesthetically speaking, the young artists’ desire to throw off the yolk of classical 
aesthetics is clear. This is evident in the primary place that free drawing and drawing from 
nature took in their early work. In Dresden, Kirchner enrolled in such courses as “Figure 
Drawing from Live Models” and “Freehand Drawing and Ornamentation.” 135 Although we 
should note that he also took courses in “Dresden’s Museums and their Artistic Treasures” and 
“Nineteenth-Century Sculpture,” and thus was not entirely seeking to break from the past—
although he presented it as such in his Chronik:  
[The artists] came together in Kirchner’s studio to work there. Here they found the 
opportunity to study the nude—the basis of all visual art—in its natural freedom. From 
drawing on this basis resulted the desire, common to all, to derive inspiration from life 
itself, and to submit to direct experience.136 
 
The Brücke artists rejected the constraints of academically sanctioned techniques, and 
demanded openness to present experience. Above all the influence from Obrist propelled them 
in this direction. Nicole Brandmüller writes that Obrist’s studio, “unlike most art schools in 
those days . . . did not allow students to copy older works of art, but instead required them to 
do all their drawing from nature.”137 Moreover, the models “were allowed to move freely 
around the studio,” instead of holding “rigid, highly artificial poses . . . and some of the nude 
classes were even held outdoors.”138 In Dresden, the artists initiated the practice of drawing 
“quarter-hour nudes,” in which the models were not allowed to remain in any single position 
for longer than fifteen minutes. These intentionally hasty sketches compelled the artists to 
react quickly to their subjects, and thus they sought to free themselves from conventional 
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representational practices (fig. 5.54). Writing in his diary in 1925, Kirchner recalled the scene in 
their Dresden studio:  
We drew and we painted. Hundreds of drawings a day, with talk and fooling in between, 
the artists joining the models before the easel and vice versa. All the encounters of 
everyday life were incorporated in our memories in this way. The studio became the 
home of the people who were being drawn: they learned from the artists and the 
painters from them. The pictures took on immediate and abundant life.139 
 
 Thus, the Brücke’s aesthetic aim of rejecting academic historicism, and creating from 
“life,” is undeniable.  Lloyd errs, however, when she connects this aesthetic aim to a “turning 
away from history,” which amounts to a rejection of society. She bases this argument, as we 
have seen, on a purported alignment with Meier-Graefe and Simmel, writing, “This spirit of 
contempt for the petty bourgeoisie and the materialistic values of their times underlies the 
organization of die Brücke, rather than any specific ambitions for social reform.”140  
This realignment, she claims, paralleled a new primitivism, in which the “primitive” 
signified the authentic and unalienated, in contrast to modern life. She writes that the Brücke 
thus are responding to: 
the themes treated by Simmel and Meier-Graefe at the turn of the century, concerning 
direct and authentic creative activity as an alternative to the alienating and fragmented 
conditions of divided labour. . . . [Kirchner’s] notions of originality and authenticity stem 
from the early Dresden years in Schumacher’s Studio. But whereas the arts and crafts 
movement sought a solution to the alienating conditions of the age in the cultivation of 
handwork and craft traditions, the Brücke artists tried to reclaim a sense of authenticity 
via their transforming notions of the “primitive.”141 
 
Yet we are now in a position to see that Lloyd interprets the Brücke’s primitivism through the 
lens of this alleged “alignment” with the critique of modernity. As I will demonstrate in greater 
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detail below, the Brücke’s notions of authenticity were in fact less straightforward, and more 
paradoxical, than this interpretation suggests. The authentic was not ultimately posed in 
opposition to the alienating or artificial conditions of reproduction; their work questioned the 
distinction between artificial and authentic. To return then to the Brücke Program, authentic 
(unverfälscht) is more satisfactorily interpreted in opposition, not to alienation or 
fragmentation, as Lloyd would have us think, but to verfälscht, distorted or falsified. For the 
Brücke,  unverfälscht suggested an interest above all in genuineness and vitality; yet this had 
more to with perceiving and expressing the truth of experience, and not a critique of a 
particular state of “modernity.” As Peter Selz writes,  
Kirchner was convinced that art must be an expression of life itself and not a 
background for living. His historical studies had made him aware that Greek vase 
painting, Roman murals, the art of the South Seas, and Byzantine and medieval art were 
formed by and expressed the essences of their respective lives and cultures. This, he 
felt, must be the aim of the new generation of painters.142  
 
 The Brücke’s vision for a new art was not predicated upon rejuvenating a “depleted” 
modern existence through recuperating a regenerative “primitive” authenticity (any more than 
this would have been the aim of Roman murals or carved Palau beams), but rather based on 
aesthetic principles of perception and expression that demanded that the artist honestly depict 
lived experience (an honesty which depends as much upon an awareness of style, an 
appreciation for formal precedent, as it does an immediate intuition); principles, in other 
words, that would hold true, in any type of society—the distinction between civilization and 
primitive rendered irrelevant. 
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Lloyd concludes that, on account of Brücke’s “new” primitivism, which echoed the 
contemporary critique of modernity, their “redefinition of Jugendstil”—that is, the 
transformation of the original Jugendstil-inspired aim of “merging life and art” into a form of 
primitivism—was doomed to failure.  Citing Georg Lukács, she writes, “German modernism was 
thus ‘cut off from the mainstream of society,’ despite its idealist attempts to counteract the 
reified conditions of the modern world and to bridge the gulf between art and its public.”143 
 To underline the point, Lloyd records that in 1911 Kirchner and Pechstein founded in 
Berlin the Institute for Modern Instruction in Painting (Moderner Unterricht in Malerei, or 
MUIM-Institut), which was based upon the Obrist Studio. She notes that the MUIM-Institute 
“only attracted two pupils,” a sign of their failure. She further suggests that the organizational 
structure of the Brücke produced a contradiction. In seeking to escape the “alienating 
commercial conditions of the art market,” they created collectives based on membership—but 
in doing so ended up relying upon a small coterie of “bourgeois enthusiasts.” She argues, citing 
a comment from Lucius Grisebach, that the bohemianism of the Brücke studios “was a topsy-
turvy version of their own middle-class backgrounds, and that the visits their bourgeois 
intellectual supporters like Gustav Schiefler and Botho Graef made to the bohemian studio 
settings were ‘flights in their own dreamland.’” Lloyd frames the Brücke’s failure on this score 
in terms of Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde. Bürger had drawn a distinction between 
bourgeois modernism and a more radical avant garde. Modernism, in its formalist self-
referentialism and its celebration of the autonomy of art (captured in the motto, l’art pour 
l’art), had cut itself off from praxis, from ordinary life. Avant-garde, according to Bürger, 
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developed explicitly as a reaction to, and rejection of, modernism’s self-amputation. As Lloyd 
writes, quoting from Bürger, “the crux of the avant-garde revolt was their ambition ‘not to 
isolate themselves but to reintegrate themselves and their art into life.’”144  In Lloyd’s 
interpretation, the Brücke, “which in many ways occupies a transitional position in the history 
of modern art, also spans across Bürger’s categories, relating to aspects of both.” Lloyd’s image 
of spanning categories, of course, plays off the image of the bridge, one which she interprets as 
ambivalence, caught between utopia and despair, or in this case, between a “primitive” ideal, 
and a “modern” reality. Although the Brücke begin with a desire to bring art and life into 
harmony, their particular form of primitivism ultimately prevents them achieving their aim, 
leading Lloyd to conclude that, “in Bürger’s terms this constitutes a modernist counterculture 
rather than a radical avant garde.”145 
However, before drawing such a conclusion, it is worth citing the 1911 advertisement in 
which they explained their offerings (fig. 5.55):  
Modern instruction in painting, graphic design, sculpture, rug design, glass and metal 
work, painting in architectural contexts. Instruction with new means in a new spirit. Life 
drawing in relation to composition. . . . Contemporary life is the point of departure for 
creation. 
 
The most important lessons to draw from the MUIM are, first, the Obrist-influenced merger of 
art and design, aesthetics and engineering; and second, the devotion to “contemporary life.” 
Brücke’s interest in joining in art and life did not represent “turning away from history” or 
“rejecting society,” as Lloyd has it; the manifold experience of life (private and public, natural 
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and urban), was for them the material for creation. The key to their aesthetics, inspired by the 
vitalism of Obrist, is precisely this openness to this life. 
 
Part 6.  Brücke and the Vital Materialism of Walt Whitman 
 
 Hermann Obrist, however, is not the only important source for understanding the 
Brücke’s particular vitalism and openness to contemporary life.  Although it is seldom discussed 
in the scholarship, the Brücke members, and Kirchner especially, were great admirers of the 
poetry of Walt Whitman. As Peter Selz has written, “[Kirchner] wanted his paintings to be a vital 
image of the life of his time, the result of a creative imagination stimulated by the realities of its 
environment. He wanted to do paintings, he later wrote, similar in feeling to Walt Whitman’s 
Leaves of Grass, ‘the book which became his best friend.’”146 This intriguing comment is the 
only mention Selz makes of Whitman in his important survey, German Expressionist Painting. It 
is unfortunate that aside from a few rare mentions in the general literature, noting that 
Kirchner described Leaves of Grass as his favorite book, the connection between Whitman and 
the Brücke has not been seriously pursued.147 The Brücke’s interest in Whitman further 
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undermines the prevailing inclination to link the Brücke to the “critique of modernity” and its 
exponents discussed above. 
The first German translation of Leaves of Grass was published in 1889 as Grashalme. The 
translation was made by Thomas William Rolleston, an Irish nationalist, and Karl Knortz, a 
German immigrant to the United States. Rolleston, a friend of Whitman, had settled in Dresden 
around 1880. Rolleston translated a selection of poems from Leaves of Grass, which he printed 
with the progressive Swiss publisher Jakob Schabelitz, an edition that was well received.148 In 
1907, the German playwright Johannes Schlaf published an edition of Grashalme with the first 
German mass market book publisher Philipp Reclam.149 Schlaf’s edition is generally credited 
with giving birth to the “Whitman Cult,” as Walter Grünzweig terms it, and Whitman’s poems 
began to appear in numerous periodicals, such as Das Forum, Die Aktion, and Die Weissen 
Blätter.150 However it would seem that Kirchner and his group were ahead of the crowd, as 
Donald Gordon writes: “Heckel, during the group’s evenings together in 1905 and 1906, would 
read this or that poem out of Kirchner’s books, or would recite it form memory in a manner 
thrilling, moving, vitally brilliant—whether it was ‘die Brück’ am Tah,’ ‘Zwei Füsse im Feuer,’ or, 
from Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass.”151 
Whitman’s signature importance to Kirchner is testified to in a letter Kirchner wrote to 
the art dealer Curt Valentin, dated April 17, 1937: 
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That great poet, Walt Whitman, was responsible for my outlook on life. During my 
dismal days of want and hunger in Dresden, his Leaves of Grass was and still is my 
comfort and encouragement.152 
 
Dayna Lynn Sadow notes that Heckel too was an ardent admirer. 153  Whitman is indeed all the 
more relevant due to what he symbolized to his German audience—namely, more so than in 
the US, he was looked to as an embodiment of primitivism. Whitman’s translators are quick to 
quote his “barbaric yawp” which he sounds “over the roofs of the world.”154 
 The few works of scholarship that do comment upon the influence of Whitman suggest 
that the primary interest for the Brücke would have been Whitman’s celebration of free 
sexuality, which would have aligned with their bohemian rejection of bourgeois standards.155 
Weikop, for example, writes that “the sexual vitalism of his verse made him a favorite.”156 This 
is no doubt the case. Others focus on Whitman’s depiction of the human in communion with 
nature, in particular the bather paintings of 1912 and 1913, and this too seems evident.  
However, as I argue, the particular relationship between human and nature on display in 
the Brücke’s work cannot fully be accounted for in this interpretation. The tendency has been 
to see Brücke images of humans in nature as a “longed for” or utopian image of unalienated 
life; these interpretations miss the fact that the same vitalism which comes across in the nature 
paintings is also found in still lifes and scenes depicting the built environment (which includes 
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not only small town life but the urban world)—it is, in other words, not a “return to nature” at 
work, but a vitalism based on material itself, experienced not in a utopian fantasy (as critique of 
the present), but experienced in the present, the modern, the “now.” 
Scholars have invoked the Brücke’s interest in Whitman primarily when  discussing a 
series of oil paintings which Kirchner made  in the summer of 1912, depicting scenes on the 
island of Fehmarn, in the Baltic Sea. Kirchner had first visited Fehmarn in 1908. He returned in 
1912 with Erna Schilling; Schmidt-Rottluff and Heckel visited him there. Rhodes describes 
Kirchner’s Ins Meer Schreitende (Striding into the Sea, 1912, fig. 5.56), considered the high point 
of these works, as an example of Whitman’s “democratic” sexual equality (a line of argument 
Rhodes presumably picks up from Gordon’s posthumously published Expressionism: Art and 
Idea).157 A man and woman in natural surroundings stride forward into the sea with ease and 
purpose, holding hands, their bodies radiant and healthy. Rhodes writes, “It is tempting here to 
invoke Kirchner’s favorite poet,” and cites Whitman’s line, “The Female equally with the Male I 
Sing”—a declaration from “One’s Self I Sing,” the very first “inscription” in Leaves of Grass.158 In 
addition, the objects of the painting all seem to resonate with each other, as curves are 
duplicated and colors schemes are balanced; the figures seem to be made of the same stuff as 
their surroundings. As in many of Kirchner’s works, there is an inversion of forms. The 
downward curve of the bathers’ legs is inverted in the upward curve of the hills behind them. 
The curves of the female’s breasts are mirrored in the upward curves intended to suggest the 
male’s clavicle bones. The waves and stones reveal upward curves, the sky downward curves. 
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Rhodes writes, “The shapes used to delineate their taut, gothic forms are not only echoed in 
each body, but also in the waves, dunes, lighthouse and sky. The bathing pictures are images of 
communion, not only with nature, but also between human beings.”159 
 Rhodes’ depiction captures the vitalism of Kirchner’s engorged landscape. Yet this 
vitalism is consistently interpreted as a “longed-for” or “archaic” authenticity, symbolized by 
the “primitive.” In other words, as the sexual antithesis of bourgeois life, and as the natural 
antithesis of modern society. Ashley Bassie, for example, quotes a passage from “Song of 
Myself,”  in which Whitman, she claims, “expresses ecstatically the longed-for fusion with 
nature itself that became so central to Expressionist thinking.”160 Donald Gordon similarly 
invokes the “primitive” in his interpretation, writing, “Kirchner here comes closest to a vision of 
untamed dionysian man, at one with a state of primal nature.”161 Two issues must thus be 
addressed: the erroneous focus in such interpretations on “nature” (as opposed to the 
material), and the way in which the “primitive” is said to operate in these works. 
There can be no doubt that Kirchner approached the topic with the “primitive” in mind. 
In a letter, Kirchner compared his Baltic refuge with the exotic South Sea Islands: “Ochre, blue, 
green are the colors of Fehmarn, wonderful coastlines, sometimes with the abundance of the 
South Seas, great flowers with fleshy stalks.”162 Donald Gordon notes that the proportions of 
the bodies in Striding to the Sea echo Kirchner’s wood sculptures from this period, which were 
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derived from Cameroon sculptures. (See for example Sitzende Frau mit Holtzpastik, Seated 
Woman with Wood Sculpture, 1912, fig. 5.56.) Gordon’s interpretation of a complementary 
Fehmarn work, Kirchner’s Badende zwischen Steinen (Bather between Rocks, 1912), reveals the 
way in which, through the association of the “primitive,” nature is cast as the antithesis of 
modernity: 
The body of the Bather thus possesses the compactness of youth and the vitalist vigor of 
the nubile conceived in primitive terms. The over-all expression appears superficially 
archaic, suggesting a race of human beings confident and unselfconscious, possessing a 
casual and natural innocence possible only before the Fall. But it is a flawed innocence 
which is depicted here, expressing the fantasy wish of an anxiously urban age.163 
 
While it is clear that the “primitive” offered the framework through which Kirchner approached 
his subject, it is less clear that this “primitive” is posed as simply “archaic” in opposition to 
modernity, as a “fantasy wish,” as Gordon would have it. It is important to note that this was 
not the only work Kirchner made at Fehmarn. Although most of the works depict vivid 
landscapes, and often bathers, a full examination of Kirchner’s output reveals that the same 
techniques, which supposedly depict a unity of human and nature, are also employed in such 
works as Burg auf Fehmarn (Burg on Fehmarn, 1912, fig 5.58), where red-roofed houses and 
forest grow together, merging into a dense foliage comprised of both the organic and the man-
made, built environment, as rounded hills are echoed in rounded streets up to the rounded 
roof and steeple of what must certainly be St. Nicholas Church (see fig. 5.59). In addition, in 
Striding, the lighthouse is a small feature on the horizon; in several other works from the 
summer, however, it figures centrally, including Grüner Leuchtturm auf Fehmarn (Green 
Lighthouse on Fehmarn, 1912, figs. 5.60 and 5.61). Other works that depict a dynamic and 
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energetic unity, not just of human and nature, but of the built environment and nature, include 
Hafen Burgstaaken, Fehmarn (Burgstaaken Harbor, Fehmarn, 1913), Bootshafen auf Fehmarn 
(Boat Harbor on Fehmarn, 1913), Gut Staberhof, Fehmarn, I (Staberhof Countryseat, 1913, fig. 
5.62) and Gut Staberhof, Fehmarn, III (Staberhof Countryseat, III, 1913, fig. 5.63). 
One might be tempted to see these images of idyllic countryside landscapes as a 
reflection of Heimatkunst, the popular late-nineteenth century movement in Germany 
composed of artists and intellectuals who “saw the countryside and the traditional small town 
as the source of the nation’s health, the modern city as a threat to it.”164 Heimatkunst revolved 
around images of cottages and country life; its proponents included Langbehn as well as Adolf 
Bartels, whose popular illustrated study, Der Bauer in der deutschen Vergangenheit (The 
Peasant in German History) was published in 1900. The artist community at Worpswede, 
established in the 1890s not far from Bremen, is often seen the most prominent example of this 
attempt at joining “spiritual integrity and national purity” in a bucolic rural setting. 165 Weikop 
has recently raised this very issue, suggesting (tentatively, he admits) that “the multifaceted 
notion of Heimat might be helpful in allowing us to reconsider the nature of Brücke’s cultural 
identity.”166  
The contemporary interest in Heimat no doubt adds an important context to the 
Brücke’s work, but there are good reasons to resist aligning their own with the tradition of 
Heimatkunst. Schmidt-Rottluff, for starters, had visited Worpswede in 1907. In a letter dated 
1909, he criticized their work as provincial, “a wholly temporary phenomenon in German 
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art.”167 (Jill Lloyd notes that he had probably not seen the work of Paula Modersohn-Becker, 
whose paintings diverged from the lyrical landscapes of the Worpswede style, particularly in 
her turn to portraits and still lifes, and her adoption of a primitivism inspired by Gauguin.) 
Perhaps the best response to such attempts to link the Fehmarn works and Brücke’s 
depictions of nature to Heimatkunst is the aesthetic development of Kirchner’s work itself; for 
example, among the works Kirchner executed during this same period, we find Nollendorf Platz 
(Nollendorf Square, 1912), Zirkusreiterin (Girl Circus Rider, 1912), and Weiblicher Akt mit 
Badezuber (Female Nude with Bathtub, 1912), some of Kirchner’s best known and most highly 
praised paintings, all of which are a far cry from Heimatkunst (figs. 5.64 – 5.66). Scholars 
generally present these animated works of contemporary life as distinct from the Fehmarn 
works, and attribute the contrast to ambivalence and alternating interests (moving between 
the “backward-looking” interest in nature or Heimat, the “forward looking” interest in modern 
life). This interpretation neglects the important similarities in the treatment of the subjects 
between the Fehmarn works and these works of “contemporary life”; only in the latter scenes, 
the vitalism of the human in “archaic” nature is found instead to manifest itself in the public 
urban city center, the world of popular entertainment, and private domestic space.  
One should note, for example, the use of the same palette and serrated shading 
techniques used for both Nollendorf Platz and Gut Staberhof I. The scene on Fehmarn involves 
few humans and little action, in comparison to the busy city scene; and yet Gut Staberhof I 
shares the same glowing energy and the sense of movement of the material, from the earth to 
the treetops to the rooftops. These two works, though thematically varied (city versus country), 
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are linked to each other and to the other works just mentioned through an aesthetic trajectory 
that begins with Fünf Badende am See  (Five Bathers at the Lake, 1911, fig. 5.67), as Donald 
Gordon has argued. 168  An important transitional work for Kirchner, Five Bathers was inspired 
by the Ajanta paintings which Kirchner encountered in Griffiths’ illustrated volume of Indian 
Buddhist cave paintings. Gordon writes, “The Five Bathers marks the precise moment of 
departure from the Fauve style dominant in Kirchner’s painting until this time. The colors 
chosen, for example, are green, brown, and lavender pink for the figures—recapitulating the 
secondary hues which dominate those Ajanta paintings illustrated in color by Griffiths. More 
muted oranges (browns), greens and violets were to dominate Kirchner’s palette in 1912 and 
1913, largely replacing the pure yellows, reds and blues favored during the years of Van Gogh 
and Fauve inspiration.” Gordon notes that this new color scheme is most fully expressed in 
Striding into the Sea. In addition, Gordon notes that in Five Bathers, “the use of small, serrated 
halftone strokes to supplement the dark contours provides the first occasion when the graphic 
zig-zag equivalents for modeling are tentatively incorporated into the painting style. These 
strokes were soon to undergo a morphological transformation from the regularly spaced zig-
zags in works from later 1911, through the looser ‘scribble’ strokes of 1912 and 1913, to 
culminate in those electric serrations of great amplitude characteristic of the Berlin street 
scenes in 1913 and 1914.”  
In other words, the minor use of this hatching brushstroke originally to suggest contours 
in Five Bathers has become, in these works from 1912, more pronounced and dramatic, 
providing more than countour and three-dimensionality but used to animate the bodies in 
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question. The interesting tension produced by this development is that, as Gordon notes, the 
use of this technique derives from a shorthand notation to suggest sculptural modeling – 
inanimate artistic creations. Thus the inanimate is here used to animate.   
In the 1912 works the hatching remains largely tied to contours; in another work of 
1912,  Porträt Dr. Alfred Döblin (Portrait of Dr. Alfred Döblin, fig. 5.68), Gordon observes that 
“the zigzag stroke is here for the first time consistently used to animate interior areas of two-
dimensional shapes themselves.” In some of the works from 1913 and 1914 (the Berlin street 
scenes, the 1914 Zirkusreiter), the animation spills over, not only animating shapes, but 
seemingly animating the relationships between shapes. When placed along this trajectory, 
works such as Striding, Girl Circus Rider, Nollendorf Platz and Gut Staberhof I reveal hatchwork 
that begins to tear itself away from edges, and to animate bodies and space. Indeed, in 
Nollendorf Platz and Gut Staberhof I, the human figures, although glimpsed from a distance in 
both works, both through positioning and uniform coloring (black in Nollendorf Platz, grey in 
Gut Staberhof I) echo the hatchings of the world around them. Thus the dynamism of the 
brushstrokes, which in Striding into the Sea both embeds the figures into their surroundings 
and evokes (through contours) the volume, materiality and life of the surroundings (the water 
and sky as well as the land) is equally present in Nollendorf Platz and Gut Staberhof I.  
A second feature uniting these works is the use of spatial distortion. Gordon, in 
discussing Zirkysreiterin, speaks of the way in which spatial distortion creates a “kinesthetic 
empathy”—the creation of empathy for a body through observing movement, and being drawn 
into the movement. Gordon writes,  “though introducing a marked degree of depth recession ... 
Kirchner’s work combines a nearly frontal view of the larger figures with an exaggeratedly 
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foreshortened view of the arena and the spectators upper left (where the two tent-supports 
converge downward).” The stage appears to the viewer as if seen from a great height, and yet 
the frontality and proportions of the horse and rider thrust the figures straight to the viewer.169 
Significantly, however, this use of combined perspectives leading to distorted spatiality is also 
present in the works discussed above, such Striding and Staberhof I.  All have the combination 
of frontality mixed with foreshortened perspective; most often, it is the central figures which 
appear frontal; the background and foreground meanwhile are tilted forwards, to produce an 
aerial view. The effect heightens the movement and creates tension in the work, which 
produces animation.  
In this context, placing Striding into the Sea in conversation with other works by 
Kirchner during the period, it no longer sense to say that the Fehmarn works represent the 
“unity of the naked human being and primordial nature,” or, as Gordon argues of Striding into 
the Sea, “In its abstract geometry and dynamic tensions . . . the picture (like others of its kind) 
was to remain inwardly for Kirchner the first embodiment of a cherished dream in a nightmare 
world.”170 Rather, these works depict a vital materialism, of which the human is a part, but this 
vitalism is not confined to the natural, organic world.  The works evoke things and the 
boundaries between them, only to blur them.  
 Schmidt-Rottluff’s work from the same period offers a further example undermining the 
ascription of a seemingly simple primitivism of the Brücke nature paintings. Schmidt-Rottluff 
also drew inspiration  from the seaside landscapes of northern Germany, in particular from the 
Baltic coastal town of Nidden. Such works as Summer (1913) and Three Nudes – Dunes at 
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Nidden (1913) present another images of humans embedded in nature (figs. 5.69 and 5.70). 
Moreover, in Three Nudes, the “primitive” element is again discernible in the treatment of the 
figures, whose faces resemble the “primitive” figurines that Schmidt-Rottluff was then 
depicting in such works as Still Life (1913, fig. 5.71) and Still Life with African Figures (1913, fig. 
5.72). Yet as Rhodes points out, in Three Dunes there is an absence of clear signification in the 
work: “They are not wearing jewelry or clothing in the picture and there is no conventional sign 
of either savagery or civilization. . . . The women in Three Nudes are not exclusively 
recognizable as white Europeans on vacation in the Baltic town of Nidden, as the title might 
suggest, since all identifying cultural markers have been omitted.”171 We can compare this with 
a similar image from the pages of Jugend depicting an Arcadian scene (fig. 5.73). In the work by 
Wilhelm Volz, a founding member of the Munich Secession, the women “return” to nature, but 
their robes and the implied modesty of the bather  serve as clear reminders not only of 
civilization but of European civilization, as markers of the boundary between humans and 
nature. In Schmidt-Rottluff’s work, however, the distinction between nature and human, 
primitive and modern, is effectively blurred. (One might also compare with Pechstein here, for 
example his work Summer in the Dunes, 1911; the motivation of depicting the human and 
nature in harmony through the nude is again the same, but by comparison Pechstein’s 
naturalism limits his ability to express the “embeddedness” found in Kirchner and Schmidt-
Rottluff’s work.172) 
 To return to Whitman, then, it is worth quoting in full the “Inscription” from which 
Rhodes draws: 
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One’s-Self I sing, a simple, separate person, 
Yet utter the word Democratic, the word En-Masse. 
 
Of physiology from top to toe I sing, 
Not physiognomy alone nor brain alone is worthy for the Muse, I say  
the Form complete is worthier far, 
The Female equally with the Male I sing. 
 
Of Life immense in passion, pulse, and power, 
Cheerful, for freest action form’d under the laws divine, 
The Modern Man I sing.173 
 
Whitman’s poetry, here and elsewhere, is about more than sexual democracy and a celebration 
of nature. Here, in the opening lines to Leaves of Grass, the poet boldly announces a rejection 
of alleged oppositions: not only between the female and the male, but the individual as 
opposed to the mass, the body to the mind, freedom to law. Whitman’s poem is a passionate 
statement of authenticity, but there is no dichotomy between this authenticity and modernity. 
“Nature” pervades both. The “primitive” for the Brücke operated in the same fashion. There is 
indeed a celebration of nature, but not nature as “archaic,” in opposition to the present or 
modern.  
In other words, I would argue it is not a depiction of a lost, “longed-for,” “primitive” 
connection of human and nature that is on display in this Brücke works; it is rather a depiction 
of the relationship (in the present moment) between the human and the material. I use the 
term “material” here in the sense given to it by Jane Bennett in her work Vibrant Matter: A 
Political Ecology of Things, in which she invokes it as part of a philosophical project to resist 
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“the idea of matter as passive stuff, as raw, brute, or inert.”174  She seeks “to reject the 
life/matter binary”: 
This habit of parsing the world into dull matter (it, things) and vibrant life (us, beings) is 
a “partition of the sensible,” to use Jacques Rancièr’s phrase. The quarantines of matter 
and life encourage us to ignore the vitality of matter and the lively powers of material 
formations.175 
 
Bennett re-examines such thinkers as Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henry David 
Thoreau, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in order to develop a positive ontology of matter as 
alive. She seeks to “dissipate the onto-theological binaries of life/matter, human/animal, 
will/determination, and organic/inorganic.”176 Her aim is that we “take seriously the vitality of 
(nonhuman) bodies.” By “vitality,” she refers to:  
the capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to impede or 
block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with 
trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own. My aspiration is to articulate a 
vibrant materiality that runs alongside and inside humans.177 
 
Bennett uses the term “vital materialism” in part to distinguish her conception from 
vitalism, the popular early-twentieth-century philosophy which is particularly associates with 
Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch. Bergson, in L’evolution créatrice (1907; published as Creative 
Evolution in 1910), and Driesch, in his Gifford lectures titled The Science and Philosophy of the 
Organism (1907-8), both developed philosophies of life out of a deeply felt opposition to a 
scientific materialist philosophy, which in their view offered purely mechanical or deterministic 
theories of the universe. Bergson and Driesch insisted that life could not be, indeed must not be 
reduced to matter. They asserted that matter required something extra, a life principle, which 
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was not itself material, but which was the animating force. Bergson’s name for this force was 
élan vital; Driesch’s, entelechy.178  
Bennett embraces their “attempts to give philosophical voice to the vitality of things,” 
but ultimately rejects the fact that their work posits a difference, an ontological divide, 
between life and matter.179 Although they insisted that matter was ultimately incalculable by 
the means of scientific rationalism, they felt that in order to make this argument, it was 
necessary to posit something “outside” of matter, which infused it, but was ontologically 
different. “The concept of nature must be enlarged,” Driesch wrote, so that it “consists of one 
completely spatial and one only partly spatial portion.”180 The vital force, Bennett explains, or 
that “only partly spatial portion of nature,” provided the impetus for change.  She thus draws 
upon vitalism to develop her argument, but rejects its ontological divisions, in order to create 
an ontological picture of “vibrant matter” itself—she writes optimistically: “It might be only a 
small step from the creative agency of a vital force to a materiality conceived as itself this 
creative agent.”181 
 The art of the Brücke, I would argue, was also inspired by the same cultural context of 
vitalism and Lebensphilosophie that fostered Bergson’s and Driesch’s ideas; but more than this, 
it in fact  comes closer to the vital materialism as theorized by Bennett. In works like Striding 
into the Sea, we see a depiction of matter itself as vibrant and alive. This vibrant matter isn’t 
found only in the bathing scenes, but in images of Dresden and in Berlin, whether in the 
bustling thoroughfares or circus entertainments. 
                                                     
178 Ibid., 62-81. 
179 Ibid., 63. 
180 Driesch, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism (1908), 321, quoted in Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 64. 
181 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 65. 
386 
 
Bennett, in outlining her  theory of vital materialism, notes that her work is based on 
more than philosophical argument: “What is also needed is a cultivated, patient, sensory 
attentiveness to nonhuman forces operating outside and inside the human body.”182 She 
explains that she has endeavored to develop attentiveness to things, in particular through close 
attention to the writings of Thoreau and Whitman.  She has developed this aspect of her work 
in subsequent essays and lectures, attempting to recuperate the nineteenth-century notion of 
Sympathy, but to expand its definition beyond its human-centered focus, to designate a 
“peculiar cross-species rapport or exchange,” “a sphere that includes but is not limited to inter-
human activity.”  She terms this “impersonal mesh of attractions and affiliations between 
bodies” an OntoSympathy.183 Thoreau, she says, suggests such a view when he writes: “Shall I 
not have intelligence with the earth? Am I not partly leaves and vegetable mould myself?”184 
She quotes from Whitman’s “Song of Myself,” where Whitman declares: “I find I incorporate 
gneiss, coal, long-threaded moss, fruits, grains, esculent roots.”185 (Gneiss is a common type of 
foliated rock.)  Bennett concludes: “I take Thoreau and Whitman to be saying that the 
Sympathy in which they participate is a function of a certain overlap or coincidence of 
materials.” 
 The Brücke’s interest in Whitman, I would argue, goes beyond the interest in free 
sexuality and an idealized nature; rather, the Brücke aesthetics were based on a similar notion 
of sympathy (although they didn’t term it such) with material, and a sense of vital materialism 
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as Bennett understands it. As it happens, Whitman’s leading German translator, Johannes 
Schlaf, had quoted the same line as Bennett in his essay on Whitman from 1892. Schlaf went on 
to explain, “Everything lives in him, in you, in all of us, is contained and enclosed by us: humans, 
stars, times, animals, plants, stones.”186  
A few lines further, Schlaf quotes a line from a memorable section of “Song of Myself”: 
“Urge and urge and urge / Always the procreant urge of the world.”187 Donald Gordon quotes 
this passage as well, when discussing the Brücke-Whitman connection. The surrounding verses 
are worth quoting in full:  
I have heard what the talkers were talking, the talk of the beginning and 
the end, 
But I do not talk of the beginning or the end. 
 
There was never any more inception than there is now, 
Nor any more youth or age than there is now, 
And will never be any more perfection than there is now, 
Nor any more heaven or hell than there is now. 
Urge and urge and urge, 
Always the procreant urge of the world. 
Out of the dimness opposite equals advance, always substance and 
increase, always sex, 
Always a knit of identity, always distinction, always a breed of life.188  
 
Gordon sees this as an example of the “passionately written verses in which the sexual 
‘urge’ is given direct expression,” an evocation of “the sheer physical attraction existing 
between people”; in Gordon’s view, Whitman served to reinforce the Brücke’s bohemian 
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“public celebration of sexual activity.”189 Although the sexual element is clearly important, what 
Gordon misses is the immanence of desire across the material realm. Moreover, he misses the 
way in which Whitman here rejects the notion of the “modern” as historically unique or 
unprecedented. Yet these are the aspects that Schlaf in fact had stressed in his article on 
Whitman: 
We are everything there was and everything there will be; there is no difference 
between these two; everything is one. Nothing is offensive or mean. Copulation is no 
more offensive than death. Everything is a miracle. The body is something miraculous 
that must be revered. In this spirit, he transfers the attributes of his body to everything 
that comes in touch with him. He speaks of broad and muscular fields etc. and yet also 
transfers attributes of lifeless objects to his body, speaks of “the mix'd tussled hay of the 
head, beard, brawn,” etc.190 
 
Schlaf here is describing Whitman in the same manner as Bennett does. Bennett would note 
that for Whitman this is more than a poetic or metaphorical “transfer,” but an ontological 
assertion of sympathy, and aside from this word choice, Schlaf seems to agree that this is more 
than metaphor, but rather a matter of experience.  
If we re-examine the works by Kirchner we have been discussing from this perspective, 
it becomes possible to view them as depictions of what Bennett terms “vital materialism.” Part 
of Bennett’s method, she explains, is not only a willingness to theorize the existence of 
“encounters between ontologically diverse actants,” but also involves an act of 
defamiliarization:  
I will turn the figures of “life” and “matter” around and around, worrying them until 
they start to seem strange, in something the way a common word when repeated can 
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become a foreign, nonsense sound. In the space created by this estrangement, a vital 
materiality can start to take shape.191 
 
In these works by Kirchner, a similar phenomenon takes place, through the juxtaposition and 
simultaneous dissolution of boundaries. This technique is present most explicitly in a series of 
still lifes from 1912, including Stilleben mit Plastiken und Blumen (Still Life with Sculptures and 
Flowers, 1912, fig. 5.74).  In these paintings, Kirchner depicts small carved figurines and a bowl 
which he himself had carved in 1910 (Gordon suggests it was modeled upon African carvings; 
see fig. 5.20).192 The coloring and treatment of volumes in these works produce a sense of 
animation, instilling the carvings with a lifelike quality. In comparison with Kirchner’s other 
works, we find humans presented like carvings, and carvings like humans; the boundaries 
between “life” and “matter,” as Bennett suggests, are effectively blurred. 
 Similarly, as we have already seen in Kirchner’s paintings above, the vitality was not 
present only in nature, but found in contemporary life. In a letter to Carl Hagemann which 
Kirchner wrote near the end of his life, he explained: 
I looked for scenes to paint from life, and to this end I drew everywhere: on the street, 
in drinking halls and theaters, etc. Rembrandt’s freedom in figure treatment at the same 
time helped me attain a strongly abbreviated drawing manner. . . . Young student that I 
was, I would have liked so much also to have seen pictures, our life, movement color. 
How could one learn to paint this in pictures? The studios in which I was drawing and 
painting gave no answer, showed no way. But the drawings of Dürer, Rembrandt, the 
Flemish primitives, etc. in the museum print collection, these contained such things 
from their time. How hastily had Rembrandt sketched the woman sitting on the bed in 
the drawing of the sick woman! One had to draw like that; then one could perhaps find 
a way to give pictorial form to contemporary life.”193 
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It was around the same time that Kirchner had written to Curt Valentin praising Walt Whitman: 
“I wanted to express the richness and joy of living, to paint humanity at work and at play in its 
reactions and interreactions and to express love as well as hatred.”194 For Whitman, and for the 
Brücke, this experience is not limited to the natural or organic world. This wasn’t lost on Schlaf, 
who writes of Whitman: 
More than everything he loves the large cities and his "Manhattan." More than the still 
shining sun, the foliage, the corn and the wheat, more than solitude and the humming 
of the bees. Untiringly, he is wandering through her streets and losing himself in her 
traffic which becomes alive in his lines, containing broad, powerful, colorful shining 
visions. In countless images endlessly strung together, his loving surprise rushes by us. 
He does not want to leave anything out, does not want to miss anything.195 
 
Bennett, in explicating Whitman’s vital materialism, argues that for Whitman, objects seem to 
speak; she makes use of Bruno Latour’s term “actants,” to describe the way in which objects 
appear as more than matter to be manipulated, but as co-participants in experience.196 Bennett 
notes that “Song of Myself” includes “one of Whitman’s many lists of these vocal material 
actants, artifacts and nonhuman animals that posses a ‘living and buried speech’ or vitality 
elided by the category of object”: 
The blab of the pave, tires of carts, sluff of boot-soles, talk of the  
promenaders, 
The heavy omnibus, the driver with his interrogating thumb, the  
clank of the shod horses on the granite floor, 
The snow-sleighs, clinking, shouted jokes, pelts of snow-balls, 
The hurrahs for popular favorites, the fury of rous’d mobs, 
The flap of the curtain’d litter, a sick man inside borne to the hospital,  
The meeting of enemies, the sudden oath, the blows and fall, 
The excited crowd, the policeman with his star quickly working his 
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 passage to the centre of the crowd, 
The impassive stones that receive and return so many echoes, 
What groans of over-fed or half-starv’d who fall unstruck or in fits, 
What exclamations of women taken suddenly who hurry home and  
give birth to babes, 
What living and buried speech is always vibrating here. . . . 197 
 
Bennett calls our attention to the voices—the blab of the pave, the clank of the shod 
horses, the groans, the exclamations, and even the stones that “return so many echoes.”—all 
examples of the “living and buried speech.”  She explains, for  Whitman, “the machines, tools, 
and artifacts of mid-nineteenth-century urban life, along with the various human types and 
groups, all have something to say and something worth listening to.”198  This echoes a comment 
Kirchner makes in a letter to Eberhard Grisebach, a professor of philosophy at the University of 
Jena:  
What you write about art, and creation in general, is easy for me to understand. I also 
understand what you mean about the artist and philosopher creating their own world. 
Actually, such a world is only a means of making contact with others in the great 
mystery which surrounds us all. This great mystery which stands behind all events and 
things (sometimes like a phantom) can be seen or felt when we talk to a person or stand 
in a landscape or when flowers or objects suddenly speak to us.199 
 
Kirchner ostensibly introduces a division, between “things” and the “great mystery 
which stands behind” everything, but upon close examination this seems rather a conciliatory 
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gesture toward Grisebach, as he begins to introduce his own slightly different philosophical 
take on things. Kirchner is suggesting here that actually (eigentlich), the point for him is less 
about the subjective creation of the world (Welt), than it is about viewing the world as a means 
of communication (Verständigungsmittel, what Miesel translates here as  “means of making 
contact”), enabling humans to enter into relationship and participate in the mystery of the 
“surroundings” (Umwelt). In this sense, the individual is embedded in its environment, and in 
fact not only people but objects can “speak to us.”200 
This “democratic” experience of objects and environment is one of the core ideas which 
Bennett discerns in Whitman’s poetry. She quotes from Whitman’s “By Blue Ontario’s Shore,” 
where the poet says, “I am for those who walk abreast with the whole earth.”201 She argues 
that this sense of co-participation with things is expressed not only in the content, however, but 
through the style of Whitman’s free verse: 
The doggedly horizontal lists that frequent Leaves of Grass model a world where 
humans beings are positioned not as potential masters of, but as coparticipants with, 
other bodies in a world that vibrates. Persons, places, and things are arranged not in a 
hierarchy but stand “abreast.”202 
 
For the Brücke, this horizontality is expressed in the embeddedness of the human in a 
cacophony of life and things, human and nonhuman. This reveals itself in the depictions of the 
natural world, but it is equally present in the social world, the studio, the circus, the urban 
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environment. To borrow Johannes Fabian’s phrase (cited above in the context of Bastian’s 
ethnology), Whitman was a poet of coevalness—the coevalness of all things—and it is this 




The foregoing discussion presents a distinction between the Brücke’s aesthetics aims 
and their cultural stance. The art of the Brücke should not be seen as simply expressing a 
critique of modernity, whether from the left or right. A comment from Kirchner articulates and 
therefore justifies this distinction I have drawn. Moreover, Kirchner argues against the 
interpretation of the Brücke’s work as a critique of modernity. The comment, cited above at the 
outset of the discussion of the Brücke’s relationship to modernity, comes from Kirchner’s diary, 
written during a time in which Kirchner was concerned to provide for posterity an account of 
his own position in relation to the art and culture of his time, as well as the history and 
significance of the Brücke. In the entry dated March 6, 1923, he recalled: 
It was lucky that our group was composed of genuinely talented people, whose 
characters and gifts, even in the context of human relations, left them with no other 
choice but the profession of artist, whose ways of life and work, strange as they were in 
the eyes of conventional people, were not deliberately intended to épater les bourgeois, 
but were simply the outcome of a naïve and pure compulsion to bring art and life 
together in harmony. And it is this, more than anything else, that has had so enormous 
an influence on the forms of present-day art. Uncomprehended for the most part, and 
totally distorted; for with us [the will] shaped the form and gave it meaning, whereas 
now strange forms are stuck on to accustomed ideas, like a top-hat on a cow.203 
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Kirchner gives voice here to that which Lloyd cites as their primary ambition, the desire to bring 
art and life together in harmony. It is clear that the Brücke felt that art needed to be 
rejuvenated, and that the inherited tradition no longer fulfilled this need. Yet strictly speaking 
this amounts to what I have suggested above is an aesthetic aim—and one that is best 
conceived as a perennial aim of art, not necessarily joined with a critique of modernity.  
Such an understanding in fact was expressed by both Schmidt-Rottluff and Heckel, in 
their responses to an invitation from the popular periodical Kunst und Künstler, asking German 
artists to offer their thoughts about the “new art programm.” The published responses included 
statements from such notable artists as Max Beckmann, Ludwig Meidner, August Macke, and 
Georg Tappert.  The responses by the Brücke members, Schmidt-Rottluff and Heckel, however, 
were distinguished not only by their brevity but their resistance to the very question. As 
Schmidt-Rottluff wrote: 
I know of no “new art program.” I have moreover absolutely no idea what it could be. If 
one could speak of such a thing as an “art program,” then in my opinion it would be as 
old as the hills and eternally the same. Except of course that art itself changes again and 
again, as it is manifested in new forms, since there are always new personalities. Yet the 
essence of art, I believe, never changes. Possibly I am mistaken. But for myself, I know 
that I have no program, only the inexplicable desire to take what I see and feel, and to 
find the purest expression. 204 
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Significantly, Heckel’s contribution to the volume was even more circumscribed, and yet also 
powerful in its implications: 
Your request, to write something, I am unable to complete. The formulation of a 
program is, I believe, a thing for academics and indeed for those that come after, those 
who do theoretic and scientific, not creative, work. The un-thought and the 
unintentional is the source of artistic power. The analysis of the final image is for me 
only possible intuitively. 205 
 
The comments of Schmidt-Rottluff and Heckel should provide occasion for further analysis, 
including the emphasis on the unconscious or unintentional as a necessary feature of artistic 
creation, which would prove to be a primary principle of Surrealist aesthetics. For the moment, 
it will suffice to note that their comments restrict themselves to aesthetic considerations, and, 
most explicitly in Schmidt-Rottluff’s case, present the artistic process as essentially the same, 
despite changes in style or form.  The “development” proclaimed in the Brücke Program 
accordingly should be understood as an affirmation of transformation, yet not evolution. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the existing scholarship on the Brücke interprets the manifest 
desire to merge art and life as an anti-bourgeois, anti-modernity stance. Yet to return to 
Kirchner’s diary, he explicitly explains that this desire, to join art and life, did not amount to a 
conscious épater les bourgeois, which is to say, a simple rejection of the bourgeois world in 
which they found themselves. Kirchner’s aesthetics pursued a vital materialism as a perennial 
ethos; not in contradistinction to a stultifying modernity, but in a way that scrubbed against the 
boundaries between human and nonhuman, nature and culture, primitive and modern. 
                                                     
205 Erich Heckel, “Das neue Programm,” Kunst und Künstler, XII, Heft 6 (1914): 309. “Ihrer Aufforderung, etwas zu 
schreiben, kann ich nicht nachkommen. Denn die Formulierung eines Programms ist, glaube ich, Sache der 
Akademiker und besser noch der Nachkommen, die theoretische und wissenschaftlich, nicht schaffend, arbeiten. 














Georg Heym. His poems are a vertigo of seeing. All things roll like orgies 
before his eyes. . . . Every thing [sic] “means” something, though its 
meaning is nowhere talked of. 
 
—A critic writing in Der Demokrat (December 21, 1910)1 
 
 
If we take these drawings into ourselves as we would read a letter dear to 
us or a book we treasure, then without being aware of it we will acquire a 
feeling for the key to this hieroglyphic script. Kirchner draws as others 
write. 
 







As argued in the previous chapter, Kirchner and the Brücke absorbed from Walt 
Whitman a mode of vital materialism: an affirmation of the abundance of life in things, a 
democracy of perception that applied not only to the organic but the inorganic, blurring the 
boundaries between the two. However, in their art, the reception of Whitman’s vital 
                                                     
1 Quoted in Rainer Rumold, The Janus Face of the German Avant-Garde: From Expressionism Toward 
Postmodernism (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2002), 12. 
2 Louis de Marsalle (E.L. Kirchner), “Zeichnungen von E.L. Kirchner,” Genius (Munich, 1920), 216-34, translated by 
Michael Hulse, in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years, eds. Jill Lloyd and Magalena M. Moeller 
(London: Royal Academy of the Arts, 2003), 209. 
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materialism was conjoined with a counter-current, a particular sensitivity to contrast and the 
ellusiveneness of signification. These formalist and self-reflexive aspects of the Brücke 
aesthetics form the subject of the following chapter.  
The vital materialist affirmations of Whitman, and the synthetic or harmonious vitalism 
of Obrist, were balanced in the Brücke’s work by a mimesis of tensions in which contrasts and 
contradictions become diffused. Through such practices, the Brücke developed an aesthetics 
that makes use of the primitivist discourse, yet undermines the oppositions it contains. Their 
work in fact bears a striking similarity to Dadaist photomontage; through parataxis, it 
undermines established definitions and relationships. Their work combined the images and 
tropes of primitives—as authentic, as unalienated—with a counterpoint, an oppositional 
tendency which disrupted that discourse and prevented it from achieving its aims. It is in this 
sense that their work may be deemed aporetic—it produces an interpretive impasse. It 
impedes the fulfillment of the primitivist discourse, which aims to secure the primitive as 
authentic “other,” in opposition to the artificial and alienated civilized modernity. 
 
Part 1.  From Vital Materialism to Vertigo 
 
 One clue pointing towards this self-reflective and disruptive feature of the Brücke 
aesthetics emerges in the letter from Kirchner to Curt Valentin, in which Kirchner compared 
Whitman to the German Expressionist poet, Georg Heym (1887–1912): “[Whitman] possesses 
the true spirit of the artist who can give and love without desiring. We have a German who 
follows in his footsteps, Georg Heym, the poet of Umbra Vitae, who has prophetically perceived 
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and written of our last decade.”3 Heym’s  Umbra Vitae (Shadow of Life) was published in 1912, 
the same year that Heym drowned, at the age of 24, while trying to rescue a friend from an ice 
skating accident. Kirchner, who only discovered Heym’s poetry after his death, became a strong 
admirer, and illustrated the 1924 reprint of Umbra Vitae with a series of woodcuts (fig. 5.75).  
Kirchner’s pairing of the two poets, however, at first seems startling. Heym is known for 
such poems “Die Dämonen der Städte” (“The Demons of the City”), written in 1910, published 
in April 1911 in his book Der Ewige Tag (The Eternal Day). Heym’s poetry offers stark, visceral 
images of alienation, madness, and disease; he is best known for his disturbing visions depicting 
the nightmarishness of the modern urban environment.4 As Scott Horton writes of Umbra 
Vitae, “It paints a dark, mysterious and painful portrait of life. It is filled with great foreboding, a 
sense of impending doom, a society on the brink of destruction.”5 
Heym and Whitman thus could not seem farther apart. Upon closer examination, 
however, it is possible to discern important similarities as well as differences which help 
account for Kirchner’s comparison. Roy Pascal, for example, writes of Heym: 
[His] revolt against reality is embodied in the energy of his images, in the violent 
association of normally disparate fields of meaning through strange conjunctions of 
image or the use, for instance, of symbolical, nonnaturalist colour images, and a 
thematic development that does not accord with the logic of normal rational discourse. 
In these ways Heym accepts the modern city as his reality and speaks in its terms, but at 
the same time challenges it by re-composing it; the poet’s vision becomes embodied 
within, not in conflict with, the factualities of the city.6 
                                                     
3 Ernst Ludwig Kirchner to Curt Valentin, “Letter of April 17, 1937,” in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: April 16 - May 10, 
1952, ed. Curt Valentin Gallery (New York: Curt Valentin Gallery, 1952), unpaginated. 
4 Rainer Rumold, The Janus Face of the German Avant-Garde: From Expressionism Toward Postmodernism 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2002); Peter Viereck, Strict Wildness: Discoveries in Poetry and 
History (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008). 
5 Scott Horton, “Heym’s ‘Umbra Vitae,’” The Stream (blog), Harper’s (February 20, 2008), 
http://harpers.org/blog/2008/02/heyms-umbra-vitae/. 





Pascal calls attention to several important features here. Obvious points of interest for Kirchner 
would be Heym’s visuality, his bold use of nonnaturalist color. But it is also worth noting that, 
like Whitman, Heym speaks in the “terms” of the city. He is in it and of it, a relation very similar 
to that which appears in Whitman’s poetry. Although Whitman’s relationship to contemporary 
life is largely affirmative and Heym’s negative, both engage with contemporary life on its own 
terms.  
 The significance of this is most clear by way of a further comparison. Pascal notes, “All 
writers on the modern city in the 1880s stress the multiplicity and confusion of scenes and 
events, the rapidity of change and ‘nervousness’ of life.”7 Other poets, including the naturalists 
of which Pascal speaks and some of Heym’s contemporaries, described the strangeness or 
agitation of the city from some external standpoint, a moral or humanist critique. In these 
works, Pascal observes: 
If a looser form in free rhythms occurs, often as an adaptation of Whitman or of 
Verhaeren, it is accompanied by rhetoric, which no less than regular stanzas and meter 
conveys the poet’s capacity to control this urban world, however confusing and 
terrifying, from some fixed perspective such as the security of his inner life, or the 
dignity of labour, or human compassion, or the prospect of revolution.8 
 
Heym’s exploration of the city, which Pascal calls “the most significant response [of literary 
Expressionism], that in one way or another underlies the others,” is new in that it offers no 
external position, no stable discourse, from which to critique. One is simply in and of the city. 
Peter Viereck captures this well:  “Readers of ‘Demons’ and of [Heym’s] poems about war are 
troubled by the ambiguity of Heym’s attitude; is he condemning or admiring? As if he were 
                                                     
7 Pascal, Naturalism to Expressionism, 143. 
8 Ibid., 143. 
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being asked: which side are you on? The condign word is neither ‘admiring’ nor ‘condemning’ 
but ‘fascinated.’”9 Viereck’s point—his use of the word “fascination”—is not meant to suggest 
that there was no horror in Heym’s works, for indeed there was, nor that there was no critical 
engagement, for there was that as well. The point is that Heym’s vision is from the inside, and 
the only critique possible is a form of what we might call immanent critique. This requires, 
however, a radically new approach to literary form. 
 This new form, however, is in fact the crucial difference from Whitman, and it is this 
which provides a specific counterpoint to the Brücke’s vital materialism. This new form, to 
which Pascal alludes, was characterized by “strange conjunctions” and the collision of 
“disparate fields of meaning.” This can be glimpsed in Heym’s poem “Umbra Vitae,” the first 
two stanzas of which run as follows: 
Die Menschen stehen vorwärts in den Straßen 
Und sehen auf die großen Himmelszeichen, 
Wo die Kometen mit den Feuernasen 
Um die gezackten Türme drohend schleichen. 
 
Und alle Dächer sind voll Sternedeuter, 
Die in den Himmel stecken große Röhren. 
Und Zaubrer, wachsend aus den Bodenlöchern, 
In Dunkel schräg, die einen Stern beschwören.10 
 
                                                     
9 Viereck , Strict Wildness, 251. 
10 Horton, “Heym’s ‘Umbra Vitae.’” Horton’s translation: 
The people stand forward in the streets 
They stare at the great signs in the heavens 
Where comets with their fiery trails 
Creep threateningly about the serrated towers. 
 
And all the roofs are filled with stargazers 
Sticking their great tubes into the skies 
And magicians springing up from the earthworks 
Tilting in the darkness, conjuring the one star. 
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Horton, who translated “Umbra Vitae” for Harper’s, comments upon the “peculiar” and 
disorienting effect of Heym’s style. Heym uses words, Horton writes, 
that seem at odds with accepted rules of ergometrics and physics. “Stehen” of course 
suggests standing, stagnation, a cessation of forward movement. But this is combined 
with words of action, “vorwärts,” for instance. The same dichotomy of action, inaction 
appears repeatedly in the poem.11  
 
Horton continues, citing other salient examples from the poem: “Note the repetition of an 
indecisive angularity, an awkwardness of the human existence: ‘In Dunkel schräg,’ ‘Sie springen, 
daß sie sterben,’ ‘Sie strecken alle viere/Begraben,’ ‘Wer stirbt, der setzt sich auf, sich zu 
erheben.’” Heym develops in this manner a particular language of evocative contradictions, 
which can be understood as a form of parataxis based on contrasts. In throwing together such 
conflicting notions, the relationship between them is suppressed; the effect is ambiguous, 
either invoking the reader to reconsider, or recreate, the relationship, or in the absence, simply 
creating an abyss of meaning which the reader must face. 
Heym’s innovative technique was not lost on his contemporaries. A reviewer of one of 
the poetry reading sessions held by “Der Neue Club” (a group to which Heym belonged) 
remarked in Der Demokrat (December 21, 1910): “Georg Heym. His poems are a vertigo of 
seeing. All things roll like orgies before his eyes. . . . Every thing [sic] ‘means’ something, though 
its meaning is nowhere talked of.”12 The reviewer’s comment evocatively depicts both the 
similarities and differences between Heym and Whitman: it expresses the coevalness of things, 
the sexual vitality of the images, and the very “thingness” of the depicted reality. It also evokes 
                                                     
11 Horton, “Heym’s ‘Umbra Vitae.’” 
12 Rumold, Janus Face, 12. 
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the dislocations and disruptions, produced by stark absences of meaning through parataxis, 
which conjure up a “vertigo.” 
 The impact of Heym’s disruptive syntax, as Rainer Rumold argues, becomes obvious 
when compared for example with the contemporary poet Johannes Becher’s poem “Berlin”: 
Berlin! You web-monster of white metropolis! 
Orchestra of the aeons! Field of iron battle! 
Your iridescent serpent-body was chafed as it rattled, 
Roofed over with the refuse and rot of running sores!13 
 
Rumold astutely observes the contrast between the two poets, yet Rumold is too quick to see 
Heym’s poetry as an expression of “modernity,” rather than an interrogation of the concept. 
Rumold writes that Becher’s poem “censors the visceral experience of modernity, suppresses 
the urban environment’s disparate nondiscursive, sensorial stimuli, which Georg Heym’s poems 
gauge in their startling imagery.”14 Rumold draws a contrast between “moralizing and 
physiological perceptions of the metropolis.” Noting, like Pascal, that Heym avoids the former, 
Rumold suggests that Heym expresses in poetry a physiological reaction to modernity. But 
Rumold presumes too much here, taking for granted that Heym’s poetry responds to the 
“obvious” fragmentation of modernity, produced by acceleration, technologization, and so on; 
Rumold neglects the recognition of Heym’s particular sensitivity to, and poetic engagement 
with, linguistic signification. For Heym, the representation of reality is not made possible 
through an unmediated physiological experience; instead, reality is itself already thoroughly 
mediated, and only a poetry which recognizes that can measure as an authentic response.  
                                                     
13 Rumold, Janus Face, 12. 
14 Ibid., 13. 
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 Peter Viereck argues similarly, in announcing: “Time to rescue Heym from the Heym 
cult. In the Germany of the late 1960s, too much was being made of his daemonic visions of big 
cities.” Viereck continues:  
When examined closely, Heym’s cities embody a horror that looks backward to the pre-
urban visions of [Hieronymus] Bosch (which Heym then works into an urban 
photomontage) rather than forward to megalopolis. Being based on his supposed urban 
modernity, the belated cult of Heym is a case of admiring an admirable writer for the 
wrong reason. The right reason, his lyricism, suffices. 15 
 
In what follows, I shall argue that the Brücke’s approach to the city (and modernity) did not 
simply echo the critique of modernity, as is found in Becher’s poem or the writings of Georg 
Simmel.  Just as significant, their approach to primitivism did not simply express a naïve 
discourse in which the “primitive” represented authenticity and unalienated existence. Rather, 
like Heym, their work introduced contrasts of primitive and modern as a means of disrupting 
the relationship between the two—the effect of which might be described as an aesthetic 
vertigo. 
It is commonly recognized in critical discussions of German expressionist prose that 
literary expressionism as a movement was intensely self-aware of language, media, and modes 
of representation. Geoffrey Perkins writes: “Expressionism must rank among the most self-
conscious movements in history. There was more than enough theory to sink even a more 
robust movement than Expressionism—and sink Expressionism it surely did.”16 Kurt Pinthus in 
                                                     
15 Viereck, Strict Wildness, 228. 
16 Perkins, Theories, 11. For German Expressionist literature and prose, see Neil H. Donahue, Forms of Disruption: 
Abstraction in Modern German Prose (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), and Rainer Rumold, The 
Janus Face of the German Avant-Garde: From Expressionism Toward Postmodernism (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 2002). 
404 
 
the 1919 introduction to his anthology of expressionist poetry Die Menschheitsdämmerung 
(Dawn of Humanity), proclaimed:  
Never before were aesthetics and the principle of L’art pour l’art as disdained as in this 
poetry. [. . .] For this reason it eschews the naturalistic depiction of reality as technique. 
[. . .] Instead, it creates with enormous and vigorous energy its own means of 
expression. [. . .] It catapults the world. . . in ecstatic paroxysm, [. . .] in a chaotic 
shattering of language.17 
  
Yet there is a marked reluctance to recognize that the Brücke were engaged in similar 
techniques of a visual and aesthetic nature. Granted, Perkins’ comment is meant to refer to the 
proliferation of manifestos and theoretical statements which accompanied Expressionism, and 
as I have previously suggested, the members of the Brücke were overwhelmingly averse to this 
kind of theoretical work. Yet their reluctance to theorize linguistically should not be taken to 
mean that their aesthetics were untheorized, and therefore simply spontaneous or intuitive. 
Indeed, it is not even correct that scholars have interpreted Brücke aesthetics as 
untheorized or spontaneous (in the style of outsider artists, for example); quite the contrary, 
scholars have readily discerned a great deal of thought behind these artworks, analyzing 
connections to the artworks of their predecessors or contemporaries, pointing out intentional 
and complex re-workings of styles or themes from Jugendstil, Fauvism, cubism, futurism, and 
                                                     
17 Kurt Pinthus, ed., Menschheitsdaemmerung / Dawn of Humanity: A Document of Expressionism, trans. and 
introduction by Joanna M. Ratych, Ralph Ley, and Robert C. Conard (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1994), 35. 
Readers of Pinthus will note I have excerpted selectively; Pinthus’s argument generally positions the aesthetic 
innovations of the expressionist poets as part of the critique of  modernity—a response to “degenerate reality” 
marked by a “flagellantly screaming and enraptured longing for God and the good, for love and for brotherliness.” I 
argue that Pinthus’s recognition of the poets’ linguistic and aesthetic innovation applies to the Brücke as well, if 
not his framing of the relationship to modernity.  
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Impressionism.18 When the discussion turns “primitivism,” however—the influence of 
significance of “primitive” art—critics too readily assume that naivety reigns. It is conceivable 
for such critics, apparently, that Kirchner may see himself responding theoretically through his 
work to the art of Matisse or Munch, but not to the art of Papua, Cameroon, or Ajanta—or 
even to the meanings of similar examples of “primitivism” in the works of other artists. Thus 
Lloyd sees Brücke’s primitivist decorations a wishful attempt to recreate an “unalienated” space 
for artistic creation; and the Brücke’s seemingly indiscriminate use of non-European references, 
whether “primitive” African sculpture, “exotic” ornamentation from the South Seas, Japanese 
prints, or sublimely sensual Buddhist wall paintings—as a naïve pastiche of “primitive” styles, 
elided difference, thereby recapitulating the homogenous “other” of colonial discourse. 
Yet, as noted above, the Brücke’s primitivism is not simply an aspiration for a “return to 
nature,” but rather, they engage with the concepts of  “life” and “matter,” in Bennett’s words, 
“worrying them until they start to seem strange, in something the way a common word when 
repeated can become a foreign, nonsense sound.” In the same way, their artworks “worry” the 
figures of primitive and civilized. The effect of this defamiliarization is aporia—an aesthetics 
which undermines the stability of the discourse of primitivism. As the discourse of primitivism, 
as I have argued, forms one of the fundamental discourses of modernity, their aesthetics can be 
understood as manifesting the constructedness of an imagined modernity. 
 There is no evidence to confirm that the Brücke members knew Heym’s poetry in the 
years before World War 1; Kirchner himself apparently did not discover Heym’s works at least 
                                                     
18 As Reinhold Heller has observed, the Brücke in fact seem to be subjected to this type of formal-infuence analysis 
to an even greater extent than any other artist group in the “classical era of modernism prior to the First World 
War.” Heller, “Some Reconsiderations,” 63. 
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until after Heym’s death.19 My reference to Heym here is not tangential, however, as Kirchner’s 
singling out of Whitman and Heym as his favorite poets provides a useful avenue in unraveling 
his aesthetics. In addition, the comparison between scholarly research on Expressionist 
literature and on the visual arts reveals a lingering reluctance to take into account the 
possibility that the Brücke, no less than their literate counterparts, were engaged in not simply 
an expression of a primitivist (or modernist) discourse, but rather engaged with these 
discourses critically, from within, and often in a manner of paratactic montage which 
characterizes the work of poets such as Gottfried Benn and Georg Heym. The source of this 
aspect of the Brücke aesthetics, as a counterpoint to their vital materialism, may not have been 
Heym, however; a more likely source is Friedrich Nietzsche. 
 
Part 2.  Brücke and Nietzsche  
 
The name Brücke, or bridge, is widely thought to be a reference to Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Before considering the significance of Nietzsche for the Brücke members, it is worth noting that 
the image of the bridge provides a key interpretive fulcrum, both in terms of assessing the 
Brücke’s relationship to modernity, with which the above discussion has primarily been 
concerned, and the significance of their primitivism, to which the following discussion will turn. 
It will also allow for a return to the claims I made in the previous chapter, about the way in 
which the ambiguity of the Brücke’s primitivist aesthetics are routinely occluded through critical 
discussions linking their aesthetics to “messianic” or “utopian” critiques of modernity. 
                                                     
19 It is conceivable however that the artists could have come across his poetry in Die Aktion. 
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In Erich Heckel’s later recollection, the name Brücke was selected by Schmidt-Rottluff, 
precisely for its ambiguity. A bridge was, Heckel noted, “a multi-levelled word and it would not 
involve a programme but, in a certain sense, would lead from one shore to the other. It was 
clear to us what we had to leave behind—where we hoped to arrive was a lot less clear.”20 
Heckel’s comment, like the Programm der Brücke, underscores the ambiguity of the Brücke 
project. Reinhold Heller at first seems to accept this, noting that, in the usage of 
contemporaries, the image did not necessarily connote a naïve one-directionality, a passage 
from the past to the future, for example. He writes that, “at the time of the Brücke’s founding 
[the image of the bridge] was used repeatedly by other progressive German artists and their 
advocates to reference goals of preparing the art of the future while taking leave of—but not 
dismissing—the past.”21 Heller, when speaking about aesthetics—“preparing the art of the 
future”—adheres to Heckel’s ambiguousness about the goal;  it was not simply a dismissal of 
the past. Yet as we saw in Heller’s previous comments, this interpretive reserve quickly 
disappears when he asserts the group’s “messianic” desires to usher in a new society.   
Similarly, Heller’s ambivalence disappears when he discusses the group in connection 
with Nietzsche. Nietzsche was widely popular in Germany at the time, and the artists of the 
Brücke were familiar with his work.22 Several scholars have suggested that the image of the 
bridge should also be interpreted as a reference to  Nietzsche, in particular a passage from Thus 
                                                     
20 Interview with Erich Heckel by Hans Köhn in Das Kunstwerk 12, vol. 3 (1958/9), 24ff, quoted in Lloyd, German 
Expressionism, 238n42. 
21 Heller, Brücke: Birth of Expressionism, 14. 
22 Kirchner later recalled Heckel once entering his studio, “declaiming aloud from Zarathustra.” Heckel made a 
woodcut of Nietzsche in 1905. Schmidt-Rottluff, during his first meeting with Nolde, discussed Nietzsche and Kant. 
In Kirchner’s personal library, which was auctioned after his death, were at least two copies of Also Sprach 
Zaratustra, in addition to several other works by Nietzsche. See Gordon, Expressionism: Art and Idea, 14.   
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Spoke Zarathustra (1883–85), in which the protagonist of the work, the philosopher/prophet 
Zarathustra, declares: 
Man is a rope, fastened between animal and Superman—a rope over an abyss. A 
dangerous going-across, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous 
shuddering and staying still. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; 
what can be loved in man is that he is a going across and a down-going.23 
 
Heller sees in the image of the bridge another sign of revolutionary determination: “Like the 
Brücke artists, Nietzsche/Zarathustra saw himself as a ‘transformer of values,’ pioneering the 
path for the future, not only accepting but heroically championing dramatically fundamental 
change—even though it might come at great cost.”24 
Jill Lloyd makes a similar move, from maintaining interpretive reserve regarding aims to 
cementing a specified interpretation not just regarding aesthetics but cultural and political 
stance—in short, that their work represents a critique of modernity. Lloyd’s interpretation is 
admittedly more nuanced than Heller’s. She cites Georg Reinhardt, the first scholar to call 
attention to the passage from Zarathustra. Reinhardt associated the group’s name with the 
previously cited 1905 woodcut by Kirchner, which seems to have been an early group insignia 
(fig. 5.39). Reinhardt had suggested that the near shore represents “the conservative and 
conventional elements associated with bourgeois and academic traditions, while the far shore 
                                                     
23 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1961), 
44,  quoted in Lloyd, German Expressionism, 18. “Der Mensch ist ein Seil, geknüpft zwischen Tier und Übermensch 
– ein Seil über einem Abgrunde, ein gefährliches Hinüber, ein gefährliches Auf-dem-Wege, ein gefährliches 
Zurückblicken, ein gefährliches Schaudern und Stehenbleiben. Was groß ist am Menschen, das ist, daß er ein 
Brücke und kein Zweck ist; was geliebt werden kann am Menschen, das ist, daß er ein Übergang und ein Untergang 
ist.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra (1883-85), in Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Vol. VI., 
ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin, 1968), 11. 
24 Heller, Brücke: Birth of Expressionism, 14. 
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signifies renewal of art and life towards which the Brücke strove.”25 Lloyd critiques Reinhardt’s 
interpretation, which she suggests naively places too much emphasis on a progressive drive. 
Lloyd, recognizing the need to account for both the culturally progressive and regressive strains 
in the Brücke, focuses on Nietzsche’s own highlighting of the bridge, rather than the goal to 
which it leads. Lloyd thus makes a useful correction of Reinhardt here, noting that “the central 
motif in this woodcut is the bridge itself, and in Nietzsche’s text the emphasis is on the process 
of transformation, the halting and precarious position of man caught between two states, 
looking backwards and forwards.”26 She continues: “Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole spans 
between the aspiration to transcend the human condition and the danger of slipping backward 
into a state of barbarism, just as civilization hinges on a precarious balance between progress 
and degeneration.” 
 The bridge offers an image of tension; yet Lloyd’s reading ultimately reifies the polarities 
of the primitive and civilized distinction. She situates the Brücke within the popular 
evolutionary thinking of the time, in particular a social Darwinist view, a stance in which man is 
held to be on an the path of evolutionary development. The present moment, which is to say 
modernity, is one of crisis—faced with the upheavals of modernization, the artists are driven 
either forward or backward. She thus poses the Brücke as responding to the crisis of 
modernity—their ambiguity is explained by their simultaneous looking backwards (i.e., to a 
nostalgic primitive ideal) and forwards (to a utopian future). 
 Lloyd sees the group’s primitivism in this context as a tool: the image of the “primitive” 
provided the means of “negotiating” the perils of modernity. Their primitivism is thus like a 
                                                     




bridge, or a tightrope (another image Lloyd invokes), on which they precariously tread. I 
maintain, however, that the Brücke’s art should not be seen as an expression of a precarious 
position, caught between poles, between civilization and the primitive, but that their work calls 
these polarities into question. If indeed Nietzsche’s bridge provided some inspiration for the 
group’s name, then one must consider more closely the detail that, in Zarathustra’s words, man 
is not just a going-across, but a down-going. Untergang is commonly translated as destruction, 
downfall, or perishing; it can mean going down, but also going under. In the latter sense, it is 
the common word for the setting of the sun. Nietzsche’s text draws upon both meanings, which 
together, especially in light of the text’s juxtaposition of the term with that of the Overman, 
suggest an image of transformation. For example, Zarathustra’s descent from the mountain is 
described as a going down, to be among the people, as the sun goes down. 
Thus the bridge is a complex symbol of transformation, achieved through destruction. 
Man therefore isn’t simply caught between two poles; he cannot reach either.  The focus on the 
bridge works precisely to call into question the opposing terminals, which together hold the 
bridge up. Yet the implied transformation represents the overcoming of this seeming 
opposition. From this perspective, therefore, the notions of “progress” and “degeneration” 
must lose their meaning. The work of the Brücke is not a naïve expression of the evolutionary 
view of progress, tinged with primitivist longing and utopian desire, but in fact an aesthetics 
that undermines this temporal construct of progress, one of the lynchpins of “modernity.” 
 The image of the bridge is thus an important interpretive focal point, as the Brücke is 
traditionally seen as expressing an urge to transcend or overcome the present moment; their 
primitivism, whether nostalgic or utopian, is said to emerge from a critique of modernity. This is 
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evident in the more straightforward interpretations, which depict Brücke primitivism as a “back 
to nature” ethos, as well as in Lloyd’s more  nuanced version, as negotiating the “crisis” of 
modernity. On the contrary, rather than a rejection of the present, combined with a nostalgic 
longing for the “primitive” past, or a striving for a “primitive”-inspired utopian future, the 
Brücke presents us with an affirmation of the possibilities of experience in the present,  
 It may be objected that Nietzsche’s Superman (or Overman, as Walter Kaufmann 
translates Übermensch), is clearly an image of overcoming, and that Nietzsche quite 
vehemently critiqued his contemporaries. Two points can here be made. For the prophet 
Zarathustra, the goal was the Overman; however, the significance and connection of the 
Overman concept to the rest of Nietzsche’s philosophy remains a topic of some debate. 
Moreover, as much as Nietzsche saw himself as a critic of contemporary society, he did not, by 
the time in which he wrote Zarathustra, see his philosophy as aspiring to “transcend the human 
condition,” as Lloyd terms it. He had by this time already developed, primarily in The Gay 
Science (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 1882), his concept of the eternal recurrence, a 
philosophical stance of profound life affirmation.27 Second, his critique was not directed at 
rationality, positivism, or materialism, strictly speaking. These had indeed been the targets of 
his earlier works, beginning with The Birth of Tragedy, Out of the Spirit of Music (Die Geburt der 
Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, 1872), in which he made use of the binaries of Dionysian 
and Apollonian to argue that modernity had succumbed to a rationalist negativity, and thus a 
revival of the Dionysian spirit was called for (and which he discerned in the music of Wagner). 
By Zarathustra, however, Nietzsche had moved away from this earlier phase. In Beyond Good 
                                                     
27 Whether the doctrine of eternal recurrence is interpreted as metaphysical reality or aesthetic will, the result is 
for our purposes the same; it marked the pinnacle of a healthy response to human existence. 
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and Evil (1886), considered to be the philosophical articulation of the literary/prophetic 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche had rejected any straightforward critique of rationality or positivism. 
Rationality could be negative, but so could instinct or irrationality. The problem was not 
rationality itself, but rationality when it interfered with, or worked against, “life.” Significantly, 
Kirchner’s personal library contained only works from Nietzsche’s late period, with Zarathustra 
the earliest.28   
Nietzsche’s target in these works, perhaps his primary one, became what he saw as the 
transcendentalist philosophy behind Christianity, but which reared its head no less in rationalist 
doctrines than in contemporary völkisch anti-modernity pessimism; to this “asceticism” he 
preached life. In 1886 he added an “Attempt at a Self Criticism” to Birth of Tragedy, in which he 
invokes an imagined interlocutor: 
My dear sir, what in the world is romantic if your book isn’t? Can deep hatred against 
“the Now,” against “reality” and “modern ideas” be pushed further than you pushed it 
in your artists’ metaphysics? believing sooner in the Nothing, sooner in the devil than in 
“the Now”? . . . Let us imagine a coming generation with such intrepidity of vision, with 
such a heroic penchant for the tremendous. . . would it not be necessary for the tragic 
man of such a culture, in view of his self-education for seriousness and terror, to desire 
a new art, the art of metaphysical comfort? 29  
 
To which Nietzsche responds: 
                                                     
28 Donald Gordon writes that the works by Nietzsche in Kirchner’s library included Also sprach Zarathustra (1883-
85), Ecce Homo (1888), Götzendämmerung (1888), Dionysos-Dithyramben (1888, published 1892), Der Wille zur 
Macht (posthumously assembled notes, published 1901), and Nietzsche in seinen Briefen und Berichten den 
Zeitgenossen, ed. Alfred Baeumler (Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1931).  Gordon’s list is based on the catalogue for 
the posthumous auction of the library contents (“Bibliothek Ernst Ludwig Kirchners,” nos. 1300-1867, in catalogue 
Bern, 1951), as well as an earlier inventory from April 29, 1946. Although it is impossible to be certain when 
Kirchner acquired the works, Gordon notes, “Because of the generally early publication dates of these books, It is 
probable that Kirchner’s basic library was formed in Dresden, beginning at the Technische Hochschule.” See 
Gordon, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, 456n34.  




No! You ought to learn the art of this-worldly comfort first; you ought to learn to laugh, 
my young friends, if you are hell-bent on remaining pessimists. Then perhaps, as 
laughers, you may some day dispatch all metaphysical comforts to the devil—
metaphysics in front.30 
 
The image of the bridge may indeed have been a reference to Nietzsche, but it was not 
in the sense of a specific means to an end or goal. Nor was it a specific rejection of the 
“modern.” Man is something that stands between two shores, but the notion of moving from 
one to the other becomes impossible. The art of the Brücke deconstructs what we might call, in 
this context, the metaphysics of modernity—the alleged and hypostatized difference between 
primitive and civilized. Lloyd seems to have glimpsed as much in her emphasis on the “process” 
of the bridge, but she loses the thread, as do Heller and others, in positing determinate goals—
namely the overcoming of the present. Lloyd’s interpretation of the Brücke clearly discerns the 
fundamental importance of the dialectic of primitive and modernity informing their work, yet 
ultimately she does so “through a glass darkly.” Rather than acknowledge the work’s disruptive 
potential, she reduces it to a critique of modernity. 
 
Part 3.  Primitivism as Immanent Critique 
 
 The primitivism of the Brücke is more complex than has generally been acknowledged. 
As I have suggested above, the Brücke’s aesthetics in general was indeed more self-reflexive 
than has been assumed. In spite of what I have termed an ethos resembling a vital materialism, 
their work was not a naïve expression of experience, but was always paired with a recognition 
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of the inherently mediated existence of art, and indeed of life. Beginning from this recognition, 
their work effectively addressed primitivism as a discourse, that is to say, as a set of mediating 
representations. They did not, in other words, simply echo the discourse of naïve primitivism. 
Through their paratactical deployment of the signifiers of primitive and modern, they in fact 
undermined the discourse of primitivism, and its postulated opposition between an “authentic” 
primitive and an “alienated” modernity.  
 One way of approaching this issue is to briefly summarize the Brücke’s response to 
Jugendstil. The Brücke derived from Jugendstil the belief in blurring the boundaries between 
decoration and art, between art and nature, between art and life—but, as I will show, their 
practice of doing so also diverged significantly from Jugendstil precedent. Whereas in 
Jugendstil, this blurring of boundaries took place through a practice of synthesis, of identifying 
harmonies, for the Brücke, their aesthetics proceeded negatively, through the interrogation of 
contrast and contradiction. Thus, where previous interpretations have stressed the Jugendstil 
aesthetic influence upon the Brücke, but neglected the cultural outlook, I am here arguing the 
reverse. From Jugendstil, the Brücke inherited a cultural outlook which was distinct from the 
popular critiques of modernity in currency at the turn of the century; yet their aesthetics, 
although developed in response to Jugendstil precedents, embarked on a new direction. 
Jill Lloyd is therefore correct that the Brücke moved away from Jugendstil, but not in the 
direction that she maintains. In her view, they absorbed from Jugendstil the “cults of 
authenticity and renewal,” but sought to break away from what seemed to be Jugendstil’s 
“ivory-tower aestheticism,” by moving towards “a new vitalism,” which was symbolized in the 
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“primitive.”31 They wanted, above all, “to bring art and life into harmony.” In Lloyd’s 
interpretation, their drive to do so was, as we saw above, a reaction to “the speed and drama 
of modernization in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century,” and “the dilemmas and 
contradictions that this involved.”32 In other words, they moved from Jugendstil toward Georg 
Simmel, thus transforming a Jugendstil naiveté into an engaged critique of modernity, in 
particular the alienating forms of rationality, labor, and city life. The “primitive,” in this view, 
came to represent for the Brücke the unalienated and authentic, that which modernity had lost, 
but which a utopian art might tap into and use as a resource to renew society. Lloyd concludes 
that, as a result of their move towards a primitivist vitalism and driven by their bohemian urge 
to join art and life, they “found themselves in a problematic zone . . . affirming life but rejecting 
society.”33 
I argue however that the Brücke never abandoned the Jugendstil ethos of dissolving 
boundaries; they did not, therefore (as the previous section demonstrated), end up by 
“affirming life but rejecting society.” The Brücke did differ from their Jugendstil predecessors in 
a fundamental way, however; their work did not perpetuate the Jugendstil mode of synthesis 
or rapprochement. Rather, emerging from this Jugendstil context, they honed a sensitivity to 
tensions, contrasts, and oppositions. Their work does not accept a naïve synthesis of categories, 
of human and nature, for example. Rather, it proceeds aesthetically in a manner that is most 
effectively understood as  immanent critique, the critical method of philosophy advanced by 
Theodor Adorno. In the case of the Brücke, through techniques of parataxis and a resolute 
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32 Ibid., vi. 
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foregrounding of the existence of representation and mediation, their work presents and 
critiques such dichotomies from within.  
Adorno first presented his notion of immanent critique in his lecture “The Actuality of 
Philosophy,” in which he argued for a rejection of philosophy as metaphysics in favor of 
philosophy as interpretation. He began here to develop a theory of philosophy as “immanent” 
critique, which could be distinguished from “transcendent” critique. As Simon Jarvis explains: 
Whereas a “transcendent” critique, a critique from the outside, first establishes its own 
principles, and then uses them as a yardstick by which to criticize other theories, 
immanent critique starts out from the principles of the work under discussion itself. It 
uses the internal contradictions of a body of work to criticize that work in its own terms. 
. . . Unlike most “critiques,” that is, it is not so much trying to score a victory over the 
work criticized, as to understand the significance of the particular kinds of contradiction 
present in a given body of such work—in particular, to understand what these 
contradictions tell us about the social experience out of which the work was written.34 
 
In the Brücke aesthetics, I argue, we find an aesthetic form of imminent critique of the 
contradictions of the primitivist discourse. The purpose of such a critique, as Jarvis explains, is 
not that it philosophically refutes a previous position (by highlighting its contradictions), but 
that through philosophical critique, the history embedded in such concepts could be 
materialized:  
Because, Adorno suggests, concepts always carry buried in within them, even when they 
look entirely abstract, the traces of bodily pleasure or suffering, fear or desire, critically 
interpreting conceptual contradictions can be a way of critically interpreting our real 
social experience.35 
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As I argued in chapter three, this notion of immanent critique would later be developed 
and refined by Adorno and Max Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment.36 The began to 
develop a greater emphasis on the negativity of critique, as a tool to dismantle particular 
ideological or philosophical constructs, a position that Adorno would later develop more 
systematically in Negative Dialects.37 In Dialectic of Enlightenment, they borrow from Hegel the 
concept of “Determinate negation” (bestimmte Negation), in order to conduct a dialectical 
critique of Enlightenment. (Enlightenment here however standing not for the particular 
historical set of philosophical discourses, but rather for a particular mode of rationality, which 
they contend informs classical myth as much as it does Enlightenment thought.) Horkheimer 
and Adorno explain their appropriation of the concept of determinate negation as follows: 
Determinate negation does not simply reject imperfect representations of the absolute, 
idols, by confronting them with the idea they are unable to match. Rather, dialectic 
discloses each image as script. It teaches us to read from its features the admission of 
falseness which cancels its power and hands it over to truth.38 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno attempt to adopt the notion of Hegelian dialectic, but revise it into a 
“negative” form. What is valuable about dialectic for Adorno and Horkheimer is that it exposes 
“each image as script.” In the following, I shall argue that, aesthetically, the Brücke’s use of 
                                                     
36 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, in Max Horkheimer: Gesammete Schriften: 
Dialektic der Aufklärung und Schriften 1940-1950, Vol. 5., ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer 
Verlag, 1987). 
37 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973). 
38 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 18. “Die bestimmte Negation verwirft die unvollkommenen Vorstellungen des 
Absoluten, die Götzen, nicht wie der Rigorismus, indem sie ihnen die Idee entgegenhält, der sie nicht genügen 
können. Dialektik offenbart vielmehr jedes Bild als Schrift. Sie lehrt aus seinen Zügen das Eingeständnis seiner 
Falschheit lesen, das ihm seine Macht entreißt und sie der Wahrheit zueignet.” Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. 
Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, in Max Horkheimer: Gesammete Schriften: Dialektic der Aufklärung und Schriften 
1940-1950, Vol. 5., ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1987), 46. 
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parataxis and self-reflexive attention to representation and mediation, in fact does precisely 
this—it exposes the figure of the primitive as script, as a feature of discourse.  
 To demonstrate this point, it will be instructive to compare the Brücke aesthetics with 
that of Dada, the European avant-garde movement which emerged during World War I. The 
Dada artists’ use of photomontage, assemblage, mixed-media, and found objects, combined 
with a strident “anti-art” ethos, exerted a profound influence on modern art. In The Dada 
Cyborg: Visions of the New Human in Weimar Berlin, Matthew Biro focuses on Berlin Dada to 
call attention to their “radical identity politics.” Biro argues that these artists imagined “new 
forms of nonbourgeois, hybrid identity,” in particular through developing a concept of the 
cyborg.39 Although the term cyborg was not invented until later, Biro argues that Weimar 
artists produced a “flowering of cyborgian imagery,” which formed “a significant cultural 
trajectory focused on reimagining human identity”40—a reimagining which would later be 
articulated by contemporary theorists such as Donna Haraway:  
For Haraway, the cyborg defined a fundamentally hybrid form of human identity that 
undermined traditional distinctions between gender, race, and class. Furthermore, the 
cyborg also broke down three crucial distinctions that had previously defined the 
difference between humans and nonhumans. First, the cyborg broke down the 
boundary between human and animals. . . .  Second, the figure of the cyborg broke 
down the boundary between organisms—both human or animal—and machines. . . . 
Third, the cyborg broke down the boundary between the physical and the nonphysical.41 
 
 I draw upon Biro’s work here to both demonstrate a similar practice at work in the art of 
the Brücke, as well as to suggest a distinction between the Brücke and Dada. If the Dadaists can 
                                                     
39 Matthew Biro, The Dada Cyborg: Visions of the New Human in Weimar Berlin (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009), 10. 
40 Biro, Dada Cyborg, 9. 
41 Biro, Dada Cyborg, 9. 
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be said to construct or articulate a hybrid figure, the Brücke’s work proceeds negatively. They 
do not offer a hybrid image of the human as both primitive and civilized; rather their work 
reveals and dismantles the discourse. The primary distinction is in regards to the conception of 
modernity in each case. Whereas the Dadaists provide a means of evolving “new and more 
balanced modes of being and acting in a rapidly transforming, technologically mediated,” 
modern world, and “imagined ways in which human beings could best reconstruct themselves 
in response to these forces,”42 the Brücke’s aesthetics undermine the narrative that the 
modern world is in fact radically new. As Schmidt-Rottluff stated, in response to the 
questionnaire about the existence of a “new art program”: it was, if anything, as “old as the 
hills and eternally the same.” A similar rejection of modernity as a unique historical crisis in the 
grip of technological change finds expression in Heym’s depictions of society cited above. In 
such works as Heym’s The Eternal Day, as Peter Viereck argues, the “cities embody a horror 
that looks backward to the pre-urban visions of [Hieronymus] Bosch (which Heym then works 
into an urban photomontage) rather than forward to megalopolis.”43 The Brücke, I argue, 
deployed a similar aesthetics to that of Dada, but not as a critique of modernity; rather, their 
work functioned as a critique of the narrative of a disenchanted modernity 
Nevertheless, at the level of aesthetic technique, the Brücke and Dada shared a certain 
similarly. As a paradigmatic example of how Dada aesthetics used montage and juxtaposition to 
challenge interpretive acts, Biro analyzes Hannah Höch’s photomontage Schnitt mit dem 
Küchenmesser Dada durch die letzte Weimarer Bierbauchkulturepoche Deutschlands (Cut with 
the Kitchen Knife Dada through the Last Weimar Beer-Belly Cultural Epoch of Germany, 1919-
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43 Viereck, Strict Wildness, 228. 
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20, fig. 5.76). The large and imposing work, which Höch assembled from mechanically 
reproduced photographic and textual fragments clipped from the pages of Berliner Illustrirte 
Zeitung, presents “a turbulent image of Germany’s postwar revolutionary moment of 1918 and 
1919.”44 It confronts the viewer with a dizzying array of images, from metropolitan buildings 
and crowds to machines, babies, animals, and pieces of text; most prominently, however, are 
the numerous “cyborg”-like figures. Biro describes the latter as: 
sutured-together images of Wilhelmine and Weimar personalities, including 
government, military, and political leaders; artists and writers; dancers and actresses; 
and scientists. These collaged, hybrid, and (sometimes) hermaphrodite figures represent 
recognizable individuals while suggesting—through their fragmented and recombined 
structures—a radical transformation of these modern individuals through war, 
revolution, and technological development.45 
 
At first, a work like Cut with the Kitchen Knife seems far removed from the Brücke works under 
consideration, both in content and in style. Yet upon examination they share many of the same 
aesthetic strategies. Biro writes, for example,  that the fragments of the image are “juxtaposed 
in a way that emphasizes heterogeneity. Not only does Höch allow gaps or white spaces to 
show between many of the montage elements, but she also cuts them together with a 
disregard for exact matches in scale and perspective.”46 Aside from the fact that Höch is 
working with photographic fragments, and thus manually combining physically distinct objects, 
this description could just as well apply to the Brücke’s sense of composition, as well as the 
disregard for scale and perspective. Just as the method of photomontage demonstrates its 
constructedness, the Brücke actively rejected illusionism, and their works, whether the stark 
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and stylized figures in the paintings, the rapid sketchwork, the bluntly etched woodcuts, or the 
roughly-hewed wood carvings, all uniformly call attention to their construction. Although in 
comparison to Dadaist montage, the effect is less pronounced, the historian must consider the 
effect  such works would have had in the years before montage had been popularized as an 
aesthetic technique; the Dadaist photomontage appears less as a radical aesthetic break than a 
development of an Expressionist technique. Dada made explicit in a new media what had been 
previously attempted in traditional media formats. 
 Biro argues that, in such works as Cut with the Kitchen Knife, Höch drew attention to the 
artificial and constructed nature of the image in order to underscore “the perspectival nature of 
her representation—the fact that it represented one particular viewpoint in a potentially much 
larger discursive field.”47 Since these works of the Berlin Dadaists are so radically composite, 
without providing any recognizable interpretive center or focus, they:  
necessitate constructing multiple interpretations and rejecting any sense of totality or 
the end of interpretation. Their all-over, nonhierarchical compositions empowered their 
original viewers to identify the elements that mattered the most to them, and by 
bringing them together, to reimagine their contemporary world.48  
 
In the case of the Brücke, a similar rejection of interpretive totality takes place, 
presenting an invitation to reimagine the contemporary world. However, there remains an 
important distinction. With Höch’s montage, the aim is to call attention to the interpretive act 
itself, and thereby underscore the existence of multiple possible interpretations.  
With the Brücke, however, there is, as it were, a particular focus. Whereas Höch’s montage 
opens itself to multiple readings, die Brucke’s work engages with a specific interpretive 
                                                     




narrative, that of primitivism (in particular, romantic primitivism understood as critique of 
modernity), and aims at its disarticulation.  
For the Brücke, the point is not simpy revealing one’s own subject position as one 
among many, but undermining a particular subject position, which had depended upon fixed 
binary significations of self and other. Brücke aesthetics can thus be understood, in the 
terminology of Horkheimer and Adorno, as a form of determinate negation that “discloses each 
image as script.” Similarly, it operates at the level of immanent critique. The Brücke participted 
in the discourse of primitivism, but through their use of a paratactical aesthetics, in which the 
signifiers of primitive and modern were juxtaposed while the relationship between them was 
suppressed, the Brücke undermined the stability of those significations. Their work was not 
therefore about encouraging multiple interpretations, but undermining in particular the 
discourse of primitivism.  
 
Part 4.  The Aporetic Primitivism of the Brücke 
 
In the art of the Brücke, I argue, we find a mode of aethetics that “discloses each image 
as script.” In other words, they develop a primitivist aesthetics that discloses the discourse of 
primitivism as a discursive construct. It may be objected that there is little in the Brücke 
members’ own writings to suggest that they intended to critique the popular discourse of 
primitivism, nor that they understood their art to operate in a manner resembling what I have 
called immanent critique. Most critics, as noted previously, focus upon statements in which the 
artists discuss their work as aspiring to a type of aesthetic “immediacy,” and argue that they 
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sought to break with traditional ideas of aesthetic represtantaion in favor of a utopian vision of 
avoiding mediation. I argue, however, that the consensus view has distorted the interpretation 
of the available material, which in fact reveals both an awareness and embrace of aesthetics as 
inevitably mediated. The Brücke conception of aesthetics aspired to honesty and directness, 
but this should not be understood as a rejection of mediation in an attempt to produce art 
“naively,” or, as this is commonly interpreted, as a mode of “primitive” creation. 
Donald Gordon presents the standard argument in his article “Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: By 
Instinct Possessed.”49 Gordon quotes from an essay Kirchner published in Genius in 1920, titled 
“E.L. Kirchner’s Drawings.”50 Kirchner, eager to enter into the discussion about his own work, 
published the article under a pseudonym, Louis de Marsalle. Gordon quotes a few lines from 
the essay, wherein Kirchner (as Marsalle) advises his readers that, in order to understand 
Kirchner’s drawings, “all aesthetic ways of seeing must be avoided.”51 Kirchner writes that his 
drawings “are without conscious design and intent; they mirror the sensations of a man of our 
time.” According to Gordon,  
What he means . . .  is the same thing he meant when he wrote in a 1918 letter that “I 
am only the instrument of the work, so that it doesn’t depend on the person.” . . . As far 
as he himself was concerned, that is, the drawings just happened. They were notations, 
images of external experience that seemed to him to flow directly from eye to hand 
while bypassing the mind and all rational intention.52 
 
                                                     
49 Donald E. Gordon, “Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: By Instinct Possessed,” Art in America (Nov. 1980): 80-95. 
50 Louis de Marsalle (E.L. Kirchner), “Zeichnungen von E.L. Kirchner,” Genius (Munich, 1920), 216-34, reproduced in 
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Gordon argues, in other words, that Kirchner’s spontaneous style represents a rejection 
of mediation, an attempt to circumvent “rational” thought through spontaneous composition. 
On the one hand, Gordon acknowledges an ambiguity in Kirchner’s desctiption. He cites from a 
1926 manuscript, in which Kirchner recognizes that images work through a mode of abstraction 
that is not necessarily referential in nature: 
In the picture we must work with abstractions. These result from the limitation of our 
pictorial means—line, point, surface, color—which  in themselves have the peculiar 
effect of only expressing the feeling-value of things and beings, not the things 
themselves.53 
 
Although Gordon observes that for Kirchner, images are not seen as representing things in 
themselves, Gordon picks up on Kirchner’s notion of the “feeling-value,” and suggests that this 
becomes the true referent of the image. Gordon argues that this “feeling-value” is the essence 
of whatever it is that the artist wants to depict. Gordon explains, “There is an irrational, 
emotional, or even spiritual quality to the perceived image—not just an optical one—and it is 
this visionary quality that must be expressed in fleeting forms.”54 Thus in Gordon’s 
interpretation, the sponteneity of the work was the only means of accessing this otherwise 
inaccessible reality of the “feeling-value.” There is still an essential reality to be expressed, it is 
simply not, in Gordon’s view, the object world. Gordon writes:  “It is as if reality for Kirchner 
preceded any subject-object dichotomy, as if reality had to be caught before it was verbalized or 
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intellectualized—precisely because intellectualization would mean bringing old image 
memories and drawing habits into play.”55 
Gordon’s interpretation however glosses over a crucial feature of the essay, which is 
Kirchner’s description of his aesthetics as a type of language. Gordon fails to consider the way 
in which Kirchner figures his drawing as a type of “notation.” As Kichner explains at the 
beginning of his article, “If we take these drawings into ourselves as we would read a letter 
dear to us or a book we treasure, then without being aware of it we will acquire a feeling for 
the key to this hieroglyphic script. Kirchner draws as others write.”56 Kirchner’s analogy of his 
pictorial work to hieroglyphics is not an arbitrary one, but one that Kirchner employed 
elsewhere in letters to friends and in other writings on aesthetics. For Kirchner, hieroglyphics 
were a useful comparison, but not because they can be said to combine figurative images with 
words; rather, he invoked the idea as type of script that could be both representative and non-
represenative. He writes: 
[The images] are hieroglyphics in the sense that they render natural forms in simpler 
two-dimensional forms, and suggest significance to the beholder as the written word 
“horse” presents the form of a horse to the eyes. They are not hieroglyphics in the 
familiar sense of the word, in which a particular form invariably stands for the self-same 
object or concept.57 
 
As hieroglyphics, the images must be read.  Pictorial work, therefore, like language, was 
necessarily involved in the act of mediation. Kirchner’s images represented reality, but only 
through a mode of mediation that functions like a language. Moreover, Kirchner took care to 
stress that his use of hieroglyphics was not intended to suggest that an image, as a sign, has a 
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precise signified object: “None of these images are representations of particular objects; it is 
only through their position, their size, and their relation to other items on the sheet that they 
acquire their specific meaning.”58 Kirchner goes on to explain that the signification process at 
work in his drawings is not about particulars representating things or ideas; rather, the part and 
the whole must be seen as interdependent, inseparable from each other: 
In moving from the larger whole to the smaller part, the individual part becomes 
dependent on the overall form. The individual part is thus derived from the whole, and 
so there cannot be any such thing as a detail proper. Thus the form of a hand or a tree, 
for example, is determined by the total composition that occupies the entire sheet.59 
 
Kirchner’s theory of aesthetics thus comes remarkably close to the linguistic theory of 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), in particular as expressed in Course in General Linguistics, 
which was published posthumously by two of Saussure’s students in 1916.60 Saussure reframed 
the focus of linguistics through his concept of the linguistic sign. A sign was composed of a 
signifier and a signified. However, Saussure argued that the relationship of a signifier to the 
signified (the word  “tree,” for example, to the idea “tree”) was arbitrary. He declared therefore 
that “the linguistic sign is arbitrary”—and, accordingly, that the referent of the signifier to the 
signified was not the proper focus of linguistics. He moved the study of language away from 
theories based on linguistic correspondence to reality, toward a study of how language works 
internally as a system of signs. In Saussure’s account, words acquired their meanings, not 
through their correspondence to fixed objects or concepts, but only through their relationships 
to each other.  
                                                     
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Schehaye, with Albert 
Riedlinger, trans. with introduction and notes by Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966). 
427 
 
Kirchner’s primary examples of significiation—the above mentioned “tree,” and 
elsewhere in the essay Kirchner uses the image “horse”—are, as it happens, the same examples 
chosen by Saussure in his Course in General Linguistics. My point here, however, is not to assert 
that Kirchner’s aesthetics was influenced by Saussure’s semiotics, but merely to note their 
fundamental similarlity. Language, in Saussure’s understanding, does not simply reference a 
pre-existing reality, but is fundamentally involved in the construction of that reality. Kirchner’s 
theory of images operating as a language does not therefore posit a pre-rational reality, either 
as an object world that images attempt to reproduce, or, in Gordon’s interpretaion, as as a 
“feeling-value” which images can “capture” if they are spontaneous and avoid 
intellectualization.  
Rather, the meaning of such signs is determined through the internal composition and 
relationships of the pictorial work. Kirchner’s aesthetics, then, were not about bridging the gap 
between an image and a “feeling-value,” as Gordon argues, through a kind of circumvention of 
rationalization. Kirchner’s understanding of aesthetics as language meant that mediation was 
unavoidable. The spontenaity of artistic creation was not an attempt to skirt rationality and 
grasp, through “instinct,” a reality that was otherwise inaccessible.  
Interestingly, Gordon attempts to support his argument with a quotation from the letter 
Kirchner had written to Eberhard Grisebach in 1917. In the letter Kirchner attempts to drescribe 
his understanding of his artistic process. Gordon argues that it represents the innacessibility of 
this reality as “feeling-value” to rational thought, but, I argue, it in fact demonstrates the 
reverse, Kirchner’s assertation that this reality was indeed accessible through a process of 
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mediation. Kirchner, apologizing for his awkward attempt to put his feelings in words, writes to 
Grisebach: 
Think of it, a person sits across from us and we talk, and suddenly there arises this 
intangible something which one could call mystery. It gives to his features his innate 
personality and yet at the same time it lifts those features beyond the personal. If I am 
able to join him in such a moment, I might almost call it ecstasy, I can paint his 
portrait.61 
 
Gordon interprets this as a statement that Kirchner wants to express this “intangible 
something,” but can only record this “fugitive truth” if he can respond to it immediately—“as if 
reality had to be caught before it was verbalized or intellectualized.” Gordon, however, as 
before, leaves out the crucial context of Kirchner’s description. Kirchner goes on to explain: 
“And yet this portrait, as close as it is to his real self, is a paraphrase of the great mystery and, in 
the last analysis, it does not represent a single personality but a part of that spirituality or 
feeling which pervades the whole world.” Kirchner’s talk of a “spirituality” or “feeling” should 
not be misinterpreted as a transendent (or as Gordon terms it, “fugitive”) reality. It is a reality 
that is very much present in the moment. As Kirchner explains: 
This great mystery which stands behind all events and things (sometimes like a 
phantom) can be seen or felt when we talk to a person or stand in a landscape or when 
flowers or objects suddenly speak to us. We can never represent it directly, we can only 
symbolize it in forms and words.62 
 
On the one hand, Kirchner states that this reality is not transcendant or inaccessible, but 
present to the artist through a type of communication. (If we consider this in conjunction with 
Saussure’s theory, this interestingly solves the problem of how signs refer to things—because 
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things are in fact participating in the dialogue.) On the other hand, Kirchner states explicitly that 
the artistic image is inherently a matter of mediation, and can never represent reality 
“directly.” This aesthetic mediation, however, is not an  unbridgeable gap between subject and 
object, artist and world; it is rather this mediation, as a form of communication, which the artist 
inhabits, which cannot be transcended.  
 Kirchner’s portrait, which ostensibly signifies particulars, in fact relinquishes claims to 
representing particulars, but rather becomes a statement about the operation of aesthetic 
representation. Images here work like language—but they do not provide a phrase, but rather a 
paraphrase. It represents, but not as a mode of direct correspondence between word or image 
and thing. 
 In fact, Kirchner’s description in the letter to Grisebach could be described as an 
attempt to put in words the situation that I described in chapter three, wherein Odysseus 
encounters the other qua other, and responds to this encounter with an act of aesthetic 
creation—driving the oar into the ground. It is an aesthetic obect that results from a dialogic 
encounter, and encounter in which one listens to the voice of the other. It is not, however, an 
attempt to “capture” that particularity, to access it “directly” or “immediately” outside of 
rational thought. It is an attempt to respond “honestly” to the inevitable mediation of this 





Part 5.  “Ideals of Authenticity”—Undoing a Critical Idyll 
 
Kirchner’s rejection of an aesthetic “immediacy” is equally apparent in some of his 
comments about sculpture and woodcuts. However, here too it has been a mainstay among the 
Brücke scholarship to interpret the interest of Kirchner and the Brücke artists in woodwork as 
an expression of  a desire to engage “directly” and “immediately” with the “raw” substance of 
wood. Their carvings and etchings are interpreted therefore as an attempt to create in 
accordance with a “primitive” ideal of authencity. As before, the intepretation of the available 
commentary is distorted through the assumption that Brücke’s primitivism was built upon a 
rejection of the rational, as a way of achieving an unmediated relationship with one’s artistic 
product. 
Jill Lloyd, for example, quotes from a slightly later article by Kirchner written under the 
Marsalle pseudonym, “E.L. Kirchner’s Sculptural Work,” which he published in 1925. In the 
article, Kirchner rejects the idea of using clay and plaster models  in sculptural work, and praises 
working directly and spontaneously with the material: 
How different a sculpture looks, which the artist himself forms with his own hands from 
genuine materials, where every rise and fall is shaped by the sensitivity of the maker’s 
hand, where the strongest blows and the gentlest carving, directly express the artist’s 
feelings.63 
 
Kirchner, Lloyd argues, expresses “the themes treated by Simmel and Meier-Graefe at the turn 
of the century, concerning direct and authentic creative activity as an alternative to the 
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alienating and fragmented conditions of divided labour.”64 She argues that the notions of 
originality and authenticity that Kirchner espouses are the product of Jugendstil, “but whereas 
the arts and crafts movement sought a solution to the alienating conditions of the age in the 
cultivation of handwork and craft traditions, the Brücke artists tried to reclaim a sense of 
authenticity via their transforming notions of the ‘primitive.’” 
Lloyd thus sees the Brücke’s interest in carving in the context of the critique of 
modernity espoused by Simmel. I argue, however, that Kirchner’s own commentary in fact 
describes woodwork in a way that does not erect a fundamental opposition between a rational, 
superficial approach to artistic creation and an instinctual and authentic one. Rather, his 
aesthetic statements call this dichotomy into question. This is demonstrated in an earlier article 
Kirchner penned for Genius (also under the pseudonym), “On Kirchner’s Graphic Works.”65 The 
article not only makes clear the way in which Kirchner rejects the idea of an opposition 
between mediation and creation, but it also offers an insight into the way in which ideas about 
the “primitive” informed his work—specifically, it amounts to a rejection of the idea of the 
“primitive” artwork as an “ideal of authenticy.” Through a closer reading of the article, it shall 
be possible therefore to dislodge this critical idyll of Brücke scholarship.  
In the article on his graphic works, Kirchner discusses his approach to creating images 
through the use of woodcuts, etchings and lithographs. Although the focus is on carving to 
produce graphics, Kirchner concludes the article with the following analogy, comparing the 
artist to a “savage” who is carving a figure from wood: 
                                                     
64 Lloyd, German Expressionism, 80. 
65 Louis de Marsalle (E.L. Kirchner), “Über Kirchners Graphik,” Genius (Munich, 1921), 250-63. Reproduced in E.L. 
Kirchner’s Davoser Tagebuch: Eine Darstellung des Malers und eine Sammlung seiner Schriften, ed. Lothar 




Just as a “savage,” with infinite patience, carves from hard wood a figure that embodies 
his longing, so too in his arduous and complex technical endeavor the artists achieves 
what may be his purest and strongest works in the spirit of the ancient curse, if it may 
be thus understood: in the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread.66 
 
This reads at first like a simple romanticization of “primitive” authenticity, and is often 
interpreted as such. Kirchner seems to suggest that an authentic relationship to artistic creation 
is like that of a “primitive” or “savage”: it is intuitive and instinctual, rather than rational and 
deliberative.  On the hand, it is true that in some parts of the article, Kirchner emphasizes the 
intuitive response to his creations, and the spontaneous or unforced achievement of aesthetic 
effects. A carved figure, he writes, will “evolve freely from the imagination that shapes it.” In 
woodcuts, “the proportions follow from the emotion out of which the work arises. . . . If a 
figure’s head particularly interests the artist, the head will be larger while the other arts of the 
figure will be underdeveloped.” In etching, “strokes that seem carelessly to have been drawn 
too long in fact have a lively part to play in the structure, while elements that run through a 
composition but are strictly speaking not visible . . . open up the composition of the sheet.” 
To focus however on these isolated comments obscures the principle thrust of 
Kirchner’s article, which is in fact to provide a long and detailed explanation of the processes 
involved in producing graphic works, offering insights into the methods he employs in 
woodcuts, lithographs, and etchings. He begins by making a contrast between the “loose” and 
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rapid technique of drawing and the more complex work involved in producing graphics. The 
former is a more spontaneous mode of creation; with the graphics, however, 
the technical procedures doubtless release energies in the artist that remain unused in 
the much more lightweight processes of drawing or painting. The mechanical process of 
printing gathers the individual stages of the work into a single result. . . . To return to a 
piece time and again, over a period of weeks or indeed months, reworking it and 
achieving the ultimate in expression and perfected form, without the plate losing its 
freshness, is extremely stimulating.67 
 
Kirchner writes that etchings, at this point his “technique of choice,” in their first states (the 
original cuts made by the artist in the presence of his subject) can be “highly expressive . . . The 
unconstrained caprice of this art comes fuly inot its own.” But he continues: 
There are also plates that have been fully and repeatedly worked and reworked, till the 
once smooth surface has been transformed into hills and valleys by repeated etching. 
There are plates with two-millimeter-thick etched strokes alongside others fine as a hair, 
thin aquatint applied to the polished surface with a brush and deep-etched areas that 
have the effect of enamel. . . . The second phase of etching superimposes lines, and this 
is follwed by further, deeper-etched areas, and so on until the work is completed. . . . 
Etching is a subtle technique.68  
 
Sponteneity, in other words, is not a requirement for artistic “authenticity.” Kirchner describes 
his etchings and lithographs as necessitating a highly rational and deliberative process, a 
process that can lead to one’s “purest and strongest works.” Etching is not presented as an 
attempt to circumvent rationality and create “instinctively.” With this in mind, Kirchner’s 
comment about the “savage,” quoted above, reveals a different significance than scholars tend 
to allow. Kirchner is expressing not a return to, or recuperation of, “primitive” authenticity. 
Rather, he asserts a parallel with the “savage”; they both are involved in an “arduous and 
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complex technical endeavor,” and  both share the patience needed to see it through. Both are 
driven by the desire to create, to reproduce their longing, but this desire is realized in a 
rational, technical, mediated process, involving patience, work, and deliberation.  
 Moreover, Kirchner’s allusion to the passage from Genesis is telling. The biblical story 
about the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden is a primary example of a 
disenchantment tale, in which humans acquire knowledgde at the expense of alienation from 
their god, from nature, and from each other. Kirchner, however, converts the “ancient curse” 
into a fortune, and in doing so, undermines the narrative of disenchantment. Moreover, the 
“savage” is here quite explicitly not represented as a pre-lapsarian Adam before the fall from 
Eden, existing in a state of “primeval innocence” (in Heller’s phrase),69 able to create in an 
“authetic” manner of “unalienated” expression. Rather, Kirchner places both the creative artist 
and savage in the same position, compelled to work, bound to an aesthetics that is inherently 
an act of mediation, yet is nonetheless an act of honest creation. Kirchner’s analogy therefore 
not only undermines the disenchantment narrative. It is in this sense, as a example of 
primitivist discourse that simultaneously undermines the sigifications of that discourse, that the 
Brücke aesthetics constitutes an example of aporetic primitivism. 
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Conclusion: The Critical Illusion and Impassable Bridges 
 
In 1919, the German art critic Wilhelm Hausenstein lamented the “collapse of 
Expressionism.”70 Hausenstein, not too many years before, had looked with great enthusiasm 
to Expressionism, not only as an aesthetic advance, but as a source of immense revolutionary 
potential. Critics such as Hausenstein and Worringer believed that the new art would bring 
about a transformation of society. Yet, the revolution failed to arrive, and Hausenstein wrote 
bitterly of his dashed hopes: “We, who at one time expected everything from [Expressionism], 
are not spared the admission that after our dire efforts, we are slipping into bankruptcy.”71 
Hausentein’s hopes were not arrived at arbitrarily. The utopian dream of an aesthetics 
that would usher in a new world had been announced by the artists Franz Marc and Wassily 
Kandinsky. In the Blue Rider Almanac, which Marc and Kandinsky published in 1912 (and which 
became a focal point for interpreting the aims of Expressionism), Marc had written in praise of 
Germany’s “savages,” a group of artists that included “the Brücke in Dresden, the Neue 
Sezession in Berlin, and the Neue Vereinigung in Munich.”72 Marc’s use of the term savages 
echoed the use of “Fauves” (or “wild beasts”) to describe the radical French painters, such a 
Matisse, Derain, and Vlaminck, who had rattled the artistic establishment with their bold use of 
color and departure from naturalist techniques. Marc’s primary point, however, was that this 
new art was more than an aesthetic achievement—it signaled the “awakening of mysticism”: 
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It is not possible to explain the recent works of these “savages” as a formal 
development and reinterpretation of Impressionism. The most beautiful prismatic colors 
and the famous Cubism have become meaningless goals for these “savages.” Their 
thinking has a different goal: through their work to create symbols for their time, 
symbols that belong on the altars of the dawning spiritual religion.73 
 
For Marc, the new aesthetics was merely a window into the coming cultural revolution. 
Similarly, Kandinsky, in his major theoretical contribution to the Almanac, “The Problem of 
Form,”  had written: “The features of a great spiritual era (which was prophesied and today 
manifests itself in one of the first initial stages) we see in contemporary art.”74  
By 1919, however, for Hausenstein and other critics, Expressionism appeared to have 
lost its way. In his essay, Hausenstein compared it to Impressionism, which, he claimed, had 
withered because it had attempted too little; Expressionism, on the other hand, had failed by 
attempting too much: “It wanted to embrace God and the heavens. It wanted more than it 
could manage.”75 The result was catastrophe. The catastrophe was compounded, however, by 
the seeming ubiquity of the Expressionist style in the years after the war. Hausenstein wrote 
that Expressionism was everywhere: “Today Expressionism has its crystal palace. It has its salon. 
No cigarette advertisement, no bar can get along without Expressionism. It is nauseating.”76 
Expressionism, in other words, had not only failed to bring about a spritual revolution, but had 
been completely copted by bourgeois society, deprived of its radical potential, and turned into 
merely a fad, another cog in the materialist machine. “We, after having consciously 
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experienced  Expressionism, after having loved it and pulled its cart along, live today with the 
consuming feeling of having come face to face with nothing.”77 
 Hausenstein’s critique of the tragic failure of Expressionism is revealing for the insight it 
offers into Hausenstein’s understanding of the movement. Although Hausenstein had earlier 
praised Kandinsky, he now considered the move to abstraction to be the single greatest error. 
He still praises some of the early expressionist, such as Alfred Kubin, Ludwig Meidner, Kirchner 
and others, whose work held onto a figurative element. Abstraction, however, which was 
supposed to tap into the essences of God and thing, had undermined the ability of art to 
communicate and create a collective impact.78  
Continuing his comparison of Expressionism with Impressionism, Hausensein argues 
that Expressionism not only failed to communicate its aims, but suffered from a fundamental 
contradiction. This contradiction has been obscured, he argues, because the “scheme” of 
Expressionism remains difficult to identify. The scheme of Impressionism, by contrast, was 
“singular” and “precise.” He explains:  
[Impressionism] means: Place de la Concorde by Degas; Place Pigalle by Renoir; Rue de 
Berne by Manet; it means Lautrec. It means therefore: periphery as center.This is a 
highly paradoxical—but also a highly precise—position. The situation [of accounting for 
Expressionism] would be easy if we could simply turn the formula around—if we could 
say it was the center as the periphery: God and the divine projected onto the edge, as a 
representation of our miserable existence in relation to the whole. But it hasn’t been 
made so convenient for Expressionism.79 
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The formula for Impressionism, Hausenstein writes, was an understandable one. They focused 
on the surfaces of things, impressions, the play of light, details, negative space—they took the 
periphery and made it the center, the focus of art. Hausenstein suggests it would be easier for 
the critic if it were possible to say that Expressionists merely reversed this formula. If they took 
the center of things—their interest in the abstract form and the spiritual essence—and made 
this peripheral; if they had banished meaning to the outskirts, as a way of representing the 
fallen state of modern man, with God dead and things reduced to commodities. 
But, Hausenstein writes, it isn’t so easy as all that. Expressionism, in his view, wants to 
go after the center of things—it wants to make God and nature the center. But the irony, he 
says, is that in going toward the center, towards the absolute, by way of abstraction, it ends up 
placing itself on the periphery: “In Expressionism, the demand for the absolute has brought 
forth only that which is relative.”80 According to Hausenstein, this is the central and 
unavoidable “problem” for Expressionism. It tried, without realizing it, to go after both the 
center and the periphery, the absolute and the abstract, the essence and the surface. But in 
trying for both, it achieved neither: “[Expressionism] hardly knows how much it knows of God 
and of things. It is a convulsion that comes just as close to the all as to the void.”81 
 Hausenstein thus washed his hands of Expressionism; the following year, a “deeply 
shattered” Wilhelm Worringer would do so as well, pronouncing his own “funeral oration” over 
the movement (as Georg Lukács later described Worringer’s “Questions about Contemporary 
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Art,” a lecture given by Worringer first in Munich and then published as a book in 1921).82 I 
have argued, however, that Hausenstein and Worringer (and those who have been influenced 
by their critique) have deeply misread the aesthetics of the Brücke, by attempting to find in it, 
or locate it as a part of, the critique of an alienating modernity. Charles Haxthausen has 
diagnosed this “critical illusion,” in which critics formulated a theory of expressionism wherein 
stylistic changes in modern painting were celebrated as as pointing to “an immenent 
transformation in the whole of life.”83 Influenced by new developments in art historical theory, 
above all Riegl and his idea of Kunstwollen, these critics sought to understand the relationship 
of aesthetics to society; wedded to a belief that modernity was riven by materialism, capitalism, 
rationalism, and secularism, the critics interpreted the aesthetics of the Expressionists as the 
first glimmer of an aesthetic revolution that would have cultural, societal consquences—a 
spiritual rebirth. From such a perspective, Expressionism seemed caught between utopia and 
despair.  However, as Haxthausen writes, “What collapsed with the concept of expressionism 
was a grand illusion, an illusion fostered above all by critics, with reinforcement from a few 
artists like Marc and Kandinsky, but which had little to do with the goals and practice of 
European art between 1910 and 1920, the art it purported to define.”84 
 This critical illusion has deeply imprinted itself upon subsequent attempts to interpret 
Expressionism. As a result, the primitivism of expressionist artists has been cast as an attempt 
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to recapture a primitive “authenticity” and an aesthetic “immediacy,” both of which have been 
thwarted by an alienating modernity. However, as I have argued in this study, the Brücke were 
not in fact motivated by this critique of modernity. Their vitalist vision, their Whitman-like 
insistence on the coevalness of all things, and their embrace of the present moment were not a 
utopian project, but an aesthetics that were “as old as the hills.” It therefore makes little sense 
to speak, as most critics do, of the Brücke’s primitivism as “tool” used to critique modernity. It 
becomes possible to ask anew, what was purpose of their primitivism? 
 Interestingly, although Hausentsein misreads Expressionism, I would suggest that the 
“scheme” that he offers to describe it—as “a convulsion that comes just as close to the all as to 
the void”—comes surprisingly close to the mark.  Rather than read this as failure, I argue that it 
constitutes an aesthetic achievement. If we take up Hausenstein’s comment in light of the 
previous discussion of Kirchner’s theorizing about aesthetics, we can read Hausenstein as 
offering an unintentional insight into the Brücke’s relationship to modernity and to primitivism. 
Kirchner, in his aesthetic ruminations, attempted to express the relationship of the 
artistic product to the “great mystery” that compelled artistic creation.  The artist’s task, for 
Kirchner, can be understood a response to the “great mystery which stands behind all events 
and things,” but which “we can never represent directly.”  Kirchner’s art aims for absolutes, but 
insits upon the fact of inherent mediation. It can be seen as the merger of a vital materialism 
(the influence of Obrist, Jugendstil, and Whitman) with an approach to aesthetics based on 
exposing the image as script. It does not offer an “immediate” access to the spiritual, to the 
“great mystery”—which can then enter into and transform the fallen world. This art begins in 
the presence of the mystery, the encounter with otherness—and offers, in the end, a work of 
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art that acknowledges its role as both signifying all and signifying nothing. In other words, 
Kirchner’s work could compellingly be described as coming “just as close to the all as to the 
void.” 
Rather than read this as failure, I argue that Kirchner’s aesthetics can be seen as a 
successful mode of abiding in this paradox. This tension only appears as a failure from a 
perspective in which art was supposed to achieve a total revolution, ushering in a new spiritual 
authenticity, but this was never in fact the Brücke’s aim. Kirchner’s description of art as 
hieroglyphics presents an aesthetics that is paradoxical—an aesthetics in which an image 
signifies, but yet does not attain signification. A hieroglyph in this sense is a bridge to 
signification, yet a bridge which cannot be crossed. This produces an interpretive impasse—in 
other words, aporia.  
 The Bücke’s use of primitivism in this context, then, was not part of a critique of 
modernity; rather, it was about undoing the discourse of primitivism, disclosing it as script. 
Popular primitivist conceptions of authenticity and immediacy are present, but simultaneously 
prevented from achieving their signification. The Brücke’s primitivism therefore erects 
impassable bridges. To thwart the discourse of primitivism, however, does more than prevent 
one from either disparaging or romanticizing the primitive. Since primitivism has been 
fundamentally tethered to the critique of modernity, the aporias of Brücke primitivism work to 
undermine the narrative of modernity imagined as disenchanted. The Brücke were not engaged 
in the critique of an alienated modernity; they were engaged in a critique of the narrative in 
which modernity appears as alienated—the disenchantment narrative. Their art offered a 
critique that gestured toward pulling out the rug from under Hausenstein’s feet.  
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 As Charles Haxthausen writes, the theory of Expressionism put forth by Hausenstein and 
the other early writers on the topic was less a theory about what defined or unified an artistic 
movement, than it was a theory of what constituted the role of the avant-garde. Haxthausen 
explains, 
In the original critical meaning of “expressionism” [e.g. for Hausenstein et al.], the goal 
of this avant-garde was to liquidate the conditions which gave birth to it and to all 
avant-gardes, to overcome the estrangement, the alienation between artist and society. 
It was, in short, an avant-garde to end all avant-gardes.85 
 
With this as their standard, the critics ended up nursing disappointment. The work of the 
Brücke did indeed contain a shimmer of revolutionary potential, simply not where Hausenstein 
was looking for it. It was not an avant-garde to end all avant-gardes. However, through their 
aporetic primitivism, the Brücke offered an aesthetics that threatened to dispense with the 




                                                     










In this study I have advanced two principal arguments. The first is that a particular 
interpretation of modernity, namely the disenchantment narrative, has been fundamentally 
shaped by the discourse of primitivism. The second is that some examples of primitivism can be 
said to challenge the discourse from within. In deploying primitivist tropes, while 
simultaneously undermining their signification, these latter types of primitivism can be 
described as aporetic.  
The significance of the first thesis is that it provides a new means of critiquing the 
disenchantment narrative. The disenchantment narrative is shorthand for a story about the 
development of an autonomous, rational subject; it is the belief that such a subject exists, 
combined with the melancholy view that the achievements of rationality and autonomy have 
objectified and thereby disenchanted the world, separating that subject from nature, from 
meaning, from relationships—from anything that would compromise one’s rationality and 
autonomy.  
New materialist and posthumanist thinkers have diagnosed the shortcomings of 
disenchantment narrative and the humanist notion of the autonomous, rational subject, 
although we might say they come at it from slightly different angles.  Posthumanists have 
critiqued the negative consequences of this view for understanding the human—the difficulties 
it poses for theorizing consciousness, agency, and subjectivity. Posthumanist thought (with a bit 
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of a head start) has sought to overcome the resistance to embodiment and materiality by 
developing new theories of the human. As Diana Coole and Samantha Frost write, such 
theorists have taken up materialist approaches to subjectivity, “discovering its efficacy in 
constructing even the most apparently natural phenomena while insisting upon its 
embeddedness in dense networks of power that outrun its control and constitute its 
willfulness.”1 New materialists, on the other hand, have critiqued the problems this view poses 
for thinking about materiality. As Coole and Frost explain, from such a position, “there is an 
apparent paradox in thinking about matter: as soon as we do so, we seem to distance ourselves 
from it, and within the space that opens up, a host of immaterial things seem to emerge: 
language, consciousness, subjectivity, agency, mind, soul; also imagination, emotions, values, 
meaning, and so on.”2 New materialists have therefore sought new approaches to theorizing 
material causality and the agency of matter.  
The division of the world into the human and the nonhuman makes it difficult to think 
about both, and a good deal of theoretical work has gone into developing new ontologies, that 
refuse the traditional oppositions of the disenchantment narrative. The result has been 
compelling set of philosophical and ethical critiques, but such critiques have not yet attempted 
to map out its history. Jane Bennett, for example, has argued that “the quarantines of matter 
and life encourage us to ignore the vitality of matter and the lively powers of material 
formations.”3 In Vibrant Matter, Bennett retheorizes assemblages, non-human actants, stem 
cells, and publics in order to “dissipate the onto-theological binaries of life/matter, 
                                                     
1 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 2. 
2 Ibid., 1. 
3 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), vii. 
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human/animal, will/determination, and organic/inorganic.”4 In The Enchantment of Modern 
Life she draws attention to “the wonder of minor experiences,” cross-species encounters, and 
television advertisements in order to open up new ways of experiencing the enchantment of 
things.5 Bennett offers a vital body of work for rethinking the present dilemmas of 
sustainability, and the necessary theoretical tools for reconsidering the “political ecology of 
things.” 
 Nevertheless, at a certain point, the appeal of a new approach to experiencing life rests 
on more than well-founded arguments. It takes more than theoretical persuasion, but a will to 
see things differently. My own work attempts to fill in this gap by outlining the historical basis 
for the disenchantment narrative. By exposing the roots of the disenchantment narrative in the 
discourse of primitivism, I seek to reframe the issue, to shift the focus from a problem of 
thinking (either as a problem of theory, or as problem of “rationality” itself) to a problem of 
history.  
In arguing that the disenchantment narrative is structured by the discourse of 
primitivism, I have sought to demonstrate that it is in fact a historical product of imperialism.  
There is, accordingly, no inherent problem with something called rationality that classifies, 
masters, and objectifies nature. Technology, for example, produces “objects” upon which it 
acts—but so do hands, and yet hands do not necessarily alienate us from nature. Hands enable 
us to touch, to gesture, communicate, and so on. Moreover, the idea that we live in a “modern” 
society defined by the dominance of “objectifying” modes of thought and action is a discursive 
                                                     
4 Ibid., x. 
5 Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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construct, an imagined modernity—indeed, it is an ethnocentric imaginary that developed out 
of a series of encounters with otherness in the imperial era.  
This study therefore has two aims. It is offered, on the one hand, as a critique of the 
autonomous, rational subject; and on the other, as a critique of the ethnocentric identification 
of this view of the subject with the history of a people—most commonly delineated as the 
history of “the West.” The traditional narrative locates the origin of this disenchanted 
subjectivity in European thought and culture, finds it expanding through imperialism into the 
idea of the West, and then, as present-day globalization and acceleration disperses knowledge 
and power (and “the West” simultaneously comes under scrutiny as an analytic term), the West 
morphs into a nebulous but pervasive modernity. This modernity is, ostensibly, open to all who 
want to participate in it—or alternatively, it is the unavoidable juggernaut that globalization is 
spreading around the world, whether individuals want to participate or not. But the price of 
entering into this modernity is the price of achieving this autonomous, rationalist subjectivity—
namely, the disenchantment that this subjectivity entails.6  
As a critique of the notion of the autonomous, rational subject, this study is intended as 
a contribution, then, to the growing body of new materialist and posthumanist theory.  
In the discourse of primitivism, civilization is identified as the achievement of the autonomous, 
rational subject. In other words, this particular conception of subjectivity is not simply a 
product of humanist philosophy, but of imperialism. As a critique of the ethnocentric 
identification of this form of subjectivity with “the West,” this study is positioned as a 
                                                     
6 The theoretical descriptions of “alternative” or “multiple” modernities are in this sense not a solution, for in spite 
of whatever difference exist between them, their identification as “modernities” must suggest, if anything, merely  




contribution to postcolonial thought. I hope therefore to bring these important critiques 
together, in a way that enables us to see how historical practices of imperialism have produced 
a particular set of ideas about the modern and the primitive, and how this has developed into 
an ethnocentric discourse of modernity.  
New materialist and posthumanist thought has generally approached the critique of the 
autonomous, rational subject as a product of “Western” thought. This is not to suggest that 
new materialists have romanticized other cultures as offering the “solutions”; this is not a case 
of “lingering” primitivism in that sense. Indeed, new materialists have, it seems, rather 
studiously refrained from looking to “other” cultures for alternatives (as earlier critics of 
“Western” rationalism were prone to do); instead they look for theoretical support in the 
“Western” tradition, from Lucretius to Whitehead to Kafka. Nevertheless, there has been a lack 
of attention to the history of this conception. In drawing attention to this history, I hope to 
demonstrate that this notion of autonomous, rational subjectivity is not simply a matter of an 
erring philosophical discourse, but a discourse that has been shaped by the history of 
imperialism. 
 
 This leads to the second principal thesis that I mentioned above: I have argued that not 
all examples of primitivism work the same—some instances of primitivism operate aporetically. 
My aim here has been to show the way in which some uses of primitivism dismantle the 
effectiveness of the primitivist discourse. They do this through a critique of the binary 
distinctions between progressive history and timelessness, rationality and fetishism, culture 
and nature, human and nonhuman. In doing so, they undermine the notion of modernity 
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imagined as a historical time characterized by autonomy and alienation, in opposition to the 
primitive.  
 These instances of aporetic primitivism that I examine, however, do more than conflate 
the primitive and civilized. They are not simply assertions that, for example, “we” (we 
Westerners, we moderns, etc.) are all “primitive” underneath a civilized exterior (as in, for 
example, Torgovnick’s argument in Primitive Passions7); nor are they claims that what we 
thought was “civilization” is actually only “savagery” and “fetishism” in a state of self-denial. 
Critiques such as these only seem to undermine the distinction between primitive and civilized, 
while in fact they reproduce the discourse at a different level of critique. Rather, examples of 
aporetic primitivism call into question the utility of the discourse to describe experience—they 
use primitivism to question the characterization of a disenchanted modernity. More 
specifically, they do this not through theory alone, but through a mode aesthetics. I use the 
term aesthetics here not only to designate artistic primitivism, as in the case of the Brücke, but 
to aporetic primitivism in ethnology as well. Bastian’s ethnology, in other words, has an 
aesthetic element to it that must be taken into account. These modes of primitivism treat the 
discourse of primitivism itself as an aesthetic object—they put a frame around it, we might say, 
and make it a subject for aesthetic contemplation. They treat the discourse of primitivism, in 
other words, as Odysseus eventually treats his oar—they plant it in the ground.   
Moments of aporetic primitivism therefore demonstrate the chinks in the armor of the 
notion of the autonomous, rational subject, and its exposition in the disenchantment narrative. 
Suzanne Marchand, in her recent erudite study of German Orientalism, has argued: 
                                                     




We need . . . a synthetic and critical history, one that reassesses Oriental scholarship’s 
contributions to imperialism, racism, and modern anti-Semitism, but one that also 
shows how modern Orientalism has furnished at least some of the tools necessary for 
constructing the post-imperialist worldviews we cultivate today.8 
 
I have sought a similar approach to the history of German primitivism, in order to show how 
primitivism has propped up an ethnocentric understanding of modernity and the West, but also 
how some instances of primitivism have worked to undermine this understanding. This study is 
therefore aimed at dislodging this narrative, and argues that examples of aporetic primitivism  
provide resources for postcolonial and new materialist critiques. 
 
If the above takes a presentist approach to history, delving into the past for resources 
with which to engage present philosophical and political dilemmas, the results of this study 
nevertheless entail some important consequences for the work of German history. On the one 
hand, my theoretical model of a historical network imposes some (I believe helpful) constraints 
on the kinds of historical claims I can make. It prevents me from attempting to picture German 
culture as a monad, or German history as singular continuous path of development. If one 
wants to talk about “a” German culture, it must be understood as polyphonic; alternatively, it 
might be better to speak about German cultures and German histories, some of which overlap, 
others pass by each other blindly in the night. 9 The culture and history that appear to the 
historian will depend to some degree upon the questions one brings to the material.  Nor is it 
feasible, based upon the few examples I have chosen for this study, to begin making 
                                                     
8 Suzanne L. Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), xx. 
9 Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003). 
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comprehensive conclusions about a German primitivism, or a German relationship to 
otherness. There are no  doubt other types of primitivism at work in other corners, and even 
the work of those I have studied may appear to serve different ends when approached from a 
different perspective.  By demonstrating the existence, however, of aporetic primitivism in the 
ethnology of Adolf Bastian and the artwork of the Brücke, I have provided important new 
readings of pivotal figures in the history of German anthropology and German modernist art.  
The Brücke, the first German expressionists, are considered by many the most 
important German artistic movement of twentieth century. They enjoy critical as well as 
popular acclaim, in Germany and abroad. Their work became especially popular among West 
German politicians during the years of the Federal Republic—Helmut Schmidt praised Emil 
Nolde as the “absolute crown,” and after him, Kirchner.10 Such admiration should be seen in 
historical context as part of an act of self-definition in response to the condemnation of the 
Brücke and other expressionists by the National Socialists. In 1975 Schmidt decorated the 
chancellor’s office in Bonn with Brücke artwork, and Helmut Kohl followed suit, until the 
relocation of the capital to Berlin. Today, Kirchner’s large-scale Sonntag der Bergbauern (The 
Mountain Farmers’ Sunday; the painting is about thirteen feet long and over five feet tall) 
dominates the cabinet room of the Berlin chancellery. The Brücke clearly remain a resource for 
self-representation and a focal point of national and cultural identity. The significance of their 
work therefore has important political and cultural meanings. I have argued that the traditional 
understanding of Brücke primitivism as a naïve or utopian view of “primitive” life in opposition 
to an alienated modernity incorrectly simplifies and distorts their engagement with the 
                                                     
10 Christian Saehrendt, “‘Hottentots in tails’: The turbulent history of "Die Brücke" in Germany,” signandsight.com 
(June 17, 2005), http://www.signandsight.com/features/216.html. 
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discourse of primitivism; and that accordingly, it is insufficient to read their work as simply 
expressing the critique of modernity that was popular among many of their contemporaries. 
I have also pressed the case for increased critical attention to Adolf Bastian. Unlike the 
Brücke, Bastian is today a largely neglected figure, yet one whose prominence for nineteenth-
century Germany anthropology is indisputable. His legacy has been largely occluded by the 
attention paid to the disciplinary turn to nation and race around the turn of the century, 
motivated by interest in understanding the history of the relationship of German anthropology 
to the developments of National Socialism.  Bastian was the leading figure in his field for 
decades, and although his writings were less frequently read (and even less frequently 
understood) as the years went by, he nevertheless had an impact, attested to by his influence 
upon figures as varied as Carl Jung and Walter Benjamin.  Aside from his readership, Bastian’s 
direction of the ethnological museum in Berlin made his ethnological theory into a palpable 
experience for the interested public. If Virchow’s Schulstatistik of the 1870s influenced a 
generation of German students to see physical features as markers of Germanness, it stands to 
reason that the generations of museum goers who experienced Bastian’s vision of a universal 
psychology in his Berlin museum (and other ethnological museums that followed his lead) were 
exposed to a disorienting approach to otherness, in which the distinctions between primitive 
and modern, German and other, were increasingly undermined. 
 Taken together, the existence of these instances of aporetic primitivism at such a level 
of prominence in the domains of anthropology and art may help us say a few things about what 
German history is not, and thus act as a corrective to some common generalizations about 
Germans’ relationships to cultural otherness, on the one hand, and to modernity on the other. 
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Most significantly, of course, German historians have long grappled with the record of vocal, 
popular critiques of reason, progress, and politics—stretching from romantic and nationalist-
inspired critiques of the French occupation of Prussia to Thomas Mann’s Reflections of a 
Nonpolitical Man.11 Different historians have framed this material in different ways, but, as is 
well known, they most often have done so in terms that center upon ideas about German 
antipathy to modernity and modernization. Fritz Stern and George Mosse embossed such a 
view of German history as characterized by a deep tradition of “volkisch” thinking and a 
“politics of cultural despair,” the fallout of which contributed to the demise of the Weimar 
Republic and the ascendance of National Socialism.12 Henry Turner summarized this view of a 
“crisis of modernization” in his description of National Socialism as “utopian antimodernism . . . 
an extreme revolt  against the modern industrial world and an attempt to recapture a distant 
mythic past.”13 
 Jeffrey Herf in the 1980s revised this approach and presented the case for what he 
called a “reactionary modernism,” in an attempt to explain the “paradox” of the reconciliation 
between a reactionary German nationalism and an embrace of technology and modernization. 
Herf argues that reactionary modernists presented a new ideology of technology in which it 
was understood as a spiritual manifestation of German Kultur; they rejected the volkisch 
longing for a pre-industrial past, but preserved a romantic-nationalist idea of a German soul 
                                                     
11 Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1918). 
12 Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1961); George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New 
York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964). See also Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political 
Tradition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic 
Community, 1890-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969). 




opposed to materialism and civilization. Herf’s argument, although it makes room for 
technology, preserves the idea of a profound German aversion to Enlightenment ideals of 
reason and politics: “What proved so disastrous for German history was the separation of the 
Enlightenment from German nationalism. German society remained partially—never ‘fully’—
enlightened.”14 
More recently, the respected German sociologist Wolf Lepenies has revisited the issue 
of a cultural version of the German Sonderweg—claiming, oddly, to offer a critique but in fact 
substantiating its most questionable features.15 Lepenies, in The Seduction of Culture in German 
History, objects to the lessons in “diminished particularity” that have shaped the historiography 
in recent decades, as evident in:  
the reconstruction of German national doctrines whose ideological transitions, rather 
than ideological persistence, are seen as characteristic; and in the assurance that 
cultural pessimism was not a German speciality, but rather a feature of bourgeois 
societies in general. These attempts, persuasive in different ways, yet convergent in 
counteracting “the chronic overstatement of the unfolding and ultimate triumph of 
modernity,” . . . have sought to reduce German particularity to a European normality.16 
 
Lepenies’ argument is not focused on the German relationship to technology, but rather 
attempts to expose a long-lasting tension in German history between culture (as a value) and 
politics. In a reworking of Stern’s argument, Lepenies suggests that German history reveals a 
consistent “overrating of culture at the expense of politics”: “Culture was the arena of the 
absolute, a realm without compromise. Its exaltation nourished the illusion that culture could 
                                                     
14 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 10. 
15 Wolf Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
16 Ibid., 10. 
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be a substitute for power and therefore a substitute for politics.”17 The rejection of politics as 
rational, superficial and alien to the “German spirit” emerged in the opposition to Napoleonic 
ideals, and paved the way for the collapse of Weimar and the rise of Nazism: 
After the Napoleonic Wars, freedom from foreign occupation did not bring political 
freedom to the German people. During the Restoration period that followed, a coalition 
between culture and a specific kind of politics was sealed in Germany. Politics meant the 
submission of civil society to the state, the surrender of the individual to the 
community, and the propagation of national values and racial pride rather than the 
pursuit of universal ideas. It kindled a romantic revolt against modernity and rejected 
“civilization” for the sake of “culture.”18 
 
From Stern to Lepenies, these views all share a core belief in something like a “German 
mind,” a determining feature of German culture and history19; they also share a common 
assertion that this cultural essence is marked by antipathy to modernity. From this starting 
point, Germans’ tendencies to deviate from the framework appear as “paradoxes”—when 
Germans embraced technology, or industrialization, or even (somehow!) politics, they must 
have done so while retaining their belief in an autochthonous, national purity and cultural 
authenticity in opposition to a superficial, rationalist civilization. As Herf, for example, expresses 
it: 
The “Prussian path” was a form of capitalist industrialization that fostered a peculiarly 
intense cultural and ideological protest, the politicization of which constituted a decisive 
chapter in the history of German nationalism. The language of romanticism, soul, Volk, 
Gemeinschaft, Kultur, life, blood, inwardness (Innerlichkeit), stood for specifically 
German virtues confronted with the danger of Zivilisation—capitalism, liberalism, 
science, soulless rationality, international communism, and, of course, the Jews.20 
 
                                                     
17 Ibid., 16. 
18 Ibid., 25. 
19 Lepenies quotes approvingly from G.P. Gooch et al, The German Mind and Outlook (London: Chapman & Hall, 
1945). 
20 Jeffrey Herf, “Reactionary Modernism: Some Ideological Origins of the Primacy of Politics in the Third Reich,” 
Theory and Society 10, no. 6 (Nov. 1981): 807. 
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This interpretation sorely distorts our understanding of the complexities of Germans responses 
to social, economic, and political change. The effect of this critique on German historiography 
of the Kaiserreich, the period with which this study is primarily concerned, has been the 
lingering impression that, as Geoff Eley has written,  
Kaiserreich German society was always already the incubator for a set of cultural traits 
that, under conditions of crisis, would dispose its bourgeois citizenry towards 
irrationalist, mystical, anti-democratic, authoritarian, and other kinds of “illiberal” 
behavior less likely to be embraced in Britain, France, and other countries further to 
“the West.”21 
 
My own study is not concerned with the German right, nor with the history of German 
nationalism; it is however concerned with German culture and ideas about modernity. My 
argument for the existence of aporetic primitivism in this context suggests two important 
consequences for German historiography. On the one hand, I have examined two prominent 
moments in German culture, leading figures in the fields of anthropology and art, figures that 
have traditionally been seen as lending support to the notion of a more widespread German 
antipathy to modernity, either in the form of an anthropological idealization of “civilization,” or 
an artistic romanticization of the authentic (anti-modern) primitive. I have argued however that 
it is a misreading of Bastian and the Brücke to see them as participating in the critique of 
modernity; their primitivism was in fact more complex, involved in a subtle critique of its own 
claims to signification. The existence of aporetic primitivism in such pivotal cases provides some 
measure of a bulwark against attempts to renew the myth of the anti-modern German mind. 
 It will be noted, however, that I have suggested that aporetic primitivism does offer a 
critique of progress, rationality, and modernity. This may sound like a contradiction; yet the 
                                                     
21 Geoff Eley, “Clearing the Ground: German Continuities,” unpublished paper. 
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difference between my claim and the idea of an anti-modern revolt is that aporetic primitivism 
suggests a way in which Germans distanced themselves from the ideas of progress, rationality, 
and modernity, not by criticizing the effects of these “things” upon society, but by questioning 
their validity as descriptions of contemporary society. Aporetic primitivism offers therefore an 
alternative means of thinking about how some Germans critiqued the idea of an autonomous, 
rational subject, but in a way that did not entail a romanticization of the collective, the 
submission of the individual to authority, or a commitment to the “German idea of Freedom.” It 
offers, in other words, a notion of German resistance to modernity that does not entail an 
aberrant embrace of fascism.  
Finally, if we accept the aporias offered by Bastian and the Brücke, and the undermining 
of the analytic category of “modernity,” defined as a moment in time and a people marked by 
instrumental reason and alienation, it problematizes the utility of this category as an 
explanatory tool for the history of German violence and ruthless politics. The notion of a 
cultural Sonderweg, after all, has leaned heavily upon a rather vague picture of modernization, 
which, in the absence of helpful liberal release-valves and power-checks (or a more close-knit 
Gemeinschaft, depending upon one’s politics), presented powerful psychological and 
sociological disruptions that proved deeply damaging to German society. As Thomas Röhkrämer 
summaries this view, “The psychological strain of a fast and crisis-ridden industrialization 
process is supposed to have provoked an antimodern sentiment in large parts of the 
population.”22 Thus the ailments of “modernity” produced the horrors of Nationalism Socialism:  
                                                     
22 Thomas Rohkrämer, “Antimodernism, Reactionary Modernism and National Socialism: Technocratic Tendencies 
in Germany, 1890–1945,” Contemporary European History 8, no. 1 (March 1999): 29. 
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The critique of modern technology, capitalism and a pluralistic society on the one hand 
and the irrational dream of a harmonious, truly German “community of the people” on 
the other allegedly reached its logical culmination in the Nazi ideology of “blood and 
soil,” the cult of the charismatic leader and the totalitarian integration of all “worthy” 
members of society, connected with the annihilation of all “unworthy” members.23 
 
This view relies, however, on a simplistic understanding of modernization, reducing a 
complex amalgam of social, political, and economic changes into a monolithic modernity, the 
cause of an alienation and fragmentation and the ensuing ideologies of “blood and soil” as a 
form of recompense. The political nightmares and human atrocities of the twentieth century 
should not be understood as a product of modernity, nor a result of a deep-set aversion to 
modernity. The aporias of primitivism suggest that we must rethink this narrative of historical 
crisis,  and devote greater attention to the particular alignments of individual wills, the specifics 
of social cohesion, institutional forms of power, contests over resources, relationships to others 
(human and nonhuman), and ideas of the self. Racial, cultural, national, and modern identities 
have played prominent roles in such developments, and this study argues that in order to 
understand their roles, we must grasp the ways in which, during at least the last two centuries, 























Figure I. E.L. Kirchner, Mit Schilf werfende Badende (Bathers Throwing Reeds), 1909. 
Published in the 1910 Brücke Portfolio. Woodcut, black, green and red-orange ink  on paper, 20.2 x 29.3 
cm;  Sheet: 40.3 x 54 cm. Reproduced in Magdalena M. Moeller, Brücke Highlights: 297 Werke aus dem 






Figure II. Erich Heckel, Stehendes Kind (Standing Child), 1911. 
Woodcut printed in black, green and red on paper. Image: 37.5 x 27.8 cm (irregular), sheet: 42.70 x 
32.23 cm. Reproduced in Magdalena M. Moeller, Brücke Highlights: 297 Werke aus dem Brücke-Museum 


















Figure III. E.L. Kirchner, Nude Seated with Crossed Legs, 1912. 
Painted wood, approx. 47 x 22.9 x 19 cm. Werner and Gabrielle 
Merzbacher Collection, Zürich-Küsnacht. Reproduced in Jill Lloyd and 
Magalena M. Moeller, eds., Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and 








Figure IV. E.L. Kirchner, Cover of the catalogue for the exhibition at 
the Galerie Fritz Gurlitt, Berlin, 1912.  
Woodcut on paper. Brücke-Museum Berlin. Reproduced in Reinhold 
Heller, ed., Brücke: The Birth of Expressionism in Dresden and Berlin, 







Figure V. Female commemorative figure. Master 
of the Bangwa region, 19th century.  
Wood, height 82 cm. Musée Dapper, Paris. 
Reproduced in Lorenz Homberger, ed., Cameroon: 
Art and Kings, with contributions by Christaud M. 










Figure 1.1. Mask. Fang. Gabon.  
Painted wood and fiber, height 63.4 cm. Collection 
Gustave and Franyo Schindler, New York. 
Reproduced in William Rubin, ed., “Primitivism” in 
20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the 
Modern, Vol. 1 (New York: Museum of Modern 









Figure 1.2. Mask. Dan. Ivory Coast or Liberia. 
Height, 22.9 cm. Private Collection. Reproduced in 









It should be noted that the above images of ethnographic objects, intended as a reference for the 
reader, should not be understood as an “objective” presentation of the objects in question. The isolation 
of individual items, in a manner designed to highlight their aesthetic quality as well as evoke their 
mysterious and indeterminable nature (suspended in space, severed from the context of their 
production and use), is a product of modernism. The above are therefore ethnographic objects as they 
would be encountered in a museum or catalog prepared under the influence of this modernist aesthetic 
(the above examples come from the catalog to the 1984 MoMA “Primitivism” exhibition). This is not 
how the artists (or the general public) of the early twentieth century would have encountered such 
objects. This list of images must therefore be contextualized and historicized. The following images 
present a few examples of how such objects were most frequently displayed. 
 
 




Figure 1.3. Museum for Ethnology, Hamburg. Congo Gallery, 1912. 
Reproduced in Ursel Berger and Christiane Wanken, eds., Wilde Welten: Aneignung des Fremden in der 










Figure 1.4. Picasso in his studio, 1908. 
Reproduced in Ursel Berger and Christiane Wanken, eds., Wilde Welten: Aneignung des Fremden in der 




Objects in a late nineteenth-century anthropological text (at a time when 
anthropology had not yet acquired a firm place in the university, such texts 






Figure 1.5. “Insignia, ornamental weapons, and drums from the Southern Congo territory.” 
Reproduced in Friedrich Ratzel, The History of Mankind, Vol. 1, trans. A.J. Butler (London: 






Figure 1.6. Pablo Picasso, Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, 1907. 








Figure 1.7. The Kanaka Village (New Caledonia), Exposition Universelle, Paris, 1989. 
Engraving after a drawing  by Louis Tinayre, published in Le Monde illustré, June 27, 1889.  








Figure 1.8. Paul Gauguin, Te aa no areois (The Seed of the Areoi), 1892. 






Figure 2.1. Advertisement for 1984 MoMA exhibition. 
Reproduced in Sally Price, Primitive Art in Civilized Places 










Figure 2.3. Brian Jungen, Prototype for New Understanding #9, 1999. 
Nike Air Jordans, human hair, 60.5 x 25.4 x 12.7 cm.  
Collection of Greg and Lisa Kerfoot, West Vancouver/Whistler. Photo: Trevor Mills, Vancouver Gallery.  
Reproduced in Bill Brown, “Objects, Others, and Us (The Refabrication of Things),” Critical Inquiry 36, 




Figure 3.1. The Ring Structure of Odysseus’s Tale 
 
Adapted from Glenn W. Most, “The Structure and Function of Odysseus' Apologoi,” Transactions of the 
American Philological Association 119 (1989): 15-30. I have also relied upon D. F. Felluga’s version of 
Most’s diagram (http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~felluga/ring.html).  
 
The following diagram presents the chronological structure of Odysseus’s nostos, as he presents it to the 
Phaeacians in Books 9-12 of the Odyssey. After departing from Troy with his men, Odysseus lands on the 
island of Cicones, then the Lotus-eaters, and so on. (The narrative action in the epic begins with 
Odysseus on Calypso’s island. It is only after he makes his way to the island of Phaeacians,  and is asked 
to recount his tales, that the reader is presented with the chronological narrative. ) The diagram 
demonstrates that the adventures “are grouped in a fully symmetrical ring-composition around the 
Nekyia [the visit to the underworld] as center.” (21) The Cicones and Phaeacians belong to the “human” 
world, whereas the encounters that take place in between, the mythological or “fabulous” episodes, are 
separated from this world by a “cordon sanitaire” of twin two-day storms. As I have argued, this ring 
structure supports a reading in which Odysseus’s failed encounters with cultural alterity is evident 
through his interpretation of these encounters in the language of myth. It further highlights the crucial 
significance of the Nekyia, where Odysseus receives the prophecy of Tiresias. 
  
Troy (Book IX) 
 Cicones (Book IX) 
 2-day storm, followed by drifting (Book IX) 
Lotus-Eaters (Book IX) 
Cyclops (Book IX) 
Aeolus and a storm (Book X) 
Laestrygonians (Book X) 
Circe (Book X) 
 
Elpenor's death (departure from Circe) (Book X) 
Nekyia (visit to the underworld) (Book XI) 
Elpenor's burial (return to Circe) (Book XI) 
 
Sirens (Book XII) 
Scylla and Charybdis (Book XII) 
Thrinacia and another storm (Book XII) 
Charybdis and Scylla (Book XII) 
Calypso (Book XII) 











Figure 5.1. E.L. Kirchner, Vier Badende (Four Bathers), 1910. 






Figure 5.2. E.L. Kirchner, Fünf Frauen auf der Straße (Five Women on the Street), 1913. 
Oil on canvas, 120 x 90 cm. Wallraf-Richartz Museum, Cologne.  
Image from the Museum of Modern Art website, www.moma.org. 
 
 






Figure 5.3. E.L. Kirchner, Zwei Frauen auf der 
Straße (Two Women on the Street), 1914. 
Oil on canvas, 120 x 92 cm. Image from the 













Figure 5.4. E.L. Kirchner, Friedrichstraßse, Berlin 
(Friedrich Street, Berlin), 1914. 
Oil on canvas, 125 x 91 cm. Image from the 





Figure 5.5. E.L. Kirchner, Potsdamer Platz, Berlin (Potsdamer Squar, Berlin), 1914. 
Oil on canvas, 200 x 150 cm. Private Collection. 












Figure 5.6. Plate from the fashion magazine 
Damenmode.  







Figure 5.7. E.L. Kirchner, Founding document of the Artists’ Group Brücke, June 7, 1905. 
Pen and Ink on Bütten paper. 18.4 x 22.5 cm. Brücke-Museum Berlin, Gift of Siddi Heckel. 






Figure 5.8. E.L. Kirchner, Chronik der KG Brücke (Chronicle of the Artists’ Group Brücke), 1913. 
Reproduced in Brücke: The Birth of Expressionism in Dresden and Berlin, 1905-1913, ed. Reinhold Heller  








Figure 5.9. E.L. Kirchner, Kopf einer Negerin (Head 
of a black woman), 1910. 
Letter to Erich Heckel, May 15, Dresden. Pencil, 
pen and ink, crayon. 14 x 8.9 cm. Reproduced in 
Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: Postkarten und Briefe an 
Erich Heckel im Altonaer Museum in Hamburg, ed. 
Annemarie Dube-Heynig (Cologne: DuMont, 1984), 







Figure 5.10. E.L. Kirchner, Drawings of Performers in “the African Village,” May 1910. 












Figure 5.11. E.L. Kirchner, Programm der 
Künstlergruppe Brücke (Program of the Artists’ 
Group Brücke), 1906.  
Reproduced in Magdalena M. Moeller, et al., 
Dokumente der Künstlergruppe Brücke  








Figure 5.12. Curtains, Kirchner’s studio, Berlinerstr. 80, Dresden, 1910-11. 
Photograph by E.L. Kirchner. Reproduced in E.L. Kirchner: Dokumente: Fotos, Schriften, Briefe, ed. 







Figure 5.13. Kirchner’s studio, Berlinerstr. 80, Dresden, 1910-11. 
Photograph by E.L. Kirchner. Reproduced in E.L. Kirchner: Dokumente: Fotos, Schriften, Briefe, ed. 




Figure 5.14. Fränzi and an unidentified youth, Kirchner’s studio, Berlinerstr. 80, Dresden, 1910-11. 
 Photoraph by E.L. Kirchner. Reproduced in E.L. Kirchner: Dokumente: Fotos, Schriften, Briefe, ed. 





Figure 5.15. E.L. Kirchner, Querhornbläser (a.k.a., Benin bronze relief), Mar. 31, 1910. 
Letter to Heckel and Pechstein. Reproduced in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: 
Postkarten und Briefe an Erich Heckel im Altonaer Museum in Hamburg, 
ed. Annemarie Dube-Heynig (Cologne: DuMont, 1984), no. 30, p78. 
 
 





Figure 5.16. E.L. Kirchner, Mutter-Kind-Plastik (Mother 
and child sculpture), Mar. 31, 1910.  
Letter to Heckel and Pechstein. Reproduced in Ernst 












Figure 5.17. Carved wooden beams from a men’s clubhouse (bai) in the Palau Islands (Njabuket, 
Aubikit, Palau), dated pre-1860.  
Carved and painted wood. Museum für Völkerkunde, Dresden. Reproduced in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: 
The Dresden and Berlin Years, eds. Jill Lloyd and Magalena M. Moeller (London: Royal Academy of the 
Arts, 2003), 16. 
 
Figure 5.18. E.L. Kirchner, Drawing after a Palau beam, June 20, 1910.  
Postcard to Erich Heckel. Pencil, ink, and crayon on paper, 9 x 14 cm. Altonaer Museum für Kunst und 










Figure 5.19. Erich Heckel,  Nude (Dresden), 1910. 
Oil on canvas, 80 x 70 cm. Reproduced in Lloyd, German Expressionism, 41. 
 
 
            
 
 
Figure 5.20. E.L. Kirchner, Obstschale I, 1910. 
Wood, 17 x 24 x 38 cm. Reproduced in Heller,  














Figure 5.21. E.L. Kirchner, “Holzplastik. Sitzender 
Akt mit Schale,” June 14, 1911. 
Postcard to Erich Heckel. Pen, 14 x 9 cm. 
Reproduced in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, ed. Dube-







Figure 5.22. Kirchner’s Berlin atelier, Körnerstraße 45, dated 1914/15. 










Figure 5.23. Erich Heckel, Kirchner, Dec. 16, 1910.  






















Figure 5.24. E.L. Kirchner, Fränzi vor 
geschnitztem Stuhl (Fränzi in front of Carved 
Chair), 1910.  
Oil on canvas, 71 x 49.5 cm. Museu Thyssen-
Bornemisza, Madrid. Reproduced in Lloyd and 








Figure 5.25. E.L. Kirchner, Nude Girl in a Bath, 1909. 
Woodcut, 28.5 x 34.25 cm. Reproduced in Lloyd, 

















Figure 5.26. Stool, Bafum, Cameroon Grasslands. 
Wood, height 27.4cm. Reproduced in Lloyd, 














Figure 5.27. Erich Heckel, Weiblicher Akt im 
Atelier (Female Nude in the Studio), Feb. 16, 
1910. 
Postcard to Frl. Dr. Rosa Schapire. 14 x 9 cm. 
Reproduced in Magdalena M. Moeller, ed., 
“Besten Gruß. . .” : Künstlerpostkarten der 
“Brücke”  (Munich: Brücke-Museum and Hirmer 








Figure 5.28. E.L. Kirchner, Mit Schilf Werfende Badende (Bathers Throwing Reeds), Sept. 6, 1909. 
Postcard to Erich Heckel. Pen and ink with crayon on paper, 9 x 14 cm. Altonaer Museum, Hamburg. 




Figure 5.29. E.L. Kirchner, Mit Schilf werfende Badende (Bathers Throwing Reeds), 1909. 
Published in the 1910 Brücke Portfolio. Woodcut, black, green and red-orange ink  on paper, 20.2 x 29.3 
cm;  Sheet: 40.3 x 54 cm. Reproduced in Magdalena M. Moeller, Brücke Highlights: 297 Werke aus dem 







Figure 5.30. Max Pechstein, Das gelbschwarz Trikot, 1909. 
Oil on canvas, 68 x 78 cm. Reproduced in Magdalena M. Moeller, Brücke Highlights: 297 Werke aus dem 







Figure 5.31. Erich Heckel, Mädchen mit Puppe - Fränzi (Girl with Doll - Fränzi), 1910. 
Oil on canvas, 65 x 70 cm. Reproduced in Brücke: The Birth of Expressionism in Dresden 
and Berlin, 1905-1913, ed. Reinhold Heller, 157. 
 




Figure 5.32. Erich Heckel, Atelierszene 
(Studio scene), 1910-11.  
Oil on canvas, 70 x 48 cm. Reproduced in 
Brücke: The Birth of Expressionism in 












Figure 5.33. Erich Heckel, Fränzi liegend (Fränzi Reclining), 1910. 







Figure 5.34. Erich Heckel, Sketch for a mural 
in Berlinerstr. 65, Dresden-Friedrichstadt, 
Feb. 5, 1909. 
Pen and Ink. Altonaer Museum, Hamburg. 










Figure 5.35. Ajanta, Detail of Cave II, wall painting. 




Figure 3.36. E.L. Kirchner, Five Women, 1911. 




Figure 5.37. E.L. Kirchner, Fünf Badende am See (Five Bathers at the Lake), 1911. 





Figure 5.38. E.L. Kirchner, Programm der Künstlergruppe Brücke  
(Program of the Artists’ Group Brücke), 1906. 
Woodcut Prints, 12.6 x 5 cm; 15.1 x 7.5 cm; Magdalena M. Moeller, et al., 
Dokumente der Künstlergruppe Brücke (Munich: Hirmer, 2007). 
 
 















Figure 5.39. E.L. Kirchner, Brücke Insignia, 1905. 





Figure 5.40. Fidus (Hugo Höppener), Lichtgebet 
(Prayer to the light), date unknown. 
Oil on canvas, 150 x 100 cm. Berlin, Deutsches 
Historisches Museum. 
 
           





                        
 
Figure 5.41. Koloman (Kolo) Moser, Ver Sacrum 1, 









Figure 5.43. Fritz Bleyl, Poster for the Brücke exhibition at the Karl-Max Seifert lamp factory and 
lighting showroom, Dresden-Löbtau, 1906. 







Figure 5.44. Hermann Obrist, Bewegung (Movement), before 1914. 














Figure 5.46. Hermann Obrist, Grabmal Oertel (Oertel Monument),  
Cemetery Schmiedebach Lehesten, 1903/04. 







Figure 5.47. Hermann Obrist, Krupp-Brunnen im Hof des Münchner Kunstgewerbehhauses  
(Krupp Fountain in the courtyard of the House of Arts and Crafts in Munich), 1912. 





Figure 5.48. Hermann Obrist, Design Model for a Hill-Top Church, circa 1900. 































Figure 5.52. Nautilus half-shell  
(Cutaway exposing  

















Figure 5.54. E.L. Kirchner, Viertelstundenakt (Quarter-hour nude), 1905-6. 
Charcoal. Reproduced in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: Nachzeichnung seines Leben; Katalog der Sammlung von 
Werken von Ernst Ludwig Kirchner im Kirchner-Haus Davos , ed. Eberhard W. Kornfeld (Bern: Kornfeld & 





Figure 5.55. MUIM-Institute advertisement, 1911. 
Reproduced in Eberhard W. Kornfeld, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: Nachzeichnung seines 
Leben; Katalog der Sammlung von Werken von Ernst Ludwig Kirchner im Kirchner-Haus 







Figure 5.56. E.L. Kirchner, Ins Meer Schreitende (Striding into the Sea), 1912. 




Figure 5.57. E.L.Kirchner, Sitzende Frau mit Holzpastik (Seated Woman with Wood Sculpture), 1912. 






Figure 5.58. E.L. Kirchner, Burg auf Fehmarn (Burg on Fehmarn), 1912. 








           
 













Figure 5.60. E.L. Kirchner, Leuchtturm Staberhuck, 
Fehmarn (Staberhuck Beacon Fehmarn), 1912.  
Oil on canvas, 117.5 x 88.3 cm. 
 
 








Figure 5.61. E.L. Kirchner, Grüner Leuchtturm auf Fehmarn (Green Lighthouse on Fehmarn), 1912. 




Figure 5.62. E.L. Kirchner, Gut Staberhof, Fehmarn, I (Staberhof Countryseat, Fehmarn, I), 1913. 





Figure 5.63. E.L. Kirchner, Gut Staberhof III (Staberhof Countryseat III), 1913. 
Oil on canvas, 82 x 91 cm. Reproduced in Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years, eds. Jill 






Figure 5.64. E.L. Kirchner, Nollendorf Platz (Nollendorf Square), 1912. 




Figure 5.65. E.L. Kirchner, Zirkusreiterin (Girl Circus Rider), 1912. 
Oil on canvas, 99.6 x 119.5 cm. 
 









Figure 5.66. E.L. Kirchner, Weiblicher Akt mit 
Badezuber (Female Nude with Bathtub), 1912. 







Figure 5.67. E.L. Kirchner, Fünf Badende am See (Five Bathers at the Lake), 1911. 
Oil on canvas, 151 x 197 cm. 
 








Figure 5.68. E.L. Kirchner, Porträt Dr. Alfred 
Döblin (Portrait of Dr. Alfred Döblin), 1912. 








Figure 5.69. Karl Schmidt-Rottluff, 
Summer, 1913.  
Oil on canvas, 88 x 104 cm. 











Figure 5.70. Karl Schmidt-Rottluff, Drei 
Akte – Dünenbild aus Nidden (Three 
Nudes – Dunes at Nidden), 1913.  
Oil on canvas, 98 x 106 cm. 
Nationalgalerie, Berlin. Reproduced in 
Moeller and Arnoldo, Brücke: Die Geburt 








Figure 5.71. Karl Schmidt-Rottluff, Still Life, 1913. 













Figure 5.72. Karl Schmidt-Rottluff, Still Life 
with African Figures, 1913.  

























Figure 5.74. E.L. Kirchner, Stilleben 
mit Plastiken und Blumen (Still Life 
with Sculptures and Flowers), 1912. 
Oil on canvas, 90 x 80.5 cm. 
 
 








Figure 5.76. Hannah Höch, Schnitt mit dem Küchenmesser Dada durch die letzte 
Weimarer Bierbauchkulturepoche Deutschlands  (Cut with the Dada Kitchen Knife 
through the Last Weimar Beer-Belly Cultural Epoch in Germany), 1919-20.  
Photomontage and collage with watercolor, 114 x 90 cm. Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, 
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Berliner Tageblatt 
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